一项新的研究显示，美国国防工业基础还没有为目前存在的竞争性安全环境做好充分准备。报告说，乌克兰战争暴露了美国军工行业普遍存在的问题，这些问题可能会削弱美国军队对中国进行持久战的能力，包括在台海冲突中出现弹药库存不足，导致所谓的“空箱子”问题。

自从俄罗斯去年2月对乌克兰发动战争以来，美国向乌克兰提供了大量的军事装备与补给。这些援助对于阻止俄罗斯的进一步入侵至关重要，也向中国传递了动武的代价和风险的信息。

不过，华盛顿智库战略与国家研究中心(CSIS)的一份最新研究报告说，乌克兰战争也暴露了美国国防工业基础的严重缺陷。这场战争耗尽了美国某些类型的武器系统和弹药的库存，如“毒刺”地对空导弹、155毫米榴弹炮和弹药，以及“标枪”反坦克导弹系统，而美国补充武器库的速度缓慢。

“美国国防工业基础还没有为目前存在的竞争性安全环境做好充分准备，它目前正以更适合和平时期环境的节奏在运作，”这份报告说。“在一场重大的地区冲突中——比如与中国在台湾海峡的战争——美国使用的弹药可能会超过国防部目前的库存，导致‘空箱子’的问题。”

报告：美国不再处于和平环境，应为此做相应准备

报告认为，乌克兰战争以及与中国不断加剧的紧张，包括在台湾海峡的紧张，凸显美国目前已经不再处于和平环境。

这份题为“战时环境中的空箱子：美国国国防工业基础的挑战”的报告作者是战略与国际研究中心的高级副总裁、国际安全项目主任赛斯·琼斯(Seth Jones)。该报告反映了美国高级军事和其他政府官员以及防务领域、国会和军工行业的看法。

战略与国际研究中心最近对台海战争进行多次兵棋推演后发现，在冲突中，美国可能会在不到一周的时间内用完一些弹药，例如远程精确制导弹药。

报告说，这些不足将使美国极难维持一场旷日持久的冲突，部分原因是美国国防工业基础缺乏急剧增加产能来应对一场大规模战争的能力。

美国共和党联邦参议员乔什·霍利(Josh Hawley, R-MO)去年12月在给国务卿布林肯的一封信中说，拜登政府对乌克兰提供的军事援助影响了美国强化台湾防务能力的努力。

战略与国际研究中心的最新研究发现，部分是由于过时的军事承包程序和官僚作风造成的国防工业基础的这些问题目前正在影响美国在印度-太平洋地区建立可信威慑力量或在军事冲突中与中国对峙的能力。

根据一些美国政府的估计，中国正在大量投资于军火和获取高端武器系统和设备，其速度是美国的五到六倍。

台湾的地理位置与乌克兰不同

 

报告还说，在可能的台海战争中，美军面临的并不仅仅是弹药不够的问题。

“与乌克兰不同，它的西部边境对武器运输敞开大门不同，而台湾是一个岛屿。一旦战争开始，中国的封锁和远程火力能力将使武器系统和弹药难以——甚至不可能——进入该地区，”报告说。

这意味着，印太地区的战争可能需要更多的远程弹药，以及战区内更多的弹药库存，以解决一旦战争开始就难以运送弹药的问题。

报告建议美国重新评估其军火需求总量，并敦促国会就此事举行听证会。该研究还建议重新评估美国的库存需求，建立战略弹药储备并确定可持续的弹药采购计划以满足当前和未来的需求。报告还建议美国拓宽军事采购途径，利用合同过程中的灵活性，并创建更多的军工合作生产设施，寻找“盟友支持”的机会等。

Joe Gould, Megan Eckstein and Jen Judson

WASHINGTON The U.S. defense-industrial base is not ready for a battle over Taiwan, as it would run out of key long-range, precision-guided munitions in less than one week, according to a new report by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

U.S. military aid to Ukraine has helped prevent a Russian victory against the neighboring nation, but that assistance has depleted Pentagon stockpiles and shown that the American defense industry cannot surge for a major war, the think tank found.

“As the war in Ukraine illustrates, a war between major powers is likely to be a protracted, industrial-style conflict that needs a robust defense industry able to produce enough munitions and other weapons systems for a protracted war if deterrence fails,” wrote Seth Jones, senior vice president and director of the international security program at CSIS.

“Given the lead time for industrial production, it would likely be too late for the defense industry to ramp up production if a war were to occur without major changes.”

