让我们为ROBERT WILSON 得到2007年经济学NOBEL纪念奖打赌:

 

Robert Wilson at Stanford should win this year's Nobel memorial prize in economic sceinces.

http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/wilson/

 

  

ROBERT B. WILSON                                             Professional Resume, March 2004

 

Robert Wilson is the Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Emeritus, at the Stanford Business School, where he has been on the faculty since 1964.  His research and teaching are on market design, pricing, negotiation, and related topics concerning industrial organization and information economics.  He is an expert on game theory and its applications.

Dr. Wilson has been a major contributor to auction designs and competitive bidding strategies in the oil, communication, and power industries, and to the design of innovative pricing schemes.  His work on pricing of priority service for electric power has been implemented in the utility industry.  His book on Nonlinear Pricing (Oxford Press, 1993) is an encyclopedic analysis of tariff design and related topics for public utilities, including power, communications, and transport; it won the 1995 Leo Melamed Prize, awarded biannually by the University of Chicago for “outstanding scholarship by a business professor.”  His work on game theory includes wage bargaining and strikes, and in legal contexts, settlement negotiations.  He has authored some of the basic studies of reputational effects in predatory pricing, price wars, and other competitive battles. 

He has published approximately a hundred articles in professional journals and books since completing the Bachelor, Master, and Doctoral degrees at Harvard College and the Harvard Business School.  He has been an associate editor of several journals, and delivered several public lectures.  He is an elected member of the National Academy of Sciences, a designated distinguished fellow of the American Economic Association, and a fellow, former officer and Council member of the Econometric Society.  The Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration conferred an honorary Doctor of Economics degree in 1986, and the University of Chicago, an honorary Doctor of Laws degree in 1995.

On problems of pricing strategy, he has advised the U.S. Department of the Interior and oil companies (on bidding for offshore leases), the Electric Power Research Institute (on pricing of electric power, design of priority service systems, design of wholesale markets, funding of basic research, and risk analysis of environmental hazards and climate change), and the Xerox Palo Alto Research Center (on pricing product lines in high technology industries).  With Paul Milgrom he designed for Pacific Bell the auction of spectrum licenses adopted by the FCC, and subsequently worked on the bidding strategy team, and later for other firms.  He contributed to the designs of the power exchange and auctions of ancillary services in California, and he has continued to advise EPRI, the California Power Exchange, the California, New England, and Ontario System Operators, the Canadian Competition Bureau, Energy Ministries of several countries, and others involved in the design of auctions for electricity, power and gas transmission, and telecommunications in the U.S. and elsewhere. His designs of other auctions have been adopted by private firms.  He has been an expert witness on antitrust and securities matters.

 

A copy of his Curriculum Vitae is attached.

CURRICULUM VITAE                                                                       October 2006

 

ROBERT B. WILSON

            Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Emeritus

            Stanford Business School, Stanford, CA 94305-5015

            Tel: 650-723-8620.  Fax: 650-725-7979. 

Email: RWilson@Stanford.edu, <http://faculty-gsb.stanford.edu/wilson/>

 

EDUCATION AND DEGREES

Harvard University                               A.B. 1959, M.B.A. 1961, D.B.A.          1963

Norwegian School of Economics       honorary Doctor of Economics          1986

University of Chicago                          honorary Doctor of Laws                    1995                                       

 

ACADEMIC POSITIONS

Stanford University, Graduate School of Business

Assistant/Associate Professor 1964-1971; Professor                       1971-1976

Atholl McBean Professor of Economics                                     1976-2000

Adams Distinguished Professor of Management                               2000-2004

Adams Distinguished Professor of Management, Emeritus              2004- 

 

ACADEMIC AFFILIATIONS

Scholarly Societies: 

National Academy of Sciences:                      elected Member          1994-

American Academy of Arts and Sciences:     elected Fellow             1981-2004

American Economic Association: named      Distinguished Fellow   2006

Econometric Society: elected Fellow 1976; elected Council member 1989-94; plenary speaker 1985, 1989, 1997; Fisher-Schultz Lecturer 1986; Vice-President and President 1997-1999; Executive Committee 1997-2000.

Game Theory Society: Council member 2001–2005; Morgenstern Lecturer at 2004 World Congress.

Fellowships:  CORE, University of Louvain, Belgium, Visiting Professor 1967.  Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellow 1968. Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences 1977-8. Guggenheim Fellowship 1982-3.

