Text 课文

Cases alleging racial discrimination in the workplace have most often been brought by and against members of different races or ethnic background. In Walker v. IRS, however, the United State District Court for the Northern District of Georgia recognized a discrimination claim by a light-skinned black employee against her dark-skinned black supervisor under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. By identifying “race” and “color” as distinct factors upon which a title VII claim may be based, Walker took an important step in acknowledging the historic tension between light-skinned and dark skinned blacks that engenders intraracial discrimination. At the same time, however, the court’s expansion of title VII coverage threatens to undermine that statute’s protection of blacks against more pervasive and damaging forms of discrimination.

指控工作场所种族歧视的案件绝大多数都是在不同的种族或者不同的种族背景的成员之间互相提起的。但在“沃克诉美国国内税务署（IRS）”一案中，美国佐治亚州北区的美国（联邦）地区法院根据《1964年民权法案》的第七编认定了由一个浅黑皮肤的雇员针对其深黑皮肤的上司的提出的歧视指控。通过将“种族”和“肤色” 确定为一个依据（民权法案）第七编提出的诉讼请求可以根据的显著因素，沃克一案在承认产生种族内部歧视的浅黑皮肤和深黑皮肤的人之间的历史性紧张关系问题上迈出了重要的一步。但同时，法院对于第七编范围的扩张（性解释）却预示着削弱法律对黑人不受更为普遍的和破坏性的歧视的保护的危险。

   Tracy Walker, a light-skinned woman, worked as a clerk typist in the predominately black Atlanta office of the Internal Revenue Service (ISR). In November 1985, Walker’s supervisor was replaced by Ruby Lewis, a dark-skinned black woman. Though Walker had enjoyed a very “cordial” working relationship with her former supervisor, her dealings with Lewis were “strained from the very beginning.” Walker alleged that Lewis often reprimanded her for matters that were either “false or insubstantial” and subjected her to a “close scrutiny” not extended to her fellow employees. Walker met with the Equal Employment Office (EEO) program manager for the Atlanta district of the IRS in an attempt to air her grievances, Two weeks later, she was discharged on Lewis’s recommendation.

翠西·沃克是一名浅黑皮肤妇女，在女性占多数的美国国内税务署（IRS）亚特兰大办公室工作。1985年11月，沃克的上司由拉比·刘易斯接替，这是一位深黑皮肤的妇女。虽然沃克与其前任上司有着很友好的工作关系，但她与刘易斯的交往从一开始就比较紧张。沃克声称刘易斯经常因为一些“伪造的或无关紧要的”事情而斥责她并使她遭受一种其同事均未受到过的“严格审查”。沃克找到了IRS“同等就业办公室（EEO）”亚特兰大地区的项目经理倾诉其冤苦。两周以后，在刘易斯的建议下她被解雇。

Walker filed a pro se employment discrimination suit under title VII. She claimed that Lewis was “prejudiced against light-colored skinned blacks” and had subjected her to “invidious discrimination” before her termination. She further alleged that she had been discharged in retaliation for her complaints to the EEO program manager. The case first came before a magistrate, who recommended granting the defendant’s summary judgment motion on Walker’s invidious discrimination claim and denying the defendant’s summary judgment motion on her retaliation claim. On appeal, the district court denied both summary judgment motions.

沃克依据第七编规定自己提起了雇佣歧视之诉。她诉称刘易斯“对浅黑皮肤的黑人有偏见”，而且在其离职之前对其进行“嫉恨式的歧视”。她还诉称她是由于向EEO项目经理投诉而被报复性地解雇的。该案首先由一名治安法官审理，这名治安法官建议对于沃克的嫉恨式歧视诉讼请求准予被告的即决（简易）审判动议，而驳回了被告要求对于沃克的报复性诉讼请求的即决（简易） 审判动议。在上诉中，地区法院驳回了这两项即决（简易） 审判动议。

The court identified two principal issued: whether color, in addition to race, may form the basis of a discrimination action under title VII, and whether a suit based on color may be brought by one black person against another, On the first issue, the court rejected the defendant’s contention that “race” and “color” must be treated synonymously. Instead, the court linked tile VII to section 1981, thus affording title VII a more expansive interpretation of “race” and “color”.

法院确认了两个首要问题：在种族之外，肤色是否可以构成第七编规定的歧视行为的基础，以及一个基于肤色的案件是否可以由一名有色人针对另一名有色人提起。对于第一个问题，法庭驳回了被告关于“种族”和“肤色”必须按照同义词对待的主张。相反，法庭将第七编与（美国法典）第1981条联系了起来，因此对第七编提供了一个关于“肤色”和“种族”的更广义的解释。

The court observed that according to the Supreme Court’s interpretation, section 1981，the “historical predecessor” of title VII, protects citizens from discrimination on the basis of “race”, color, or previous condition of servitude” and “was originally enacted to apply to citizens of “every race and color.” Moreover, it noted that title VII also include “color” as a basis for prohibited discrimination and that the “plain meaning of legislation should be conclusive” unless “literal application” would frustrate “the intention of [the statute’s ]drafters”.

