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65  D.S.Solod to I.V.Samylovskii (Moscow)

[Beirut] 13 August 1946

Secret

To the Director of the Near East Department of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Comrade I.V.Samylovskii,

   Further to our minute No.272/s of 30.7.1946:

   I am enclosing certain material from the local press on the Palestine question, in particular comments on the British government's proposed plan for a federal structure in Palestine.

   It can be seen from this material that, as early as 10 July of this year, the British newspaper The Times reported some Anglo-American circles considered it necessary to partition Palestine. There weeks later, on 31 July, British Deputy Prime Minister Herbert Morrision put to the House of Commons the British plan for the partition of Palestine into four zones: one Arab, one Jewish, the holy places and the Negev. 1

   The most important and fundamental point, of which we should take note, is the detachment of the Negev- the desert area of southern Palestine- as an independent zone, which, according to the British plan, would come entirely under British administration, since neither 'a local administration' nor 'parliament' could be formed in this area, as is proposed for the other zones, for the simple reason that there is no population in the Negev.

   Plenty of information suggests that the British singled out the Negev as an independent zone for the following two reasons:

   1. When they from a federal Palestine 'state', the British will have to cover it with the figleaf of 'trusteeship' or even 'independence', which could in certain circumstances make it difficult for them to keep their armed forces in Palestine. This in turn could only impede the links of their troops in Transjordan with the ports on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean. Again, although no one is yet saying what particular piece of land is understood by the 'Negev region', or what towns or settlements in southern Palestine would be included in it, there is enough evidence for us to say with confidence that the British will choose the port of Gaza as the centre of the Negev region. In short, the British authorities' selection of the Negev as an independent zone is prompted in the first place by their strategic plan to turn Transjordan and the southern part of Palestine into a general military bridgehead, in case for any reason the British have to withdraw their troops from the Arab and Jewish parts of Palestine.

注释：

1. See 'Extract from the Speech by Herbert Morrison in the House of Commons on 31 July, 1946' in Cohen, The British Decision to Evacuate Palestine, pp.8-13.

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   It should be added that the creation of such a strategic bridgehead in the Negev area would completely isolate Egypt from Syria, Lebanon and northern Palestine by a cordon of British troops.

   2. Apart from these British military and strategic reasons for separating the Negev, they also want to use it to dupe the Americans.

In my letter No.05/S of  3 January this year, 2 I noted that a certain clash of interests between the British and the Americans could be detected o0ver Palestine, namely that the Americans are seeking a solution to the Palestine question which will enable them to bring the Arabian oil pipeline to the eastern coast of the Mediterranean without passing through British territories or territories under British influence. For the Americans, one of the most suitable ports on the eastern coast of the Mediterranean is the Palestinian port of Gaza-- if it would be assigned to the Jewish zone or Jewish province, as it is called in the British plan for the partition of Palestine.

   By making the Negev region a special zone under British rule, the British are quite openly opposing these unspoken but scarcely disguised Amreican intentions. They have, in reality, deprived the Americans of the main factor which could have justified their agreement to the partition of Palestine.

   In connection with this British ruse, President Truman, as was to be expected, has refused to approve the British plan for the partition of Palestine, and has thereby seriously upset the British plans as a whole. 3

   I think that the main reason why Truman rejected the British plan is the detachment of the Negev region. Confirmation of this may be found in the fact that the Americans do not reject the idea of a partition of Palestine in principle but only the British plan.

   Thus, for instance, today's local newspapers carry reports that the Americans are putting forward their own plan for the partition of Palestine, not into four parts, as the British have no reason to object to treating the holy places, i.e., the towns of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, as a separate region.

   This is what the newspapers say about the American plan:

   The New York correspondent of the Evening News gives the following four points in the American experts' plan for the partition of Palestine:

   1. The partition of Palestine into two zones, one Arab and one Jewish, with the Jewish zone considerably larger than that which is proposed in the British plan--4900 square km. Insteas of 2900 square km.

