小拉丰DAVID.MARTIMORT十月份来CEMA讲课,大家也先了解他的书和论文.他和拉丰的激励理论的第一卷已经翻译成中文.大家最好只看英文版.

[BOOK] The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model - all 6 versions »
JJ Laffont, D Martimort - 2002 - books.google.com
Copyright ©2002 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University
Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom:
Princeton University Press, 3 Market Place, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 1SY ...
Cited by 567 - Related Articles - Web Search - Find It @ Jolis

Collusion under Asymmetric Information - Find It @ Jolis - all 4 versions »
JJ Laffont, D Martimort - Econometrica, 1997 - JSTOR
878 SJ LAFFONT AND D. MARTIMORT types. If one considers implementation in
Bayesian-Nash equilibrium and if one assumes that members of a coalition who
share their information are committed to stay in the coalition,3~ some ...
Cited by 158 - Related Articles - Web Search - BL Direct

Exclusive Dealing, Common Agency, and Multiprincipals Incentive Theory - Find It @ Jolis - all 8 versions »
D Martimort - Rand Journal of Economics, 1996 - JSTOR
2 / THE RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS exclusive dealing is mostly anticompetitive
and increases monopoly power in the up- stream market, whereas others, following
Bork (1978), have defended this arrangement as being procompetitive. I ...
Cited by 146 - Related Articles - Web Search - BL Direct

Separation of Regulators against Collusive Behavior - Find It @ Jolis - all 7 versions »
JJ Laffont, D Martimort - Rand Journal of Economics, 1999 - JSTOR
LAFFONT AND MARTIMORT / 233 framed, economists still have much less to say than
political scientists on the positive and normative issues raised by the internal
organization of government. It seems the right time to revisit these ...
Cited by 143 - Related Articles - Web Search - BL Direct

Mechanism Design with Collusion and Correlation - Find It @ Jolis - all 12 versions »
JJ Laffont, D Martimort - Econometrica, 2000 - Blackwell Synergy
In a public good environment with positively correlated types, we characterize
optimal mechanisms when agents have private information and can enter collusive
agreements. First, we prove a weak-collusion-proof principle according to ...
Cited by 140 - Related Articles - Web Search

Competing Mechanisms in a Common Value Environment - Find It @ Jolis - all 7 versions »
B Biais, D Martimort, JC Rochet - Econometrica, 2000 - Blackwell Synergy
Consider strategic risk-neutral traders competing in schedules to supply
liquidity to a risk-averse agent who is privately informed about the value of
the asset and his hedging needs. Imperfect competition in this commonalue ...
Cited by 124 - Related Articles - Web Search - BL Direct

The Revelation and Delegation Principles in Common Agency Games - Find It @ Jolis - all 8 versions »
D Martimort, L Stole 2 - Econometrica, 2002 - Blackwell Synergy
1 introduction The use of the revelation principle has become widespread in the
optimal con- tracts literature, 2 in large part because of the convenient
description it provides of the set of allocations that can be achieved when ...
Cited by 91 - Related Articles - Web Search - BL Direct

Collusion, Delegation and Supervision with Soft Information - Find It @ Jolis - all 22 versions »
A Faure-Grimaud, JJ Laffont, D Martimort - Review of Economic Studies, 2003 - Blackwell Synergy
This paper shows that supervision with soft information is valuable whenever
supervisors and supervisees collude under asymmetric information and proceeds
then to derive an Equivalence Principle between organizational forms of ...
Cited by 78 - Related Articles - Web Search - BL Direct

The Life Cycle of Regulatory Agencies: Dynamic Capture and Transaction Costs - Find It @ Jolis - all 6 versions »
D Martimort - The Review of Economic Studies, 1999 - Blackwell Synergy
The dynamics of regulation is analysed in a model where regulatory capture comes
from the repeated interaction between an interest group and a regulatory agency.
Regulatory institutions offer a framework for this dynamic process. They ...
Cited by 74 - Related Articles - Web Search - BL Direct

The multiprincipal nature of government - Find It @ Jolis - all 3 versions »
D Martimort - European Economic Review, 1996 - Elsevier
One of the theoretical tools required to open the black box of the government
organization is the theory of multiprincipals which describes how different
incentive mechanisms compete with each others. In viewing the set of ...
Cited by 71 - Related Articles - Web Search