班雅明(Benjamin, Walter)与德勒兹皆将巴洛克从狭义的艺术史研究范畴释放出来，将之建构为一套有别于启蒙理性主义的「原-现代性」（proto-modernity）与「另类现代性」（alternate modernity）。 
     

         相对于当代人文学界的研究视野与思考水平迷漫着一股「历史主义」潮流，班雅明与德勒兹的巴洛克研究其实是相当「不合时宜」的，二氏皆诉诸某种超越「历史主义」视野的「理想型」（ideal type）研究方法。所以本书第一章首先针对班雅明与德勒兹的「方法学」进行比较研究：班雅明之「星图形构」与「星座命名」的「星座」方法学（constellation），以及德勒兹&瓜达利的「概念-平面-人物」之创意教学法。吾人发现，二氏之方法学不仅与社会学家韦伯(Weber, Max)之「理想型」研究作为一种「风格化重构」有异曲同工之妙，更可直接模拟于通俗流行文化中的「星象学」或「占星术」。吾人以为，班雅明与德勒兹实提出了较诸韦伯之「理想型」更富于想象自由度与形象性的「类型学」建构方法，允为当代人文科学研究的「星象学」或「占星术」。 
      

       透过「星座」方法学的研究视野，「巴洛克」得以被建构为一种「原-现代性」与「另类现代性」的新类型与新模型。本书第二章与第三章分别探讨两种巴洛克星座：班雅明透过德国哀悼剧所建构的「废墟」美学的「颓废」现代性( modernity of decadence)，德勒兹透过德国哲学家莱布尼兹(Leibniz, Gottfriend)的「单子论」(monadologie)所建构的「迷宫」诗学的「穷尽」现代性( modernity of exhaustion)。 
       不同于文艺复兴人文主义或启蒙运动理性主义之 「现代性」都指向某种理想的「方案」( project )，巴洛克则指向「现代性」的「危机」与「极限」，它同时照见了人文主义之「主体性」形式的衰亡与启蒙运动之「理性化」形式的局限不足。巴洛克诉诸「矫饰主义」(mannerism)的策略来回应危机，将僵化疲弊之「形式」予以多样化与弹性化的仿真重组，直至「风格化」与「戏剧化」的曲折变形。矫饰主义其实是一种「谐拟」(parody)的手法，以对某一「形式」的夸张模仿将之推到「极限」，反显出该「形式」的局限与可笑，正如时下流行的「模仿秀」。在这意义下，巴洛克的的原创性并不是提出另一种全新的「现代性」，而是对文艺复兴与启蒙运动的「谐拟」，使「现代性」逼临自身的「极限」与「危机」，反显出人文主义的「颓废」与启蒙理性的「穷尽」。 
    所以巴洛克的世界总是展现为一场「古与今之争」：在文艺复兴与启蒙运动之「科学化」与「世俗化」的「现代世界观」中重新唤回传统基督信仰的权威性，有如在一个水平开展的世俗世界中重新安置「神圣性」与「超越性」的垂直向度，而呈现出新旧并陈，圣俗混搭的「今古奇观」。 
    无须讶异，今日「全球化」情境其实非常接近巴洛克的世界，因为所谓「全球化」(globalization)无非就是「现代化」(modernization)的别名，并无太多新意。所以「巴洛克」的「原-现代性」与「另类现代性」所逼显的「危机」与「极限」并未过时，今日的「全球化」情境只有更加突显展现出「巴洛克世界」新旧并陈，圣俗混搭的「今古奇观」。更无需讶异，今日流行的「后现代主义」或「当代艺术」皆无太多新意，绝大部分皆可归为一种「新巴洛克」的「矫饰主义」。 
所以，综合班雅明的「废墟美学」与德勒兹的「迷宫诗学」，可以形构出一个原创、丰富，深刻的「新巴洛克」星座，最能透视照亮今日的「全球化」情境，重新解读从「古典」、「浪漫」到「后现代」、「当代」各种「颓废」艺术与「虚拟」文化之光怪陆离。 
    此「巴洛克计划」原本还包含对古今中外作品与文化现象进行延伸诠释解读的一系列研究，包括〈从「废墟-寓言体」论李商隐的〈锦瑟〉、〈无题〉诗与王家卫电影《2046》〉、〈从「废墟美学」论元明戏曲的文人颓废主义〉、〈卡尔维诺的《看不见的城市》：「废墟」与「迷宫」的二合一书写〉、〈莱布尼兹的「微细知觉」理论与《黑客任务》的母体世界〉、〈「心/物」两层的「巴洛克之屋」与计算机网络世界〉…，但限于时间与篇幅，只有俟诸来日。 【《德勒茲 巴洛克 全球化》導論: 什么是「德勒兹世纪？》http://www.douban.com/group/topic/7306223/】

   

48. In God there is Power, which is the source of all, also Knowledge, whose content is the variety of the ideas, and finally Will, which makes changes or products according to the principle of the best. (Theod. 7, 149, 150.) These characteristics correspond to what in the created Monads forms the ground or basis, to the faculty of Perception and to the faculty of Appetition. But in God these attributes are absolutely infinite or perfect; and in the created Monads or the Entelechies (or perfectihabiae, as Hermolaus Barbarus translated the word) there are only imitations of these attributes, according to the degree of perfection of the Monad. (Theod. 87.)

在上帝中有力量，它是万物的源泉，还有知识，其内容是观念的细节，最后还有意志，它根据最佳者原则来改变或产生事物。（参见《神正论》第7节，第149节，第150节）这些特性相应于被创造的单子中的构成其主体或基础 [①] 的东西、知觉能力和欲求能力。但在上帝中这些属性是绝对无限或完满的；而在被创造的单子或隐得来希（或“具有完满性者”，如赫莫劳斯·巴勃鲁斯 [②] 所译）中所存在的，只是根据单子的完满性程度，对这些属性的模仿。（参见《神正论》第87节）

 

第六部分 单子间的关系（第49节—第60节）

49. A created thing is said to act outwardly in so far as it has perfection, and to suffer [or be passive, patir] in relation to another, in so far as it is imperfect. Thus activity [action] is attributed to a Monad, in so far as it has distinct perceptions, and passivity [passion] in so far as its perceptions are confused. (Theod. 32, 66, 386.)