法庭注意到，根据最高法院的解释，第1981条作为第七编的前身，保护公民不受基于“种族、肤色或先前奴隶身份”的歧视并且“原始性地规定应适用于‘每一个种族和肤色’”。另外，它还注意到第七编还将“肤色”包括为被禁止之歧视的一个基础，以及除非“按照字面含义的适用”会破坏“[法律]起草者的意图”，“立法的字面意思（显然意义）应当是决定性的”。

The court interpreted title VII’s specific references to both “race” and “color” as clear indications of congressional intent to establish the two terms as distinct elements in a title VII claim. To support this interpretation, the Walker court cited the Supreme Court’s decision in St. Francis College v. Al Khazraji, in which an Arab university professor alleged that his white employer discriminated against him on the basis of his race. The Supreme Court held in St. Francis that although section 1981 “at a minimum reaches discrimination against an individual because he or she is genetically part of an ethnically and physiognomically distinctive subgrouping of homo sapiens? ... it is not even essential to be physiognomically distinctive” to sustain an action under section 1981.

法庭将第七编特别提到“种族”和“肤色”两个词解释为明确表明了国会在第七编的诉讼请求中确立两个不同的要素的意图。为了证明这一解释，沃克案法庭援引了最高法院在“圣弗朗西斯学院诉艾尔-卡兹拉吉”一案中的裁决。在该案中，一名阿拉伯大学教授诉称他的白人雇主基于他的种族对其进行歧视。最高法院在圣弗朗斯西案中认定，尽管第1981条“最低限度地包括了由于一个人在遗传学上是某个依据种族和相貌划分的人类亚群体的部分而产生的针对个别人的歧视……”，但要根据第1981条受理诉讼，“相貌上的差别并非必须条件”。

Once the court determined that discrimination on the basis of color may support a title VII claim, it turned to the narrower issue of whether the statute “allow［ed］ a law suit by a light-colored black person against a dark-colored black person.” The court looked again to St. Francis, noting that the Supreme Court had previously reviewed the legislative history of section 1981 and found that Congress intended the statute to “apply to all forms of discrimination,” including those acts perpetrated by whites against members of other white subgroups, such as “Finns, Gypsies, Basques, Hebrews, Swedes ... Irish and French.” Reasoning that only an “ethnocentric and naive world view” would suggest that all blacks, unlike whites, “are part of the same subgroup,” the court concluded that “race” and “color” are by no means synonymous for purposes of title VII coverage and that subgroups may exist among blacks as a race. It held that Walker had stated a cause of action for invidious discrimination under title VII.

法庭在确定基于肤色的歧视可以支持第七编诉讼请求之后，便开始解决一个更为具体的问题，即法律“是否允许浅皮肤黑人对黑皮肤黑人（歧视）的案件”。法庭再次审视圣弗朗西斯案时，注意到了最高法院先前曾对第1981条的立法史有过评论并发现国会的意图是将这条法律“适用于所有形式的歧视”，包括那些由白人实施的针对其他白人亚群体的歧视行为，如针对“芬兰人、吉普赛人、巴斯克人、犹太人、瑞典人……爱尔兰人和法国人”。法庭推理认为，只有种族中心论和朴素世界论观点才会有所有的黑人与白人不一样，“都是同一个亚群体的一部分”的看法。因此法庭得出结论，认为在确定第七编范围方面，“种族”和“肤色”决非同义词，而且在作为一个种族的黑人之间会存在各种亚群体。因此认定沃克依据第七编提起的嫉恨式歧视是有诉讼理由的。

Although some observers may laud Walker’s recognition of discrimination between blacks as a much-needed expansion of title VII, such praise may be misguided. By holding that title VII addresses both intraracial and interracial discrimination, Walker may sacrifice Congress’s intent to dismantle institutional racism in the United States for the short-term goal of redressing a sporadic and less profound form of discrimination.

