LEIBNIZ, Gottried Wilhelm von
(1646—1716), German philosopher, mathematician, physicist,
and historian. While carrying on an extensive career as a civil
servant, first with the Elector of Mainz and then with the ducal
family of Brunswick-Luneburg, Leibniz made major contributions to
mathematics, logic, and metaphysics. For example, he invented a
differential and integral calculus, slightly later than but
independently of Isaac Newton. Leibniz’ metaphysics centered on the
idea of substance, as developed in his concept of monads. His
interests and contributions were wide-ranging, and the extent of
some of his achievements was not recognized until the
20th century.
戈特弗里德·威廉·冯·莱布尼茨 （1646年至今1716年），德国哲学家，数学家，物理学家和历史学家。作为一名公务人员，他从事过多种职业，先是在美因兹选区工作，然后又在不伦瑞克·吕内堡公爵家族效力，莱布尼茨对数学、逻辑学以及形而上学做出了重要贡献。例如，他发明了微分和积分学，虽稍晚于艾萨克·牛顿，但却与牛顿无关。莱布尼茨的形而上学集中于物质的概念，以其单子的概念发展起来。他的兴趣和贡献是广泛的，但是他的一些成就的程度直至20世纪才被认识到。
LIFE
Leibniz was born in
Leipzig, Germany, on July 1 (June 21, Old Style), 1646. Though he
attended the Nicolai school in Leipzig, he was largely self-taught
and read voraciously in several languages on a wide range of
subjects. At 15 he enrolled in the University of Leipzig to study
law, but he also attended lectures in mathematics and philosophy.
In 1666, when not yet 21, he received a doctorate from the
University at Altdorf, near Nuremberg, with the dissertation De
casibus perplexis (On Complex Cases at Law). His home university
had refused to grant the degree because of his youth, and he left
Leipzig for good, settling in Nuremberg.
生活
1646年7月1日（旧历，6月21日）莱布尼茨出生于德国的莱比锡。虽然他在莱比锡的尼克莱学校上学，但他很大程度上是靠自学并如饥似渴地用几种语言对各种不同的学科进行了阅读。在15岁时，他进入莱比锡大学学习法律，但他也参加了数学和哲学课程的讲座。1666年，还不到21岁时，他就凭借De
casibus perplexis的论文（论法律的复杂案件）在阿尔多夫大学获得了博士学位。因为他年轻，他家乡的大学拒绝授予他学位，因此，他永远开了莱比锡，定居在纽伦堡。
Leibniz, who had
already written a number of mathematical and legal essays,
attracted the attention of Johann Christian von Boineburg, formerly
prime minister to the Elector of Mainz and one of leading German
statesmen of the day. Leibniz entered his service, chiefly to write
about legal matters and law reform. After von Boineburg’s death in
1672, Leibniz entered the service of the Elector of Mainz, Johann
Philipp von Schonborn, first as an assistant in the revision of the
statute book and afterward on important diplomatic work. From this
time on, Leibniz was in the service of German princes, employed
principally to write about juridical, dynastic, and political
matters.
莱布尼茨，撰写了许多有关数学和法律的论文，吸引了美因兹选举人前总理以及当时重要的德国政治家之一的约翰·克里斯蒂安·冯·伯恩伯格的注意。莱布尼茨开始为其服务，主要撰写有关法律事务和法律改革的东西。1672年冯·伯恩伯格去世后，莱布尼茨加入了约翰·菲利普·冯·匈保的美因兹选举人团队，先是担任法律汇编修订方面的助理，后负责重要的外交工作。从那时起，莱布尼茨就为德国王子服务，主要承担撰写有关司法、王朝以及政治方面的文稿。
Leibniz’ first task
of real political importance was to make propaganda in support of
von Boineburg’s plan to induce the French to seize Egypt it was
hoped that by drawing the attention of Louis XIV to Egypt, the
French threat to Holland and Germany would be reduced. In 1672,
Leibniz was sent on a diplomatic mission to Paris to promote this
project. Although he failed in his mission, his stay in Paris gave
him the opportunity to further his studies in mathematics, science,
and philosophy. He met a number of leading scholars, including the
philosopher Nicolas de Malebranche, and the mathematician
Christiaan Huygens. While in Paris, Leibniz also perfected his
calculating machine, which could add, subtract, multiply, divide,
and extract roots.