就创造物具有完善性而言，它被认为是向外作用，就其是不完善的而言，它与他物的关系是承受性的或消极的。因而，就单子具有清晰的知觉而言，它具有积极性（活动），就其知觉是混乱的而言，它具有消极性（情感）。（参见《神正论》第32节，第66节，第386节）

50. And one created thing is more perfect than another, in this, that there is found in the more perfect that which serves to explain a priori what takes place in the less perfect, and it is on this account that the former is said to act upon the latter.

一个创造物之所以比另一个更完满在于，在更完满之物中能找到可先验地解释发生在较不完满之物中的事情的理由，也正因此，前者被认为是作用于后者。

51. But in simple substances the influence of one Monad upon another is only ideal, and it can have its effect only through the mediation of God, in so far as in the ideas of God any Monad rightly claims that God, in regulating the others from the beginning of things, should have regard to it. For since one created Monad cannot have any physical influence upon the inner being of another, it is only by this means that the one can be dependent upon the other. (Theod. 9, 54, 65, 66, 201. Abrege, Object. 3.)

但在单纯实体中，一个单子对另一单子的影响仅是观念性的，只有通过上帝的中介才能发生效果，因为在上帝的观念中，每一单子都有权要求，上帝在万物之初规定其他单子的时候应该关注到它。既然一个被创造的单子不能对另一单子的内部存在具有任何物理的影响，那么只有凭借这一方式一个单子才能依赖于另一单子。（参见《神正论》第9节, 第54节, 第65节, 第66节, 第201节；节略，异议3）

解释：

单子既然没有可供外物出入的窗户，单子间的相互作用就不可能是现实的，而只能是观念性的：即每个单子都独立的运动、变化，而彼此之间却能够保持一种协调性和一致性，显得好像在相互作用似的。单子之间之所以能够彼此协调，是由于上帝在创世之初的预先安排。在莱布尼茨看来，只有使一个单子与其它的所有单子保持和谐一致，才能使现实世界具有最高的完满性和实在性。这就是他的“前定和谐”理论。

52. Accordingly, among created things, activities and passivities are mutual. For God, comparing two simple substances, finds in each reasons which oblige Him to adapt the other to it, and consequently what is active in certain respects is passive from another point of view; active in so far as what we distinctly know in it serves to explain [rendre raison de] what takes place in another, and passive in so far as the explanation [raison] of what takes place in it is to be found in that which is distinctly known in another. (Theod. 66.)

因而，在创造物中能动与被动是相互的。当上帝比较两个单纯实体时，在每一个中都发现迫使他使另一个适应于它的理由，因而从一个角度看是主动的东西，从另一角度看则是被动的；它是主动的，是就我们在其中清晰地知道能够解释在另一实体中所发生的事而言，说它是被动的，是就在其中所发生的事的解释须在我们于另一实体中所清晰地知道的东西中寻求而言。（参见《神正论》第66节）

53. Now, as in the Ideas of God there is an infinite number of possible universes, and as only one of them can be actual, there must be a sufficient reason for the choice of God, which leads Him to decide upon one rather than another. (Theod. 8, 10, 44, 173, 196-199，225, 414-416.)

既然在上帝的观念中具有无限多的可能世界，而只有其中之一才能成为现实的，那么上帝的选择就必须有一个充足理由，以使他选择这一个而不是另一个。（参见《神正论》第8节，第10节，第44节，第173节，第196-199节，第225节，第414－416节）

54. And this reason can be found only in the fitness [convenance], or in the degrees of perfection, that these worlds possess, since each possible thing has the right to aspire to existence in proportion to the amount of perfection it contains in germ. (Theod. 74, 130，167, 201, 345-347,350，352，354.)

这一理由只能在这些世界所拥有的合适性或完满性的程度中寻找，因为每一可能事物都有权要求与它所拥有的完满性的多少相适应的存在。（参见《神正论》第74节，第130节，第167节，第201节，第345-347节，第350节，第352节，第345节）

55. Thus the actual existence of the best that wisdom makes known to God is due to this, that His goodness makes Him choose it, and His power makes Him produce it. (Theod. 8, 78, 80, 84, 119, 204, 206, 208. Abrege, Object. 1 and 8.)

也正因此，智慧使上帝认识到最佳者的实际存在，上帝的善使他选择它，上帝的力量则使他产生它。（参见《神正论》第8节, 第78节, 第80节, 第84节, 第119节，第204节，第206节，第208节；节略，异议1，异议8）

56. Now this connexion or adaptation of all created things to each and of each to all, means that each simple substance has relations which express all the others, and, consequently, that it is a perpetual living mirror of the universe. (Theod. 130, 360.)

这种所有创造物与每一创造物的联系或适应，以及每一创造物对所有创造物的联系和适应，意味着每一单纯实体都具有表现所有其他单子的关系，因而，它是宇宙的一面永恒的活的镜子。（参见《神正论》第130节, 第360节）

解释：

单子“是宇宙的一面永恒的活的镜子”并不是说单子实际上表象着宇宙，而是说一个单子的与其他单子的和谐性，使其自身内部包含有所有与其他单子的关系，就好像在表象整个宇宙似的。也就是说，由于单子没有窗户，它只能表现自身。但由于单子包含了整个宇宙的关系，它自身就是个无比深邃的小宇宙，所以单子之表现自身也就是像在表象着宇宙。

57. And as the same town, looked at from various sides, appears quite different and becomes as it were numerous in aspects [perspectivement]; even so, as a result of the infinite number of simple substances, it is as if there were so many different universes, which, nevertheless are nothing but aspects [perspectives] of a single universe, according to the special point of view of each Monad. (Theod. 147.)

