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西方认识论

(2013-01-26 20:36:35)
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杂谈

认识论非常重要,他关系到我们认为知识是怎样获得的问题;是否有绝对正确的知识的问题;等等。
The nature of human knowledge

Two main kinds of theory have emerged during the development of Western European philosophy: those rationalist views that take as their starting point the supremacy of the intellect over other human faculties and stress that true knowledge is that which is achieved by the mind in some way independently of the information provided by the senses; and those empiricist views which have taken a contrary stance and maintained that knowledge of the world about us can be derived only from the evidence that the world offers us through the use of our sense.

This dispute further reflects two related beliefs which have characterized western european philosophy from the beginning -- the idea o the fallibility of the senses as sources of information and views that some have held of the infallibility of the intellect. Thus such philosophers as Plato, Descartes, Kant AND Hegel have offered various versions of a rationalist epistemology which have shared the basic conviction that the evidence of our senses is misleading but that the rational mind can attain true knowledge independently of the senses by apprehending what lies beyond those sense impressions or in some way introducing a rational structure to our understanding of them. 

The philosophical objection began with the emergence of an alternative epistemology, that of empiricism which is perhaps best understood as a reaction against the mysticism of the essentially metaphysical nature of rationalism. Its fundamental tenet is well expressed in the claim of John Locke, the founder of the empiricist movement, that no knowledge comes into the mind except through the gates of sense.

Thus a number of recent theories of knowledge and theories of education have begun from the conviction that human knowledge has to be treated in a far more tentative way than many who take a rationalist view would concede and that, in relation to curriculum planning, we are in no position to be dogmatic about its content. 

The whole pragmatist movement, as promoted by John Dewey, which has been highly influential in the recent development of educational practice, especially in the early years, has been founded a view of knowledge as hypothetical and therefore subject to constant change, modification and evolution. Such a view requires us to be hesitant about asserting the value of any body of knowledge or its right to inclusion in the curriculum and ecourages us to accept that knowledge is to be equated rather with experience, so that what is means for children to acquire knowledge is that they should have experiences which they can themselves use as the basis for the framing of hypotheses to explain and gain control over the environment in which they live. In other words, we cannot impose what is knowledge for us upon them; we must assit them to develop their own knowledge, their own hypotheses, which will be different from ours if the process of evolution is go on .

This certainly results in a view of education as a much more personal activity than any rationalist could acknowledge. It may also suggest, however, that knowledge itself is personal and subjective. Thus some have stressed the phenomenological or existentialist claim that all knowledge is personal and subjective and the result of his or her own unique
perceptions of his or her own world. This, however, is not a view of Dewey. Dewey believes that the proper model for all knowledge is that of scientific knowledge, where hypotheses are framed and modified according to publicly agreed criteria, so that, while such knowledge has no permanent status, it is objective in so far as it at least enjoys current acceptance by everyone. CHilds argues 'Meaning and truth are empirical affairs to be developed and tested by operational or experimental procedures'.

On this kind of view, then, human knowledge is seen as evolving but as subject to conformity which publicly accepted and agreed criteria. For Dewey, this further implies that its continuing evolution requires the kind of intellectual freedom which only a truly democratic political context can provide. 

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