莱布尼茨第一个真正重要的政治任务是支持冯·伯恩伯格为引诱法国去占领埃及所做的宣传，人们希望通过引起路易十四对埃及的注意，减少法国对荷兰和德国的威胁。1672年，为推动这一计划，莱布尼茨被派往巴黎执行外交任务。尽管他的任务失败了，但他在巴黎的逗留给了他继续在数学、科学以及哲学方面研究的机会。他遇见了许多著名学者，包括哲学家尼古拉斯·德·马勒伯朗士，和数学家克里斯蒂安·惠更斯。在巴黎期间，莱布尼茨也完善了他的计算器，它能加、减、乘、除，以及求根。
In January—March
1673, Leibniz went to London as an attaché on a political mission
for the Elector of Mainz. There he came in contact with several
important scientists, among them the chemist Robert Boyle and Henry
Oldenburg, secretary of the Royal Society, to which Leibniz was
elected later that year. After returning to Paris, Leibniz
transferred from the service of the Elector of Mainz to that of
John Frederick, Duke of Brunswick-Luneburg. On 1675, at the Duke’s
request, he settled in Hannover, traveling there via London and
Amsterdam. In Amsterdam he met with Spinoza and made notes on
Spinoza’s still unpublished Ethics.
1673年1月至3月，莱布尼茨作为美因兹选举人政治代表团的一名随员前往伦敦。在那里，他接触了一些重要的科学家，其中有化学家罗伯特·波义耳和皇家学会的秘书，享利·奥尔登堡，同年晚些时候他入选了该学会。回到巴黎之后，莱布尼茨从美因兹选举人团队转入了不伦瑞克·吕内堡公爵的约翰·弗雷德里克的团队，
在1675年，应公爵的邀请，他途经伦敦和阿姆斯特丹，定居在汉诺威。在阿姆斯特丹时，他会见了斯宾诺莎并对斯宾诺莎尚未出版的《伦理学》做了注释。
For the 40 remaining
years of his active life, Leibniz continued, under thr?ee
successive princes, in the service of the Brunswick family,
effectively as a minister without portfolio in charge of
historicpolitical, cultural, and scientific affairs. He wrote
tracts to justify various rights and claims of the Dukes of
Hannover, and he superintended the mint and reorganized the mines.
Though he lived in the atmosphere of petty politics in a small
German principality, his interests and outlook were always
wide-ranging and international. From 1687 to 1690 he traveled
extensively through Germany and Italy, searching public records and
archives to gather material for an official history of the house of
Brunswick.
在莱布尼茨剩余的40年积极生活中，在连续三任王子的统治下，作为一名没有职务的部长实际上负责历史上有名的政治、文化和科学事务，一直在为不伦瑞克家族服务。
他撰写了许多小册子来为汉诺威公爵的各种权力和主张辩护，而且他监管着造币厂并重组了矿山。虽然他生活在一个德国小公国琐碎的政治氛围中，但他的兴趣和眼界一直都是广泛而国际化的。从1687年至1690年，他游历了德国和意大利，搜寻着公共记录和档案，为不伦瑞克家庭收集官方历史的资料。
Under Dukes John
Frederick and Ernest Augustus, Leibniz enjoyed a respected and
influential place at the court of Hannover. After the accession of
George Louis in 1698, this situation changed drastically.
Brunswick-Luneburg had attained the status of an electorate in
1692, which had been a principal aim of much of Leibniz’ researches
and his tracts on the rights of the family. The ruler, now given
the title of Elector of Hannover, continued him in service, but
Leibniz was no longer entrusted with missions of significance. The
King and his chief minister, Bernstorff, bluntly told him to get on
with his work as official historian. Increasingly alienated from
the court of Hannover, Leibniz took steps to cement his relations
at other courts, particularly Berlin and Vienna. These efforts
brought him various honors. He became a member of the Academie des
Sciences in Paris (1700), president of the Berlin Academy (1700),
privy councilor to several monarchs, and baronet (Freiherr)
of the empire. Yet he never attained the post of distinction his
ambition desired and his merits deserved.