正如同一城市从不同角度去看，会显得非常不同，好像因视角的不同而变成了许多城市；同理，由于有着无数多的单纯实体，就好像有无数不同的宇宙，而这不过是从每一单子的独特视角来观看同一宇宙所产生的不同景观。（参见《神正论》第147节）

58. And by this means there is obtained as great variety as possible, along with the greatest possible order; that is to say, it is the way to get as much perfection as possible. (Theod. 120, 124, 241, 214－243, 275.)

这就是获得最大可能的多样性同时又具有最大可能的秩序的方法；也就是说，它是获得最大可能的完满性的方法。（参见《神正论》第120节, 第124节，第241节, 第241－243节, 第275节）

解释：

“多样性”与“秩序”是“完满性”的不可或缺的两个方面。仅有“多样性”世界会一片混乱，仅有“秩序”世界会非常单调。在莱布尼茨看来，现实世界只有同时具有最大可能的“多样性”与“秩序”，才是最完满的，才能显示出作为建筑师的上帝的无比伟大。

59. Besides, no hypothesis but this (which I venture to call proved) fittingly exalts the greatness of God; and this Monsieur Bayle recognized when, in his Dictionary (article Rorarius), he raised objections to it, in which indeed he was inclined to think that I was attributing too much to God—more than it is possible to attribute. But he was unable to give any reason which could show the impossibility of this universal harmony, according to which every substance exactly expresses all others through the relations it has with them.

此外，唯有这一假设（我冒昧地认为它已获得证明）才能恰当地赞美上帝的伟大；贝尔先生在他的辞典（“罗拉留”辞条）中提出反对意见时意识到了这一点，实际上他倾向于认为，我归于上帝的太多了——超过了可能被归于的。但他找不出任何理由来反对这种普遍的和谐，据此每一单子都通过它所具有的与所有其他单子的关系来确切地反映它们。

60. Further, in what I have just said there may be seen the reasons a priori why things could not be otherwise than they are. For God in regulating the whole has had regard to each part, and in particular to each Monad, whose nature being to represent, nothing can confine it to the representing of only one part of things; though it is true that this representation is merely confused as regards the variety of particular things [le detail] in the whole universe, and can be distinct only as regards a small part of things, namely, those which are either nearest or greatest in relation to each of the Monads; otherwise each Monad would be a deity. It is not as regards their object, but as regards the different ways in which they have knowledge of their object, that the Monads are limited. In a confused way they all strive after the infinite, the whole; but they are limited and differentiated through the degrees of their distinct perceptions.

进而，在我刚才所说的话中，可找到为什么事物不可能是其他情形的先天理由。因为在上帝规定整体的时候必须考虑到部分，尤其是要考虑到每一单子。单子的本质既然在于表象，那就没什么能限制它只表象一部分事物；尽管这种表象在相关于整个宇宙的繁多的特殊事物时确实是混乱的，而只在相关于很小的一部分事物时是清晰的，即那些与它最接近或关系最大的事物；否则单子就会是神了。单子之受限制，不在于单子的对象，而在于认识对象的方式。他们都以混乱的方式追求着无限和全体；但他们因自身的知觉的清晰程度而受限制和相区别。

解释：

值得注意的是，由于单子没有可供外物出入的窗户，严格地说，单子并不表象外物。但由于小宇宙与大宇宙之间的和谐一致，单子之表现自身也就是在表象宇宙了。由于单子的有限性，它对宇宙的表象必然是存在着不同程度的混乱，只有上帝才能完全清晰地表象宇宙。

 

第七部分 有机的自然观 （第61节－第70节）

61. And compounds are in this respect analogous with [symbolisent avec] simple substances. For all is a plenum and thus all matter is connected together and in the plenum every motion has an effect upon distant bodies in proportion to their distance, so that each body not only is affected by those which are in contact with it and in some way feels the effect of everything that happens to them, but also is mediately affected by bodies adjoining those with which it itself is in immediate contact. Wherefore it follows that this inter-communication of things extends to any distance, however great. And consequently every body feels the effect of all that takes place in the universe, so that he who sees all might read in each what is happening everywhere, and even what has happened or shall happen, observing in the present that which is far off as well in time as in place: sympnoia panta, as Hippocrates said. But a soul can read in itself only that which is there represented distinctly; it cannot all at once unroll everything that is enfolded in it, for its complexity is infinite.

复合物在这一方面类似于单纯实体。既然一切都是充实的，所有的物体就都相互联系在一起，在充实之中，每一运动对于遥远的物体都能产生与其距离相对应的影响，因而每一物体不仅受与它相接触的物体影响，以某种方式感受到发生在他们身上的一切事情，而且受与它直接接触的物体相邻近之物的间接影响。由此可知，这种事物间的相互交往延伸到无限遥远的距离。因为，每一物体都能感受到所有发生在宇宙中的事情的效果，从而，洞察一切的人能在每一事物中看到各处所发生的事，甚至那些已经发生的或将要发生的，能在当下看到那些时间上和空间上甚为遥远的事情。正如希波克拉底 [③]所说的，sympnoia panta （万物相通）。但灵魂在自身中只能看到那些被清晰表象的东西；而不能立刻打开封藏在自身中的所有东西，因为其繁复性是无穷的。

解释：

由这一节起，莱布尼茨开始集中谈论有形体、广延的自然界。在自然界中万事万物是互相联系、互相影响的，因为自然是一个充实，没有虚空的隔离，一个事物的运动、变化必通过力学定律传导到所有地方。这种现象界的普遍联系与本体界的单子之间的普遍联系是非常不同的：前者是通过力学定律的外部影响，后者则是基于每个单子内部都包含了与所有其他单子的关系。

