zt原来这次美国金融危机是TG派出的SPY搞的啊

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李大卫金融危机财经 |
好玩儿!自己看吧,有点难度,别问我,我也只看了个大概。反正是说这次金融危机的根本原因是整个华尔街相信了一个从中国大陆去的李先生的公式。
王小东
妈的,原来这次美国金融危机的是TG派出的SPY搞的啊,太牛了
送交者: heaven 于 2009-02-28 21:59:47
这位神秘的李先生原来是南开毕业的,先胜利完成任务,回归中国,任职中金公司风险管理部。
60年代中人哦。。。
http://www.wired.com/images/article/magazine/1703/wp_quant3_f.jpg
WIRED MAGAZINE: 17.03
Tech Biz : IT
Recipe for Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street
By Felix Salmon 02.23.09
In the mid-'80s, Wall Street turned to the quants—brainy financial
engineers—to invent new ways to boost profits. Their methods for
minting money worked brilliantly... until one of them devastated
the global economy.
Photo: Jim Krantz/Gallery Stock
Road Map for Financial Recovery: Radical Transparency Now! A year
ago, it was hardly unthinkable that a math wizard like David X. Li
might someday earn a Nobel Prize. After all, financial
economists—even Wall Street quants—have received the Nobel in
economics before, and Li's work on measuring risk has had more
impact, more quickly, than previous Nobel Prize-winning
contributions to the field. Today, though, as dazed bankers,
politicians, regulators, and investors survey the wreckage of the
biggest financial meltdown since the Great Depression, Li is
probably thankful he still has a job in finance at all. Not that
his achievement should be dismissed. He took a notoriously tough
nut—determining correlation, or how seemingly disparate events are
related—and cracked it wide open with a simple and elegant
mathematical formula, one that would become ubiquitous in finance
worldwide.
For five years, Li's formula, known as a Gaussian copula function,
looked like an unambiguously positive breakthrough, a piece of
financial technology that allowed hugely complex risks to be
modeled with more ease and accuracy than ever before. With his
brilliant spark of mathematical legerdemain, Li made it possible
for traders to sell vast quantities of new securities, expanding
financial markets to unimaginable levels.
His method was adopted by everybody from bond investors and Wall
Street banks to ratings agencies and regulators. And it became so
deeply entrenched—and was making people so much money—that warnings
about its limitations were largely ignored.
Then the model fell apart. Cracks started appearing early on, when
financial markets began behaving in ways that users of Li's formula
hadn't expected. The cracks became full-fledged canyons in
2008—when ruptures in the financial system's foundation swallowed
up trillions of dollars and put the survival of the global banking
system in serious peril.
David X. Li, it's safe to say, won't be getting that Nobel anytime
soon. One result of the collapse has been the end of financial
economics as something to be celebrated rather than feared. And
Li's Gaussian copula formula will go down in history as
instrumental in causing the unfathomable losses that brought the
world financial system to its knees.
How could one formula pack such a devastating punch? The answer
lies in the bond market, the multitrillion-dollar system that
allows pension funds, insurance companies, and hedge funds to lend
trillions of dollars to companies, countries, and home
buyers.
A bond, of course, is just an IOU, a promise to pay back money with
interest by certain dates. If a company—say, IBM—borrows money by
issuing a bond, investors will look very closely over its accounts
to make sure it has the wherewithal to repay them. The higher the
perceived risk—and there's always some risk—the higher the interest
rate the bond must carry.
Bond investors are very comfortable with the concept of
probability. If there's a 1 percent chance of default but they get
an extra two percentage points in interest, they're ahead of the
game overall—like a casino, which is happy to lose big sums every
so often in return for profits most of the time.
