自俄乌战事爆发以来，西方一直在劝说印度和中国放弃对冲突的“中立”，支持对俄制裁，但至今仍难如愿。为劝说印中两国，西方领导人采取不同手段：对北京生硬无礼，对新德里似有体谅之心，目的却是一样的。但鉴于新德里和北京与莫斯科的历史联系和利益关系，它们与俄罗斯的持续接触不仅仅是一种习惯性行为，还与印中冷对单边制裁有关。

多年来，印度和中国一再受到西方国家和机构的制裁。对印度来说，许多制裁是在1974年其第一次核试验后产生的。多年来，许多西方国家和出口管制团体对新德里实施制裁，限制向这个发展中国家转让两用技术。而新中国1949年成立后，由于意识形态分歧，受到（西方）制裁或威胁。后来在上世纪八九十年代以及进入本世纪以来，人权等问题又招致西方对一些中国实体制裁。但每当印中受到制裁时，两国都表现出蔑视态度。多年来，印中一直谴责制裁及制裁威胁。

尽管所有的主要制裁最终都被取消，但一再受到制裁的经历令新德里和北京不愿支持单边制裁。此外，他们的经历还产生了一种国家话语，即认为制裁通常是胁迫工具，而被制裁方是受害者。在很大程度上，他们的经历影响了印中对单边制裁的政策，并形成对（西方）制裁的看法。

印度和中国不仅各自谴责单边制裁，还在多边论坛上共同讨论单边制裁问题。新德里和北京与莫斯科一起，在金砖国家论坛和俄中印三国部长级会谈等论坛上逐渐形成反对单边制裁的论述。特别是在2013年以后，由于西方国家开始对金砖国家大量使用单边制裁，该集团认为有必要确立并解释他们对制裁的立场。金砖国家每年的声明都会强调：“我们谴责单边军事干预和经济制裁……”金砖国家基本上同意他们“不受单边制裁的约束”，强调制裁无益，并可能造成供应短缺。

此外，新德里和北京认为单边制裁违反国际法。金砖国家的联合声明强调，联合国安理会拥有“实施制裁的唯一权力”。金砖国家各自表示，它们“没有义务遵循任何特定国家的国内法律和规则”。最近，这个话题对印度和中国来说非常突出。

西方争取对俄制裁支持的同时，必须反思。印中仍在应对疫情，过去两年两国的能源和经济需求不断增加。这种情况下，它们不会同意被限制与一个老盟友的往来。西方要理解两国观点，要考虑到这两个新兴大国的利益。

by Rishika Chauhan

During his recent visit to India, British prime minister Boris Johnson stated that Russia and India’s historical ties are well-known and unlikely to change. Nonetheless, Johnson also offered to augment the United Kingdom’s defense cooperation with New Delhi. Such a move would not only help wean India off of its dependence on Russian defense equipment but, by extension, prod New Delhi to consider complying with Western sanctions against Russia. This proposition is not different from the one proposed by the European Union (EU) to China in early April. During the twenty-third EU-China summit, European leaders called on China to support efforts to bring about an end to violence in Ukraine. The topic of sanctions was brought up rather directly with China, and the EU stressed that sanctions were intended to stop Russia’s aggression despite the economic damage that they were doing to European economies. Beijing was asked to support the effort.

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February, the West has been persuading India and China to abandon their “neutrality” in the conflict and back sanctions against Russia—a feat that has remained elusive. While Western states’ policies and relations with India and China are not singular, nor is the “West” a monolith, the two instances hint at the general acknowledgment in the Western world that gaining support from the rising powers is vital to make sanctions on Russia bite. To cajole India and China, Western leaders have adopted a different approach—they are brusque with Beijing, and empathetic with New Delhi. The goal, however, is the same—garner support for sanctions against Russia.

New Delhi and Beijing’s continued engagement with Moscow is not merely a habitual practice, given their historic ties and beneficial relations with Russia, but is intertwined with the Indian and Chinese disregard for unilateral sanctions, namely sanctions imposed by a state independently. To address Indian and Chinese skepticism about sanctions, it is important to comprehend the reasons for New Delhi and Beijing’s discomfort with sanctions. By looking into the two rising powers’ own histories of dealing with unilateral sanctions, as well as their views, as articulated at national and international forums, their aversion to unilateral sanctions can be deciphered.

