加载中…斯坦福大学经济系为本科生开设的Market Design荣誉课程
(2013-12-11 11:43:44)
标签：
市场设计斯坦福大学经济系 |
分类： 美国著名经济学家 |
主讲人：小岛武仁(Fuhito
Kojima)，斯坦福大学经济系副教授
Class 1:
world problems.
Class 2:
Class 3:
Class 4:
Class 5:
Class 6:
Class 7:
Class 8:
Class 9:
Class 10: Random assignment; Using Lottery for Fair
Allocations
Class 11: Random assignment; Applications
Class 12: Matching with contracts: Basic Theory
Class 13: Matching with contracts: Applications
Class 14: Mechanism Design Theory
Class 15: Mechanism Design Theory (2)
Class 16: Student Presentations
Class 17: Student PresentationsClass 18: Student
Presentations
References
Class 1
Alvin E. Roth (2002) The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory,
Experimentation,
and Computation as Tools for Design Economics. Econometrica 70,
1341-1378.
*Roth, Alvin E. "What have we learned from market design?" Hahn
Lecture, Economic
Journal, 118 (March), 2008, 285–310.
Al Roth’s webpage
http://kuznets.fas.harvard.edu/~aroth/alroth.html
discusses many topics in market design and is worth seeing.
Class 2
*David Gale and Lloyd Shapley (1962), “College Admissions and the
Stability of
American Mathematical Monthly, 69, 9-15.
*Alvin E. Roth andMarilda Sotomayor (1990) Two-SidedMatching: A
Study in GameTheoretic Modeling and Analysis, Econometric Society
Monograph Series, Cambridge
University Press. Chapters 1,2,4,5
Tayfun Sonmez, “Manipulation via Capacities in Two-Sided Matching
Markets,” Journal of
Economic Theory, 1997, 77, 197–204.
Tayfun Sonmez, “Can Pre-arranged Matches be Avoided in Two-Sided
Matching Markets?”
Journal of
Class 3
Immorlica, N. and Mahdian, M. (2005), “Marriage, Honesty, and
Stability,” SODA 2005,
pp. 53–62.
*Kojima, F. and Pathak, P. A. (2008), “Incentives and Stability in
Large Two-Sided
Matching Markets,” forthcoming, American Economic Review.
*Alvin E. Roth and Elliott Peranson (1999) “The Redesign
of
Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects
of
Class 4
I. Ashlagi, M. Braverman, and A. Hassidim (2011) “Stability in
Matching Markets with
Complementarities,” working paper
B. Klaus and F. Klijn (2005): “Stable Matchings and Preferences
of
Economic Theory, 121(1), 75-106.
B. Klaus, F. Klijn, T. Nakamura (2007): “Corrigendum: Stable
Matchings and Preferences of
Couples,” Journal of
Fuhito Kojima, “Finding All Stable Matchings with Couples,”
mimeo
F. Kojima, P.A. Pathak, and Alvin E. Roth (2010), “Matching with
Couples: Stability and
Incentives,”
Class 5:
*Ma, J., “Strategy-Proofness and the Strict Core in a Market with
Indivisibilities”
International Journal of
Herve Moulin (1995), Cooperative Microeconomics: A Game-Theoretic
Introduction. Princeton University Press, Chapter 3
Alvin E. Roth and Andrew Postlewaite (1977) “Weak versus strong
domination in a market with indivisible goods,” Journal
of
4, 131-137.
*Alvin E. Roth (1982) “Incentive compatibility in a market with
indivisibiliTies” Economics Letters 9, 127-132.
*Lloyd Shapley and Herbert Scarf (1974) “On cores and
indivisibility,” Journal
of
Lars-Gunnar Svensson (1999) “Strategyproof
Social Choice and Welfare 16, 557-567.
Class 6:
*Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Tayfun Sönmez (1999) “House Allocation
with Existing Tenants” Journal of
Experimental Study,”
*Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez and M. Utku Ünver (2003) “Kidney
ExChange” Quarterly Journal of
Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver, “Kidney Exchange with Good Samaritan
Donors: A
Characterization,” mimeo
Class 7:
Hatfield, J. W. (2005), “Pairwise Kidney Exchange: Comment,”
Journal of Economic
Theory.
*Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez, and M. Utku Ünver (2005) “Pairwise
Kidney
Exchange,” Journal of
Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sönmez, and M. Utku Ünver (2005) .A Kidney
Exchange Clearinghouse in New England.American Economic Review
Papers
and Proceedings, 95(2): 376-380
*Alvin E. Roth, Tayfun Sonmez and Utku Unver (2007), “Efficient
Kidney Exchange:
Coincidence of
Economic Review, 97(3): 828-851.
Class 8:
*Atila Abdulkadiroglu and Tayfun Sönmez (2003) “School Choice: A
Mechanism Design Approach” American Economic Review, 93,
729-747.
Michel Balinski and Tayfun Sönmez (1999) “A Tale
of
Student Placement” Journal of
Ergin, H. and Tayfun Sonmez (2006) “Games of
Mechanism,” Journal of
Class 9:
Abdulkadiroglu, Che and Yasuda (2008) “Expanding ‘Choice’ in School
Choice,” mimeo.
*Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Parag Pathak and Alvin E.
Roth
Efficiency in Matching with Indifferences: Redesigning the NYC High
School Match,”
mimeo.*Erdil, Aytek and Haluk Ergin (2007), “What's the Matter with
Tie-breaking?
Improving Efficiency in School Choice,” American Economic Review,
forthcoming.
*Onur Kesten, “An Alternative Mechanism Design Approach to School
Choice in the
United States.” mimeo
Fuhito Kojima and Mihai Manea (2010), Axioms for Deferred
Acceptance, Econometrica.
Parag Pathak and Tayfun Sonmez, “Leveling the Playing Field:
Sincere and Strategic Players
in the Boston Mechanism,” forthcoming in American Economic
Review.
Class 10&11: Random
assignment
Abdulkadiroglu, A., and T. Sonmez (1998): “Random Serial
Dictatorship and the Core from
Random Endowments in House Allocation Problems,” Econometrica, 66,
689
Abdulkadiroglu, A., and T. Sonmez (2003) “Ordinal Effciency and
Dominated Sets of
Assignments,” Journal of
*Bogomolnaia, A., and H. Moulin (2001), “A New Solution to the
Random Assignment
Problem,” Journal of
E. Budish, Y-K. Che, F. Kojima, and Paul R. Milgrom (2012)
“Designing Random Allocation
Mechanisms: Theory and Applications” forthcoming, American Economic
Review.
Che, Y-K and Fuhito Kojima (2010), ``Asymptotic Equivalence
of
Probabilistic Serial Mechanisms,” Econometrica.
Katta, A.-K. and J. Sethuraman, “A solution to the random
assignment problem on the full
preference domain” (2006), Journal of
Kesten, O, “Why Do Popular Mechanisms Lack Efficiency in Random
Environments?”
mimeo
Fuhito Kojima and Mihai Manea, “Incentives in the probabilistic
Serial Mechanism,” Journal
of
Fuhito Kojima, “Random Assignment of
Mathematical Social Sciences.
McLennan A., “Ordinal efficiency and the polyhedral seperating
hyperplane theorem,”
Journal of
Yilmaz, O., “House Allocation with Existing Tenants: A New
Solution,” mimeoClass 12&13: Matching with
Consracts
*Adachi, Hiroyuki, “On a characterization of
68, 43–49.
Echenique, Federico and Jorge Oviedo, “Core Many-to-One Matchings
by Fixed Point
Methods,” Journal of
Echenique, Federico and Jorge Oviedo, “A theory
of
Theoretical Economics, 2006, 1, 233–273.
Hatfield, John William and Fuhito Kojima, “Group Incentive
Compatibility for Matching
with Contracts,” 2007. Games and Economic Behavior.
Hatfield, John William and Fuhito Kojima, “Substitutes and
Stability in Matching with
Contracts,” 2007. Journal of
Hatfield, John William and Fuhito Kojima, “Matching with Contracts:
Comments,” 2007.
American Economic Review, forthcoming.
*Hatfield, John William and Paul R.Milgrom, “Matching with
Contracts,” American
Economic Review, 2005, 95, 913–935.
