诺贝尔奖获得者马斯金教授11月5日开始讲课的参考资料(重复对策论专题)

Topics in Repeated Games

E. Maskin

CEMA, November 5-9, 2007

General Reference: G. Mailath and L. Samuelson (2006), Repeated Games and

Reputations, Oxford University Press

D. Abreu (1988), “On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting,”

Econometrica, 383-396

D. Abreu, P. Milgrom, D. Pearce (1991), “Information and Timing in Repeated

Partnerships,” Econometrica, 1713-1733

D. Abreu, D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti (1990), “Toward a Theory of Discounted

Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring,” Econometrica, 1041-1063

R. Aumann and S. Sorin (1989), “Cooperation and Bounded Recall,” Games and

Economic Behavior, 5-39

J. Benoit and V. Krishna (1985), “Finitely Repeated Games,” Econometrica, 905-922

M. Cripps, G. Mailath, and L. Samuelson (2004), “Imperfect Monitoring and

Impermanent Reputations,” Econometrica, 407-432

J. Ely, J. Horner, and W. Olszewski (2005), “Belief-Free Equilibria in Repeated Games,”

Econometrica, 377-416

J. Farrell and E. Maskin (1989), “Renegotiation in Repeated Games,” Games and

Economic Behavior, 327-360

D. Fudenberg and D. Levine (1989), “Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games

with a Patient Player,” Econometrica, 759-778

D. Fudenberg and D. Levine, and E. Maskin (1994), “The Folk Theorem with Imperfect

Public Information,” Econometrica, 997-1039

D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin (1986), “The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with

Discounting or with Incomplete Information,” Econometrica, 553-554

D. Fudenberg and E. Maskin (1990), Evolution and Cooperation in Noisy Repeated

Games,” American Economic Review, 274-279

M. Kandori (1992), “Social Norms and Community Enforcement,” Review of Economic

Studies, 63-80.

M. Kandori and H. Matsushima (1998), “Private Observation, Communication and

Collusion,” Econometrica, 627-652

D. Kreps, P. Milgrom, J. Roberts, and R. Wilson (1982), “Rational Cooperation in the

Finitely Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma,” Journal of Economic Theory, 245-252

H. Matsushima (2004), “Repeated Games with Private Monitoring: Two Players,”

Econometrica, 823-852

A. Rubinstein (1986), “Finite Automata Play the Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma” Journal

of Economics Theory, 83-96

K. Schmidt (1993), “Reputation and Equilibrium Characterization in Repeated Games of

Conflicting Interests,” Econometrica, 325-351

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