《菊花与战刀》陈国华译文赏析

The Chrysanthemum and the Sword：Patterns of Japanese Culture

by Ruth Benedict

1

Assignment: Japan

The Japanese were the most alien  enemy the United States had ever fought in an all-out struggle. In no other war with a major foe  had it been necessary to take into account such exceedingly  different habits of acting and thinking. Like Czarist Russia before us in 1905, we were fighting a nation fully armed and trained which did not belong to the Western cultural tradition. Conventions of war which Western nations had come to accept as facts of human nature obviously did not exist for the Japanese. It made the war in the Pacific more than a series of landings on island beaches, more than an unsurpassed problem of logistics. It made it a major problem in the nature of the enemy. We had to understand their behavior in order to cope with it .

The difficulties  were great. During  the past seventy- five years since Japan’s closed doors were opened, the Japanese have been described in the most fantastic  series of “but also’s” ever used for any nation of the world. When a serious observer is writing about peoples other than the Japanese  and says they are unprecedentedly polite , he is not likely to add, “But also insolent and overbearing.” When he says people of some nation are incomparably rigid  in their behavior, he does not add, “But also they adapt themselves readily to extreme  innovations.” When he says a people are submissive, he does not explain too that they are not easily amenable to control from above . When he says they are loyal and generous, he does not declare, “But also treacherous and spiteful .” When he says they are genuinely brave, he does not expatiate on their timidity. When he says they act out of concern for others’ opinions, he does not then go on to tell that they have a truly terrifying  conscience. When he describes robot-like discipline  in their Army, he does not continue by describing the way the soldiers in that Army take the bit in their own teeth even to the point of insubordination. When he describes a people who devote themselves with passion to Western learning, he does not also enlarge on their fervid  conservatism. When he writes a book on a nation with a popular cult of aestheticism which gives high honor to actors and to artists and lavishes art upon  the cultivation of chrysanthemums, that book does not ordinarily have to be supplemented by another which is devoted to the cult of the sword and the top prestige  of the warrior.

All these contradictions, however, are the warp and woof of books on Japan. They are true. Both the sword and the chrysanthemum are a part of the picture. The Japanese are, to the highest degree , both aggressive and un-aggressive, both militaristic and aesthetic, both insolent and polite, rigid and adaptable, submissive and resentful of being pushed around , loyal and treacherous, brave and timid, conservative and hospitable to new ways . They are terribly concerned about what other people will think of their behavior, and they are also overcome by guilt  when other people know nothing of their misstep. Their soldiers are disciplined to the hilt  but are also insubordinate .

When it became so important for America to understand Japan, these contradictions and many others equally blatant  could not be waved aside. Crises  were facing us in quick succession. What would the Japanese do? Was capitulation  possible without invasion? Should we bomb the Emperor’s palace? What could we expect of Japanese prisoners of war? What should we say in our propaganda to Japanese troops and to the Japanese homeland which could save the lives of Americans and lessen Japanese determination to fight to the last man ? There were violent disagreements  among those who knew the Japanese best . When peace came, were the Japanese a people who would require perpetual martial law to keep them in order ? Would our army have to prepare to fight desperate bitter-enders  in every mountain fastness of Japan ? Would there have to be a revolution in Japan after the order of the French Revolution or the Russian Revolution before  international peace was possible? Who would lead it? Was the alternative the eradication  of the Japanese? It made a great deal of difference  what our judgments were.

In June, 1944, I was assigned to the study of Japan. I was asked to use all the techniques I could as a cultural anthropologist to spell out what the Japanese were like. During that early summer our great offensive against Japan had just begun to show itself in its true magnitude . People in the United States were still saying that the war with Japan would last three years, perhaps ten years, more. In Japan they talked of its lasting one hundred years. Americans, they said, had had local victories, but New Guinea and the Solomons were thousands of miles away from their home islands. Their official communiqués had hardly admitted naval defeats and the Japanese people still regarded themselves as victors.

In June, however, the situation began to change. The second front was opened in Europe and the military priority which the High Command had for two years and a half given to the European theater paid off . The end of the war against Germany was in sight. And in the Pacific our forces landed on Saipan, a great operation forecasting eventual Japanese defeat. From then on our soldiers were to face the Japanese army at constantly closer quarters. And we knew well, from the fighting in New Guinea, on Guadalcanal, in Burma, on Attu and Tarawa and Biak, that we were pitted against a formidable foe.

In June, 1944, therefore, it was important to answer a multitude of questions about our enemy, Japan. Whether the issue was military or diplomatic, whether it was raised by questions of high policy or of leaflets to be dropped behind the Japanese front lines, every insight was important . In the all-out war Japan was fighting we had to know, not just the aims and motives, of those in power in Tokyo, not just the long history of Japan, not just economic and military statistics; we had to know what their government could count on from the people. We had to try to understand Japanese habits of thought and emotion and the patterns into which these habits fell. We had to know the sanctions  behind these actions and opinions. We had to put aside for the moment the premises on which we act as Americans and to keep ourselves as far as possible from leaping to the easy conclusion that what we would do in a given situation  was what they would do. 