在约翰·弗雷德里克公爵和欧内斯特·奥古斯都的统治下，莱布尼茨在汉诺威宫廷中享有受人尊敬和具有影响力的地位。1698年，乔治·路易斯即位后，这种情况发生了戏剧性的变化。1692年，不伦瑞克—吕内堡获得了选举人身份，这是莱布尼茨众多的研究以及有关那个家族权力小册子的主要目标。统治者，现在被授予汉诺威选举人的头衔，但莱布尼茨不再被赋予重要任务。国王和他的主要大臣，伯恩斯托夫，直截了当地告诉他继续他作为官方历史学家的工作。莱布尼茨与汉诺威宫廷的关系在不断地疏远，但他采取了一系列步骤来巩固与其它宫廷的关系，尤其是柏林和维也纳。这些努力给他带来了各种荣誉。他成为了巴黎科学院院士（1700年），柏林科学院院长（1700年），几位君主的枢密院官员以及帝国的准男爵。
To the end he
remained in Hannover, working in the vacuum left by the departure
of important courtiers when the elector succeeded to the throne of
England in 1714. His last years were made difficult by neglect,
illness, and the distrust of the local people, who suspected him of
theological heterodoxy. Nevertheless, he maintained his positive
outlook and continued his researches in many fields of learning.
His death in Hannover on Nov. 14, 1716, passed without public
notice. A witness at his funeral is quoted as remarking that “he
was buried more like a robber than what he really was, the ornament
of his country.”
1714年，当选举人继承了英国王位时，因一些重要侍臣的离去而留下了真空，直到最后，他依然留在汉诺威工作着。由于被忽视、疾病以及当地人的不信任，他们怀疑他的神学异端邪说，他的晚年过得很艰难。虽然如此，他保持着乐观的看法而且在许多知识领域继续着他的研究。1716年11月14日，他在汉诺威去世，悄无声息。在他的葬礼上，一位目击者这样评论到“他被埋葬得更像一个强盗，而不像他真实的样子，国家的装饰”。
CONTRIBUTIONS TO
SCHOLARSHIP
Mathematics and
Logic. Leibniz’ achievements in mathematics
surpassed his contributions to philosophy. During his stay in Paris
(1672-1675), he devoted himself intensively to higher mathematics,
especially geometry, largely under the tutelage of Huygens. There
he began the studies that resulted in his development of thr?ee
major branches of mathematics—differential and integral calculus,
the calculus of variations, and topology. In these researches
Leibniz built upon and developed the work of his predecessors,
especially the mathematicians Pierre de Fermat, John Wallis, and
Isaac Barrow. Earlier interests led to his development of two
further branches of mathematics—combinatorial analysis and
mathematical logic.
对学问的贡献
数学和逻辑学
莱布尼茨的数学成就超过了他对哲学的贡献。在他逗留巴黎期间（1672年至1675年），他全身心地致力于高等数学的研究，主要在惠更斯的指导下，尤其是几何学。在那里，他开始了导致其三个主要数学分支发展的研究—微分学和积分学，变分法以及拓扑学。在这些研究中，莱布尼茨继承并发展了其前辈们的工作，尤其是数学家皮埃尔·德·费马，约翰·沃利斯和艾萨克·巴罗。早期的兴趣使他进一步发展了两个数学的分支—组合分析和数学逻辑。
Leibniz’ mathematical contributions would have sufficed to
establish a half dozen reputations of the first magnitude. His work
with the calculus, for example, would have brought him universal
acclaim in the community of scholars of his day, had it not been
for an unfortunate sequence of developments, which caused him
endless vexation. Under the stimulus of jealous enemies of Leibniz
and overzealous friends of Newton, dispute broke out regarding the
priority of the invention of differential and integral calculus.
This controversy divided the learned world of Europe and embittered
Leibniz’ later years. Investigations by 20th the century
historians of mathematics reveal that Leibniz made his discovery
somewhat later than, but wholly independently of, Newton and in a
manner possessing substantial formal advantages and exerting a far
more powerful influence.
