委员会盲目扩大带来了危害。The inclusion of the Revisionists and Agudat Israel did not silence the conflicts and mutual suspicions that lingered throughout the life of the committee—which is precisely why it developed into a body devoid of decisive authority and true operational power. Another reason was its constant expansion. The Committee of Four became the Committee of Five, then the Committee of Ten, and, with the addition of two Revisionist members, the Committee of Twelve—and this, apparently, was not the end of the matter. [p130]

委员会的领导人员。 By mid-January 1943 there was a committee in place that answered the needs of the main bodies in the Yishuv. It consisted of tweleve individuals, five of whom, “established” and familiar members of the Actions committee, were also members of [p130] the JAE. The seven new recruits were: Yitzhak Meir Levin of Agudat Israel and Benyamin Mintz of Po’alei Agudat Israel; Yitzhak Ben-Zvi (Mapai), Shlomo Zalman Shragai (Mizrahi), and Yehoshua Suprasky (General Zionists)—all members of the National Council Executive; and Revisionists Joseph Klarman and Hermann Segal. Yitzhak Gruenbaum headed the committee, a nomination that was self-explanatory. [p130-131]

Everyone wanted to meet Ben-Gurion, to persuade him of their demand for representation on the new committee. [p131]

委员会的局限性。Thus, within only two months (late November 1942-January 1943) the Rescue Committee had become a clumsy organization consisting of some sixty people. [p132]

Given this fact, the Rescue Committee was a not a place where important decisions were made. Docu-[p132]-mentation of the time shows that the committee’s main activity consisted of reviewing reports—some of which were not even complete. The committee’s various offices did not receive important information that arrived at the JAE, not to mention news received by the more clandestine bodies that dealt with the rescue issue. [p132]

委员会的历史作用。The first task of the Rescue Committee, at least during it’s early stages, was to foster the cooperation of as many sectors of the Yishuv as possible.  The JAE’s Committee of Four was the core that linked the other elements to each other. Ben-Gurion was obviously involved in recruiting the support of the [p132] National Council and securing the approval of the Zionist Actions Committee. This strategy reduced the danger of the JAE losing control over the public. [p132-133]

Through the formation of the Rescue Committee, the JAE’s senior position was sanctioned by the religious and secular right in return for insignificant concessions and the establishment of a body that was almost totally devoid of authority. [p133]

The Rescue Committee was the target of criticism from all sides, but it did not increase the process of dissolution in the Yishuv and actually served as the basis for cooperation—even if only temorarity—among the various forces. Thus, the bonds were tightened between the Mapai leadership in the JAE and Agudat Israel and, to a lesser extent, the Revisionists. The other organizations that joined the committee also become more “coalitionist” and “oppositionist”. [p133]承受了社会舆论的压力，为本-古里安分忧了

Nonetheless, it may be assumed that he realized the political importance of this committee as an emergency coalition body that would help the JAE guide the public through a very difficult period. [p133]

委员会主席的作用。Gruenbaum, a JAE member, was a key figure in the JAE’s control of the committee (which he chaired) and his personality and behavior suited the real task that the committee finally fulfilled.      Justifiably or not, Gruenbaum drew fire upon himself, but in doing so he made it possible for others to work undisturbed by public pressure. [p134]

本-古里安的不重视。The Rescue Committee’s main task was acting like a “lightning rod” rather than functioning as an operational body. It is this characteristic of the committee that might help explain why Ben-Gurion never addressed it throughout the war. He attended only one meeting at the end of 1944 at Gruenbaum’s request, and when he arrived it was to announce the JAE’s intent to disband the committee. 本-古里安唯一一次拜访委员会就是来宣布解散它。

解救行动的真正领导者。The “undeclared triumvirate” and the “parallel system” governed the aid and rescue activity. It was a system of planning and initiative, supervision and operation that worked around what was known as the Section for Special Operations in the JAE’s Political Department, which included Reuven Zaslani (Shiloah), Teddy Kollek, Ehud Avriel, Eliahu Epstein (Elath), and Shaul Meirov (Avigur)—the latter was not really a member of the Political Department and belonged mainly to the Mossad Le Aliyah Bet. Other members of this group included Ze’ev Schind, Wenja Pomeranz (Hadari), and Menahem Bader, who sometimes functioned as part of a system that led directly from the operations “field” to the top of the political hierarchy. There was hardly any connection between this group and the Rescue Committee, and often even the JAE plenum was unware of its secret activity. [p134]

