阅读Bloomberg《Goldman Sachs's Role in Crisis at Stake in Question Over Marks》有关高盛浴血战，只觉废话多… 

FCIC主席Philip N. Angelides质问高盛：「…You guys are net short and you're driving down prices, are you creating a self-fulfilling prophecy？…Were you in fact pushing the market down？…」 

咁边个创造咁Q大慨Bubble俾人去沽空呀，聪明？高盛David Viniar回答曰：「…We never instruct people to mark things down. We mark where the market is.…」吹咩！ 

2007年6月26日，一名高盛员工在电邮中透露向AIG追Call Margin：「…massive remarking…ahead of other dealers in the street, which have not yet remarked this type of underliers.…This remarking is independent from today's market move and reflective of the desk's view that marks were stale…In their views, marks at only a small discount to par (as they were) do not reflect the increased risk in this market…」 

事后有人以此认定高盛以此夹死AIG。查实在2008年9月之前，AIG的信用评级为AA-。根据ISDA的标准拥有AA-评级的AIG只须交付极少按金便可承保极大额的信贷组合。岂料美国次按风暴令AIG须为投资作大额减值。因此在2008年9月开始评级机构须降低其信用等级以反映其财务实力。同样基于ISDA标准的要求，己被降级的AIG须为现有已承保的信贷组合追加保证金(Call Margin)。点解不反过来说明高盛早在一年前先知先觉做好风险管理呢？ 

玩过认股证或其他结构性产品都知道，平仓价由庄家话事，做闲慨边度有Say。日本大保险公司AIOI投诉高盛提供的CDO平仓价压到非常贱。一名高盛员工在电邮中透露：「…Aioi is very unhappy and even mad at our MTM…Our MTM is more than twice as bad as others…」你试吓向保险公司要求张人寿保单提出Terminate会点？ 

最绝还是一句由调查委员会呈上电邮中的所谓大发现：「…show that setting prices for some of the little- traded derivatives on CDOs may have been more art than science - less a matter of reacting to market moves and more a matter of anticipating them…」近日由于要研发VICKS，阅读了不少由高盛撰写的Technical Papers。平心而论，相关分析和研究的确是非常出色。但当论及其中最核心引伸波幅的原理时，其潜台词乃是： 

「断估！」