Enduring Sanctions on Self

Over the years, both India and China have been sanctioned by Western states and institutions, even though the reasons for imposing sanctions have remained different. For India, many of the sanctions came about after its first nuclear test in 1974. Through the years, many Western states and export control groups imposed sanctions on New Delhi, limiting the transfer of dual-use technology to the developing state. China, on the other hand, was sanctioned or threatened by sanctions immediately after its formation in 1949 due to ideological disagreements. Later in the 1980s, 1990s. and through the 2000s, human rights violations and nuclear trade with non-nuclear-weapon states invited Western sanctions on Chinese entities.

Every time sanctions were placed on the two states, their leaders remained defiant, often declaring that sanctions would not change their policies. Speaking in the context of sanctions imposed after the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping shared his state’s perspective. In 1990, Deng maintained, “Ever since last year some countries have imposed sanctions on China. I think, first, they have no right to do so; second, experience has proved that China has the ability to withstand these sanctions … we’re good at withstanding sanctions.” Nearly a decade later in 1998, responding to a question on the consequences of conducting a nuclear test, Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee held, “ the talk of sanctions does not stand the scrutiny of logic or fairness. Besides, it sounds hypocritical … I believe our decision to conduct the [nuclear] tests is in supreme national interest—then we have to face the consequence and overcome the challenge … Sanctions cannot and will not hurt us. India will not be cowed down by any such threats and punitive step.” Other Chinese and Indian leaders followed suit and denounced sanctions and their threat through the years.

Though all major sanctions were eventually lifted, enduring sanctions have made New Delhi and Beijing reluctant to acquiesce to unilateral sanctions. Moreover, their experience has also engendered a state discourse, wherein sanctions are generally understood as instruments of coercion, and the sanctioned party as a victim. Largely, Indian and Chinese experiences as sanctioned countries have impacted their policies on unilateral sanctions and shaped their understanding of the measures.

Discourse against Unilateral Sanctions

India and China have not only deliberated on unilateral sanctions individually but also together at multilateral forums. New Delhi and Beijing, along with Moscow, have gradually established a discourse against unilateral sanctions at forums like BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) and annual RIC (Russia, India, and China) trilateral ministerial meetings. Especially in 2013 onwards, as unilateral sanctions started being used copiously by Western states on the BRICS states themselves—primarily on states like Russia and secondarily on Indian and Chinese entities—the group felt the need to develop and explain their stance on sanctions. Yearly BRICS declarations have repeatedly held, “We condemn unilateral military interventions, economic sanctions...” In the last decade, sanctions on close allies or trading partners of BRICS states like Iran and North Korea have also led to censure. The BRICS group has largely agreed they are “not bound by unilateral sanctions,” stressing that such measures do not have a conducive effect and could cause supply shortages.

Furthermore, New Delhi and Beijing have argued that unilateral sanctions are against international law. BRICS’ joint statements have emphasized that the UN Security Council (UNSC) has, “the sole authority … for imposing sanctions.” BRICS states have individually argued that they are “not obliged to follow any domestic laws and rules of any particular countries.” Lately, the topic assumed prominence for India and China, as Chinese entities were sanctioned under the United States’ Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act, while India feared meeting the same fate for its import of defense equipment from Russia. At RIC trilateral meetings, the same discussion has been advanced. Through joint statements, the representatives of the three countries have underlined that such measures reduce the “effectiveness and legitimacy” of the UNSC sanction regime and are detrimental to international trade.

This discourse against unilateral sanctions has persisted and developed in the last decade. It seems highly likely that discussions on sanctions and their impact on BRICS states would remain at the top of the agenda in the imminent BRICS summits and RIC meetings.

Sanctions, an Impediment to Development 

As the West garners support for sanctions against Russia, it must reflect. India and China are still coping with the pandemic, and their energy and economic needs have mounted in the last two years. In this situation, the two will not agree to limit engagement with an old ally.

Historically, sanctions, have served a range of purposes, from supporting international norms and restraining the development of nuclear weapons by non-nuclear states to pushing states to the negotiating table. Sanctions against Russia are being understood as a means of stopping violence in Ukraine and aiding in bringing about a resolution to the conflict.

These goals are not disagreeable to New Delhi and Beijing, nor is the utility of sanctions lost on them, who have themselves on occasions used sanctions. However, it is also important to understand their perspective and make adaptable offers that are sentient and accommodative of the two rising powers’ interests. As the West weighs various policy options to make unilateral sanctions less averse to India and China, it should bear in mind their present concerns and histories of dealing with Western unilateralism.