74      B.F.Shtein to A.Ia. Vyshinskii (Moscow)

COPY:AVP RF,F.07,Op.12A,P.42,D.6, LL.134-41

Moscow ,6 March 1947

To Comrade A.Ia.Vyshinkii,

THE PALESTINE QUESTION

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1.      The British Position

For Great Britain, Palestine has always played the part of strategic cover for the Suez Canal, which, like Egypt, guaranteed free communications with India. As Britain saw more and more clearly that it would have to leave Egypt, so Palestine’s position become more important.

  In Palestine during World War I, Great Britain decided to rely on the Jews. Balfour’s Declaration of 2 November 1917 promised to create a ‘Jewish national home’ in Palestine. This declaration was included in the mandate given to Britain by the League of Nations in 192[2]. Herbert Samuel, a Jew, was appointed high commissioner. In the first period of British rule in Palestine, they relied mostly on the Zionists, and supported both Jewish immigration into Palestine and capital investment by major Jewish financiers for the development of the economy.

  In 1925 this policy underwent a complete turnabout. Influenced by the growth of the Arab national movement in a number of countries in the Middle East, Great Britain decided to put its stake on the Arabs instead of the Jews. Herbert Samuel was recalled, and was replaced by Field Marshal Lord Plumer, whose policy relied on the Arab sheikhs. Jewish immigration to Palestine was greatly reduced.

  However, this shift in British policy in Palestine did not bring the expected results. The Arabs had no intention of helping the British turn Palestine into a British colony, and continued their struggle for its independence. In the whole period of mandatory government in Palestine there was no cessation either of the Arab struggle for independence, or of the struggle between Arabs and Jews. Since 1937 every single plan put forward by the British government for the solution of the Palestine. Great Britain tried, and is still trying, to keep in its own hands the role of arbiter between the two conflicting groups (Jews and Arabs).

  The British government’s decision to hand over the Palestine problem to the United Nations was taken for the following reasons:

1)      The stalemate which had been reached in the British government’s negotiations with both Arabs and Jews and the impossibility of finding a plan acceptable to both sides.

1.      The first part of the document, which recounts recent events in Palestine, has been omitted.

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2)      The understanding that support for the status quo in Palestine by force would require the despatch of substantial armed forces and the expenditure of considerable material resources, which would have been extremely difficult given the present strained state of British finances.

3)      The opportunity to transfer Great Britain’s main strategic base in the Middle East from Palestine to Transjordan, an operation which was secured by the Anglo-Jordanian treaty of April 1946.

4)      Increased pressure from the United States (see Below).

Referring the Palestine questine question to the United Nations did not, of course, mean that Great Britain fully and finally relinquished Palestine and was ready for an immediate withdrawal of its troops. The decision to refer is, in present circumstances, a very adroit diplomatic manoeuvre. Bevin is well aware that a practical solution of the Palestine problem is not something simple which could be quickly achieved by the UN. On the other hand, Great Britain continues to consider itself the mandatory power, from which it follows that no decision on Palestine can be reached without British agreement. The colonial secretary, Creech-Jones, has stated that Great Britain has no intention of giving up the mandate. In this way, by shifting responsibility for the Palestine question onto the United Nations, Great Britain at once maintains its presence and its troops in Palestine. It is gaining time and preserving its position.

3.The United State’ position

 The United States’ interest in Palestine dates from before World War I. In 1919 President Wilson put forward the idea of a United States Mandate in Palestine. In 1922 the United States Congress adopted a resolution that ‘the United States favours the establishment of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine’. This American interest in Palestine was determined mainly by two factors: the presence of oil and the role of the Jews in the United States.

US interest in Palestine greatly increased during World War II as a result of the receipt of American co9ncessions to exploit the rich oil deposits of Saudi Arabia and the plan to build an American oil pipeline from Arabia to the Mediterranean and construct oil fefineries in Palestine.

Alresdy in Roosevelt’s time, the United States expressed disapproval of the British White Paper of 1939 and called for an increase in Jewish immigration.However, during World war II, Roosevelt took a very cautious line on the Palestine question, since he did not wish to antagonize the Arab states.

Under Truman the United States came out decisively in support of Jewish demands for Palestine. In August 1945 Truman asked Britain for permission for 100,000 Jews to enter Palestine. We have alresdy set out the United States’ position in the joint Anglo-American Committee. The day following the adjournment of the London Conference on Palestine, on 2 October 1946, Truman sent a message to Prime Minister Attlee in which he said that the United stateds would not support the plan for partition of Palestine as propased by the British, since this plan had met opposttion from the main political parties in the US.

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The United States’ support for Jews in the Palestine questine question led to sharp polemic between Great Britain and the United States. In a debate in the House of Commons on 25 February, Bevin referred to the position of the United States and emphasized that Great Britain was the mandatory power and responsible for Palestine. Bevin said further that the publication of Truman’s statement on the admission of 100,000 Jews to Palestine was the cause of the breakdown of negotiations. Bevin added:’ I cannot solve problems which are the subject of an electoral campaingn’. Bevin was basically right, since the United States’ position on Palestine, as we have indicated above, depends in good measure on the existence of two million Jewish voters, whose votes are sought by both the Republican and the Democratic parties.

Bevin’s speech aroused a sharp reaction in the US. The White House released a statement rejecting the view that ‘the American interest in Palestine is to be explained by party politics’.

For the United States, Palestine is, of course, exceptionally important both strategically and economically. To leave Great Britain in power in Palestine would mean British control of the export of oil from Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, possession of Palestine (in one form or another)would give the United States an important stronghold on the Mediterranean where, as we know, the US has no other such bases.

4.A Possible position for the USSR

The forthcoming discussion of the Palestine question at the UN makes it necessary for the USSR to formulate its position, which it has not yet done.

  The USSR must take a decisive stand in favour of the abolition of the British Mandate. As mandatory power, Great Britain has not coped with its task successfully. During the whole period of the mandate, that is, for more than a quarter of a century. Great Britain has not managed to establish order in the country, nor to prevent almost continuous bloodshed. The replacement of the mandate by British trusteeship is out of the question. A different name would change nothing. One might consider a collective trusteeship,either of the United Nations or of a number of states (possibly the permanent members of the Security Council). But the establishment of such a trusteeship in Palestine is countered by the fact that the population of that country (both Jews and Arabs) are mature enough for full independence. Neither Arabs nor Jews will agree to any sort of trusteeship, but will call for full independence.

  The Soviet Union cannot cannot do other than support the demand for the full independence of Palestine as a state. The first and essential condition for this independence must be the withdrawal of British troops from the country.

  However, giving Palestine independence will not resolve Jewish-Arab antagonism there. The USSR can see no way to solve this problem except by democratic constitution which would give full and genuinely equal rights (both civil-political and national) to the whole population of Palestine. This constitution must be drawn up by the United Nations, which must then ensure that it is imolemonred.

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  Great Britain’s referral of the Palestine questine to the United Nations offers the USSR its first opportunity not only to express its point of view on the matter, but also to play an effective part in deciding the fate of Palestine.

                                                 B.Shtein