Bond investors also invest in pools of hundreds or even thousands
of mortgages. The potential sums involved are staggering: Americans
now owe more than $11 trillion on their homes. But mortgage pools
are messier than most bonds. There's no guaranteed interest rate,
since the amount of money homeowners collectively pay back every
month is a function of how many have refinanced and how many have
defaulted. There's certainly no fixed maturity date: Money shows up
in irregular chunks as people pay down their mortgages at
unpredictable times—for instance, when they decide to sell their
house. And most problematic, there's no easy way to assign a single
probability to the chance of default.
Wall Street solved many of these problems through a process called
tranching, which divides a pool and allows for the creation of safe
bonds with a risk-free triple-A credit rating. Investors in the
first tranche, or slice, are first in line to be paid off. Those
next in line might get only a double-A credit rating on their
tranche of bonds but will be able to charge a higher interest rate
for bearing the slightly higher chance of default. And so on.
"...correlation is charlatanism"
Photo: AP photo/Richard Drew The reason that ratings agencies and
investors felt so safe with the triple-A tranches was that they
believed there was no way hundreds of homeowners would all default
on their loans at the same time. One person might lose his job,
another might fall ill. But those are individual calamities that
don't affect the mortgage pool much as a whole: Everybody else is
still making their payments on time.
But not all calamities are individual, and tranching still hadn't
solved all the problems of mortgage-pool risk. Some things, like
falling house prices, affect a large number of people at once. If
home values in your neighborhood decline and you lose some of your
equity, there's a good chance your neighbors will lose theirs as
well. If, as a result, you default on your mortgage, there's a
higher probability they will default, too. That's called
correlation—the degree to which one variable moves in line with
another—and measuring it is an important part of determining how
risky mortgage bonds are.
Investors like risk, as long as they can price it. What they hate
is uncertainty—not knowing how big the risk is. As a result, bond
investors and mortgage lenders desperately want to be able to
measure, model, and price correlation. Before quantitative models
came along, the only time investors were comfortable putting their
money in mortgage pools was when there was no risk whatsoever—in
other words, when the bonds were guaranteed implicitly by the
federal government through Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.
Yet during the '90s, as global markets expanded, there were
trillions of new dollars waiting to be put to use lending to
borrowers around the world—not just mortgage seekers but also
corporations and car buyers and anybody running a balance on their
credit card—if only investors could put a number on the
correlations between them. The problem is excruciatingly hard,
especially when you're talking about thousands of moving parts.
Whoever solved it would earn the eternal gratitude of Wall Street
and quite possibly the attention of the Nobel committee as
well.
To understand the mathematics of correlation better, consider
something simple, like a kid in an elementary school: Let's call
her Alice. The probability that her parents will get divorced this
year is about 5 percent, the risk of her getting head lice is about
5 percent, the chance of her seeing a teacher slip on a banana peel
is about 5 percent, and the likelihood of her winning the class
spelling bee is about 5 percent. If investors were trading
securities based on the chances of those things happening only to
Alice, they would all trade at more or less the same price.
But something important happens when we start looking at two kids
rather than one—not just Alice but also the girl she sits next to,
Britney. If Britney's parents get divorced, what are the chances
that Alice's parents will get divorced, too? Still about 5 percent:
The correlation there is close to zero. But if Britney gets head
lice, the chance that Alice will get head lice is much higher,
about 50 percent—which means the correlation is probably up in the
0.5 range. If Britney sees a teacher slip on a banana peel, what is
the chance that Alice will see it, too? Very high indeed, since
they sit next to each other: It could be as much as 95 percent,
which means the correlation is close to 1. And if Britney wins the
class spelling bee, the chance of Alice winning it is zero, which
means the correlation is negative: -1.
If investors were trading securities based on the chances of these
things happening to both Alice and Britney, the prices would be all
over the place, because the correlations vary so much.
But it's a very inexact science. Just measuring those initial 5
percent probabilities involves collecting lots of disparate data
points and subjecting them to all manner of statistical and error
analysis. Trying to assess the conditional probabilities—the chance
that Alice will get head lice if Britney gets head lice—is an order
of magnitude harder, since those data points are much rarer. As a
result of the scarcity of historical data, the errors there are
likely to be much greater.