The group acted on direct orders from an undeclared “triumvirate” leadership (whose power was not equally divided) consisting of Ben-Gurion, Kaplan, and Sharett (in that order). This setup, which existed parallel to other political systems already described, grew out of the complex Yishuv political structure. It drew its justification from the importance of its activity to the Jewish nation and the need for secrecy and operational discipline. It was this body that made the most vital decisions and carried out the main rescue attempts. There is no point in determining what the Yishuv did to rescue the Jews of Europe during the Second World War by examining the activity of the large, clumsy, and inept body that assumed the pretentious title of Rescue Committee. [p134]

Gruenbaum 是本-古里安的同乡，波兰普朗斯克镇。[p134]

悲喜交加的解救行动。This, therefore, is the story of rescue attempts full of imagination, courage, and hope, but also of desperate, painful, and futile attempts. [p140]

解救的五种方式。 Five rescue concepts that Yishuv were involved in can be discerned: “Large Rescue”; “Small Rescue”; the dispatch of emissaries to occupied regions; motivating the Allies into the disrupting the annihilation process by bombing extermination camps; recruitment into the British armed forces.

第一种：Plans such as the “Large Rescue” or the “big projects” were mainly intended to remove Jews from Nazi-occupied regions or beyond the borders of Europe (this plan was in effect throughout most of the war).   

解救儿童计划也在其中。 Efforts at rescuing children belong to this category of rescue attempts, as do ransom and exchange plans. In the course of the war the Yishuv was presented with at least three ransom proposals. The first was to ransom the Jews of Romania expelled to Transnistria. The second, a ransom plan to rescue the Jews of Slovakia, later developed into the “Europe Plan”, a broader attempt to rescue the remaining Jews of Europe. The third and best know plan, commonly known as “Goods for Blood”, was presented by Joel Brand for his mission from Hungary to Istanbul. A fourth ransom plan was presented to Saly Mayer, the representative of the JDC in Seitzerland.

The proposals to ransom the deportees to Transnistria and the Jews of Slovakia were raised in late 1942- early 1943, while the Brand Plan was presented in the spring of 1944 and was aimed at rescuing the Jews of Hungary as well as those Jews remaining in Europe at that time. At the end of 1944 another plan was proposed in the wake of an announcement by Admiral Miklos Horthy (Hungary’s leader) that he intended to allow children and (later) adults to leave his country.

Another aspect of the “Large Rescue” consisted of an exchange plan for the rescue of Jews in return for the release of German prisoners of war and German nationals caught in areas controlled by the Allies since the beginning of the war. One such group was the exchange group of sixty-nine that arrived in Palestine in November 1942. In the end, the hopes raised by this kind of action were dashed. The Jewish nation lacked a state and thus had no German soldiers or nationals under its control. The Allies naturally preferred the release of their own nationals and sol-[p140]-diers and placed their names at the top of the list of exchange candidate.

第二种。要求纳粹提高待遇。Under the rubric “Small Rescue” or “small projects” was the second type of aid and rescue activity aimed at increasing the chance for Jews to survive under Nazi control: smuggling or open dispatch of food and clothing parcels, medicine, and money; secretly proving forged documents, including those proving that the bearer is not a Jew or is citizen of a neutral country; and funding and organizing “walks”, that is, the smuggling of Jews out of dangerous areas to those that were relatively safe.

第三种。组建地下武装反抗纳粹。A third kind of rescue attempt consisted of the dispatch of Yishuv emissaries in order to help Jews survive in occupied areas, to confound as far as possible the Nazi murder operation, and to organize Jewish resistance cells in Europe. The best known of these activities was included in the secret collaboration between the Yishuv and British and British and American intelligence and sabotage units. Similar possibilities, including sea landings and overland penetration, were also examined in conjunction with the governments-in-exile of Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as with underground groups in Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary.

第四种，轰炸德国以阻止把犹太人向集中营聚集。The Yishuv also attempted to rescue the Jews of Europe by demanding that the British and Americans bomb civilian targets in order to wreak havoc and motivate the Nazis to cease the annihilation. This issue was discussed immediately after the official announcement on the extermination. It was already known that the Allies had made reprisal bombing attacks in Europe. The Yishuv, of course, was itself unable to carry out bombing raids, not having an air force of its own, but it was proposed that Jewish pilots from Palestine and elsewhere take part to represent the Jewish response. In the summer of 1944 the JAE appealed to the United States and Britain to bomb the extermination camps and the roads leading to them.

第五种，加入英国军队。Recruitment into the British armed forces was also seen as an effort by the Yishuv on behalf of the Jews of Europe. Their bitter fate motivated many young people in the Yishuv to join the ranks of those fighting against the Nazis. More than thirty thousand young men and women joined various branches of the British armed forces in the hope of shortening the war and thus rescuing those Jews remaining in Europe. Military training for the Yishuv youngsters and Holocaust survivors was an additional incentive raised in discussions prior to their recruitment. It was seen both as a means of rescuing Jews and as an important step in establishing an independent Jewish army.