莱布尼茨的数学贡献足以建立起六个第一流的声望。例如，他对微积分学的研究，要不是因为发生了一系列令人遗憾的事件，让他烦恼不已的话，就会使他在他那个时代的学者圈内就享誉全球的。在莱布尼茨妒忌的对手以及牛顿过分热心朋友们的刺激下，出现了有关微分学和积分学发明优先权的辩论。这场争论使欧洲的学术界出现了分歧，并且使莱布尼茨的晚年很痛苦。根据20世纪数学史学家的调查，莱布尼茨的发现要稍晚于牛顿，但完全与于牛顿无关，而且是以一种拥有实质的形式优势和具有更大的影响力。
By contrast, Leibniz’ important
contributions to the development of symbolic logic were utterly
without influence both in his lifetime and later. The path of his
discoveries had to be retraced some two and a half centuries after
his death, and their importance was unappreciated until the
20th century. Leibniz projected a majestic vision of a
universal language (characteristic universalis) fused with a
calculus of reasoning (calculus ratiocinator) to make possible
exact reasoning in science and ordinary affairs. He would have
viewed with much pleasure the extensive use of computers as aids in
problem solving and the management of affairs.
相比之下，莱布尼茨对符号逻辑发展的重要贡献无论在其一生和之后都完全没有什么影响。他的发现之路不得不追溯到他死后的两个半世纪，而且它们的重要性直到20世纪才受到了赏识。莱布尼茨设计了一种通用语言的宏伟景象（特有的通用语言）与推理演算相融合（推理演算机），使科学和日常事务中的精确推理成为了可能。他会非常愉快地看到计算机作为解决问题和事务管理助手的广泛应用。
Jurisprudence and History.
Leibniz was trained as a jurist, and his
official career was devoted primarily to law, especially in its
diplomatic and international dimensions. His proposals for
reunifying the churches by means of a common creed for Protestants
and Catholics and his attempts at a union of Lutheran and Reformed
churches were motivated by practical diplomatic and political
considerations. The same motive lay behind his investigations of
the historical roots of the royal house of
Hannover-Brunswick.
法学和历史
莱布尼茨被培养成了一名法学家，而且他的职业生涯主要都致力于法律，尤其是在外交和国际层面的法律。他建议通过新教徒和天主教徒的共同信仰来重新统一教会，而且试图将路德教会和改革过的教会联合起来就是出于实际的外交和政治的思考。他对汉诺威—不伦瑞克王室历史根源调查的背后就藏有同样的动机。
Leibniz’ ethical and
social doctrines were based on the concept of natural law. He saw
in the natural law a fixed standard of morals whose precepts
possess the character of eternal truths. Basic among these precepts
are the freedom of the individual and his right to intellectual and
moral development, a right that which must in no way be limited. In
developing these ideas Leibniz followed theological models—in
particular the Augustinian concept of the City of God—but he sought
to secularize this concept through the ideal of a supranational
community based purely on the natural light of human rationality.
On this basis Leibniz helped to lay the philosophical foundation of
the doctrine of the “inalienable rights of man” and to prepare for
the significant role played by this doctrine in the period of the
Enlightenment.
莱布尼茨的伦理和社会学说都是以自然法概念为基础的。他在自然法中看到了道德的固定标准，其戒律拥有永恒真理的特征。在这些戒律中的基础就是，个人的自由以及人的智力和道德发展的权力，一种绝不能被限制的权力。在发展这些观念时，莱布尼茨遵循着神学的模式—尤其是奥古斯丁的上帝之城的概念—但他通过一种纯粹基于人类理性自然之光的超国家共同体的理想，旨在使这个概念世俗化。在此基础上，莱布尼茨帮助奠定“不可剥夺的人权”学说的哲学基础，并为这种学说在启蒙运动时期发挥重要作用做好了准备。
Leibniz’
genealogical researches in Italy in 1687-1690, through which he
established the common origins of the families of Brunswick and
Este, enabled him to enlarge his collection of historical sources
and to publish valuable documentary materials for a code of
international law (Codex juris gentium diplomaticus [1693]
and Mantissa codicis juri gentium diplomaticus [1700]).
