加载中…2013-14届管理类联考MBA英语训练5.02
(2013-05-02 09:32:42)
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2013-14届MBA联考英语训练由成都MBA培训典范机构-成都华章MBA培训中心提供：
Publicanger over high levels of executive pay has provoked new government proposals in Britain for binding shareholder votes on compensation committee reports. This will mark a revolution in corporate governance, as shareholders would vote both on the past year’s awards and on the coming year’s plans for salary increases, bonuses and long-term share awards, although boards will find it difficult to deal with such intervention in complex pay structures.
Asa former chairman and member of several remuneration committees, I support the move to a binding ‘say on pay’ vote, despite its difficulties. The market for chief executives has a number of inherent flaws which can be improved by regulation. There is a strong element of ‘winner take all’ behaviour in this market, just as for top athletes or musicians. If a board has good ones, it will want to keep them and keep them motivated. The motivational considerations also explain why there is so much inertia（惰性）in the bonus element of pay even during a year of poor results.
Theother side of this coin is that there is nothing more damaging to a company than a poor CEO, one who does not live up to the task or who creates a negative internal culture. But in such a case, the board’s response will not be to deduct the bonus, but to find someone new. Unless there is an in-house successor, this often drives up the pay because it will be necessary to appeal to the preferred candidate away from their current employer.
Thesemarket characteristics have the effect of escalating executive pay. To counterbalance this, it is helpful to enhance the intervention power of shareholders. This has already happened to some extent with the advisory vote on compensation reports, as shown by the recent cases of large negative votes by shareholders in Barclays, Aviva and Xstrata.
Thereare risks to this approach. Shareholders may simply vent their anger at other aspects of corporate strategy through the vehicle of the compensation vote, leaving the way forward unclear. But it is also possible that giving shareholders more power will cause them to accept the responsibility that comes with such engagement. If more shareholder engagement can lead to better understanding and simpler pay structures, then the extra burdens on both boards and investors imposed by binding votes will be well justified.
26.It can be learned from paragraph 1 that shareholders in Britain ______.
[A]are angry with government’s high level of governance
[B]will play their role in deciding the distribution of bonus
[C]find the present situation hard to properly dealt with
[D]can offer proposals in the vote of executives to a firm
27.The author is in favor of binding ‘say on pay’ vote because ______.
[A]the present recruit system for executives is not ideal
[B]“winner takes all” behaviors should be encouraged
[C]good executives are hard to get unless well paid
[D]top executives behave just as athletes or musicians
28.We can infer from paragraph 3 that ______.
[A]a company will motivate executives by reducing their bonus
[B]companies play emphasis on the cultivation of executives
[C]a successor of the poor CEO is likely to get a higher pay
[D]companies prefer executives from the present employees
29.The intervention of the power of shareholders can prevent ______.
[A]executives from leaving a company
[B]a company from releasing a false report
[C]executives from giving negative advice
[D]the general rise of executives’ pay
30.Generally speaking, the author’s attitude toward shareholders’ intervention is ______.
[A]critical
[B]supportive
[C]scornful
[D]objective
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