既然宇宙在本质上是无数的精神性的单子，那么有广延的自然界从何而来呢？这恐怕是莱布尼茨哲学中最困难的问题之一。《单子论》第二节中说“复合物只是单纯物的集合或堆积”，这显然不能从字面上去理解，因为无广延的单子无论如何堆积也堆不出有广延的物质。笔者认为，可通过莱布尼茨的表象理论或知觉理论对物质世界的形成作出较合理的解释。如前所说，每个单子都表象着或知觉着所有的单子，由于单子知觉的有限性和含混性，在其知觉或表象中就不可避免地存在着某种扭曲和变形，这样一来，原本无广延的单子世界就被表象为或构造成有广延的物质世界了。这种表象出物质世界的混乱的知觉应该处于无意识的层面，这样，物质世界就独立于人和动物的意识而获得其自在性，是“有着良好基础的现象”（well-founded phenomena）。

这种表象理论的解释还可以为莱布尼茨的物质是单子的堆积的说法提供某种说明。既然物质世界是被无意识的混乱知觉所表象出的现象，其本质是无数的单子，在某种比喻的、不严格的意义上，我们可以说“物质是单子的堆积”。更贴切一些的比喻说法应该是“无数的单子被无意识的混乱知觉堆集成有广延的物质世界”。

62. Thus, although each created Monad represents the whole universe, it represents more distinctly the body which specially pertains to it, and of which it is the entelechy; and as this body expresses the whole universe through the connexion of all matter in the plenum, the soul also represents the whole universe in representing this body, which belongs to it in a special way. (Theod. 400.)

尽管每一个被创造的单子都表象整个宇宙，但它表象特别属于它的、以它为隐得来希的形体更为清晰；由于这一形体通过与在充实中的所有物体的联系而反映整个宇宙，灵魂也通过表象这一以特别的方式属于它的形体而表象整个宇宙。（参见《神正论》第400节）

解释：

从逻辑的角度来分析，单子的形态可分为三个阶段，第一，单子最本源的形态是纯精神的实体。第二，由于单子的无意识的知觉的混乱的表象作用，物质世界产生出来与单子相对。第三，为了更好地表象物质世界，单子通过与某些物质紧密联系以具有躯体或形体，从而成为现实的个体或复合的实体。这三个阶段只是逻辑意义上的，并不表示单子在时间中现实地经历了三个阶段。

63. The body belonging to a Monad (which is its entelechy or its soul) constitutes along with the entelechy what may be called a living being, and along with the soul what is called an animal. Now this body of living being or of an animal is always organic; for, as every Monad is, in its own way, a mirror of the universe, and as the universe is ruled according to a perfect order, there must also be order in that which represents it, i.e. in the perceptions of the soul, and consequently there must be order in the body, through which the universe is represented in the soul. (Theod. 403.)

形体附属于单子，而单子是其隐得来希或灵魂，形体和隐得来希一起构成了生物，和灵魂一起构成了动物。生物或动物的形体总是有机的，因为每一单子以自身的方式是宇宙的一面活的镜子，而宇宙又为完美的秩序所统御，那么在表象它的东西中，也就是灵魂的知觉中，必定也存在着秩序，从而在形体中，通过它宇宙被表象于灵魂，也存在着秩序。（参见《神正论》第403节）

解释：

单子的形体与普通的复合物（如一块石头）不同，形体是为单子所统一起来的，而石头则是被力学定律所聚集在一起。单子之中包含了宇宙（无数单子所组成的系列）的完美秩序，当单子在赋予形体以统一性的时候，这种完美秩序也在某种程度上被赋予形体，从而形体具有了有机性，而不仅仅是量的聚集。

64. Thus the organic body of each living being is a kind of divine machine or natural automaton, which infinitely surpasses all artificial automata. For a machine made by the skill of man is not a machine in each of its parts. For instance, the tooth of a brass wheel has parts or fragments which for us are not artificial products, and which do not have the special characteristics of the machine, for they give no indication of the use for which the wheel was intended. But the machines of nature, namely, living bodies, are still machines in their smallest parts ad infinitum. It is this that constitutes the difference between nature and art, that is to say, between the divine art and ours. (Theod. 134, 146, 194, 403.)

因而，每一生物的有机形体都是一个神圣的机器，或一台无限地优越于任何人造的自动机器的自然的自动机器。因为人的技艺所制造的机器的每一部分并非机器。例如黄铜齿轮的齿的部分或断片对我们而言就不再是人造物，它们不具有机器的特征，因为它们不能表现出齿轮的用途。而自然的机器，即有机体，在其无限小的部分仍是机器。这正是自然与技艺之间、也就是说神的技艺与我们的技艺之间的区别所在。（参见《神正论》第134节, 第146节，第194节, 第403节）

解释：

与早期近代哲学中把形体视为机器的机械论观点不同，莱布尼茨认为生物的形体是神圣的机器即上帝造的机器，完全不同于人造的机器。在形体中，部分与整体互相关联，以致无限小的部分仍表现出整个神圣机器的特性和功能。形体的这种有机的部分与整体的统一性来源于起在生物中主导作用的单子，因为单子是多中之一，在自身中容纳了整个宇宙，当单子与形体结合时，就把这种有机性赋予了形体。

65. And the Author of nature has been able to employ this divine and infinitely wonderful power of art, because each portion of matter is not only infinitely divisible, as the ancients observed, but is also actually subdivided without end, each part into further parts, of which each has some motion of its own; otherwise it would be impossible for each portion of matter to express the whole universe. (Theod. Prelim., Disc. 70, and 195.)

自然的创造者能够运用这一神圣的和无比神奇的技艺能力，因为物质的每一部分不仅是无限可分的，如古人所观察的那样，而且实际上可以无止境地再分割，每一部分都可分为更小的部分，而任一部分都有其自身的运动；否则，物质的每一部分就不可能反映整个宇宙了。（参见《神正论》,导论，第70节, 第195节）

66. Whence it appears that in the smallest particle of matter there is a world of creatures, living beings, animals, entelechies, souls.

