翻译：Rapheal   校对：Catherine

THE GENERAL STOCK MARKET IN 1958

A friend who runs a medium-sized investment trust recently wrote: “The mercurial temperament, characteristic of the American people, produced a major transformation in 1958 and ‘exuberant’ would be the proper word for the stock market, at least.

一个经营着一家中等规模的信托公司的朋友这样写道：“美国人易变的性情，造就了股票市场1958年的大转变，我们至少可以用生机勃勃这个词来描述股票市场。”

I think this summarizes the change in psychology dominating the stock market in 1958 at both the amateur and professional levels. During the past year, almost any reason has been seized upon to justify “investing” in the market.

我认为表明这样的大转变可以归结为：无论从业余层次还是专业层次的投资者的主导的心理发生了变化。再过去一年里，几乎所有原因都被拿到股票市场来为投资的依据。

There are undoubtedly more mercurially-tempered people in the stock market now than for a good many years and the duration of their stay will be limited to how long they think profits can be made quickly and effortlessly.

无疑较之以前的很多年，现在有更多的性情易变的人在股票市场里，而这些人在股票市场里滞留的时间取决于他们认为在股票市场轻松快速赚取收益的持续时间。

While it is impossible to determine how long they will continue to add numbers to their ranks and thereby stimulate rising prices. I believe it is valid to say that the longer their visit, the greater the reaction from it.

然而到底多长时间才能停止这种不断增加筹码并且刺激股价上升的行为是不可能被决定的。我相信并且有依据的说，他们持续的时间越长，那么副作用就会越严重。

I make no attempt to forecast the general market - my efforts are devoted to finding undervalued securities. However, I do believe that widespread public belief in the inevitability of profits from investment in stocks will lead to eventual trouble. Should this occur, prices, but not intrinsic values in my opinion, of even undervalued securities can be expected to be substantially affected.

我从不尝试去预测大盘-我热衷于发现价值被低估的股票。然而，我相信被广大公众所相信的信条：从股票市场里赚取的利润最终会不可避免的导致困境。我认为，这种情况发生基股票的价格，甚至是那些被低估的股票的价格会受到很大的影响，但受到影响的不是内在的价值。

RESULTS IN 1958

In my letter of last year, I wrote:

“Our performance, relatively, is likely to be better in a bear market than in a bull market so that deductions made from the above results should be tempered by the fact that it was the type of year when we should have done relatively well. In a year when the general market had a substantial advance, I would be well satisfied to match the advance of the averages”.

在我的去年的信中我这样写道：

“相比较而言，我们的表现在熊市中比在牛市中更加的出色，所以在我们的表现的相对一般的时候，这应该归结为股票市场整体出现了牛市行情。当一年中是牛市的时候，达到市场收益的平均值是我就会很满意的。”

The latter sentence describes the type of year we had in 1958 and my forecast worked out. The Dow-Jones industrial average advanced from 435 to 583 which, after adding back dividends of about 20 points, gave an overall gain of 38.5% from the Dow-Jones unit. The five partnerships that operated throughout the entire year obtained results averaging slightly better than this 38.5%. Based on market values at the end of both years, their gains ranged from 36.7% to 46.2%.

后面的句子描述了1958年我们所经历的牛市和我对我们工作结果预测的验证。道琼斯工业指数从435点涨到了583点，加上后面省略的近20点的小数点，整体收益高于38.5%。我们的五位合伙企业在这一年的投资运作当中我们的盈利水平稍稍好于38.5%。基于两年年底数据的计算收益在36.7%到46.2%之间。

Considering the fact that a substantial portion of assets has been and still is invested in securities, which benefit very little from a fast-rising market, I believe these results are reasonably good. I will continue to forecast that our results will be above average in a declining or level market, but it will be all we can do to keep pace with a rising market.

