对于德黑兰儿童的解救。They heard about unsuccessful attempts to obtain a plane in which to bring over the children from Tehran and of the promise from Lord Moyne’s clerk to assist in obtaining a British ship for this purpose. The committee decided to see if the British would agree to the children being dressed in General Anders’s army uniforms and brought over as Polish children. By means of this stratagem they hoped to outwit the Iraqis, who forbade the overland transfer of Jewish children to Palestine across their territories. This possibility was also presented to Kot. It was decided to try to obtain a plan through the offices of the JAE branch in the United States. [150]

土耳其恐怕犹太人会滞留在自己境内，而消极对待。Turkey has announced that it was not permitting the passage of groups of more than fifty children and allowed each new group to enter only on the condition that its predecessor had departed. The Turks were afraid that the children might wind up being “stuck” on Turkish soil as a result of complications in transport and British and Arab opposition to the entry of Jewish children into Palestine, in which case the care and responsibility for these children would fall to Turkey. [151]

罗马尼亚等国家的反复，要求允许更多的大人陪同儿童前往，从而造成了困难，间谍。More problems were raised by the governments of Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria, which at first agreed that each group be escorted by one adult but later, after all the passes had been obtained, insisted on three adult escorts. The organizers now had to find additional suitable escorts and to equip them with appropriate documentation. This took much time and meant that the departure of 320 children from Hungary, Romania, and Bulgaria was held up even though it had already been authorized. [p151]

派人在伊斯坦布尔专门负责移民工作。The JAE committee decided to cable its U.S. branch and ask it to cooperate with the Red Cross in removing these obstacles, appointing Dov Joseph to meet with the Swiss consul in order to request his help. The committee was also informed that Chaim Barlas, the Jewish Agency’s representative in Turkey, was about to return to Istanbul, where he would organiz the immigration Palestine had been approved by the British. [151]

The JAE met three days after the announcement by the allies of the mass murders occurring in Europe (17 December 1942). Ben-Gurion did not wish to concentrate on attempts to extract [p151] from the Allies declarations of support and sympathy in lieu of motivating them to take real action on the issue of rescue. His position was based on Britain’s apparent willingness to assist in the rescue of children and repeated requests for details on rescue plans. Activity on the part of Oliver Stanley, the new colonial secretary, and Sharett’s reports from London also gave cause for optimism. [p152]

英国不准备违背白皮书。It would fend off certain public pressure in London, while its “cost”—Jewish immigration to Palestine—would not be so great as to overstep the limitations of the White Paper. No one in the British government at that time was prepared to deviate from the White Paper policies. [152]

本-古里安呼吁红十字会要求德国允许儿童移民，呼吁中立国允许犹太人穿过境内或暂时停留，呼吁波兰流亡政府促使中立国能这样做。Ben-Gurion described the activities carried out thus far: an appeal to the Red Cross to request that the “German authorities allow Jews out, especially children”; a request of the neutral countries (Turkey, Sweden, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland) to allow Jews to pass through or remain briefly in their territories; and an appeal to the Polish government-in-exile to persuade the neutral countries to permit this occur. [p152]

对巴尔干犹太人的关注。Ben-Gurion stressed that negotiations were being carried out involving thousands of refugees “whom we are able and are authorized to bring over from the Balkan states”, and that it appeared that the only destination left was the “little homeland”, whose hands are “tied” and “over which we have no sovereignty”. His main sentiments were expressed in the following sentence: “Following all the horror, the blood cries of the millions, the cries of the butchered children, we are now being given a mere few thousand and the trials are many that we are subject to before we can evacuate them, until we can transport them across neutral countries and until we can bring them here”. [152]

英国的让步与坚持。If the necessary means of transport were obtainable, Britain would permit the entry of Jewish children into Palestine escorted by proportionate numbers of adults. The numbers would be limited to the five-year immigration quota, due to end 31 March 1944, and would not exceed the Twenty-nine thousand allotted to “Jewish immigration according to the White Paper”. [p154]

Stanley also reported on arrangements to bring 270 children to Palestine from Romania and Hungary, some of whom were already on their way. [p154]

英国不允许全部进入巴勒斯坦，不允许用解救儿童掩盖非法移民。He 【Stanley】also stressed that the government would not permit all surviving Jews to enter Palestine and would not permit disorganized immigration—in other words, illegal immigration by adults—to take the place of children and interfere in their rescue. [p154]