The report, which spotlights U.S. military aid to Ukraine and criticizes bureaucratic hurdles for defense contracting and U.S. arms sales overseas, recommends Washington reexamine its munitions needs and deepen its supplies, and that it remove regulatory hurdles to manufacturing with and exporting to allies.

The vast number of weapons the U.S. is sending to Ukraine highlights how difficult it would be to replenish them. For example, the U.S. has committed more than 160 M777 155mm howitzers to Ukraine, leaving its inventory “low.” Manufacturer BAE Systems would need at least 150 orders over several years to justify restarting production lines.

U.S. military stocks of Javelin anti-tank weapons, Stinger anti-aircraft weapons, counter-artillery radars and 155mm artillery shells are all considered low by the study.

Stocks of the Harpoon coastal defense system, a key capability for Taiwan, are considered medium, though current U.S. inventories might not be sufficient for wartime, Jones wrote.

“The history of industrial mobilization suggests that it will take years for the defense industrial base to produce and deliver sufficient quantities of critical weapons systems and munitions and recapitalize stocks that have been used up,” the report said.

Army officials, cognizant of the demand, said last month they are investing in a “dramatic” ramp-up in monthly production of 155mm shells over the next three years and they’ve awarded contracts for that to General Dynamics Ordnance and Tactical Systems, American Ordnance, and IMT Defense.

Still, top Army officer Gen. James McConville told reporters this month that the service could consider buying in advance the parts of weapons that take the longest to build, so that they’re available in the event of a war.

“We have to start to think about, you know, how do you in a nonlinear way, buy insurance so when something happens, when you have the money, you can reduce the amount of time to stand up your organic industrial base,” McConville said.

Along these lines, the CSIS report recommends the U.S. create a strategic munitions reserve. The government, under the authorities in the Defense Production Act, would buy one or two lots of long-lead subcomponents — such as metals, energetics and electronics — for critical munitions to reduce the 12-24 months of lead time in times of crisis.

‘Too sluggish’

One of the most important munitions to prevent a Chinese seizure of all of Taiwan are long-range precision missiles, including those launched by U.S. submarines.

China considers Taiwan a rogue province, and has threatened to take back the island by force. In a conflict over Taiwan, the U.S. would depend on Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles to strike China’s naval force outside the range of its air defenses.

While it takes Lockheed Martin two years to make LRASMs, the think tank projects a Taiwan conflict would drain U.S. military supplies within a week.

Likewise, in a war against a major power the U.S. military would expend hundreds of Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles and extended-range versions each day, emptying its inventories in just over a week.

The military would also expend large quantities of ship-based munitions, such as the Standard Missile 6.

Several munitions considered critical in a Taiwan scenario Tomahawk missiles, Joint Air-to-Ground Missiles, Joint Air-to-Surface Standoff Missiles and Long Range Anti-Ship Missiles take more than 20 months to produce, calling into question the ability to replace them during a war.

Spending for naval munitions stockpiles to boost readiness is a priority for the U.S. Navy’s top officer. Adm. Mike Gilday’s list of unfunded priorities for this year sought $33 million to buy 11 more LRASMs, and he’s seeking to maximize the production of key weapons, including the Maritime Strike Tomahawk and the SM-6.

“Not only am I trying to fill magazines with weapons, but I’m trying to put U.S. production lines at their maximum level right now and to try and maintain that set of headlights in subsequent budgets so that we continue to produce those weapons,” Gilday told Defense News earlier this month. “That’s one thing we’ve seen in Ukraine — that the expenditure of those high-end weapons in conflict could be higher than we estimated.”

According to the CSIS report, the Pentagon should examine its munition needs with an eye toward Europe and the Pacific, based on operational plans, wartime scenarios and analyses.

Furthermore, Congress could hold hearings into defense-industrial base capacity and find ways to streamline approval for the Pentagon’s requests to move money between accounts, the report added.

While foreign military sales can supplement U.S. government orders and establish predictable, efficient production rates for industry, the report called the FMS system “risk-averse, inefficient, and sluggish.”

In one case, a decision to sell a system to Taiwan through the Foreign Military Sales process — rather than as a direct commercial sale — added two years to a delivery date, on top of a two-year production timeline.

The report also criticizes the system for the transfers of sensitive technologies from the United States, which can take 12-18 months, even for close allies.

“In trying to prevent military technology from falling into the hands of adversaries, the United States has put in place a regulatory regime that is too sluggish to work with critical frontline countries,” Jones wrote in the report.

About Joe Gould

Joe Gould is the senior Pentagon reporter for Defense News, covering the intersection of national security policy, politics and the defense industry. He served previously as Congress reporter.