考虑到我们相当的一部分资产被投入到了本年盈利很少但处在高速发展的行业中的股票，并且这些股票我们仍然继续持有着，我相信这样的结果是相当不错的。我会继续预测我们的投资收益会在下跌的或者是平稳的市场中会高于平均，但是在一个增长的市场中，这是全部我们能做的来使我们的收益与大盘并驾齐驱。

A TYPICAL SITUATION

一个典型的情形

So that you may better understand our method of operation, I think it would be well to review a specific activity of 1958. Last year I referred to our largest holding which comprised 10% to 20% of the assets of the various partnerships. I pointed out that it was to our interest to have this stock decline or remain relatively steady, so that we could acquire an even larger position and that for this reason such a security would probably hold back our comparative performance in a bull market.

这样你可能就更加深入的理解了我们投资运作的方法，我觉得回顾一下1958年细节的行动是有益处的。去年我提及了我们持有的最大的股票，它占据了我们几个合伙企业10%-20%的资产。我指出使这只股票股价下降或保持相对稳定是我们所感兴趣的，如此我们就可以买股更高比例的这只股票，正因为这个原因，在牛市中这样的股票会对我们的相对表现有所拖累。

This, stock was the Commonwealth Trust Co. of Union City, New Jersey. At the time we started to purchase the stock, it had an intrinsic value of $125 per share computed on a conservative basis. However, for good reasons, it paid no cash dividend at all despite earnings of about $10 per share, which was largely responsible for a depressed price of about $50 per share. So here we had a very well managed bank with substantial earning power selling at a large discount from intrinsic value. Management was friendly to us as new stockholders and risk of any ultimate lose seemed minimal.

这只股票是新泽西州联合市联邦信托有限公司。当我们开始买进这只股票的时候，它的内在价值保守估计有125美元。然而，虽然它每股的净收益高达10美元,但是由于某种原因公司没有发放一分钱的现金股利，这几乎直接导致了股票的股价下跌到了50美元。所以现在我们有了一家经营很好的有着赚钱潜力的银行，并且出售价格在内在价值的基础上打了巨大的折扣。管理人员对我们像新的股东一样的友善，并且最终损失的风险看起来微乎其微。

Commonwealth was 25½% owned by a larger bank (Commonwealth had assets of about $50 Million - - about half the size of the First National or U.S. National in Omaha), which had desired a merger for many years. Such a merger was prevented for personal reasons, but there was evidence that this situation would not continue indefinitely. Thus we had a combination of (1) Very strong defensive characteristics; (2) Good solid value building up at a satisfactory pace and, (3) Evidence to the effect that eventually this value would be unlocked although it might be one year or ten years. If the latter were true, the value would presumably have been built up to a considerably larger figure, say, $250 per share.

联邦信托公司25.5%的股权被一个大型银行所持有，而这家银行试图并购联邦信托已经多年。并购没有进行主要是个人原因，但是有证据表明这种情况确定不会持续下去。所以我们有了一个组合：

（1）     非常强大的壁垒

（2）     通过符合要求的稳定的步伐家里起来的优秀的坚实价值

（3）     有证据表明有作用会最终导致这价值被解锁，虽然这可能需要一年也可能需要十年。如果后者成立的话，那么价值可能已经建立到了一个很大的规模，比如每股250美元。

Over a period of a year or so, we were successful in obtaining about 12% of the bank at a price averaging about $51 per share. Obviously it was definitely to our advantage to have the stock remain dormant in price. Our block of stock increased in value as its size grew, particularly after we became the second largest stockholder with sufficient voting power to warrant consultation on any merger proposal.

经过一年左右的时间，我们成功的以平均51美元的价格购入了这家银行12%的股票。显然，让这支股票保持股价的稳定是对我们有力的。当我们持有股票的规模增加价值也在随之增加，尤其是我们变成了公司第二大股东后，我们就有着充足的投票力量去支持每一个并购的提案。

Unfortunately we did run into some competition on buying which raised the price to about $65 where we were neither buyers nor sellers. Very small buying orders can create price changes of this magnitude in an inactive stock, which explains the importance of not having a “Leakage” regarding our portfolio holdings.