虽然一些观察家可能会赞美沃克案对黑人之间歧视的承认，认为这是一个对第七编非常必要的扩大（性解释），但这种赞赏可能被误导。沃克案判决认定第七编同时解决种族间和种族内歧视问题，可能会为了纠正一种偶尔发生而且意义不太深远之歧视的短期目标而牺牲国会要粉碎美国传统种族主义的本意。

In St. Francis, the Supreme Court expanded the scope of title VII protection by acknowledging that various white subgroups have historically displayed animus toward each other. Until Walker, however, courts had not made the same observation about blacks. Observers within the black community have long acknowledged the historic tension between light-skinned and dark-skinned blacks, which has roots in antebellum slave society. Furthermore, commentators on contemporary relations in the black community have noted that the "ubiquitous concern with color" remains embedded in black consciousness. While "the only factor common to all Negroes is color," it has been color that, ironically, has frustrated "intraracial harmony" and has "forever got［ten］ in the way of racial solidarity.”Walker’s recognition of this historic tension reflects an awareness that, just as discrimination has engendered strife among various white subgroups, prejudice among blacks remains a debilitating factor in the quest for civil rights. Walker casts doubt upon traditional notions of the identities of both the victims and perpetrators of discrimination. It acknowledges that such discrimination is pernicious in all forms, whether committed by members of other races or by those within the same race.

在圣弗朗西斯案中，最高法院通过承认各种白人亚群体互相之间存在着历史上的敌意从而扩展了第七编保护的范围。但是，直到沃克案，最高法院才发现黑人也存在着同样的情况。黑人社区内部的观察家早就发现在浅肤色黑人和深肤色黑人之间有着历史性的紧张关系，其根源是南北战争以前的奴隶社会。另外，黑人社区中现代关系的评论家也注意到，“对肤色的普遍关注”仍然牢牢地根植于黑人的意识当中。虽然“所有黑人唯一所共同拥有的就是肤色”，但具有讽刺意味的是，正是肤色破坏了“种族内的和谐”并“永久性地成了种族团结的拦路虎”。沃克案对这种历史性紧张关系的承认反映了一种认识，即正如歧视造成各种白人亚群体之间的冲突一样，黑人之间的偏见仍然是寻求民权之努力中的一个削弱因素。沃克案对于传统上关于歧视行为的受害者和发起者提出了质疑。它承认不管是由其他种族还是在同一种族内部实施的，所有形式的歧视都是有害的。

By broadening title VII, however, Walker represents the most recent dilution of the legislative intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and its progeny. Much of the legislation enacted during Reconstruction addressed discrimination against groups, particularly blacks, rather than individuals. Indeed, the history of section 1981 indicates that the statute was formulated to “eradicate racial discrimination ［by whites］ against blacks in the making of contracts, specifically in instances of private employment.”Walker illustrates the tension in anti-discrimination statutes between reflecting the reality of groups and their historical experiences and effecting broader protection against discrimination. By holding that blacks may be the victims of intraracial discrimination, Walker emphasizes the immediate harm caused to individuals, regardless of the perpetrator’s identity, rather than the legislative intent of section 1981 and title VII.

但是，由于拓宽了第七编的适用范围，沃克案代表着近期对1866年《民权法案》及其后续法案立法意图的削弱。许多在“重建”期间通过的立法都关注群体尤其是黑人群体之间而不是个人之间的歧视。当然，第1981条的历史表明该项立法是要“根除[白人]对黑人在缔结契约特别是在私人雇用方面的种族歧视”。沃克案说明了反歧视立法在反映群体及其历史经历的实际情况与实施更为宽泛的针对歧视的保护之间的张力。沃克案由于认定黑人可能成为种族内部歧视的受害者，因而与第1981条和第七编的立法意图不同，强调的是对个人的直接损害，而不论歧视行为实施者的身份如何。

Walker's de-emphasis of the historic and systemic realities from which title VII arose may divert attention from the immediate objects of title VII, section 1981, and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, discriminatory actions by whites against blacks. Discrimination by whites, who have always been the socioeconomically empowered group in the United States, remains far more dangerous and pervasive than that committed by other blacks, who have typically occupied lower socioeconomic positions and who enjoy relatively little influence in the workplace.

沃克案对第七编所据以产生的历史的和系统的现实的重要性的降低，可能会转移对第七编、第1981条以及1866年《民权法案》规定的白人歧视黑人行为这一直接规制对象的注意力。在美国一直是经济社会方面的强势群体的白人所实施的歧视比由经济社会地位较低因而在工作场所的影响相对较小的其他黑人所实施的歧视更为有害和普遍。

Walker's legacy may, therefore, prove to be a double-edged sword for future black litigants. While the court's broad interpretation of title VII may present itself as a boon for blacks who experience intraracial discrimination, it may also prove a bane for those who suffer from the more pervasive problem of institutional racism. The extent to which Walker will enable courts to confront discrimination on an individual level without detracting from group redress remains to be seen.

因此，沃克案的后果对以后的黑人诉讼者来说可能证明是一把双刃剑。尽管法庭对第七编的广义解释本身可能表明对于受到种族内部其实的黑人来说有所裨益，但它也会证明对那些受到更为普遍的制度性种族主义问题之害的人来说是一种祸根。沃克案可以使法官们在不贬低群体矫正效能的情况下在个人层次上抗击歧视的程度仍有待实践的证明。