REALISM, in philosophy. Although traditionally realism has signified the doctrine that universals are real in opposition to nominalism, in modern philosophy it is primarily an attitude toward knowledge. Against skepticism, realism affirms the existence of knowledge, and against idealism, it holds that the object of knowledge has a reality independent of the knowing mind.

哲学中的实在论。在传统上，尽管实在论所指的是普遍性为真实的学说，与唯名论相反，但在现代哲学中，它主要是对知识的一种态度。对于怀疑论，实在论肯定了知识的存在，而对于唯心论，它认为知识的对象具有一种独立于头脑中认知的实在性。

Realism is an umbrella term covering a wide variety of philosophies. In retrospect, 17^th century philosophers such as the French rationalist Rene Descartes and the English empiricist John Locke have been counted as realists. They held that ideas in the mind represent real objects.

实在论是个覆盖各种各样哲学的涵盖性术语。追溯起来，17世纪的哲学家，诸如法国理性主义者勒奈·笛卡尔和英国经验主义者约翰·洛克都被视为是实在论者。他们认为，头脑中的观念代表着真实对象。

In the 18the century, Thomas Reid reacted against the idealism and the skepticism into which, at the hands of George Berkeley and David Hume, respectively, representationalism and empiricism had fallen. He appealed to common sense. This appeal not only seemed to dispel skepticism and philosophical perplexity about natural causal laws and the existence of the external world; it also combated relativism in morality and agnosticism in religion. Thus Reid founded the school known as Scottish commonsense realism.

在18世纪，托马斯·里德反对通过乔治·柏克莱和大卫·休谟之手分别沦落为表象论和经验论的唯心论和怀疑论。他诉诸于常识。这一诉求不仅驱散了有关自然的因果关系，以及外部世界存在的怀疑论和哲学的困惑；它也反对道德中的相对论和宗教中的不可知论。因此，里德创立了被称为苏格兰常识性实在论学派。

Scottish realism migrated to America with John Witherspoon, a signer of the Declaration of Independence and a teacher of James Madison at Princeton. From the late 18^th through most of the 19^th century, Scottish realism dominated American academic philosophy. It served as an intellectual bulwark for conventional morality and religion. Near the end of its regnancy James McCosh, himself a Scot and a president of Princeton, could proclaim that “if there is to be an American philosophy, it must be Realistic.”

苏格兰的实在论随着约翰·威瑟斯彭迁移到美国，一位《独立宣言》的签署人和詹姆斯·麦迪逊在普林斯顿大学的老师。从18世纪末到19世纪大部分时间，苏格兰实在论主导了美国的学术哲学。它充当了传统道德和宗教思想的壁垒。在接近詹姆斯·麦克考什统治的末期，他宣称“如果真有美国哲学的话，那它一定是实在论的”，可他本身就是一位苏格兰人和普林斯顿大学的较长。

Undermined by the scientific revolution wrought by the Darwinian theory of evolution, realism yielded in the late 19^th century to idealism and to pragmatism. Then early in the 20^th century it emerged again, at first in s series of attacks on idealism.

In England, G. E. Moore sought to refute idealism by showing that it depends on Berkeley’s principle according to which esse est percipi (“to be is to be perceived”). This principle, according to Moore, confounds the act of perceiving with its content. Subsequently Moore, reviving Reid’s commonsense realism, affirmed belief in fundamental judgments concerning physical objects and minds—for example, “This is a piece of paper” or “I am thinking”—on the grounds that any philosophical theory denying such belief is logically indefensible.

在英格兰，G. E. 摩尔根据esse est percipi（“存在就是被感知”），试图通过展示其依靠柏克莱的原则来驳斥唯心论。据摩尔所说，这个原则使感知与其内容产生了混淆。后来摩尔，复兴了里德的常识性实在论，肯定了有关物理对象和心灵基本判断的信念—例如，“这是一张纸”或“我在思考”，理由是，任何否认这一信念的哲学理论在逻辑上都是站不信脚的。

While Moore was refuting idealism in England, W. P. Montague and R. B. Perry in America wrote reviews critical of Josiah Royce’s attack on realism in his book The World and the Individual (1900). Against Royce the American realists argued that knowledge is an external relation. The object of knowledge is neither restricted to the mind nor altered by it being known. In 1900, W. T. Marvin, R. B. Perry, E. G. Spaulding, W. P. Montague, E. B. Holt, and W. B. Pitkin published a program and a platform in the Journal of Philosophy, and in 1912 a cooperative volume of essays entitled The New Realism. New realism stressed direct knowledge of objects that exist independently of being known. It consequently foundered on the problem of error. Since it claimed that the objects of such cognitive states as sensation, perception, and belief exist (or subsist) independently of their being apprehended, new realism could not distinguish between true and false cognition.

就在摩尔正在驳斥英格兰的实在论时，在美国的W. P.蒙塔古和R. B.佩里撰写评论批评了约西亚·罗伊斯在其《世界与个人》（1900年）一书中对实在论的攻击。针对罗伊斯，美国的实在论者认为，知识是一种外在的关系。知识的对象既不限于头脑，也不会因它被知晓而改变。1912年，W. T.马文，R. B.佩里，E. G.斯波尔丁，W. P.蒙塔古，E. B.霍尔特和W. B.皮特金在《哲学期刊》中发布了计划和平台，并于1912年开辟了一个合作的论文栏目，取名为《新实在论》。新实在论强调了独立于已知之外存在对象的直接知识。结果，它败在了错误的问题上。因为，它宣称像感觉、感知这种认知状态的对象，以及信仰的存在（或生存）与理解它们无关，所以新实在论无法在真假认知之间进行区别。

An influential response to the problem of new realism was critical realism. In 1920, D. Drake, A. Q. Lovejoy, J. B. Pratt, A. K. Rogers, G. Santayana, R. W. Sellars, and C. A. Strong published Essays in Critical Realism. The critical realists strove not only to resolve the problem of error bequeathed by new realism but also to reconcile idealism and realism. With realism they affirmed that the objects of knowledge exist independently of the knowing mind. But they held that knowledge is indirect and that it proceeds by means of contents immediately apparent to the mind. They disagreed about the ontological status of these intermediate contents. Some construed these contents to be sense data and ideas wholly dependent on the mind. In the case of error or false cognition the sense data or ideas do not correspond to any real object, but are wholly mental in status. Other critical realists considered the intermediate contents to be “essences” and maintained that, while these essences are not numerically identical with externally existing objects, they nevertheless symbolize or represent such objects. Furthermore, they contend that these essences have an ontological status independent of the mind.