These vast historical labors—virtually without influence then or
since—represent the chief way in which Leibniz earned his keep as
an official. They mark him as among the founders and best
practitioners of the scientific study of European affairs of the
Middle Ages.
1687年至1690年，莱布尼茨通过在意大利进行的谱系学研究，建立了布伦瑞克和埃斯特家族共同起源的谱系，使他能够扩大他历史资料的收集和为国际法法典出版有价值的文献资料。这些大量的历史工作—在当时和之后，几乎都没有什么影响—却代表了莱布尼茨作为一名官员的主要方式。人们认为，他是中世纪的欧洲事务科学研究的创建者和最好的实践者之一。
Theory
of Knowledge. Leibniz
distinguished thr?ee cognitive faculties: sense, imagination, and
reason. Sense deals with the sensory qualities encountered in the
perception of external objects. The imagination, classed as an
“internal sense,” adds to the individual senses the deliverances of
the common sense and thus introduces the “common sensible” that
provide the materials of mathematics. The common sensible can be
apprehended by several senses—length is known by sight and touch.
Reason brings us to the “supersensible”—that is, the awareness of
the mind’s functioning even when not engaged to working with
sensory materials.
知识的理论
莱布尼茨区分了三种认知能力：感觉、想象力和理性。感觉涉及在感受外部对象时所遇到的感官品质。想象力，被视为增加了个体感官常识的传递，从而引入了提供数学材料“常识”的一种“内在的感觉”。该常识可用几种感觉来理解--长度可通过视觉和触觉来获知。理性将我们带入“超感觉”—就是说，即使不参与感官材料的工作，也能意识到大脑的功能。
The division of
truths into truths of fact (verities de fait) and truths of
reason (verities de raison) is the cornerstone of Leibniz’ theory
of knowledge. The materials for a knowledge of the truths of fact
derive from sensation—that is, conscious external perception. Those
of the pure truths of reason (innate truths) are inherent and are
based upon apperception, that is, the mind’s own consciousness of
its working. Reason has two basic capacities with respect to ideas,
which are its materials: analysis, by which these ideas are
dissected into their component ideas; and comparison, by
which the coincidences and differences between the components of
two ideas can by noted. The fundamental resources of human
reasoning are extremely simple, but their systematic and repeated
application leads to endless complexities of knowledge.
把真理分成事实真理和理性真理是莱布尼茨知识理论的基石。认识事实真理的材料来源于感觉---换言之，来源于有意识的外部感知。那些纯粹的理性事实（固有的真理）都是与生俱来的，而且是基于感悟的。也就是说，它是大脑活动的自身意识。理性对于概念有两种基本能力，这两种能力就是理性的材料：分析，凭借分析，这些概念就被分解成了它们的构成概念；还有对比，通过对比，可以注意到两种概念构成之间的一致和差异。人类推理的基本资源非常简单，但它们系统的和重复的应用导致了知识无穷的复杂性。
Truths of fact deal specifically with
the actual world. The grounds of these truths hinge upon the will
of God—they would be falsehoods rather than truths had he chosen it
so. Truths of reason do not deal with matters of contingent
existence but with generic truths that must apply in every possible
world, and are thus necessary. There is but one existential truth
of this character, a noncontingent one, which asserts the existence
of God. Knowledge of necessary truths is available, even to man, by
conceptual analysis of a finite character. The status of these
truths is independent of the will of God. They are as they are, not
because God wishes it, but because the concepts involved in them
are what they are.
事实真理专门处理现实的世界。这些真理的基础取决于上帝的意志---如果上帝是这样选择真理的，那么它们就是谎言。理性真理不涉及那些偶然存在的事件，而是处理那些必须适用于每个可能的世界，而且都是必要的一般真理。这种特性只有一个存在的真理，一个非偶然的真理，它断言了上帝的存在。即使对人类来说，凭借对有限特性的概念分析，也可获得必然真理的知识。这些真理的状态是不受上帝意志支配的。它们之所以是那样，不是因为上帝的愿望，而是因为涉及到它们的那些概念就是它们本来的样子。
Since men cannot know
the “complete individual notions” of contingent existents, all
human knowledge regarding truths of fact must be based on
perception and apperception. These are our only avenues of access
to information about the contingently existing substances that
populate the actual, or best possible, world. Because of
limitations inherent in human observation, man can never attain to
better than a limited, imperfect (limited, albeit clear) knowledge
about those contingent particulars. The nature of these
particulars—that is, what he called these individual notions—is
accessible to us only by piecemeal experience.