由此可知，在物质的最小的微粒中也有一个生物－－有机体、动物、隐得来希和灵魂－－的世界。 [④]

解释：

这两节进一步说明了生物形体的有机性。在这里整体与部分的统一性从形体与其部分扩展到形体与宇宙，从而形体的任一微小的部分都有一个生物的世界，而不仅仅是一个生物。

这两节看上去似乎是泛指物质而言，即包括生物的形体也包括无机物。但这样解释的话逻辑上会遇到困难，因为无机物的部分和整体之间虽然可以通过力学定律相影响，但不存在着有机的统一关系。

67. Each portion of matter may be conceived as like a garden full of plants and like a pond full of fishes. But each branch of every plant, each member（organ）of every animal, each drop of its liquid parts is also some such garden or pond.

物质的每一部分都可被视为是一个长满植物的花园，或一个充满着鱼的池塘。而植物的每一枝条、动物的每一肢体以及它的体液的每一滴，都也是这样的花园或池塘。

68. And though the earth and the air which are between the plants of the garden, or the water which is between the fish of the pond, be neither plant nor fish; yet they also contain plants and fishes, but mostly so minute as to be imperceptible to us.

尽管花园中的植物之间的土壤和空气，或者池塘里的鱼之间的水，不是植物或鱼，但它们也包含了植物和鱼，只是通常极为细微而不为我们所觉察。

解释：

在莱布尼茨看来，土壤、空气、水虽然自身并不是有生命的有机体，但却包含了无数微小的生物，当时刚发现不久的显微镜被莱布尼茨视为对他的理论提供了很好的说明。这样一来，整个世界就都充满了生命，没有一个地方不具有有机性。

从另一个角度看，按照莱布尼茨的理论，既然现实世界是所有可能世界中最完满的，而且生命体比无机物具有更高的完满性，那么上帝就没有理由不使整个自然界都具有有机性。

69. Thus there is nothing fallow, nothing sterile, nothing dead in the universe, no chaos, no confusion save in appearance, somewhat as it might appear to be in a pond at a distance, in which one would see a confused movement and, as it were, a swarming of fish in the pond, without separately distinguishing the fish themselves. (Theod. Pref. [E. 475 b; 477 b; G. vi. 40, 44].)

因而，在宇宙中没有任何荒芜的、贫瘠的或死亡的东西，没有任何混沌和混乱，除了表面现象之外。有些像远处的池塘所显现的那样，人们只能远远看到鱼的群集和混乱的运动，而不能看清鱼本身。（参见《神正论》,前言，[E. 475 b; 477 b; G. vi. 40, 44]）

解释：

在承认世界的有机性的同时，莱布尼茨并未否定世界的机械性，只是认为机械性是现象性的，世界的本质则在于有机性。

70. Hence it appears that each living body has a dominant entelechy, which in an animal is the soul; but the members of this living body are full of other living beings, plants, animals, each of which has also its dominant entelechy or soul.

由此可知，每一个活的形体都有一个主导性的隐得来希，在动物中则是灵魂；但这一活的形体的肢体中充满了别的生物、植物、动物，它们中的每一个又有自己的主导性的隐得来希或灵魂。

解释：

值得注意的是，莱布尼茨虽然认为真正的个体是精神性的单子，但现实的个体（除了上帝之外）却总是复合性的，是由单子与形体构成的生命体，莱布尼茨又称此为复合实体（compound substance）。由于形体的无限可分性，在每一复合实体的内部都存在着无数的层面，每一层面都充满了各种生命的小宇宙，是对大宇宙的映射。

莱布尼茨似乎没有严格区别复合实体与复合物（compound），但两者的所指应该有所不同。复合实体指形体与灵魂组成生命体，有着显著的个体性和有机性；而复合物一般指有广延的物质，尽管莱布尼茨最终认为一切物质都充满了生命。

 

第八节 复合实体（生命体）的变化 （第71节――第77节）

71. But it must not be imagined, as has been done by some who have misunderstood my thought, that each soul has a quantity or portion of matter belonging exclusively to itself or attached to it for ever, and that it consequently owns other inferior living beings, which are devoted for ever to its service. For all bodies are in a perpetual flux like rivers, and parts are entering into them and passing out of them continually.

但不能像某些误解我思想的人那样去设想，每一灵魂都拥有专属于它自己，或永远附着于它的一块或一份物质，并且它就因此而拥有了永远服务于它的其他低级生物。因为一切形体都处于像河流一样的永恒变迁之中，不断地有些部分进入和离开它们。

解释：

由于与灵魂的密切关系，形体虽然具有了某种统一性，但这种统一性是不纯粹的，不可能像单子那样具有不受外界影响的绝对的独立性和自足性。在与外界的直接的相互作用中，形体不断地与外界进行着物质交换。

72. Thus the soul changes its body only by degrees, little by little, so that it is never all at once deprived of all its organs; and there is often metamorphosis in animals, but never metempsychosis or transmigration of souls; nor are there souls entirely separate [from bodies] nor unembodied spirits [genies sans corps]. God alone is completely without body. (Theod. 90, 124.)

因而，灵魂只是逐渐地、一点点地改变其形体，从而决不会突然失去其所有器官；在动物中只有形态的改变，而绝没有轮回或灵魂的迁移；也不存在完全脱离形体的灵魂或无形体的精神。只有上帝才完全没有形体。（参见《神正论》第90节, 第124节）

73. It also follows from this that there never is absolute birth [generation] nor complete death, in the strict sense, consisting in the separation of the soul from the body. What we call births [generations] are developments and growths, while what we call deaths are envelopments and diminutions.