本-古里安的认真对待。Ben-Gurion stressed the importance of action no matter how limited. It was important, among other things, to show the British that the Yishuv was capable of carrying out so complex an [p155] enterprise. [p155-156]

邱吉尔访问土耳其，争取其倒向盟国。Churchill arrived in Turkey at the end of January in order to win the latter over to the Allied side, invoiking the spirit of the Allied decisions at the Casablanca conference of January 1943. [p158]

土耳其接受犹太移民的局限性。In February 1941 the Turkish parliament passed a law that allowed Jewish refugees of Nazi presecution to pass through Turkey. However, the law stipulated that passage would be permitted only to people with entry permits to their countries of destination. Anyone arriving in Turkey without a permit would be expelled immediately or imprisoned for long periods. Turkey even forbade Turkish ships—specifically their owners and crew—from engaging in the transfer of refugees. Anyone disobeying this law risked imprisonment and confiscation of his ship. [p159]

土耳其积极的一面，对营救行动睁一眼闭一眼。The Turks maintained a conspiracy of silence with regard to the activity of Jewish rescue organization such as the JDC, which helped refugees and the local community. They even silently agreed to limited operations for rescuing the Jews of Greece, which might have been due to the involvement of Ameircan and British intelligence services in these activities. [p159]

By the beginning of March 1943, Ben-Gurion had begun to convince the JAE of the need to abandon the British plan as formulated by Stanley. Stanley himself was beginning to realize that certain elements within the British government were working to thwart the changes he was trying to effect in British policy. [p160]

虽然无能力，但也要尽力而为。Now Ben-gurion repeated his own words from March 1943 at a JAE meeting: “It goes without saying that it is our duty to rescue as many Jews as possible from the Nazi hellhole, but unfortunately the issue of certificates is mere theory, since there is no promising that we can use them to evacuate this may Jews from the occupied countries”. The British announcement “is a kind of nice gesture” and no more, since its other meaning is that “by issuing these certificates it is effectively completing Jewish immigration to Palestine according to the White Paper”. [p161]

本-古里安面对的四个困境，英国坚持1929年白皮书的名额限制更消极。坐以待毙是不行的，那就意味着停止移民。Ben-Gurion wanted to avoid the following trap: in Istanbul Kaplan would learn that the logistical problems were insurmountable; the certificate, issued by region only to children from the Balkans, would be wasted because these children could not be rescued; the remaining certificates would not be sufficient for those children who could be rescued; given the lack of adequate numbers of certificates, the possibility for rescue would not be realized, causing the Jewish children, the Jewish Yishuv in Palestine, and the entire Jewish nation to emerge empty-handed. The British, meanwhile, would stick to their 1939 restrictions, so that the real consequence of the trap would be a total embargo on immigration and rescue. Ben-Gurion was sure that not reacting would be construed as an acceptance by the Yishuv and the JAE of the British tendency to include the rescue of children in a game of quotas and restrictions on the immigration of Jews to Palestine. [p161]

提出东方犹太人的解救问题，以防止英国缩减名额。In order to escape this trap—and perhaps also to deviate from the routine request that Britain change its policy—Ben-Gurion suggested informing the British that the Yishuv was now demanding that the certificates intended for the rescue of children be used to rescue Jews from the eastern Mediterranean countries of Yemen, Iraq, and Syria. They, too, were in danger, for “if there is disquiet in Palestine after the war, these Jews are liable to be the first to be exterminated”. [p161]

土耳其的铁路不对犹太人开发使用。Turkey was completely clogged, and its railway system was in disrepair. Even important cargoes belonging to the Allies were arriving in northern Turkey two months after being unloaded in the southern ports. “We demanded five railway carriages a week”, said Kaplan, “and this would have allowed us to transport, albeit uncomfortably, 300 to 350 children a week”. Even this request was not fulfilled, and the Turks would not even promise railway carriages for two hundred children a week. The rest of Kaplan’s report on the hardships of overland transport conforms with what has already been described. The Mandatory authorities also rejected the proposal to send railway carriages to Turkey from Palestine. [p163]

希望悲剧不再重演。 it was not clear whether the Soviets or the Nazis were directly responsible for the February 1942 sinking of the Struma in the Black Sea, and there was a real fear of a repeat of such events. [p163]