由于人类无法了解偶然存在的“完整的个体概念”，因此有关事实真理的所有人类知识必须基于知觉和感悟。这些是我们获得有关偶然存在的物质信息的唯一途径，它们构成了现实世界，或者最好的世界。由于人类观察固有的局限性，有关那些偶然的细节，人永远无法超越有限、不完全的（有限，尽管清楚）知识。这些细节的性质---换言之，他所谓的这些个体概念---对于我们只能通过零碎的经验来获得。
Knowledge of
necessary truth is independent of perception, not in the sense that
we may not learn of them in the course of experience, but that such
experiences play merely a guiding, not a determinative, role.
Leibniz’s analog is that experience helps us to discover such
innate truths in the same way as miners expose a vein of ore-not by
creating it as a result of their work, but by exposing a
preexisting structure whose nature is wholly independent of their
efforts and merely revealed by them.
必然真理的知识不依赖感知，并不是说我们在经验的过程中不能学习它们，而是说这样的经验起引导作用，不起决定作用。莱布尼茨的类比是，经验帮助我们以同样的方式发现这样固有的真理，如同矿工发现矿脉一样---并非是由于他们的工作而发现矿脉，而是通过发现一个早已存在的结构，其本性完全不依赖他们的努力，而仅仅是由他们发现而已。
Always important in
Leibniz’ thinking was his program of a universal science
(scientia universalis) for coordinating all human knowledge,
providing a framework within which each of the particular sciences,
while functioning efficiently in its own area, would stand in
illuminating relation to the rest. This program consisted of two
parts: (1) a universal character or notation (characteristica
uniersalis) by use of which any item of information can be
recorded in a natural, simple, and systematic way; and (2) a
formalized method or calculus for reasoning (calculus
ratiocinator), manipulating the knowledge recorded in a
computational fashion in reveal the logical consequences of any
time and its interrelation with others. The former was by no means
original with Leibniz. It was a commonplace in his day. The concept
of a calculus ratiocinator, however, was original with him, and it
inspired him to develop his mathematically inspired systems for
reasoning.
在莱布尼茨的思想中始终重要的是他协调人类所有知识的普通科学计划，他的计划在每个特定科学内提供了一个框架，在它自己领域有效运行的同时，将会与其它科学建立起有启发性的关系。该计划包括两部分：（1）以自然、简单和系统的方式，通过利用可以记录的任何信息项的一种普遍特性或符号；（2）推理的一种形式化方法或演算（演算推理器），以计算的方式来操作记录的知识，揭示任何时间的逻辑结果以及与其它时间的相互关系。前者并非是莱布尼茨的原创。在他的时代，这是司空见惯的事。然而，演算推理器的概念是他的独创，而且它激发了他开发推理系统的数学灵感。
Metaphysics—Theory
of Monads. The philosophy of Leibniz, like that of Descartes or
Spinoza, depends on a characteristic conception of substance. The
prime features of his conception of substance are (1) that a given
individual substance is a simple, enduring existent, not in the
sense of logical simplicity, but in the absence of spatial parts,
and (2) that a given individual substance is capable of functioning
as the subject of propositions, the predicates of true assertions
concerning the substance standing for attributes of the substance.
Speaking generally, one can describe Leibniz’ individual substance
as a spatiotemporal continuant, and existent without spatial parts,
but not without attributes, and with a perduring individuality and
an inner dynamic of change. This last feature endows the monad with
its key character of a unified manifold of forces. Let the state of
affairs corresponding to a consistent total description of the
attributes of a substance be called the state of the
substance at a given moment. That a monad—a substance within
the actual world—has many different states is an aspect of variety.
That these states can be ordered continuously into smooth
transitional sequences is an aspect of orderliness.