由此还可知，不会有严格意义上的绝对的生，或就灵魂脱离形体而言的完全的死。我们所谓的生是指发展和成长，而我们所谓的死是指封藏和缩减。

解释：

受宗教思想影响的人常倾向于认为，生是灵魂与形体的结合，死是灵魂与形体的分离，莱布尼茨对此不以为然。他认为，灵魂由于自身的有限性而必然要与形体永远相结合，这样一来，生与死不过是形体在显著状态与不显著状态之间的变化而已。就灵魂本身而言，生与死不过是知觉的某种在有意识与无意识之间的转化（参见《单子论》第21节）。

74. Philosophers have been much perplexed about the origin of forms, entelechies, or souls; but nowadays it has become known, through careful studies of plants, insects, and animals, that the organic bodies of nature are never products of chaos or putrefaction, but always come from seeds, in which there was undoubtedly some preformation; and it is held that not only the organic body was already there before conception, but also a soul in this body, and, in short, the animal itself; and that by means of conception this animal has merely been prepared for the great transformation involved in its becoming an animal of another kind. Something like this is indeed seen apart from birth [generation], as when worms become flies and caterpillars become butterflies. (Theod. Pref.86，89， 90, 187, 188, 397，403.)

哲学家们曾对形式、隐得来希或灵魂的起源大惑不解；但现在人们通过对植物、昆虫和动物的仔细考察已经知道，自然界的有机形体绝非混沌或腐化的产物，而总是源于精子，在其中无疑存在着某种预成（preformation）；经认定，不仅有机形体在受孕之前已经在那里，而且有灵魂在形体中，总之，动物自身已经存在了；通过受孕，这一动物仅仅是为巨大的变形作准备，以成为另一种动物。人们还可在在生殖之外看到类似的事情，例如蠕虫变成苍蝇，毛虫化为蝴蝶。（参见《神正论》前言，第86节, 第89节，第90节, 第187节，第188节，第397节，第403节）

解释：

莱布尼茨用当时生物学中的“预成论”来为自己的生命体的连续性思想提供经验的证明。与当时流行的生物的灵魂源于无机物（混沌或腐化）不同，“预成论”根据显微镜的观察结果提出，生命体的成熟形态在精子阶段就已经预先形成了，只不过被缩小了很多倍。

75. The animals, of which some are raised by means of conception to the rank of larger animals, may be called spermatic, but those among them which are not so raised but remain in their own kind (that is, the majority) are born, multiply, and are destroyed like the large animals, and it is only a few chosen ones [elus] that pass to a greater theatre.

这些动物，其中的一些通过受孕而上升到大动物之列，被称为精子动物，但它们中的那些没有上升而仍保持原样的（即绝大多数）象大动物一样诞生、繁衍和死亡，只有少数被选中的才走上一个更大的舞台。

76. But this is only half of the truth, and accordingly I hold that if an animal never comes into being by natural means [naturellement], no more does it come to an end by natural means; and that not only will there be no birth [generation], but also no complete destruction or death in the strict sense. And these reasonings, made a posteriori and drawn from experience are in perfect agreement with my principles deduced a priori, as above. (Theod. 90.)

但这仅是真理的一半，因而我认为，如果一个动物不为自然的方式所产生，那它也不为自然的方式所终结；不仅没有严格意义上的诞生，也没有严格意义上的完全毁灭或死亡。这些后天的、源于经验的推论与我前面的先天推演出来的原理完全一致 [⑤] 。（参见《神正论》，第90节）

77. Thus it may be said that not only the soul (mirror of an indestructible universe) is indestructible, but also the animal itself, though its mechanism [machine] may often perish in part and take off or put on an organic slough [des depouilles organiques].

由此可知，不仅灵魂（不可毁灭的宇宙的一面镜子）是不可毁灭的，动物自身也是如此，尽管它的机体常常部分消亡，并脱去或获得有机的外壳。

 

第九部分 身心关系 （第78节—第81节）

78. These principles have given me a way of explaining naturally the union or rather the mutual agreement [conformite] of the soul and the organic body. The soul follows its own laws, and the body likewise follows its own laws; and they agree with each other in virtue of the pre-established harmony between all substances, since they are all representations of one and the same universe. (Theod. Pref. 340, 352, 353, 358.)

这些原理给予我一种方法，可以自然地解释灵魂和有机形体之间的结合或一致。灵魂遵循自身的法则，形体也遵循自身的法则；凭借所有实体间的前定和谐，两者之间能够协调一致，因为它们都是同一宇宙的表象。（参见《神正论》前言，第340节, 第352节，第353节, 第358节）

79. Souls act according to the laws of final causes through appetitions, ends, and means. Bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes or motions. And the two realms, that of efficient causes and that of final causes, are in harmony with one another.

灵魂按照目的因通过欲求、目的和手段的法则而活动。形体依据动力因的或运动的法则而活动。这两个领域，目的因的领域和动力因的领域，是彼此协调的。

80. Descartes recognized that souls cannot impart any force to bodies, because there is always the same quantity of force in matter. Nevertheless he was of opinion that the soul could change the direction of bodies. But that is because in his time it was not known that there is a law of nature which affirms also the conservation of the same total direction in matter. Had Descartes noticed this he would have come upon my system of pre-established harmony. (Theod. Pref. 22, 59－61, 63, 66, 345－348, 354, 355.)

笛卡尔认识到，灵魂不可能给予力量于形体，因为在物质中力保持相同的数量。然而他却认为，灵魂可以改变形体的方向。但这是因为在他的时代，物质中运动方向的守恒这一自然律尚不为人所知。如果笛卡尔知道这一点，他一定会赞同我的前定和谐体系。（参见《神正论》前言，第22节, 第59－61节，第63节，第66节，第345－348节，第354节，第355节）

解释：

笛卡尔一方面把形体与灵魂割裂开来，另一方面又试图想办法使其相连系，以解释身心互动的经验事实。他认为，尽管灵魂不可能改变形体运动的数量，因为物质中运动量是守恒的，但灵魂可以通过大脑中的松果腺的中介而改变形体的运动方向。与之针锋相对，莱布尼茨认为，不仅物质运动的数量是守恒的，而且其运动的方向也是守恒的，从而物质运动完全是自足的，不需要也不允许灵魂的干预。通过将笛卡尔的动量守恒定律改造成动力守恒定律，莱布尼茨为其前定和谐理论提供了物理学的基础。

81. According to this system bodies act as if (to suppose the impossible) there were no souls, and souls act as if there were no bodies, and both act as if each influenced the other.