Some of these activities began even before the Yishuv actually understood what was happening in Europe. Recruitment into the British forces, the secret collaboration between the Yishuv and British and American intelligence and espionage organizations, the rescue of children through legal or illegal immigration—all these began long before the Nazis set off on their journey of systematic murder, and some even antedated the war. [p141]

把儿童作为解救对象的便利之处。The Yishuv leadership believed that immigration of children would be less likely to arouse the opposition of the British and the Arabs because children could not bear arms and, at least during the early years, would be more of a burden on the Yishuv than a threat to its enemies.[p143]

The Yishuv decided to give preference to the rescue of Jewish children in the belief that it would be easier to raise funds on their behalf among the Jews of the free world. They also believe that money spend on rescuing children would not cause dissent in the Yishuv and the Zionist movement since no one could offer a more worthy group on which to spend the little funds available. [p143]

Children did not constitute a labor force and were therefore the first to be put to death. Their special condition was discussed by the JAE in November 1942, following a report by the sixtynine. Moshe Shapira (a member of Hapo’el Hamizrahi and Dobkin’s colleague that they accept the offer by several neutral countries to take in Jewish children on the condition that they be repatriated once the war was over. This effort was aimed mainly at Sweden, where the idea developed into widespread action. [p143]

维希政府提供的机会。Those connected to a rescue plan begun in June 1942 in Vichy France. This plan was initiated by Pinkney Tuck, the American charge d’affaires in France, who protested to Pierre Laval, prime minister of the Vichy government, about the way his government was treating Jews, especially children to the United States, there was more than a hint of ridicule concerning hypocritical American and British immigration laws. Tuck, however, pounced on Laval’s promise and repeated America’s official commitment to remove seven thousand Jewish children from France.   The children’s parents had been expelled to eastern Europe while they remained behind in France. [p144]

When the plan was proposed to rescue Jewish children from France, the Yishuv expressed its willingness to accept them all. This decision and early preparations preceded official knowledge of the annihilation. Following this news, it was decided to allocate one third of the general quota to children from France. In the meantime, however, the picture in France had changed. In the wake of Allied landings in North Africa on 8 November 1942, the German army occupied all of France and diplomatic relations between the Vichy government and the United States were severed. The JAE’s decision came at a time when it was doubtful that the Tuck plan could be put into effect, [p144] since Jewish children trapped in France were already under direct German control. [p144-145]

本-古里安也认为应先救儿童。”First and foremost, take out the children of Israel… who might not even know yet that they are Jews and that for this crime they are sentenced to death. Remove them from the valley of death and let them into your countries, let them into the neutral countries! Let them into here our homeland! Five hundred thousand Palestinian Jews would be happy to adopt the children of the ghetto”. Ben-Gurion called for the opening of all the gates, not only those of Palestine. The success of Tuck’s plan meant not only that Jewish children would be rescued from France but that this would pave the way for other Jewish children to be rescued from Europe. He went on to say: “The children of Israel, the nation’s future and its hope, who were chosen by the tyrant to be the first target of his fanatic fury, will be the first to be rescued. And if the rumors are true… that in order to release the Reich from the burden of supporting them, the children are sentence to destruction, [then] these children will be extracted from the … talons and all the gates will be opened immediately to let them in”. [p145]

与波兰流亡政府的商谈。Ben-Gurion also raised the matter of rescuing Jewish children at a meeting with Polish minister Stanislaw Kot during the latter’s visit to Palestine. Kot had met Eliyahu Dobkin in August 1942 in Tehran, where they discussed the possibility of saving many of the four hundred thousand Jews who had escaped or were deported to the eastern part of the Soviet Union from the areas captured by the latter from Poland. Dobkin also mentioned the need to rescue the “Tehran children” (a group of Jewish children from [p145] Poland who wandered the length and breadth of Russia, ending up in Tehran on their way to Palestine) amd resquested that Jewish soldiers in Polish general Wladislaw Anders’s army in the Middle East be allowed to remain in Palestine. [p145] 逃入苏联的犹太人，想要经过伊朗到达巴勒斯坦的犹太儿童。

Kot’s third meeting with local public figures took place after the arrival of the exchange group and the commotion this caused. He met with ex-Polish community leaders Drs. Moshe Kleinbaum (Sneh) and Avraham Stupp. [p145]

12月3日，本-古里安对波兰流亡政府提出三点请求。First, he asked that the latter press the Vatican into exercising its influence in the occupied regions, hoping the pope might be able to influence politicians in Germany and statellite states occupied by Germany. Sneh and Stupp had presented this request before and Ben-Gurion’s appeal lent it greater weight. Second, he asked Kot for help in bringing to Palestine the Jewish refugees deported by the Russians to the eastern Poland. According to Ben-Gurion, the Russians had no objection to the transfer of the refugees to Palestine; this opinion was based on a check he made of the Russian embassy in Washington. Ben-Gurion also repeated Dobkin and Sharett’s requests for help in bringing over the “Tehran children”. Third, he asked Kot to help the JAE in its efforts to infiltrate its emissaries into Poland, a reference to the plan the Yishuv was concocting with the British involving sending Yishuv “commando brigades” into Europe.