Research Programs:  Stanford Center on Conflict and Negotiation 1987-2001; Director 1990. Harvard Law School, Program on Negotiation, Affiliated Faculty 1993-2001. Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, Director 1993-5.

Associate Editor:  Econometrica 1979-85. Mathematics of Operations Research 1988-90. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 1987-91. Journal of Regulatory Economics 1988-94. Review of Economic Design 1998-02. Games and Economic Behavior 1988—. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 1995—.

Public Lectures:  Norwegian School of Business and Economics, Borch Memorial Lecture 2004. Boston University, Rosenthal Memorial Lecture 1993. University of Oslo, Leif Johansen Award Program 1997. Tel Aviv University, Elisha Pazner Memorial Lecture 1997. Northwestern University, Nancy Schwartz Memorial Lecture 1994. Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Oskar Morgenstern Lecture 1994. Helsinki School of Economics, Union Bank Lecture 1991. MIT, Inter-Session Lectures 1984.

PUBLICATIONS OF ROBERT WILSON

 

DISSERTATION

A Simplicial Algorithm for Concave Programming. Boston: Harvard Business School, 1963.

BOOK

Nonlinear Pricing. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.  ISBN 0-19-506885-8. Paperback edition 1997.

Reviewed by Richard Schmalensee, Journal of Political Economy, December 1994, 102(6): 1288-1291; and by John C. Panzar, Journal of Economic Literature, September 1995, 33(3): 1339-1341.  Selected by the editors of the Journal of Business as the 1995 winner of the Leo Melamed Prize, awarded biannually by the Graduate School of Business of the University of Chicago for “outstanding scholarship by a business professor.”

 

EDITOR

Barriers to Conflict Resolution.  New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1995.  ISBN 0-393-03737-1.  Co-edited with K. Arrow, R. Mnookin, L. Ross, and A. Tversky.  Paperback edition published in 2000 by the Harvard Program on Negotiation, Cambridge, MA.

Co-winner of the 1995 Awards for Excellence Book Prize of the CPR Institute for Dispute Resolution.

Special Issue on Auction Design, co-edited with John McMillan and Michael Rothschild, Journal of Economics and Management Science, 1997.

Special Issue in Memory of Robert W. Rosenthal”, co-edited with Andrew Postlewaite, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 45, No. 2 (November 2003).

 doi:10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00174-X

BOOK REVIEW

Game and Economic Theory: Selected Contributions in Honor of Robert J. Aumann, University of Michigan Press, 1995; reviewed in Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 21 (1997), pp. 322-324. doi:10.1006/game.1997.0593

ARTICLES      in chronological order

1.       "Computation of Optimal Controls," Journal of Mathematical Analysis and Applications, Vol. 14, No. 1 (April 1966), pp. 77-82.

2.       "On Programming under Uncertainty," Operations Research, Vol. 14, No. 4 (July-August 1966), pp. 652-657.

3.       "Programming Variable Factors," Management Science, Vol. 13 (September 1966), pp. 144-151.

4.       "Stronger Cuts in Gomory's All-Integer Integer Programming Algorithm," Note, Operations Research, Vol. 15, No. 1 (January, 1967), pp. 155-157.

5.       "Exchange Equilibrium as a Budgetary Adjustment Process," International Economic Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (February 1967), pp. 103-108.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0020-6598%28196702%298%3A1%3C103%3AEEAABA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4>

6.       "A Pareto-Optimal Dividend Policy," Management Science, Vol. 13, No. 9 (May 1967), pp. 756-764.

7.       "Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information," Management Science, Vol. 13, No. 11 (July 1967), pp. 816-820.

8.       "Optimal Dividend Policy," Proc. Fourth International Conference on Operations Research, D. Hertz and J. Melese (eds.), John Wiley & Sons, New York (1968), pp. 128-138.

9.       "The Theory of Syndicates," Econometrica, Vol. 36, No. 1 (January, 1968), pp. 119-132.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28196801%2936%3A1%3C119%3ATTOS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-J>

10.   "Decision Analysis in a Corporation," IEEE Transactions on Systems Science and Cybernetics, Vol. SSC-4, No. 3 (September 1968), pp. 220-226.

11.   "Arrow's Possibility Theorem for Vote Trading," Mathematical Theory of Committees and Elections, pp. 26-39. Vienna: Institute for Advanced Studies, 1969.

12.   "The Role of Uncertainty and the Value of Logrolling in Collective Choice Processes," La Decision: Agregation et Dynamique des Ordres de Preference, G. Guilbaud (ed.), pp. 309-315.  Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1969.

