U.S. relies on Sudan despite condemning it

The nation accused of aiding the killings in Darfur provides spies in

Iraq. In return, it gets access in Washington.

By Greg Miller and Josh Meyer, Times Staff Writers

June 11, 2007

 

WASHINGTON — Sudan has secretly worked with the CIA to spy on the

insurgency in Iraq, an example of how the U.S. has continued to

cooperate with the Sudanese regime even while condemning its suspected

role in the killing of tens of thousands of civilians in Darfur.

 

President Bush has denounced the killings in Sudan's western region as

genocide and has imposed sanctions on the government in Khartoum. But

some critics say the administration has soft-pedaled the sanctions to

preserve its extensive intelligence collaboration with Sudan.

 

The relationship underscores the complex realities of the post-Sept.

11 world, in which the United States has relied heavily on

intelligence and military cooperation from countries, including Sudan

and Uzbekistan, that are considered pariah states for their records on

human rights.

 

"Intelligence cooperation takes place for a whole lot of reasons,"

said a U.S. intelligence official, who like others spoke on condition

of anonymity when discussing intelligence assessments. "It's not

always between people who love each other deeply."

 

Sudan has become increasingly valuable to the United States since the

Sept. 11 attacks because the Sunni Arab nation is a crossroads for

Islamic militants making their way to Iraq and Pakistan.

 

That steady flow of foreign fighters has provided cover for Sudan's

Mukhabarat intelligence service to insert spies into Iraq, officials

said.

 

"If you've got jihadists traveling via Sudan to get into Iraq, there's

a pattern there in and of itself that would not raise suspicion," said

a former high-ranking CIA official familiar with Sudan's cooperation

with the agency. "It creates an opportunity to send Sudanese into that

pipeline."

 

As a result, Sudan's spies have often been in better position than the

CIA to gather information on Al Qaeda's presence in Iraq, as well as

the activities of other insurgent groups.

 

"There's not much that blond-haired, blue-eyed case officers from the

United States can do in the entire Middle East, and there's nothing

they can do in Iraq," said a second former CIA official familiar with

Sudan's cooperation. "Sudanese can go places we don't go. They're

Arabs. They can wander around."

 

The officials declined to say whether the Mukhabarat had sent its

intelligence officers into the country, citing concern over the

protection of sources and methods. They said that Sudan had assembled

a network of informants in Iraq providing intelligence on the

insurgency. Some may have been recruited as they traveled through

Khartoum.

 

The U.S.-Sudan relationship goes beyond Iraq. Sudan has helped the

United States track the turmoil in Somalia, working to cultivate

contacts with the Islamic Courts Union and other militias in an effort

to locate Al Qaeda suspects hiding there. Sudan also has provided

extensive cooperation in counter-terrorism operations, acting on U.S.

requests to detain suspects as they pass through Khartoum.

 

Sudan gets a number of benefits in return. Its relationship with the

CIA has given it an important back channel for communications with the

U.S. government. Washington has also used this channel to lean on

Khartoum over the crisis in Darfur and for other issues.

 

And at a time when Sudan is being condemned in the international

community, its counter-terrorism work has won precious praise. The

U.S. State Department recently issued a report calling Sudan a "strong

partner in the war on terror."

 

Some critics accuse the Bush administration of being soft on Sudan for

fear of jeopardizing the counter-terrorism cooperation. John

Prendergast, director of African affairs for the National Security

Council in the Clinton administration, called the latest sanctions

announced by Bush last month "window dressing," designed to appear

tough while putting little real pressure on Sudan to stop the militias

it is widely believed to be supporting from killing members of tribal

settlements in Darfur.

 

"One of the main glass ceilings on real significant action in response

to the genocide in Darfur has been our growing relationship with

authorities in Khartoum on counter-terrorism," said Prendergast, a

senior advisor to the International Crisis Group. "It is the single

biggest contributor to why the gap between rhetoric and action is so

large."