菊花与战刀：日本文化的模式

茹丝•贝讷迪克著

陈国华译

第一章：使命：日本

在美国全力以赴与之博斗过的敌人中，日本人最为异类。在之前与任何一个劲敌的交战中，我们都不必考虑对方的行事和思维习惯与我们的迥然不同。跟1905年的沙皇俄国一样，我们现在是在与一个全副武装、训练有素、不属于西方文化传统的民族作战。西方民族视为符合人性的那些战争常规，对于日本人来说，显然并不存在。这使得太平洋战争不仅是一系列的岛屿抢滩登陆，也不仅是无比艰难的后勤保障，而且还是认识敌人本性的一个大问题。只有瞭解其行为，才能应对其行为。

这件事困难重重。日本打开其关闭的大门已经75年了，这期间人们一直用一系列的“却又”来形容日本人，频率高得出奇，超过用来形容世界上任何其他民族。严肃认真的观察家在描写其他各民族时，如果说他们彬彬有礼，无以复加，就不大可能又补充说“却又出言不逊，趾高气昂”；如果说某一民族的人行为无比僵化，就不会再补充说“却乐于顺应极为大胆的创新”；如果说一个民族性情温顺，就不会又解释说他们容易桀骜不驯；如果赞扬他们忠心耿耿，宽厚大度，就不会又宣布他们“居心叵测、刻薄恶毒”；如果形容他们英勇无畏，就不会继而侈谈他们胆小如鼠；如果说他们一举一动都顾及他人看法，就不会接着又说他们的良心实在令人胆寒；如果描写他们军纪严明，如同机器人一般整齐划一，就不会继而又描述士兵们自作主张、自行其是，甚至到了以下犯上的程度；如果讲述一个民族如何激情地拥抱西学，就不会继而又大谈他们怎样狂热地固守祖制；如果写一本书，介绍一个国家的民众如何崇尚唯美主义，给予演员和艺术家崇高荣誉，在菊花栽培上倾注心血，精益求精，就一般不会马上续写一本书，专讲该国的战刀崇拜和武士的至尊地位。

然而这些相互矛盾的说法却成了有关日本问题著作的经线和纬线，且全是真的。战刀与菊花都是一幅画面的组成部分。相互矛盾的特性在日本人那里集为一身，达到无以复加的程度：他们既好斗又不好斗，既尚武又唯美，既傲慢又客气，既僵化又善变，既驯服又执拗，既忠诚又奸诈，既勇敢又怯弱，既守旧又创新。他们十分在意别人对自己行为的看法，但倘若别人对其劣行毫不知情，他们也会情不自禁为非作歹。他们的士兵被训练得服服帖帖，但也会抗命不遵。

瞭解日本已是美国当务之急，面对日本人的这些矛盾性格以及其他许多同样显而易见的特性，我们不能置之不理。关键时刻接踵而至。日本人下一步会干什么？能否不进攻日本本土就让它根据所给条件投降？是否应该轰炸皇宫？从日本战俘口中可以期待得到什么？在对日军及其本土进行宣传时，说些什么才能减少美国士兵的伤亡，瓦解日本顽抗到最后一兵一卒的斗志？在这些问题上，日本问题专家们唇枪舌剑，争论不休。一旦和平到来，日本这个民族是否需要实行无限期军事管制才能使他们安分守己？我军是否得准备在日本的每一个山头与地堡里拼死抵抗的日军士兵激战？是否得在日本爆发一场革命，就像法国革命或俄国革命那样，国际和平才有可能实现？谁会领导这场革命？如若不然，是不是只好把日本人彻底消灭？我们做出什么判断，事关重大。

1944年6月，我受命研究日本，要我利用文化人类学家的所有手段和方法，描绘出日本人的特点。那年夏初，我们对日本进行的大反攻刚刚显山露水。在美国，人们仍说对日战争会持续三年，也许十年，甚至更长。在日本，人们则说这场战争会持续一百年。他们说，美国人虽然取得了一些局部胜利，但是新几内亚和所罗门群岛距日本本土有数千英里之遥。他们的官方公报几乎从不承认其海军的失败，日本人民依旧自认为是胜利者。

到了6月，局势却发生了变化，欧洲开辟了第二战场。两年半以来，盟军最高统帅部在军事上一直把欧洲战场摆在首位，这一做法收到了成效，对德战争的胜利指日可待。在太平洋战场上，我军在塞班岛登陆，这一重大战役昭示着日本的最终失败。此后我军将会与日军日益抵近接火。通过在新几内亚、瓜达尔卡纳尔岛、缅甸、阿图岛、塔拉瓦岛和比亚克岛与日军交战，我们已经清楚地知道，自己是在跟一个强悍之敌较量。

因此，1944年6月一件重要的事就是，解答有关日本这一敌国的诸多问题。无论是军事问题还是外交问题，是高层决策提出的问题还是关于空投到日军后方传单的问题，每一见解都很重要。在日本发动的这场全面战争中，我们要瞭解的不仅是东京当权者的目的和动机，不仅是日本的悠久历史，不仅是经济上和军事上的统计数据；还包括日本政府指望从人民那里获得什么样的支持。我们得瞭解日本人的思维和情感习惯以及这些习惯形成的模式，瞭解这些行为和观点背后的动机。我们得暂时把我们美国人的思维和行事模式放在一边，尽量避免轻率地下结论，说在特定环境下我们怎么做，日本人也会怎么做。