维和问题本非我之所长，但无奈何李东燕同志主办另一个国际会议，分身乏术，故将此次会议机会留予在下。在下不才，勉力凑成英文发言稿一篇(有个统计表放不进去，望见谅)，现贴出以飨诸君之砖。


                           The Active Participator in A Conservative Framework:
                                                       China's Policy On UNPKO

   As a permanent member of the UN Security Council, China has consistently supported and actively participated in the UN peacekeeping operations (UNPKO, PKO) consonant with the spirit of the UN Charter. China has become an increasingly active participant in the UNPKO since 1999.  

                                 　　 China As a Major Contributor of UNPKO
    According to the White Paper on China's National Defense in 2008 and the website of UN (www.un.org), since 1990 the PLA has sent 11,063 military personnel/time to participate in 18 UN peacekeeping operations. Eight lost their lives on duty. As of the end of July 2009, China had 2,151 military (military observers, engineering troops and medical personnel) and civilian police peacekeeping personnel serving in 10 UN mission areas and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. Among them, there are 55 military observers, 1686 engineering troops, 206 medical personnel and 204 policemen. China ranks number 15 among the 117 Troop Contributing Countries, and second among the Permanent Five Members of UNSC.
     As to the 7 UNPKO missions in Africa, China is participating 6 of them, only except United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT). As to the geographic distribution of the 2,151 Chinese peacekeepers, 1632 (75%) are dispatched to the African mission areas. So, Africa is the main target of China’s policy on UNPKO.

                  　                        Being Active in A Conservative Framework
    Beijing has been treating UNPKO and her participating in it as a highly politicalized and sensitive project. During the cold war years, China didn’t attend any UNPKO and regarded it as a violation of the principles of international law and the UN Charter such as state sovereignty, non-intervention and no use of force. From 1989 to 1998, China relaxed its rockbound attitude to those normative principles and explained them with some flexibility. This new explanation gave Beijing a jurisprudential and political rationale to open a narrow door to UNPKO.  
    1999 marked a turning point of China’s policy on PKO. Since then, China adopted a more relaxed and flexible attitude to those principles, and thus has been increasing its commitment to UNPKO, improving its training capabilities through the deliberate efforts, and contributing both military and police units. It has also joined international efforts to improve the peacekeeping  capabilities of relevant regional organizations and has given political and financial support to relevant war-torn host countries.

    China’s adoption an active policy on UNPKO can be explained by the reasons below:
    First, the rise of national power derived from the “Reform and Opening up” policy since 1979 enables Beijing to provide UNPKO with adequate material resources. For example, in 2003, China invested US$20 million in setting up China Peacekeeping CIVPOL Training Center (CPCTC). Every selected civilian police personnel will get a three month training course in the center and all the costs will be covered by the Chinese government.
     Second, the cumulative experience in UN regime also promotes China’s enthusiasm for UNPKO. China now has taken deliberate measures to build up its training capabilities. Both the police and military have established their own training mechanisms which meet strict UN requirements. The civilian police have a comprehensive training center. All military observers receive training in the PLA Nanjing International Relations Academy, while the non-combat military troops are trained in the training bases in the military regions. China has also cumulated more knowledge about logistic supply, troop projection and contingent management.
    Third, it is urgent to construct an image of a responsible power. China faces a dilemma when dealing with the international security affairs. On the one hand, as a permanent member of UNSC, China has the special responsibility to maintain international peace and security, and the international society hopes Beijing to do more than before. Moreover, as a beneficiary of globalization, Beijing is aware that its peaceful development cannot be achieved without a peaceful environment.
    On the other hand, China’s rapid rising as a great power triggers many misgivings, criticisms and “China Threat” debate around the world. So, China has to assure the world by showing its good intentions. Wearing a blue helmet is a good option. It can furthers China’s image as a status-quo nation seeks to contribute to international stability through diplomatic and security measures, thus serving to dispel the “China Threat” theory and projecting a good image in the eyes of both the developing and developed worlds.
    Fourth, Beijing's active participation can also help strengthen the UN, whose authority has been challenged by the trend of unilateralism. China's support for the UN can yield valuable benefits, which not only serve its “peaceful rise” aspirations, but can also be used as clout to balance against unilateralism and yield positive political currency to promote its multilateral diplomacy agenda.
    Meanwhile, China’s active participation is without limits. Although China adopted a flexible attitude to those Westphalian norms, it has never abandoned them. Actually, they are seen by Beijing as a framework or more vividly speaking, a birdcage of China’s policy on UNPKO. Thus, China will be still reluctant to participate those operations about humanitarian intervention and peace enforcement, which are preferred to by some great powers as means to address conflicts. At the same time, there are internal barriers from within China as well. For example, the “China Threat" theory has discouraged China and forced it to keep a low profile in UNPKO, in order not do alarm others. Beijing's more active participation in UNPKO in the future does not merely depend on its capabilities or willingness, but also on the sincere attitude and encouragement by others of its active participation rather than criticism and　skepticism.
           
                                         Persistence and Possible Changes in the Future
    In the foreseeable future, China will continue to act as a defender of UN authority, advocate multilateralism and strengthen its support for the UN peacekeeping regime. Thus, China's attitude towards UNPKO will continue to be positive and will have a larger stake in UNPKO. It is expected to favor UN commanded peacekeeping operations, increase its financial contributions to UNPKO and contribute more support troops, military observers and civilian police officers to UNPKO. However, it will not rush into sending PLA combat troops to overseas missions as it is sensitive towards how others may view such a move, leading to misunderstandings about its activities abroad.
    Beijing may continue to selectively vote for UNSC resolutions that authorize the establishment of UN commanded peacekeeping operations which adopt Chapter VII of the UN charter. It may also selectively refrain from saying “no" to peace enforcement operations or humanitarian interventions conducted by “multinational forces," provided there is UNSC authorization and acquiescence of the host country; but it will not participate in these missions. China is likely to continue to remain reluctant to dispatch combat troops to UNPKO in the very future. Nevertheless, if there is adequate encouragement from other major powers (especially the United States) as well as from its neighboring countries, China may one day contribute its combat troops to UNPKO.
    Finally and significantly, Beijing will continue to oppose unilateral actions outside of the UN framework. It is and will be Beijing’s bottom line. So, my conclusion is there is and will be no competition in UNPKO among China, EU and USA.