13.   "The Structure of Incentives for Decentralization under Uncertainty," La Decision: Agregation et Dynamique des Ordres de Preference, G. Guilbaud (ed.), pp. 287-307.  Paris: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 1969.

14.   "Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information," Management Science, Vol. 15, No. 7 (March 1969), pp. 446-448.  Reprinted in: Steven A. Lippman and David K. Levine (eds.),  The Economics of Information, Edward Elgar Publishing, London, 1994; and P. Klemperer (ed.), The Economic Theory of Auctions, Edward Elgar Publishing, London, 1999.

15.   "An Axiomatic Model of Logrolling," American Economic Review, Vol. 59, No. 3 (June 1969), pp. 331-341.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28196906%2959%3A3%3C331%3AAAMOL%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Y>

16.   "Investment Analysis under Uncertainty," Management Science, Vol. 15, No. 12 (August 1969), pp. B650-B664.

17.   "Integer Programming via Modular Representations," Management Science, Vol. 16, No. 4 (December 1970), pp. 348-353.

18.   "The Finer Structure of Revealed Preference," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 1970), pp. 348-353. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(70)90018-9  

19.   "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Social Choice," Social Choice, B. Lieberman (ed.), pp. 393-407.  London and New York: Gordon and Breach Science Publishers, 1971.

20.   "Computing Equilibria of N-Person Games," SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics, Vol. 21, No. 1 (July 1971), pp. 80-87.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0036-1399%28197107%2921%3A1%3C80%3ACEOG%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q>

21.   "Stable Coalition Proposals in Majority-Rule Voting," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 3, No. 3 (September 1971), pp. 254-271. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(71)90022-6  

22.   "The Postulates of Game Theory," co-authored with Stefan Bloomfield, Journal of Mathematical Sociology, Vol. 2 (1972), pp. 221-234.

23.   "Computing Equilibria of Two-Person Games from the Extensive Form," Management Science, Vol. 18, No. 7 (March 1972), pp. 448-460.

24.   "The Game-Theoretic Structure of Arrow's General Possibility Theorem," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 5, No. 1 (August 1972) pp. 14-20.
 doi:10.1016/0022-0531(72)90115-9 

25.   "Social Choice Theory without the Pareto Principle," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 5, No. 3 (December 1972), pp. 478-486. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(72)90051-8  

26.   "On the Need for a System Optimization Laboratory," co-authored with G. B. Dantzig, et al., Mathematical Programming, T. C. Hu and S. M. Robinson (eds.), pp. 1-32. New York: Academic Press, 1973.

27.   "On the Theory of the Firm in an Economy with Incomplete Markets," co-authored with Steinar Ekern, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Spring 1974), pp. 171-180.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0005-8556%28197421%295%3A1%3C171%3AOTTOTF%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S>

28.   "The Structure of Trade," co-authored with Mordecai Kurz, Economic Inquiry, Vol. 12, No. 4 (December 1974), pp. 493-516.

29.   "On the Theory of Aggregation," Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 10 (February 1975), pp. 89-99. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(75)90062-9 

30.   "Informational Economies of Scale," Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 6, No. 1 (Spring 1975), pp. 184-195.  Reprinted in G. Heal (ed.), The Economies of Increasing Returns, Edward Elgar Publishing, London, 1999.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X%28197521%296%3A1%3C184%3AIEOS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E>

31.   "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 4, No. 3 (October 1977), pp. 511-518.  Reprinted in:  P. Klemperer (ed.), The Economic Theory of Auctions, Edward Elgar Publishing, London, 1999.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0034-6527%28197710%2944%3A3%3C511%3AABMOPC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-S>

32.   "The Bilinear Complementarity Problem and Competitive Equilibria of Piecewise Linear Economic Models," Econometrica, Vol. 46, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 87-103.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28197801%2946%3A1%3C87%3ATBCPAC%3E2.0.CO%3B2-L>

33.   "Competitive Exchange," Econometrica, Vol. 46, No. 3 (May 1978), pp. 577-585.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28197805%2946%3A3%3C577%3ACE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3>

34.   "Information, Efficiency, and the Core of an Economy," Econometrica, Vol. 46, No. 4 (July 1978), pp. 807-816. Reprinted in: D. Glycopantis and N. Yannelis (eds.), Differential Information Economies, pp. 55-64, Springer-Verlag, New York, ISBN 3-540-21424-0.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28197807%2946%3A4%3C807%3AIEATCO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-C>

35.   "Management and Financing of Exploration for Offshore Oil and Gas," Public Policy, Vol. 26, No. 4 (Fall 1978), pp. 629-657.