In the world of mortgages, it's harder still. What is the chance
that any given home will decline in value? You can look at the past
history of housing prices to give you an idea, but surely the
nation's macroeconomic situation also plays an important role. And
what is the chance that if a home in one state falls in value, a
similar home in another state will fall in value as well?
Here's what killed your 401(k) David X. Li's Gaussian copula
function as first published in 2000. Investors exploited it as a
quick—and fatally flawed—way to assess risk. A shorter version
appears on this month's cover of Wired.
Probability
Specifically, this is a joint default probability—the likelihood
that any two members of the pool (A and B) will both default. It's
what investors are looking for, and the rest of the formula
provides the answer. Survival times
The amount of time between now and when A and B can be expected to
default. Li took the idea from a concept in actuarial science that
charts what happens to someone's life expectancy when their spouse
dies.
Equality
A dangerously precise concept, since it leaves no room for error.
Clean equations help both quants and their managers forget that the
real world contains a surprising amount of uncertainty, fuzziness,
and precariousness.
Copula
This couples (hence the Latinate term copula) the individual
probabilities associated with A and B to come up with a single
number. Errors here massively increase the risk of the whole
equation blowing up.
Distribution functions
The probabilities of how long A and B are likely to survive. Since
these are not certainties, they can be dangerous: Small
miscalculations may leave you facing much more risk than the
formula indicates.
Gamma
The all-powerful correlation parameter, which reduces correlation
to a single constant—something that should be highly improbable, if
not impossible. This is the magic number that made Li's copula
function irresistible.
Enter Li, a star mathematician who grew up in rural China in the
1960s. He excelled in school and eventually got a master's degree
in economics from Nankai University before leaving the country to
get an MBA from Laval University in Quebec. That was followed by
two more degrees: a master's in actuarial science and a PhD in
statistics, both from Ontario's University of Waterloo. In 1997 he
landed at Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, where his financial
career began in earnest; he later moved to Barclays Capital and by
2004 was charged with rebuilding its quantitative analytics
team.
Li's trajectory is typical of the quant era, which began in the
mid-1980s. Academia could never compete with the enormous salaries
that banks and hedge funds were offering. At the same time, legions
of math and physics PhDs were required to create, price, and
arbitrage Wall Street's ever more complex investment
structures.
In 2000, while working at JPMorgan Chase, Li published a paper in
The Journal of Fixed Income titled "On Default Correlation: A
Copula Function Approach." (In statistics, a copula is used to
couple the behavior of two or more variables.) Using some
relatively simple math—by Wall Street standards, anyway—Li came up
with an ingenious way to model default correlation without even
looking at historical default data. Instead, he used market data
about the prices of instruments known as credit default
swaps.
If you're an investor, you have a choice these days: You can either
lend directly to borrowers or sell investors credit default swaps,
insurance against those same borrowers defaulting. Either way, you
get a regular income stream—interest payments or insurance
payments—and either way, if the borrower defaults, you lose a lot
of money. The returns on both strategies are nearly identical, but
because an unlimited number of credit default swaps can be sold
against each borrower, the supply of swaps isn't constrained the
way the supply of bonds is, so the CDS market managed to grow
extremely rapidly. Though credit default swaps were relatively new
when Li's paper came out, they soon became a bigger and more liquid
market than the bonds on which they were based.
When the price of a credit default swap goes up, that indicates
that default risk has risen. Li's breakthrough was that instead of
waiting to assemble enough historical data about actual defaults,
which are rare in the real world, he used historical prices from
the CDS market. It's hard to build a historical model to predict
Alice's or Britney's behavior, but anybody could see whether the
price of credit default swaps on Britney tended to move in the same
direction as that on Alice. If it did, then there was a strong
correlation between Alice's and Britney's default risks, as priced
by the market. Li wrote a model that used price rather than
real-world default data as a shortcut (making an implicit
assumption that financial markets in general, and CDS markets in
particular, can price default risk correctly).