根据这一体系，形体就象不具有灵魂那样（这当然是不可能的）活动，灵魂就像不拥有形体那样活动，这两者就像能相互影响那样活动。

解释：

后来的笛卡尔主义者如马勒布朗士等，放弃了笛卡尔的困难重重的身心直接相关联的理论，提出了“偶因论”（occasionalism）来解释身心关系。他们认为，灵魂和身体之间不存在真正的因果关系和相互作用，只是由于上帝的随时干预，才使得身心之间保持协调一致。莱布尼茨的前定和谐理论与偶因论有相同的地方，即都认为身心间不可能有真正的关联；两者的不同在于，偶因论依赖于上帝的随时干预来保持身心间的协调，前定和谐理论则认为，上帝之在创始之初规定形体的规律与灵魂的规律协调一致，此后上帝就不再进行任何干预了。莱布尼茨认为，偶因论者实际上把上帝变成了个糟糕的钟表匠，需要不断的调整，才能让他所造的形体和灵魂这两块表保持时间的一致。

 

第九部分  上帝之城 （第82节—即90节）

82. As regards minds [esprits] or rational souls, though I find that what I have just been saying is true of all living beings and animals (namely that animals and souls come into being when the world begins and no more come to an end that the world does), yet there is this peculiarity in rational animals, that their spermatic animalcules, so long as they are only spermatic, have merely ordinary or sensuous [sensitive] souls; but when those which are chosen [elus], so to speak, attain to human nature through an actual conception, their sensuous souls are raised to the rank of reason and to the prerogative of minds [esprits]. (Theod. 91, 397.)

至于心灵或理性灵魂，尽管我觉得我刚才所说的适用于所有的生物和动物（即动物和灵魂与宇宙同始同终），然而理性灵魂有其特殊性，即他们微小的精子动物，就他们是精子而言，就只具有普通的或感性的灵魂；但当那些被选中的小动物通过实际的受孕而获得人性时，它们的感性灵魂就被提升到理性的层面，获得了心灵的特权。（参见《神正论》，第91节, 第397节）

83. Among other differences which exist between ordinary souls and minds [esprits], some of which differences I have already noted, there is also this: that souls in general are living mirrors or images of the universe of created things, but that minds are also images of the Deity or Author of nature Himself, capable of knowing the system of the universe, and to some extent of imitating it through architectonic ensamples [echantillons], each mind being like a small divinity in its own sphere. (Theod. 147.)

在普通灵魂和心灵的区别中，我对此已谈到了一些 [⑥] ，还有这一点：即一般的灵魂是创造物的宇宙的活的镜子或映象，而心灵则还是神或自然的创造者本身的肖像，能够认识宇宙的秩序，并在一定程度上能通过例如建筑来模仿它，每一心灵在自身领域内就像是个小神。（参见《神正论》，第147节）

解释：

人的心灵由于具有了理性，从而具有了某种神性，这使他不仅像其他灵魂一样是宇宙的活镜，更是上帝的肖像。对人的理性思维能力和实践能力的推崇体现了莱布尼茨作为理性主义哲学家的基本特色和乐观主义精神。值得注意的是，这与强调理性的软弱无力的新教思想的信仰主义是恰恰相反的，尽管莱布尼茨在名义上也是新教徒。

84. It is this that enables spirits [or minds—esprits] to enter into a kind of fellowship with God, and brings it about that in relation to them He is not only what an inventor is to his machine (which is the relation of God to other created things), but also what a prince is to his subjects, and, indeed, what a father is to his children.

正是这一点使得精神或心灵进入到一种与上帝的伙伴关系，使得上帝与他们的关系不仅仅是发明家与他的机器的关系（上帝与其他创造物的关系正是如此），而且还是君主与其臣民的关系，甚至还是父亲与其子女的关系。

解释：

托马斯·阿奎那认为人可以与上帝形成一种友爱关系，但前提是必须信仰道成肉身的耶稣，从而能分有神性。但在莱布尼茨看来，人与上帝的伙伴关系基于人具有理性这一点就足够了，不需要信仰或奇迹的因素。这充分地表现了莱布尼茨理性神学中的人本主义色彩。

85. Whence it is easy to conclude that the totality [assemblage] of all spirits [esprits] must compose the City of God, that is to say, the most perfect State that is possible, under the most perfect of Monarchs. (Theod. 146; Abrege, Object. 2.)

由此很容易得出，所有精神的全体必构成了上帝之城，也就是说，在最完美的君主统治之下的尽可能最完美的国度。（参见《神正论》，第146节，节略，异议2）

解释：

奥古斯丁的“上帝之城”指的是与世俗社会相对而言的基督徒的教会，莱布尼茨的“上帝之城”则是指与自然界相对的整个人类社会（再加上天使等理性灵魂）。这表明莱布尼茨晚年的理性神学已突破传统基督教的局限，而达到真正意义上的普世性。

86. This City of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral world in the natural world, and is the most exalted and most divine among the works of God; and it is in it that the glory of God really consists, for He would have no glory were not His greatness and His goodness known and admired by spirits [esprits]. It is also in relation to this divine City that God specially has goodness, while His wisdom and His power are manifested everywhere.