36.   "Auctions of Shares," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 93, No. 4 (November 1979), pp. 675-689.  Reprinted in:  P. Klemperer (ed.), The Economic Theory of Auctions, Edward Elgar Publishing, London, 1999.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0033-5533%28197911%2993%3A4%3C675%3AAOS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-N>

37.   "Temporal Resolution of Uncertainty in Stapleton and Subrahmanyam's A Multiperiod Equilibrium Asset Pricing Model," co-authored with David Kreps, Econometrica, Vol. 48, No. 6 (September 1980), pp. 1565-1566.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198009%2948%3A6%3C1565%3ATROUIS%3E2.0.CO%3B2-E>

38.   "Computation of Competitive Equilibria by a Sequence of Linear Programs," co-authored with Alan Manne and Hung-Po Chao, Econometrica, Vol. 48, No. 7 (November 1980), pp. 1595-1615.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198011%2948%3A7%3C1595%3ACOCEBA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-6>

39.   "Perfect Equilibria and Sequential Rationality," in: Games of Incomplete Information and Related Topics, H. Moulin et al.  (eds.).  Marseilles-Luminy, France: Centre International de Rencontres Mathematiques, 1981.

40.   "Risk Measurement of Public Projects," in: Discounting for Time and Risk in Energy Policy, R. C. Lind (ed.), pp. 205-249. Washington: Resources for the Future and John Hopkins University Press, 1982.

41.   "Sequential Equilibria," co-authored with David Kreps, Econometrica, Vol. 50, No. 4 (July 1982), pp. 863-894.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198207%2950%3A4%3C863%3ASE%3E2.0.CO%3B2-4>

42.   "Reputation and Imperfect Information," co-authored with David Kreps, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 1982), pp. 253-279. 
doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90030-8        Reprinted in: Oliver Williamson (eds.), Industrial Organization, 1990 (paperback edition 1996); London: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.  Also in: Jean Gabszewicz and Jacques-François Thisse (eds.), Microeconomic Theories of Imperfect Competition: Old Problems and New Perspectives, 1998; London: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.

43.   "Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated Prisoners' Dilemma," co-authored with David Kreps, Paul Milgrom, and John Roberts, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 27, No. 2 (August 1982), pp. 245-252.  Reprinted in: A. Rubinstein (ed.),  Game Theory, 1991; London: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd. doi:10.1016/0022-0531(82)90029-1 

44.   "Nonlinear Pricing in Markets with Interdependent Demand," co-authored with Shmuel Oren and Stephen Smith, Marketing Science, Vol. 3, No. 1 (Summer 1982), pp. 287-313.

45.   "Linear Tariffs with Quality Discrimination," co-authored with Shmuel Oren and Stephen Smith, Bell Journal of Economics, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Autumn 1982), pp. 455-471.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0361-915X%28198223%2913%3A2%3C455%3ALTWQD%3E2.0.CO%3B2-K>

46.   "On Competitive Bidding Applied," Chapter IV.4 in: Auctions, Bidding, and Contracting: Uses and Theory, Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans, Martin Shubik, and Robert M. Stark (eds.), pp. 363-368.  New York: New York University Press, 1983.

47.   "Competitive Nonlinear Tariffs," co-authored with Shmuel Oren and Stephen Smith, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 29, No. 1 (February 1983) pp. 49-71.
doi:10.1016/0022-0531(83)90122-9  

48.   "Auditing: Perspectives from Multi-Person Decision Theory," The Accounting Review, Vol. 58, No. 2 (April 1983), pp. 305-318.

49.   "Pricing a Product Line," co-authored with Shmuel Oren and Stephen Smith, Journal of Business, Vol. 57, No. 1 [Part 2, supplement] (January 1984), pp. S79-S99.

50.   "A Note on Revelation of Information for Joint Production," Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 1984), pp. 69-73. DOI: 10.1007/BF00297060
http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/BF00297060

51.   "Capacity Pricing," co-authored with Shmuel Oren and Stephen Smith, Econometrica, Vol. 53, No. 3 (May 1985), pp. 549-566.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198505%2953%3A3%3C545%3ACP%3E2.0.CO%3B2-Q>

52.   "Priority Service: Managing Risk by Unbundling Electric Power Service," co-authored with Hung-po Chao, Shmuel Oren, and Stephen Smith, Proceedings of Energy Technology Conference XIII, March 1986, pp. 1610-1618.