形而上学---单子理论
莱布尼茨的哲学，就像笛卡尔和斯宾诺沙的理论一样，取决于一种特定的物质概念。他的物质概念的主要特征是（1）一个给定的个别物质是一种简单的，持久的存在，非逻辑意义上的简单，而是在缺乏空间部分的情况下，（2）一个给定的个别物质有能力作为命题的主题发挥作用，判断有关代表物质属性的物质。一般说来，人们可以描述莱布尼茨的个别物质为时空的连续体，没有空间部分的存在，但不是没有属性，而是具有持久个性和变化的内在动力。这最后的特征赋予了单子统一的多种力量的重要特性。让事物的状态与一种物质属性一致的整个描述相一致被称为该物质在一种给定时刻的状态。一个单子---现实世界中的一种物质---具有许多不同的状态就是多样性的一个方面。这些状态可以连续有序地进入平滑的序列就是有序的一个方面。
Each monad has built
into its “complete individual notion” the internal programming of
all its states throughout its history, providing the basis for the
state-to-state transition that makes the monads unstable and
continually changing. This leads Leibniz to the metaphor that “the
present is pregnant with the future.” Each individual substance is
subject to a perpetual change of state. Such changes are without
jumps. The transition of the substance from one state to another is
always continuous and orderly. The world is thus a harmonious
cosmos, not a chaos, a fact inherent in the principle
perfection, that God as creator acts always for the best. The merit
or worthiness of the substance for actualization, its quantity of
essence or potentiality for existence, is directly proportional to
its perfection. God, desirous to act in the most perfect possible
way, actualizes that possible world constituted by that system of
possible substances for which the sum total of perfection is at a
maximum.
每个单子都在它的“完整的个别概念”中构建起了贯穿其历史的所有内在程序，为状态到状态的转换提供了基础，以至于使单子处于不稳定和不断的变化之中。这使莱布尼茨提出了“现在孕育着未来”的隐喻。每个个别的物质都从属于状态的永久变化。这样的变化都是没有跳跃的。物质从一种状态到另一种状态的转化总是连续和有序的。因此，世界是一个和谐的宇宙，而非混沌的世界，作为造物主的上帝总是出于好意而行动，就是一个原则完美的内在事实。
One of the
consequences of the inherent order that obtains among the
substances of this world as an orderly cosmos is that to any
instantaneous state of a given individual substance there
corresponds, in a certain fashion, exactly one instantaneous state
of every other individual substance. Such an instantaneous
“contemporaneity-slice” cutting through the history of all
substances defines a moment of time. Accordingly, at any moment of
time each substance “perceives” or “expresses” all the others, in
the sense that a certain similarity relationship obtains between
their states. This produces a “preestablished harmony” among all
the substances constituting the natural universe.
作为一个有序的宇宙，在这个世界的物质中获得固有秩序的结果之一就是一种给定的个别物质的任何瞬时状态，以某种方式，恰好对应于所有其它个别物质的一个瞬时状态。因此，一个贯穿所有物质历史瞬时的“同时发生的---部分”就定义了一个时刻。于是，在任何时刻，每个物质都“感知”和“表达”了其它所有的物质，从某种意义上说，在它们的状态之间就获得了某种相似性的关联。这就在构建自然宇宙的所有物质中产生了一种“预先建立的和谐”。
Theodicy. Leibniz made
important contributions to the problem of the relation of God to
evil. Leibniz distinguishes thr?ee modes of evil: physical evil,
which consists of suffering; moral evil, the wickedness and sin of
agents; and metaphysical evil, the imperfection of creatures. Evil
of any sort cannot properly be said to be “created” by God. Rather,
it is “admitted into existence” by him as an unavoidable
concomitant of the perfections he seeks to realize in
creation.