Kandori, M., Fuhito Kojima and Yosuke Yasuda, ``Bridging the gap
between cooperative
and noncooperative games: simple economics of
Kelso, A. and Vincent Crawford (1982), “Job matching,
coalition
formation, and gross substitutes,” Econometrica, 1982, 50,
1483–1504.
*Ostrovsky, Michael, “Stability in Supply Chain Networks,” American
Economic
Review, 2007, forthcoming.
*Tayfun Sonmez and Tobias Switzer “Matching with (Branch-of-Choice)
Contracts at the
United States Military Academy”, forthcoming, Econometrica.
Class 14&15: Mechanism Design
*P Jehiel, B Moldovanu, Efficient design with interdependent
valuations, Econometrica
Archishman Chakraborty, Alessandro Citanna and Michael Ostrovsky,
Two-Sided Matching
with Interdependent Values
M. Perry and P. Reny, "An Efficient Multi-Unit Ascending Auction."
Motty Perry and Philip
J. Reny; The Review of
post
Tadashi Hashimoto (2011) “Generic Impossibility
of
General Utility Functions”
Class 16-18: Student Presentations
Students are encouraged to present their own work in progress,
however preliminary.
Alternatively, students can present one of
asterisk (*), or other papers. The following list suggests possible
papers to be presented, but
you are more than welcome to present papers not on the list as long
as it is related to the
topic of
Atila Abdulkadiroğlu, Parag Pathak, Alvin Roth and Tayfun Sonmez,
“Changing the Boston
School Choice Mechanism,” mimeo
Archishman Chakraborty, Alessandro Citanna and Michael Ostrovsky,
“Two-Sided Matching
with Interdependent Values,” mimeo.
Niederle, Muriel, and Alvin E. Roth, “Making Markets Thick:
Designing Rules for Offers
and Acceptances”, mimeo
Pathak, P., and Tayfun Sonmez, “Comparing Mechanisms by their
Vulnerability to
Manipulation,” mimeo
Pathak, P. “Lotteries in Student Assignment,” mimeo
Marek Pycia and Utku Unver, “A Theory of
mimeo
Utku Unver, “Dynamic Kidney Exchange,” mimeo
Bumin Yenmez and Michael Schwarz, “Median Stable Matching,”
mimeo
Tayfun Sonmez and Tobias Switzer, Matching with (Branch-of-Choice)
Contracts at the
United States Military Academy, Econometrica
Parag Pathak and Tayfun Sonmez, School Admissions Reform in Chicago
and England:
Comparing Mechanisms by Their Vulnerability to Manipulability,
AER
Tayfun Sonmez, Bidding for Army Career Specialties: Improving the
ROTC Branching
Mechanism, mimeo
Scott Kominers and Tayfun Sonmez, Designing for Diversity in
MatchingAygun and Sonmez x 2
Valuing Prearranged Paired Kidney Exchanges: A Stochastic Game
Approach (with
Murat Kurt, Mark Roberts, and Andrew Schaefer) Boston College
Working Papers in Economics, No: 785; revision requested
from Operations Research
A Theory of School-Choice Lotteries (with Onur Kesten) Boston
College
Working Papers in Economics, No: 737
Unraveling Results from Comparable Demand and Supply: An
Experimental
Investigation (with Alvin E. Roth and Muriel Niederle)
Strategy-proof Stochastic Assignment
The Revealed Preference Theory of Stable and Extremal Stable
Matchings [PDF],
joint with Federico Echenique, Matthew Shum, and M. Bumin
Yenmez, Econometrica, forthcoming.
Incentive Compatibility of Large Centralized Matching
Markets [PDF] (Supplemental Materials)
“The difference indifference makes in strategy-proof allocation
of
objects,” forthcoming, Journal of
“A market approach to fractional matching,” 2011.
Dur and Unver, Tuition Exchange
Cho (Rochester)
Hashimoto, Tadashi.
When are Local Incentive Constraints Sufficient? / Online appendix
(Econometrica,
forthcoming)
On Mechanisms Eliciting Ordinal Preferences
A General Equivalence Theorem for Allocation of Indivisible
Objects
Efficient Random Assignment with Constrained Rankings
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