Kot replied that the Jews expelled from Poland to the USSR were considered Soviet citizens by the Soviet authorities and thant Polish government-in-exile could do noting to cancel the ban on their exit. He rejected Ben-Gurion’s proposal to disguise the “Tehran children” as soldiers of Anders’s army and smuggle them in through Iraq. [p146]

呼吁国际支持儿童计划On 6 December, before Kot’s reception, Ben-Gurion had reported to the JAE on their meeting, emphasizing that “the first to be rescued would be the children”. He also pointed to other things that could be done, such as appealing to Eleanor Roosevelt to establish and head an international institution for the rescue of children, asking neutral countries to declare that they would be willing to permit the temporary asylum of Jewish children in their territories, and promoting activity on behalf of “exchange plans” to include Jews. [p147]

Border smuggling is a complex and complicate process, especially in the chaotic atmosphere typical of wartime. It might be possible to smuggle several hundred children, but smuggling thousands or even tens of thousands is an almost impossible proposition. [p147]

罗马尼亚地区犹太复国主义领导人的无力，悲观。Silence was the order of the day, so suitable local leadership was necessary to alleviate doubts and offer emotional support. Often this natural leadership was missing. Some of the community heads had managed to escape occupied lands in time. The remaining leaders were the first to be exterminated. Others were not Zionists and often frustrated rescue atempts. When local leadership did exist, It was frequently spread among several different political factions. This was the situation in Romania, a central locus for rescuing children, where emissaries were obliged to spend time and energy in often unsuccessful attempts at settling feuds. [p147]

其他国家的额外要求,这与战争环境下的资金紧张构成了矛盾。 Throughout the sea voyages, food and basic supplies dad to provided for the children. Since some of the countries that had agreed to affer refuge to Jewish children demanded external aid to support them, if the rescue operation were to prove successful it was necessary to provide such assistance. Virtually every link in the rescue chain depended on large sums of money, which is not readily available in time of war. Moreover, financing rescue operations was an extremely complicated affair due to the complete ban on the transfer of monies from Western countries into the occupied areas. [p148]

面对灾难，仅仅口头声明抗议还是不够的，更要做出行动。In the face of the “enormous tragedy”, declarations were not sufficient. Efforts had to be concentrated in two directions: “Toward a swift… removal of Jews and especially women and children from enemy states and first of all from the Balkans, from which there is a direct overland route… Efforts must… be made… to establish a Jewish army”. [p148]

本-古里安眼中的第一步行动,英国的同意。Here he was hinting at Britain’s willingness to permit the entry into Palestine of four thousand Bulgarian children accompanied by five hundred women. Britain’s agreement, which arrived one day prior to the dispath of the letter to Frankfurter (7 December 1943), was seen by Ben-Gurion as the first step in a long struggle. [p149]

不切实际的对于儿童数量的争辩。There was therefore great anticipation in the country for a wave of immigrant children to arrive in Palestine. Within a short time the issue of integrating the potential immigrants turned into a full-scale polemic. In the end, the children did not arrive and all the documentation on the subject remains a grotesque memorial to the helplessness of Jews in those days. [p149]

为解救儿童建立专门的委员会。In the spirit of his belief in centralized authority, he [Ben-Gurion] proposed that a JAE committee formulate a broad program for integrating children in Palestine. The JAE accepted his proposals to inform the British of the willingness to accept twenty-five thousand children and to establish an integration planning committee. This committee—consisting of Ben-Gurion, Gruenbaum,Kaplan, and Dobkin and Shapira, the two Immigration Department heads—illustrates the importance Ben-Gurion attached to the matter. [p150]

不能因为经费问题而耽误了解救计划。Ben-Gurion set his sights on al large-scale rescue operation, reprimanding his colleagues and warning them not to involve themselves in unimportant issues such as the cost of supporting a child. No noe brought up the cost of integrating a child as a reason for not bringing children into the country,although there were some who dwelt on the division of financial responsibility among various elements in the Yishuv. [p150]

The JAE’s Special Subcommittee for Child Immigration met for the first time on 14 December. [p150]