对新实在论的问题具有影响力的回应是批判实在论。在20世纪20年代，D.德拉克，A. Q.拉夫乔伊，J. B.普拉特，A. K.罗杰斯，G.桑塔亚纳，R. W.塞拉斯和C. A.斯特朗出版了《批判实在论文集》。批判实在论者不仅努力解决由新实在论遗留的错误问题，而且也在调和唯心论和实在论。依据实在论，他们断言，知识的对象独立于头脑中的认知而存在。但他们认为，知识是间接的，而且它是依靠头脑中直接显现的内容进行的。他们并不赞同这些中间内容的本体论地位。一些人将这些内容解释成完全依靠头脑的感觉数据和想法。在错误的或虚假的认知情况下，感觉材料或想法并不符合任何真实的对象，而是完全的精神状态。其它批判实在论者认为中间内容是“本质”，并坚持，虽然这些本质与外部存在的对象在数值上并不相同，不过它们象征或代表这样的对象。此外，他们主张这些本质具有独立于头脑的本体论地位。

George Santayana was the most famous philosopher of the essence wing of critical realism. His Skepticism and Animal Faith (1923) ranks as the greatest single work in epistemology written by a critical realist. Knowledge, he asserted, is faith mediated by symbols. He presented his epistemology as the introduction to a naturalist system of ontology in which he distinguished four realms of being: essence, matter, truth, and spirit. Santayana’s type of ontology is reflected in the writings of many American philosophers, including F. J. E. Woodbridge, M. Cohen, J. Feibleman, and P. Weiss.

乔治·桑塔亚纳是批判实在论本质学派最著名的哲学家。他的《怀疑论与动物信仰》（1923年）被认为是由批判实在论者撰写的最重要的个人著作。他宣称，知识是以符号为媒介的信仰。他将其认识论作为进入自然主义本体论体系的导论，其中他对存在的四个领域进行了区别：本质，物质，真理和精神。桑塔亚纳的本体论在许多美国哲学家的著作中都有体现，包括F. J. E. 伍德布里奇，M. 科恩，J. 费伯尔曼和P. 韦斯。

On the European continent the development of realism was fed by many sources. Studies of the logic of reference by Alexius Meinong and of the intentionality of consciousness by Franz Brentano nourished the affirmation of realism in objective reality existing independently of the mind. Especially noteworthy for the rise realism was Pope Leo XIII’s encyclical Aeterni Patris (1879), which vigorously pressed the study of Thomas Aquinas and of Plato and Aristotle in Roman Catholic seminaries, colleges, and universities. It stimulated the realistic new-Thomist movement, which embraces such major thinkers as Jacques Maritain, Joseph Marechal, Etienne Gilson, and Bernard Lonergan.

在欧洲大陆上，实在论的发展有许多来源。由亚历克修斯·迈农引用的逻辑研究和弗朗茨·布伦塔诺对意识意向性的研究，滋养了独立于头脑而存在的客观实在中实在论的肯定。尤其值得注意的是教皇利奥十三世《永恒之父》的教皇通谕，它在罗马天主教神学院，专科学院和大学中强力推行对托马斯·阿奎那，柏拉图和亚里士多德的研究。它激发了现实主义的新托马斯主义者运动，其中包括像雅克·马里坦，约瑟夫·马雷沙尔，艾蒂安·吉尔松和伯纳德·朗尼根这样的主要思想者。

American philosophical realism has been enriched by these European developments. During the 1930’s and 1940’s at the University of Chicago, under Robert Hutchins, Mortimer Adler, and Richard McKeon, classical realism flourished. Shortly after World War II, John Wild founded the Association for Realistic Philosophy, and in 1953 he published The Return to Reason, which included essays by a wide range of philosophical realists.

通过欧洲的这些发展，美国的哲学实在论得以丰富。在20世纪30年代和20世纪40年代，在罗伯特·哈钦斯，莫蒂默·阿德勒和理查德·麦克基翁的领导下，芝加哥大学的古典实在论兴旺起来。二次大战后不久，约翰·魏尔德创立了现实主义哲学协会，并于1953年出版了《回归理性》一书，其中包括了多种多样的哲学实在论者的论文。

Beginning in the 1950’s, Roderick Chisholm, drawing upon Reid, Brentano, and Moore, articulated a profoundly argued realistic philosophy EXPRESSED in a contemporary analytic idiom. Realists take pride in a perennial philosophy that is sober, comprehensive, and relevant.

从20世纪50年代开始，罗德里克·奇泽姆利用里德，布伦塔诺和摩尔，用当代的分析语言，明确表达了一种深刻论证的现实主义哲学。实在论者们为其清醒、全面和切题的永恒哲学而引以为豪。

                                       ANDERW J. RECK

                                       Tulane University

                                       安德鲁·J. 雷克

                                          杜兰大学

                                     2023年2月5日译

（译者注：该词条位列《大美百科全书》1985年版，第23卷，第291页至292页）