CHINA'S GREAT DEPRESSION

by Krassimir Petrov, Ph.D.  September 2, 2004

In order to establish our parallel, we need some historical perspective of the relationship between a world superpower and a rising economic giant. In the 1920s, Great Britain was the superpower of the world, and the United States was the rising giant. As such, Great Britain ran its economic policies independently, and the U.S. adapted its own policies in a somewhat subordinated manner. Today, The United States is the hegemonic superpower of the world, and China is the rising economic giant. Not surprisingly, the U.S. runs its policy independently, while China adjusts its own accordingly.

需要以历史视野巡视一个世界霸权和一个崛起中巨型经济体之间的关系。20世纪20年代，英国是世界霸权，美国正在崛起。英国独立地施行其经济政策，而美国以附庸形式调整政策。今天，美国是这个世界支配性的强权，中国正在崛起。因此很自然的，美国独立地施展政策，而中国相应地调整。

Continuing our parallel analysis, during the 1920s the British Empire was already in decline, was militarily overextended, and in order to pay for its imperial adventures, resorted to debasing its own currency and running continuous foreign trade and budget deficits. In other words, Britain was savings-short, a net-debtor nation, and the rest of the world was financing her. Meanwhile, America was running trade surpluses and was a net creditor nation. Importantly from a historical point of view, the British Empire collapsed when the rest of the world pulled the plug on their credit and began capital repatriation. Today, the American Empire is in decline, is militarily overextended, and is financing her overextended empire with the “tried-and-true” methods of currency debasement and never-ending foreign trade and budget deficits. In other words, America is savings-starved, a net-debtor nation, and the rest of the world is financing her. At the same time, today China runs trade surpluses and is a net-creditor nation. When the rest of the world finally pulls the plug on American credit, will the American Empire also collapse? (陈宏杰博客   blog.sina.com.cn/TimesBaby)

20世纪20年代英国为了给帝国的冒险埋单，军事上过度扩张而衰落。英国求诸于货币贬值和持续的外贸和预算赤字政策。换言之，英国是一个储蓄不足、净负债的国家，而其他国家为其提供融资。此时美国贸易盈余，是一个净债权国。当其他国家拧紧借贷的水龙头，并开始把资本抽返回国内时，英国崩溃。如今，美国军事上过度扩张，并且以经过历史验证的货币贬值和无尽头的外贸和预算赤字方法来资助它过度扩张的帝国。换言之，美国是储蓄消耗殆尽的净债务国，而其他国家正为其融资。同时，今天的中国贸易盈余，是一个净债权国。当其他的国家最终关闭对美国信贷的水龙头时，美国也会崩溃吗？

The cause of the Depression, as Rothbard explains, was a credit expansion that fuelled the boom. According to Rothbard, 大萧条的出现是因为繁荣建立在信贷扩张基础上。“over the entire period of the boom, we find that the money supply increased by $28.0 billion, a 61.8 percent increase over the eight year period [of 1921-1929]. This was an average annual increase of 7.7 percent, a very sizable degree of inflation (p.93)…The entire monetary expansion took place in money substitutes, which are products of credit creation… The prime factor in generating the inflation of the 1920s was the increase in total bank reserves” (p.102). In other words, during the 1920s, the United States experienced an inflationary credit boom. 欢呼中国的增长，却没有意识到中国正在经历一次通货膨胀性信贷扩张，其规模让美国喧嚣的20年代相形见绌。This was most evident in the booming stock and the booming real estate markets. Furthermore, there was a “spectacular boom in foreign bonds… It was a direct reflection of American credit expansion, and particularly of the low interest rates generated by that expansion” (p.130). To stem the boom, the Fed attempted in vain to use moral suasion on the markets and restrain credit expansion only for “legitimate business. Importantly, consumer “prices generally remained stable and even fell slightly over the period” (p. 86). No doubt the stable consumer prices contributed to the overall sense of economic stability, and the majority of professional economists then did not realize that the economy was not fundamentally sound. To them the bust came as a surprise.在过去三年间（01-04），中国货币供应增长速度大约是美国在20年代的三倍。

Similarly, today the dollar is overvalued and used as the reserve currency of the world. The U.S. runs its inflationary policy and is losing dollars to the rest of the world, mainly China (and Japan). Today, the currency and export policy of China is anchored around its peg to the dollar. The main reason for this is that by artificially undervaluing its own currency, and therefore overvaluing the dollar, China artificially stimulates its manufacturing exports. The second reason is that by buying the excess U.S. dollars and reinvesting them in U.S. government bonds, it acts as a foreign lender to the United States. The third reason is that this foreign lending stimulates American demand for Chinese manufacturing exports and allows the Chinese government to relieve its current unemployment problems. In other words, the motives behind the Chinese currency and export policy today are identical to the American ones during the 1920s: (1) to support the overvalued U.S. dollar, (2) to stimulate foreign lending, and (3) to stimulate its manufacturing exports. Just like America in the 1920s, China establishes its trade today not on the solid foundation of reciprocal and productive exchange, but on the basis of foreign loans. No doubt, most of these loans will turn out to be very expensive because they will be repaid with greatly depreciated dollars, which in turn will exacerbate down the road the growing financial distress of the banking sector in China.(陈宏杰博客   blog.sina.com.cn/TimesBaby)