It was a brilliant simplification of an intractable problem. And Li
didn't just radically dumb down the difficulty of working out
correlations; he decided not to even bother trying to map and
calculate all the nearly infinite relationships between the various
loans that made up a pool. What happens when the number of pool
members increases or when you mix negative correlations with
positive ones? Never mind all that, he said. The only thing that
matters is the final correlation number—one clean, simple,
all-sufficient figure that sums up everything.
The effect on the securitization market was electric. Armed with
Li's formula, Wall Street's quants saw a new world of
possibilities. And the first thing they did was start creating a
huge number of brand-new triple-A securities. Using Li's copula
approach meant that ratings agencies like Moody's—or anybody
wanting to model the risk of a tranche—no longer needed to puzzle
over the underlying securities. All they needed was that
correlation number, and out would come a rating telling them how
safe or risky the tranche was.
As a result, just about anything could be bundled and turned into a
triple-A bond—corporate bonds, bank loans, mortgage-backed
securities, whatever you liked. The consequent pools were often
known as collateralized debt obligations, or CDOs. You could
tranche that pool and create a triple-A security even if none of
the components were themselves triple-A. You could even take
lower-rated tranches of other CDOs, put them in a pool, and tranche
them—an instrument known as a CDO-squared, which at that point was
so far removed from any actual underlying bond or loan or mortgage
that no one really had a clue what it included. But it didn't
matter. All you needed was Li's copula function.
The CDS and CDO markets grew together, feeding on each other. At
the end of 2001, there was $920 billion in credit default swaps
outstanding. By the end of 2007, that number had skyrocketed to
more than $62 trillion. The CDO market, which stood at $275 billion
in 2000, grew to $4.7 trillion by 2006.
At the heart of it all was Li's formula. When you talk to market
participants, they use words like beautiful, simple, and, most
commonly, tractable. It could be applied anywhere, for anything,
and was quickly adopted not only by banks packaging new bonds but
also by traders and hedge funds dreaming up complex trades between
those bonds.
"The corporate CDO world relied almost exclusively on this
copula-based correlation model," says Darrell Duffie, a Stanford
University finance professor who served on Moody's Academic
Advisory Research Committee. The Gaussian copula soon became such a
universally accepted part of the world's financial vocabulary that
brokers started quoting prices for bond tranches based on their
correlations. "Correlation trading has spread through the psyche of
the financial markets like a highly infectious thought virus,"
wrote derivatives guru Janet Tavakoli in 2006.
The damage was foreseeable and, in fact, foreseen. In 1998, before
Li had even invented his copula function, Paul Wilmott wrote that
"the correlations between financial quantities are notoriously
unstable." Wilmott, a quantitative-finance consultant and lecturer,
argued that no theory should be built on such unpredictable
parameters. And he wasn't alone. During the boom years, everybody
could reel off reasons why the Gaussian copula function wasn't
perfect. Li's approach made no allowance for unpredictability: It
assumed that correlation was a constant rather than something
mercurial. Investment banks would regularly phone Stanford's Duffie
and ask him to come in and talk to them about exactly what Li's
copula was. Every time, he would warn them that it was not suitable
for use in risk management or valuation.
David X. Li
Illustration: David A. Johnson In hindsight, ignoring those
warnings looks foolhardy. But at the time, it was easy. Banks
dismissed them, partly because the managers empowered to apply the
brakes didn't understand the arguments between various arms of the
quant universe. Besides, they were making too much money to
stop.
In finance, you can never reduce risk outright; you can only try to
set up a market in which people who don't want risk sell it to
those who do. But in the CDO market, people used the Gaussian
copula model to convince themselves they didn't have any risk at
all, when in fact they just didn't have any risk 99 percent of the
time. The other 1 percent of the time they blew up. Those
explosions may have been rare, but they could destroy all previous
gains, and then some.