 

In an interview, Sudan's ambassador to the United States, John Ukec

Lueth Ukec, suggested that the sanctions could affect his country's

willingness to cooperate on intelligence matters. The steps announced

by Bush include denying 31 businesses owned by the Sudanese government

access to the U.S. financial system.

 

The decision to impose financial penalties "was not a good idea," Ukec

said. "It diminishes our cooperation. And it makes those who are on

the extreme side, who do not want cooperation with the United States,

stronger."

 

But White House and U.S. intelligence officials downplayed the

prospect that the intelligence cooperation would suffer, saying that

it was in both countries' interests.

 

"The No. 1 consideration in imposing stiffer sanctions is that the

Sudanese government hasn't stopped the violence there and the people

continue to suffer," said Gordon Johndroe, a spokesman for the

National Security Council. "We certainly expect the Sudanese to

continue efforts against terrorism because it's in their own

interests, not just ours."

 

Sudan has its own interests in following the insurgency because

Sudanese extremists and foreign fighters who pass through the country

are likely to return and become a potentially destabilizing presence.

 

Sudan's lax controls on travel have made it, according to one

official, a "way station" for Islamist militants not only from North

Africa, but also from Saudi Arabia and other Persian Gulf states.

 

Some former U.S. intelligence officials said that Sudan's help in Iraq

had been of limited value, in part because the country accounts for a

small fraction of the foreign fighters, mainly at lower levels of the

insurgency.

 

"There's not going to be a Sudanese guy near the top of the Al Qaeda

in Iraq leadership," said a former CIA official who operated in

Baghdad. "They might have some fighters there, but that's just cannon

fodder. They don't have the trust and the ability to work their way

up. The guys leading Al Qaeda in Iraq are Iraqis, Jordanians and

Saudis."

 

But others say that Sudan's contributions have been significant

because Sudanese frequently occupy support positions throughout Arab

society — including in the Iraq insurgency — giving them access to

movements and supply chains.

 

"Every group needs weapons. Every group needs a meeting place," said

another former high-ranking CIA official who oversaw intelligence

gathering in Iraq. "Sudanese could get involved in the support chain

or smuggling channels from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait."

 

A State Department official said Sudan had "provided critical

information that has helped our counter-terrorism efforts around the

globe," but noted that there was an inherent conflict in the

relationship.

 

"They have done things that have saved American lives," the official

said. "But the bottom line is that they are bombing their people out

the wazoo [in Darfur]. Dealing with Sudan, it seems like they are

always playing both ends against the middle."

 

The CIA declined to discuss any cooperation with Sudan.

 

"The agency does not, as a rule, comment on relations with foreign

intelligence organizations," CIA spokesman Paul Gimigliano said.

 

Ukec, the Sudanese ambassador, said "the details of what we do in

counter-terrorism are not available for discussions." But he noted

that the U.S. State Department "has openly said we are involved in

countering terrorism," and that the assistance his country is

providing "is not only in Sudan."

 

In the mid-1990s, the CIA's relationship with Sudan was severed. At

the time, Sudan was providing safe harbor for Osama bin Laden and

other Al Qaeda leaders. But ties were reestablished shortly after the

Sept. 11 attacks, when the CIA reopened its station in Khartoum.

 

Initially, the collaboration focused on information Sudan could

provide about Al Qaeda's activities before Bin Laden left for

Afghanistan in 1996, including Al Qaeda's pursuit of chemical,

biological or nuclear weapons and its many business fronts and

associates there.

 

Since then, Sudan has moved beyond sharing historical information on

Al Qaeda into taking part in ongoing counter-terrorism operations,

focusing on areas where its assistance is likely to be most

appreciated.

 

"Iraq," a U.S. intelligence official said, "is where the intelligence

is going to have the most impact on Americans."

 

In 2005, the CIA sent an executive jet to Sudan to fly the country's

intelligence chief, Maj. Gen. Salah Abdallah Gosh, to Washington for

meetings with officials at agency headquarters.

 

Gosh has not returned to Washington since, but a former official said

that "there are liaison visits every day" between the CIA and the

Mukhabarat.