不都是土耳其的错，原因是多方面的。It was not simply because of Turkey that the rescue operation did not succeed. Some of the people the emissaries spoke to in Turkey did express goodwill, but they were all acting within the unrelenting restrictions of their foreign offices or other government restrictions of their foreign offices or other government agencies. They were acting within a complex system of conflicting interests that did not produce a single constant, firm, and definitive response favoring the rescue of Jews from the certain death awaiting them at the hands of the Nazis in Europe. [p163]

本-古里安先救儿童。Ben-Gurion obviously felt it necessary to evacuate the children, both for humanitarian and practical reasons. First, they would not be coming at the expense of adults and must be given priority bacause of their greater vulnerability; it was an unconditional position, whose motives were principally emotional and moral. Second, the rescue of children would pave the way for the rescue of adults. [p170]

英国的政策迷惑了犹太人。From the beginning he believed there were signs of Britain’s tendency to relax its immigration policies in Palestine. British policy continued to mislead the JAE and the emissaries. [p170]

英国退步了。They meant nothing except that the British were being extremely cautious and reserving for themselves the right to withdraw if necessary. After a while something else emerged that proved the British had not, in fact, made any changes in their rescue policies: they informed the Turks of their changed policies only eight months later—in March 1944! Without Turkey’s agreement to the entry of Jews, Britain’s decision to permit them to enter Palesine was worthless. It was Britain itself, therefore, that emptied its promise of all significance. [p174]

由于纳粹对移民的阻力大了，所以英国自身就可以摆一摆高姿态了。As far as the British were concerned, there was no dangerous risk here: First, they could rely on the Bulgarian borders being blocked by the Nazis; and, second, they had control over the timing of announcements to Turkey concerning policy change, which they delayed from summer 1943 to spring 1944. Thus, there was only a slight chance of promises being fulfilled, which was probably the motive behind the declared change in British policy toward the rescue of Jews. [p174]

罗马尼亚的承诺如果解决交通问题，可以移出犹太人。The Romanian deputy prime minister, Mihai Antonescu, that his country would permit Jews to leave if means of transportation were found. He even promised to make sure that neighboring countries (Bulgaria or Turkey) allow the Jews to cross territories. [p178]

英国对此不理睬。The london branch replied that the British government had informed it that it had already applied to the Romainian government in May and June 1943 and had received no reply. [p179]

罗马尼亚要求保障。It was announced that the Romanians would not allow the ships to sail, under the pretext that if a Soviet submarine sank them in the Black Sea, this could be blamed on Romania. [p179]

德国采取了限制措施。Germany repeatedly demanded that Jews be prevented from leaving Romania. It is also known that toward the summer the anti-Semitic atmosphere increased in Romania. [p179]

事件后犹太人的异动，而英军则已经远去了。Britain appeared concerned that the JAE would be unable to restrain extreme elements in the Yishuv and that things would get completely out of hand. Such fears also arose after the Struma affair. Underground pictures of the high commissioner captioned “Wanted: Murderer”, editorials, leaders’ speeches –all expressed great fury, pain, and deep frustration. Intelligence reports on unrest in the Haganah ranks and other underground organizations increased Britain’s concern.   During the spring and summer months of 1943, the Yishuv was hoarding weapons and the underground movements were increasing in strength. Fears grew as Allied troops continued to move from the Middle East to the new battlefronts: at first to North Africa, then to Italy, and finally into western Europe. [p179]

英国软化移民立场的别有用心，因为还有别的障碍存在。英国感到有必要通过帮助解救一些犹太人来改善自己的形象。The British apparently wanted to soften their harsh policies by exhibiting signs of concern for the refugees, but this willingness and these promises could never be carried out because of obstacles unconnected to them.    They felt a need to soften the impression they were making of objecting to the ransom plans, which they viewed as a threat of mass immigration, by helping to rescue a few Jews. [p180]

本-古里安的总结，把原因归结为德国的阻挠。Several days later, Ben-Gurion spoke at a Mapai meeting, where he referred to the complexity of the rescue attempts in general and that of children in particular. He also rejected the criticism hurled at him and the other Mapai members in the JAE. Ben-Gurion delivered an abbreviated description of the efforts to obtain exit and transit permits and safe passage certificates, and of the pressure exerted by the Germans on their satellite nations to prevent the exit of Jews from their territories. It was an insurmountable obstacle. The Germans were again blamed as the primary reason for the failure to rescue Jerwish children. [p183]