这一上帝之城，这一真正的普遍王国，是自然世界中的道德世界，是上帝的作品中最崇高、最神圣的部分；上帝的荣耀正在于此，因为如果上帝的伟大和善如果不为精神所认识和崇敬的话，那他就没有荣耀可言。也正是在与这一神圣之城的关系中，上帝才特别具有了善，而他的智慧和力量则无处不在。

 

解释：

没有人类社会的话，上帝的荣耀和善就无处体现。莱布尼茨的这一思想有着浓厚的人类中心论的色彩，当代的很多环境主义者、动物保护主义者恐怕不会喜欢。

87. As we have shown above that there is a perfect harmony between the two realms in nature, one of efficient, and the other of final causes, we should here notice also another harmony between the physical realm of nature and the moral realm of grace, that is to say, between God, considered as Architect of the mechanism [machine] of the universe and God considered as Monarch of the divine City of spirits [esprits]. (Theod. 62, 74, 112, 118, 130, 247，248.)

如上所示，在自然的两个领域之间，即动力因的领域和目的因的领域之间，存在着完美的和谐，我们还应该注意到自然的物理领域和神恩的道德领域之间的另一种和谐，也就是说，作为宇宙机器的建筑师的上帝和作为精神的神圣之城的君主的上帝之间的和谐。（参见《神正论》，第62节, 第74节，第112节, 第118节, 第130节, 第247节, 第248节）

88. A result of this harmony is that things lead to grace by the very ways of nature, and that this globe, for instance, must be destroyed and renewed by natural means at the very time when the government of spirits requires it, for the punishment of some and the reward of others. (Theod. 18－20, 110, 244, 245, 340.)

这一和谐的一个结果是，事物通过自然的方式引向神恩，例如，这一星球会以自然的方式而被毁灭和重建，当对精神的统治需要这样做来惩罚一些人和奖励另一些人的时候。（参见《神正论》，第18－20节, 第110节, 第244节, 第245节, 第340节）

89. It may also be said that God as Architect satisfies in all respects God as Lawgiver, and thus that sins must bear their penalty with them, through the order of nature, and even in virtue of the mechanical structure of things; and similarly that noble actions will attain their rewards by ways which, on the bodily side, are mechanical, although this cannot and ought not always to happen immediately.

还可以得出，作为建筑师的上帝在一切方面都满足作为立法者的上帝，因而罪恶必通过自然的秩序、乃至事物的机械结构而受到惩罚；同样，高尚的行为在形体方面也通过机械的方式获得奖励，尽管这不可能也不应该经常立刻发生。

解释：

自然的物理领域和神恩的道德领域之间的前定和谐意味着，上帝并不需要去行使超自然的奇迹来惩恶扬善，神恩总是通过自然的方式表现出来，否则，上帝就成了个糟糕的钟表匠。

90. Finally, under this perfect government no good action would be unrewarded and no bad one unpunished, and all should issue in the well-being of the good, that is to say, of those who are not malcontents in this great state, but who trust in Providence, after having done their duty, and who love and imitate, as is meet, the Author of all good, finding pleasure in the contemplation of His perfections, as is the way of genuine ‘pure love,’ which takes pleasure in the happiness of the beloved. This it is which leads wise and virtuous people to devote their energies to everything which appears in harmony with the presumptive or antecedent will of God, and yet makes them content with what God actually brings to pass by His secret, consequent and positive [decisive] will, recognizing that if we could sufficiently understand the order of the universe, we should find that it exceeds all the desires of the wisest men, and that it is impossible to make it better than it is, not only as a whole and in general but also for ourselves in particular, if we are attached, as we ought to be, to the Author of all, not only as to the architect and efficient cause of our being, but as to our master and to the final cause, which ought to be the whole aim of our will, and which can alone make our happiness. (Theod. Pref. 134,ad fin., 278.)

最后，在这一完美的统治下，没有任何善的行为不会被奖励，没有任何恶的行为不会被惩罚，所有这些都是为了善人的幸福，也就是说，为了那些在这一伟大国度毫无怨言、尽职责而信天命的人，那些如其所应该的那样去热爱并仿效那所有善的创造者、在对他的完满性的沉思中找到快乐的人，这种从所爱对象的幸福中获得快乐乃是真正的“纯爱”之道。正是因此，贤明之士致力于与上帝的假定的、在先的意志相一致的任何事情，而满足于上帝通过他的隐秘的、结果的和决定的意志所实际带来的事情，他们认识到，如果人们能够充分理解宇宙的秩序，就会发现它超出了最聪慧的人的所有期望，无论就整体一般而言，还是就我们个别而言，都不可能使它变得比现在更好，只要我们能够如我们所应该的那样归附万物的创造者，不仅归附作为我们存在的建筑师和动力因的上帝，而且归附作为我们的主宰和目的因的上帝，他应该成为我们意志的全部目的，仅仅是他就足以使我们幸福。（参见《神正论》，前言，第134节,正文，第278节）

解释：

莱布尼茨引用了经院哲学的两个重要术语，即上帝的假定的、在先的意志（presumptive or antecedent will）和上帝的结果的和决定（consequent and positive will）的意志。上帝的假定的、在先的意志是指上帝主观上希望人类在各方面都得到最大的幸福；上帝的结果的和决定的意志是指由于世界和人的局限性，以及个体与个体之间、整体和部分之间还有过去、现在与将来之间必须相协调的极端复杂性，上帝在客观上只能给予人类在现实条件制约之下的尽可能多的幸福。上帝的结果的和决定的意志不是人类的有限的理智所能够认识和预料的，因此，贤明之士尽人事而听天命，在行动时遵循上帝的假定的、在先的意志，为全人类的幸福而努力，无论其结果如何都欣然接受，因为这是上帝的结果的和决定的意志的体现。

莱布尼茨认为，最高的德性在于爱上帝。在他看来，爱是非功利性的，是“从所爱对象的幸福中获得快乐”，而上帝作为最完善、最幸福的存在，最值得人去爱，也最能给人带来幸福。爱上帝意味着我们认为他的所作所为都是最完善的，他所创造的世界是所有可能世界中最好的世界。