73        M.A.Maksimov and S.Nemchinov to A.Ia.Vyshinskii (Moscow)

COPY: AVP RF,F.07,OP.12A, P.42,D.6,LL.130-3

Moscow, 5 march 1947

Secret

THE PALESTINE　QUESTION

(October 1946-February 1947)

The London Conference on Palestine, which opened on September 1946, has ended in failure.1

  The British government, on the pretext that they needed to study the Arab plan for the state structure of Palestine,postponed the conference first untill December 1946, and then again, untill 27 January 1947.

  The Jews, who did not attend the London conference, rejected both the British and the Arab proposals. They called for free immigration of Jews into Palestine, transferring control of immigration into the hands of the Jewish Agency, and the creation of an independent Jewish state.

  On 9 December 1946, the 27^th World Zionist Congress opened in Basel and pass a resolution expressing indignation that the British government was continuing the policy elaborated in the 1939 White paper.

  According to this resolution:

1.      Palestine must become a jewish state.

2.      It must be open to Jewish immigration.

3.      Control of immigration must be handed ove to the Jewish Agency.

4.      The Jewish Agency must be granted the powers nedessary for the creation of a Jewish state in Palestine.

The Congress also decided to forbid Jews to take part in the work of the new London conference on the Palestine question.

  The representatives of the Arab states and the Palestine Arabs agreed to take part in the new London conference, but re-affirmed their determination to champion the idea of creating an independent Arab state in Palestine and to reject any plan to partition the country. On 6 December 1946, US Secretary of State James Byrnes stated that the United States would accept the British invitation to send an observer to the forthcoming conference in London, provided that Jewish leaders also took part in it.

  That was the situation which faced the new London conference, which opened on 27 January 1947.

  The conference was attended by delegations from the following Arab states: Iraq,Egypt, Siria,Lebanon,Transjordan and Saudi Arabia. There was also a delegation of Palestinian Arabs. The British delegation was headed by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin and Colonial secretary Arthur Creech-Jones.

1.      see Doc.67,n.3.

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  Jewish representatives took no part in the conference’s work, but they were in London and held separate talks with Bevin and Creech-Jones.

  At the outset of the conference, the head of the Syrian delegation, Fares al-Khuri, said that the Arab plan for the structure of a Palestinian state was the most just since it guaranteed civil and political rights to all citizens of Palestine. “therefore”, Khuri went on,”the Arab cannot take part in the discussion of a plan which envisages the partition of Palestine and the creation of a Jewish state.” Jamal al-Husayni, the leader of the Palestinian Arabs, expressed similar views.

  The British government presented the Syrian delegates and the Jewish Agency with a new plan for the state structure of Palestine, Jewish and Arab, which would be subject to a central tripartite (Arab-Jewish-British) government, established in Jerusalem.  Jerusalem would be divided into three districts: Jewish, Christian and Muslim.

  The Arabs would have to guarantee the right of the Jewish minority living in their canton. The Jewish canton would hanve to accept the same obligations with respect to the Arab monorrity. A further 100,000 Jewish immigrants must be admitted to the Jewish canton.

 The tripartite government would be of a temporary nature, and would exist for four years, after which a bi-national constituent assembly would be formed, which would draft a constitution for the Palestinian state. Future relations between Great Britain and the Palestinian state would be regulated by agreement. The futher Palestinian state would be subject to a five-year trusteeship.

  This drift was rejected by both the Arabs and the Jews, although the latter announced that they were ready to discuss with the British government any ‘compromise proposal for the creation of a viable Jewish state in the territory of Palestine’.

  Judging from Bevin’s words.(in his speech in the House of Commons on 19 February 1947), the Jewish Agency proposed at the beginning of the conference that the British government  continue running the administration according to the mandate on such a basis as would enable the Jews to countinue to enlarge the Jewish national home until immigration would give them a numerical majority in Palestine and they could call for the creation of an independent Jewish state in the whole country.

  On 14 February 1947, Bevin told the Arab delegates at the conference and the representatives of the Jewish Agency that, since the British government’s proposals had been rejected by the Arabs, it had decided to hand the Palestine question over to the United Nations.

  The Jewish leaders categorically object to turning the Palestine question over to the Trusteeship Council. They propose that the United Nations prepare a detailed report on the course of events in Palestine, set up a special committee on the Palestine problem, and then pass the conclusions of this committee on to the United Nations for discussion.

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  The Arab leaders consider that this authoritative international organization woll be able to find a correct and just solution of the Palestine problem which will satisfy the age-old yearnings of the Palestinian Arabs.

  Speaking on the Palestine question in the House of Commons on 25 February 1947, Bevin stated that’ it is still possible to settle this matter without recourse to the United Nations if the two sides (I,e, Arabs and Jews) abandon their irreconcilable positions’.

  In conclusion, we should note, on the one hand, Bevin’s and on the other, Creech-Jones’ attitude to the problem of the mandate. Bevin, whose speech was largely demagogic and aimed mainly at placating the Arabs, emphasized that the mandate had outlived its time and was ‘in fact impracticable’, while  Creech-Jones, the colonial secretary, stated bluntly:

  ‘We are not going to the United Nations in order to give up the mandate. We are going to the United Nations in orser to raise the issue and to ask for advice on how to implement the mandate, if that can be done in its present from.’

  On the basis of this frank statement by the British colonial secretary, it may be concluded that Britain is not about to let go of Palestine, but only that, finding itself in a difficult position, it is looking for new ways of enabling it to go on governing Palestine with the approval of the United Nations.

  If Britain hands over the Palestine question to the United Nations, our position must evidently rest on these point:

1. The British Mandate over Palestine must be ended, since it makes a fundamental solution impossible and creates a constant threat to security in the Near East.

2.British troops must be withdrawn from Palestine in order to normalize the situation.

3.The United Nations must prepare the conditions necessary for the creation of a single, independent and democratic Palestine which will ensure that all the people living there will enjoy equal national and democratic rights.

4.The Jewish question in Western Europe cannot be resolved by immigration to Palestine, since only the complete eradication of the roots of fascism and the democratization of the countries of Western Europe can give the Jewish masses normal living conditions.2

                    Deputy Director of the Near East Department

                                           M. Maksimov

                           Attache of the Near East Department

                                           S. Nemchinov

2.Endorsed by I.Samylovskii on 4 March 1947.

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