More than 30 years have passed since China began its reform and
opening up, but it has yet to create a political and social model
for sustainable development.
On the economic side, by and large the market economy has taken the
leading role, but there are some serious shortcomings. The
government still intervenes too much in the
economy. This problem of improper intervention in
the economy has not been solved. To cite just two examples:
First, the stock market bears clear signs of being a policy-driven
market. The recent classic example is the government’s violent
intervention to rescue the market Regrettably, not only was this
action ineffective, it also provided evidence to those abroad who
doubt that China has a market
economy. Fortunately, the government has taken
note of that and is making suitable
adjustments. This new recalibration very possibly
will suit the needs of a market economy.
Second, restrictions on and discrimination against private sector
enterprises remains a problem. Private sector enterprises already
provide employment for most of China’s labor force and account for
most of China’s
GDP. However, many fields
restrict or forbid the entry of private enterprises. The proportion
of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) is too
large. SOEs are less efficient and yet still often
get special treatment, such as being granted monopoly status or
special subsidies. This leads to unfair market
conditions and to the waste and reverse flows of economic
resources.
Politically, leaders at every level of China’s government have too
much overall influence on the area which they govern. A change in
leaders brings on a cascade of new policies — big changes in
planning for economic development, in urban construction and
planning, and in the bureaucratic system. Meanwhile, the problem of
inadequate oversight of the top leaders at each level has not been
solved. Plus, there is no mechanism for effectively constraining
the growth of local
debt. According to European and
U.S. standards, some Chinese local governments are in fact already
bankrupt.
China’s Social Stability: Political and Economic
Factors
Over the past 30-plus years, several factors have
made it possible for China to maintain its overall social
stability. For one thing, an enormous amount of
capital has been expended on maintaining social stability. However,
China faces constraints how much it can increase and intensify
spending on social stability. Social stability
expenses already exceed military spending and there is limited room
for further increases.
Another factor in China’s social stability is that officials have
co-opted political, economic, and cultural
elites. Political elites are given status as
members of the People’s Congress or as members of the Political
Consultative Congress and invited to join government leaders’
delegations visiting foreign countries. Economic
elites are allowed to join the Party and even enjoy special
permissions and support for their commercial activities (Geely’s
purchase of Volvo is a classic example). In the
academic world, elites get opportunities to participate in
politics, planning, and policymaking, and thereby earn a
comfortable income. Most people, and particularly
elites, fear chaos. Once these
elites have been co-opted into the government system through the
means listed above, they generally support it.
However, the most important factor in keeping China’s social
stability has been the political legitimacy that economic growth
has brought with it (what we might call GDP-based
legitimacy). But economic growth has a cyclical
character. The Chinese economy, which has already grown rapidly for
several decades, will at some point change to low growth, zero
growth, or even negative growth. All this would be
normal. But if there are economic issues, then
there will also be political issues.
Dramatically slowed growth will create many different chain
reactions in China, both from society at large (such as more mass
incidents) and from within the Party. The case of
the Soviet Union shows that some party cadres from rich families
are always looking for opportunities to legalize and become open
about their personal fortunes. This kind of
attitude — that the misfortune of the country is an individual
cadre’s good fortune — under certain circumstances becomes a threat
to state stability. There could also be threats
from outside the mainland, if the United States or even Taiwan
decides to take advantage of China’s slowing growth.
Translation courtesy of Gao Dawei