今天美元被高估，作为全球储备货币。美国执行通货膨胀政策，正在向其它各国输出美元，主要是中国和日本。今天，中国货币和出口政策与它钉住美元政策挂钩。这样做的主要动机是，通过有意低估自己的货币，从而高估美元，中国人为地刺激其制造业出口。第二个动机是，通过买入过多的美元，并再投资于美国政策债券，中国充当了美国的对外借贷人。第三个动机，是这种对外借贷刺激美国对中国制造业出口的需求，使中国政府得以缓解其当下的失业问题。换言之，中国货币和出口政策背后的动机与美国在20年代时的一样：（1）支持高估的美元，（2）刺激对外贷款，（3）刺激自己的制造业出口。就像美国在20年代，中国的贸易不是建立在互惠和有益交换的基础上，而是在对外贷款的基础上。毫无疑问，大部分贷款将变得成本非常高，因为贷款将被以大大贬值了的美元偿还，这反过来将加剧中国银行业日益积累的金融灾难。

Therefore, it is clear that China travels today the road to Depression. How severe this depression will be, will critically depend on two developments. First, how much longer the Chinese government will pursue the inflationary policy, and second how doggedly it will fight the bust. The longer it expands and the more its fights the bust, the more likely it is that the Chinese Depression will turn into a Great Depression. Also, it is important to realize that just like America's Great Depression in the 1930s triggered a worldwide Depression, similarly a Chinese Depression will trigger a bust in the U.S., and therefore a recession in the rest of the world.

因此，很清楚，中国今天在滑向萧条的道路上。这次萧条的严重程度会如何，将关键取决于两方面的进展：首先，中国政府将在多长时间内追求通货膨胀的政策，第二，中国政府与泡沫破灭搏斗的顽强程度。

Unless there is an unforeseen banking, currency, or a derivative crisis spreading throughout the world, it is my belief that the Chinese bust will occur sometime in 2008-2009, since the Chinese government will surely pursue expansionary policies until the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in China. By then, inflation will be most likely out of control, probably already in runaway mode, and the government will have no choice but to slam the brakes and induce contraction. In 1929 the expansion stopped in July, the stock market broke in October, and the economy collapsed in early 1930. Thus, providing for a latency period of approximately half a year between credit contraction and economic collapse, based on my Olympic Games timing, I would pinpoint the bust for 2009. Admittedly, this is a pure speculation on my part; naturally, the bust could occur sooner or later.

除非提前出现一场没有被预测到的波及全世界的银行、货币或者衍生产品危机，我确信，中国的泡沫破灭将会在08-09年间某个时刻发生，因为一直到08年奥运会举办前，中国政府将肯定会继续追求一种刺激经济的政策。到那时，通货膨胀将非常可能无法控制，可能现在已经处于失控的状况，而政府除了急踩刹车和采取收缩外毫无选择。29年，美国扩张在7月份停止，股市在10月份崩溃，经济在30年崩溃。因此，考虑到在信贷收缩与经济崩溃之间有大约半年的延宕期，基于我的奥运会时间点，我将崩溃确定在09年。无可否认，这纯粹是我的猜测；自然的，崩溃可能更早或更晚发生。

We should also consider another possible trigger for a bust, namely trade surpluses turning into trade deficits due to the accelerated rise of prices for resources, such as commodities, which China must import. Faced with trade deficits, China may decide to dishoard surpluses by selling U.S. government bonds, or it may decide to abandon its peg to the dollar. In either case, this will exacerbate the problems of the ailing U.S. economy, which in turn will boomerang back to China.

Finally, the bust may be triggered by a worldwide crisis in crude oil supplies. Peak oil supply is around the corner, if not already behind us, and Middle East or Caspian instability could sharply cut oil supplies. Historically, oil shortages and their concomitant rise of oil prices have always induced a recession. China's growing dependence on oil ensures that should an oil crisis occur, it will slip into recession.

我们应该还要考虑另一个可能的崩溃引发点，即由于中国必须进口的资源，比如矿产品价格加速上涨，令贸易盈余变成贸易赤字。面对贸易赤字，中国可能决定通过出售美国政府债券来沽出盈余，或者中国可能抛弃钉住美元。两种情况都将令染恙在身的美国经济更形恶化，并反过来打击中国。

To summarize, the likely candidates for a trigger to the Chinese depression are (1) a worldwide currency, banking, or derivatives crisis, (2) a U.S. recession, (3) the containment of runaway inflation, (4) the disappearance of Chinese trade surpluses, and (5) an oil supply crisis.

总而言之，以下几种情形可能会成为中国萧条的触发点：（1）世界范围的货币、银行或者衍生产品危机，（2）美国衰退，（3）扼制通货膨胀的措施，（4）中国失去贸易盈余，还有，（5）石油供应危机。

Whatever the trigger of the bust in China, there is little doubt that this will provide the onset of a worldwide depression. Just like the U.S. emerged from the Great Depression as the unrivalled superpower of the world, so it is likely that China will emerge as the next.