神正论
莱布尼茨对上帝与罪恶的问题做出了重要贡献。他区别了罪恶的三种模式：身体的罪恶，它包括痛苦；道德的罪恶，代理人的邪恶与罪恶；以及形而上学的罪恶，造物的不完美。任何形式的罪恶都不能恰当地被说成是上帝的“创造”。还不如说，罪恶是他在创造中寻求现实完美的，由他“允许存在”的一种不可避免的伴随物。
In his doctrine of
contingence, perhaps more heavily than in any other part of his
philosophy, Leibniz the philosopher is indebted to Leibniz the
mathematician. The logic underlying this doctrine stems entirely
and directly from his mathematical investigations into infinite
processes of summation and comparison. Against this background it
becomes possible to appreciate Leibniz’ exculpation of God from
blame for evil and imperfection as they seem to exist in the world.
Each substance has always subsisted—or, strictly speaking, has had
being in the sphere of possibility—in the mind of God. Its total
nature was determined, for its adequate and complete notion—that
is, all of its predicates save existence---was fixed before the
question of its existence could even arise. For this nature God is
in no way responsible. It is an object of his understanding, not a
creature of his will. God chose for actualization the best—that is,
most perfect—system of substances that are able to coexist. He is
indeed the reason for all existence, hence for all existent
perfection and imperfection. But imperfection is not avoidable,
since no substance different from God can be wholly perfect. God,
however, chose to minimize imperfection or, positively, to maximize
perfection. Thus he is positively the cause of existent perfection,
but only negatively of imperfection, since he retained only what
could not but remain. God has no choice but to tolerate the evils
that are an inevitable consequence of the good that is the primary
object of his will.
在他偶然性的学说中，也许比他哲学的任何其它部分分量更重，哲学家的莱布尼茨受惠于数学家的莱布尼茨。这一学说的逻辑基础完全并直接源自于他对求和与比较的无穷过程的数学探究。在这样的背景下，才有能可欣赏到莱布尼茨为上帝开脱因罪恶与不完美所受到的责备，因为它们似乎存在于世界上。在上帝的心中---各种物质一直都存在着，严格说来，一直存在于可能的范围内。因为它充足而完整的概念，所以就决定了它的整体性质---就是说，它的所有判断都挽救了存在---甚至在其存在的问题可能出现之前就已经被确定。对于这种性质，上帝没有任何责任。它是上帝理解的对象，不是他意志的造物。上帝选择了最高标准去实现---也就是说，最完美---那种能够共存的物质系统。他的确是万物存在的理由，因此就是所有的完美与不完美的原因。但不完美是无法避免的，因为任何不同于上帝的物质全部都是不完美的。然而，上帝选择了最小化的不完美，或者明确地说，选择了最大化的完美。因此，他是完美存在的积极原因，而只是不完美的消极因素，因为他只保留了他不得不保留的东西。上帝没有选择，只有忍受那些罪恶，这是善的必然结果，是他意志的主要目标。
##
The welfare of the
highest level monads (or spirits, as Leibniz called them) is a
prime consideration with God: “There is no room for doubt that the
felicity of the spirits is the principal aim of God and that He
puts this purpose into execution as far as the general harmony will
permit.” But even God cannot exclude the moral evil of spirits from
the best possible world (this is the root of original sin for
Leibniz), for God has no control over an evil that inheres in the
definitive nature of a spirit. Cosmic history is so arranged that a
spirit never descends to the level of a bare monad. It always has a
body—that is, it is the dominant monad of an organically structured
aggregate. No matter how low this may descend on the organic scale,
a spirit always, throughout its whole history, qualifies for
membership in the community of morally qualified individuals which
Leibniz characterizes as the “City of God.”
最高等级单子的福利（或者精神，莱布尼茨这样称呼它们）是上帝的一种主要考虑：“毫无疑问，精神的快乐就是上帝的主要目标，而且只要实现了普遍的和谐，他就实现这个目标”。但即使上帝都不能从可能的最好世界中（对莱布尼茨来说，这是原罪的根源）排除精神的道德罪恶，因为上帝无法控制本质上为决定性的精神本质的罪恶。宇宙的历史就是这样安排的，以至于精神从未下降到一种光秃秃单子的水平。它总是有一个主体---就是说，它是构成有机集合体的主导单子。
NICHOLAS RESCHER
尼古拉斯·雷舍尔
University of Pittsburgh
匹兹堡大学
2019年7月7日译校
译者注：该词条位列于《大美百科全书》第17卷，第183页至186页）
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