不幸的是，我们陷入了购买这只银行的股票的竞争之中，使得这支股票的价格涨到了62美元左右，而这样的价格我们是是不会买也不会卖的。很少情况下，购买一只不活跃股份会引起它股价这种幅度的波动，这也证明了对于我们所持有的证券组合的额保密性的重要性。

Late in the year we were successful in finding a special situation where we could become the largest holders at an attractive price, so we sold our block of Commonwealth, obtaining $80 per share although the quoted market was about 20% lower at the time.

在下半年的时候我们成功寻找到了一个特殊的时机，在一个具有新引力的价格买入这只股票，并成为了这家银行的第一大股东，所以我们将我们所持有的联邦信托的股份以80美元每股的价格卖出，而当时的市场价格要比这个价格低20%。

It is obvious that we could still be sitting with a $50 stock patiently buying in dribs and drabs, and I would be quite happy with such a program although our performance relative to the market last year would have looked poor. The year when a situation such as Commonwealth results in a realized profit is, to a great extent, fortuitous. Thus, our performance for any single year has serious limitations as a basis for estimating long term results. However, I believe that a program of investing in such undervalued well protected securities offers the surest means of long term profits in securities.

显然，我们也可以以50美元的价格一点一点的购买联邦信托的股票，我也会对这样的投资项目非常满意，虽然它会使我们的在去年市场中的变现稍显逊色。在这一年中，像联邦投资这样的投资项目实现了收益，在很大程度上是运气。因此，用任何一年的表现作为标准来衡量长期投资的结果是有很大的局限性的。但是我相信投资于价值被低估并且受保护的证券能提供最为肯定的长期收益。

I might mention that the buyer of the stock at $80 can expect to do quite well over the years. However, the relative undervaluation at $80 with an intrinsic value of $135 is quite different from a price of $50 with an intrinsic value of $125, and it seemed to me that our capital could better be employed in the situation which replaced it. This new situation is somewhat larger than Commonwealth and represents about 25% of the assets of the various partnerships. While the degree of undervaluation is no greater than in many other securities we own (or even less than some) we are the largest stockholder and this has substantial advantages many times in determining the length of time required to correct the undervaluation. In this particular holding we are virtually assured of a performance better than that of the Dow-Jones for the period we hold it.

我或许提及过，以80美元购买联邦信托股票的人可以期望在今后的几年里有很好的收益。但是内在价值135美元被低估到80美元的股票与内在价值125美元被低估到50美元的股票是有明显差异的，并且我们的资金在此价格抛售股票是合理的。之后的新情况是，导致了我们比联邦信托更大比例的持仓，这时对这家银行的持仓达到了几个合伙公司总资产的25%。然而它被价值低估的程度不比我们所持有的其他证券多（甚至少于某些股票），但是我们是它的第一大股东，我们有潜在的优势通过多次决定需要的时间长度来改正被低估的价值。我们持有这样的股票实际上保证了我们能够比道琼斯指数有更好的表现。

THE CURRENT SITUATION

现在的额形势

The higher the level of the market, the fewer the undervalued securities and I am finding some difficulty in securing an adequate number of attractive investments. I would prefer to increase the percentage of our assets in work-outs, but these are very difficult to find on the right terms.

To the extent possible, therefore, I am attempting to create my own work-outs by acquiring large positions in several undervalued securities. Such a policy should lead to the fulfillment of my earlier forecast an above average performance in a bear market or neutral market, and a normal performance in a bull market. It is on this basis that I hope to be judged. If you have any questions, feel free to ask them.

市场越是走好，那么就越难发现被低估的股票，我也发现在这种情况下很难保证一个足有有吸引力的投资回报。我更喜欢增持被挖掘殆尽的资产，但是这个时候找到好的股票是非常困难的。在条件允许的范围内，我试图通过大量买入多个价值被低估的股票来建立自己的投资组合。这样的策略应该可以完成我之前的预测：在熊市或者平庸市场有着高于平均的表现，在牛市中有一个平庸的表现。这是我希望予以评判的标准。如果你有什么问题，请随时问他们。