53.   "Efficient Trading," in: Issues in Contemporary Microeconomics and Welfare, George Feiwel (ed.), Chapter 4, pp. 169-208.  London: Macmillan Press, Ltd., 1985. (Reviewed by J. Chilton in The Wall Street Review of Books, Fall 1986, pp. 236-238.)

54.   "Reputations in Games and Markets," in: Game Theoretic Models of Bargaining with Incomplete Information, Alvin Roth (ed.); Chapter 3, pp. 27-62.  Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. (Reviewed by S. Clark in Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1987, page 103.)

55.   "Incentive Efficiency of Double Auctions," Econometrica, Vol. 53, No. 5 (September 1985), pp. 1101-1116.  Reprinted in:  P. Klemperer (ed.), The Economic Theory of Auctions, Edward Elgar Publishing, London, 1999.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0012-9682%28198509%2953%3A5%3C1101%3AIEODA%3E2.0.CO%3B2-3>

56.   "Multi-Dimensional Signaling," Economics Letters, Vol. 19, No. 1 (October 1985), pp. 17-21.  doi:10.1016/0165-1765(85)90094-1  

57.   "Foundations of Dynamic Monopoly and the Coase Conjecture," co-authored with Faruk Gül and Hugo Sonnenschein, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 39 (July 1986), pp. 155-190.  doi:10.1016/0022-0531(86)90024-4   Reprinted in: Peter B. Linhart, Roy Radner, and Mark A. Satterthwaite (eds.), Bargaining with Incomplete Information, Chapter 12, pp. 264-299, Academic Press, San Diego, 1992.

58.   "Multi-Level Demand-Subscription Pricing for Electric Power," co-authored with Hung-po Chao, Shmuel Oren, and Stephen Smith, Energy Economics, Vol. 8 (October 1986), pp. 199-217.  doi:10.1016/0140-9883(86)90001-0  

59.   "Priority Service: Unbundling the Quality Attributes of Electric Power," co-authored with Shmuel Oren and Stephen Smith.  Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute, Report EA-4851, November 1986.

60.   "Multi-Product Pricing for Electric Power," co-authored with Shmuel Oren and Stephen Smith, Energy Economics, Vol. 9 (April 1987), pp. 104-114.
doi:10.1016/0140-9883(87)90013-2

61.   "Equilibria of Bid-Ask Markets," in: Arrow and the Ascent of Economic Theory: Essays in Honor of Kenneth J. Arrow, G. Feiwel (ed.); Chapter 11, pp. 375-414.  London and New York: Macmillan Press and New York University Press, 1987.

62.   "Game-Theoretic Analyses of Trading Processes," in: Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, Truman Bewley (ed.); Chapter 2, pp. 33-70.  Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

63.   "Selected Papers on Priority Service," co-authored with Shmuel Oren, Stephen Smith, and Hung-po Chao.  Palo Alto, CA: Electric Power Research Institute, Report EPRI P-5350, August 1987; 253 pages.

64.   "Bidding," entry on auction theory, in: The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman (eds.), Volume 1, pp. 238-242.  London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1987. Reprinted in: The New Palgrave Selected Reprints, Volume 2 (Allocation, Information, and Markets), 1989, pp. 54-63; and The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, 1992.

65.   "Exchange," entry in The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, and P. Newman (eds.), Volume 2, pp. 202-207.  London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1987.  Reprinted in The New Palgrave Selected Reprints, Volume 2 (Allocation, Information, and Markets), 1989, pp. 83-93; The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, 1992; and The New Palgrave World of Economics, 1992. Revised version in the 2007 editions.

66.   "Priority Service: Pricing, Investment, and Market Organization," co-authored with Hung-po Chao, American Economic Review, Volume 77, No. 5, December 1987, pp. 899-916.
<http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28198712%2977%3A5%3C899%3APSPIAM%3E2.0.CO%3B2-A>

67.   "Priority Service: Market Structure and Competition," co-authored with Hung-po Chao, Shmuel Oren, and Stephen Smith, Energy Journal, special Issue on Electricity Reliability, Volume 9, No. 4, November 1988, pp. 77-104.

68.   "Credentials and Wage Discrimination," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, special issue on Information and Incentives in Organizations, Volume 90, No. 4 (December 1988), pp. 549-562.

69.   "Entry and Exit," in: George R. Feiwel (ed.), The Economics of Imperfect Competition and Employment, 1989, Chapter 8, pp. 260-304.  London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

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