   2. General autonomy for the Jews in their zone, and a limitation of the powers of the British high commissioner.

注释：

2. Doc. 56

3.  Truman received the Morrison-Grady proposals on Palestine on 29 July 1946. On the next day, Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed the British ambassador in the US that the president could not make a statement supporting the recommendations (see FRUS, 1946, Vol.VII, pp.673-4).

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   3. The Jews themselves are to determine the upper limit of immigration.

   4. The United States is prepared to finance operation for an agreed-upon period:

   This American plan clearly reveals the Anglo-American differences on the Palestine question-differences which are linked to the aim of both sides to consolidate their hold on the southern part of the Palestine coast of the Mediterranean. True, one cannot yet infer that these differences will lead to a deterioration of Anglo-American relations, but it is plainly a sign of things to come.

  Among other remarks we should note former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill's statement in the House of Commons that if the Arabs resist British intentions for Palestine, they should be told that British troops will remain in Egypt. 4 To be sure, there is no reason to suppose that British troops really will leave Egypt if the Arabs accept British measures for Palestine, but Churchill's political blackmail will make it easier for the local British stooges to make a deal with the British, since this will even more obviously justify their actions by presenting them as measure taken in a desperate situation.

   Another extraordinarily significant development in the Palestine question is the answer given by Ahmad al-Shuqayri, the leader of the Arab Bureau, 5 to a question about the Arabs' attitude to Russian intervention in the Palestine problem. ' I personally think', said Shuqayri, 'that Russia has every reason to intervene. Russia is the state which freed itself from racial and religious differences in the most auspicious manner.'

   This statement provoked an immediate painful reaction from London, where it was noted, in the first place, that Shuqayri's statement was just his personal opinion and did not reflect the point of view of the Arab Bureau. At the same time a most effective device was brought into play, because the communist parties of Palestine and Lebanon were immediately entangled in the matter, and to be accused of Communist Party membership has now become quite dangerous here.

   The appearance of such a cavalier and insolent British plan for the partition of Palestine, and such a barefaced seizure of the southern part of the country, turning it into an uncontrolled British possession, has become possible, thanks to the position of capitulation to the British adopted by the heads of the Arab states at the conference at Inshas on 28-29 May, 6 and by the Arab political

注释：

4. In December 1945, Egypt and Britain began negotiating a possible revision of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 21 August 1936. The Egyptian side demanded immediate withdrawal of British troops and military installations and unlfication with the Sudan. Britain was prepared to discuss the expiry of the treaty on the condition that it was replaced by a defence pact that would satisfy British strategic requirements in the canal zone.

5.  In 1945-46 Shuqayri was Director of the Arab Bureau--the Palestinlan--Arab propaganda office which operated first in the US and later in Jerusalem.

6.  The Inshas meeting of Arab rulers followed publication of the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry. The meeting called for the establishment of Palestine as an independent state, a hilt to Jewish immigration land purchase, and the financial support for Palestinian Arab.

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leaders at the Special Session of the Arab League Council in Bludan on 8-12 June this year.7

   It is still difficult to predict how the Palestine question will be resolved, since the last word on a solution to the Arabs' difficult position will come from the Conference of Foreign Ministers of Arab League countries which opened yesterday in Alexandria. Still, based on all the material attached to this report, there is very reason to believe that the the present Arab leaders will give way again. First, no one among them will dare to raise his voice against the British, which would result in dependence on the broad Arab masses, and secondly, they all dread a widespread movement of the masses, who are mostly anti-British, and who could, if brought into play, overwhelm the present collection of Arab 'politicians'.

                                                                  Minister Solod

Appendix to text: 40 pp. 8

注释：

7.  At Bludan, Syria, the Arab League called for the disarmament of the Zionists in Palestine, formation of a special fund for Palestine, and establishment of a Supreme Arab Committee to deal with the Palestine issue. If the implementation of the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee were accepted, the Arab countries would not grant the US and Great Britain any industrial concessions, and would boycott them on moral grounds and complain to the UN.

8.  On file.