Page 144
67 M.A.Maksimov to
V.G.Dekanozov (Moscow)
COPY:AVP RF, F.0118, OP.2, P.2, D.7, LL.9-11
[Moscow] 6 September 1946
Secret
To Comrade V.G.Dekanozov,
The report and proposals of
the Anglo-American Committee, which has been studying the Palestine
question, were published on 30 April 1946. 1 They have aroused such
strong objections from the Arab countries that the British and
American governments have not ventured to pit the committee's
recommendations into practice.
In order to work out a new
solution to the Palestine problem, the British and American
governments set up the so-called Committee of Experts. On 27 July
this year, the committee presented the two governments with its
proposals, which were plainly incompatible with the previous
Anglo-American Committee's report.
The Committee of Experts
recommended to the US and Britain:
1. To divide Palestine into
four provinces, of which one would be Jewish and another Arab, with
two provinces under direct British rule.
2. These provinces should
together from a single federal Palestinian state, to be ruled by a
'central' government under the direct control of the British high
commissioner.
3. Britain should be
responsible for the defence and foreign policy of the whole of
Palestine, as well as with the police, communications, transport
and the ports of Haifa and Jaffa. 2
4. The Councils of
Ministers of the 'autonomous' Arab and Jewish provinces should be
appointed by the British high commissioner.
注释：
1. See Doc. 65 and n.1 there.
2. The plan referred only to Halfa harbour
(see FRUS, 1946, Vol. VII, p.657).
Page 145
As a condition for the
acceptance of this plan for the political structure of Palestine,
the experts recommended the immediate admission of 100,000 Jewish
settlers into Palestine.
The new plan for a solution
to the Palestine problem gives the British complete country,
replacing the mandate system with a special federal structure in
which Britain would be a permanent member of the federation
alongside the Arabs and the Jews.
The British government has
accepted the experts' proposals as a basis for the solution of the
Palestine problem, but the US has not yet expressed its opinion,
though the American press has observed that the British proposals
for the partition of Palestine secure the British position there,
but are less advantageous for the US.
Public opinion in the Arab
countries has come out against the experts' proposals. The Arab
Higher Committee in Palestine announced on 31 July that the Arabs
would not agree to the partition of Palestine, since it would mean
the loss of Palestine for the Arabs.
The Executive Committee of
the Jewish Agency came out against the partition on 6 August, since
such a partition does not give any independence to the palestinian
Jews, and the self-government of the autonomous provinces, as
proposed in the plan, is illusory. However, the Zionists do not
attack the experts' proposals strongly, since, failing the rapid
transformation of Palestine into a Jewish state, these proposals
do, at least, increase the flow of Jewish settlers to
Palestine.
On 20 June, in order to
exclude the US, which accepts the Zionist position, from the group
of countries which are now deciding the fate of Palestine, the
Egyptian government proposed to Britain that direct negotiations be
initiated with Syria, Egypt, Transjorsan, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi
Arabia and Yemen for an agreement on the Palestine problem, with
the aim of 'putting an end to the present situation and creating a
new regime based on the conditions and goals expressed in the
United Nations Charter'. A similar proposal has been made to
Britain by the Iraqi government.
The British government has
accepted the proposals and invited representatives of the Arab
countries to discuss the Palestine question at a conference in
London on 9 September. Representatives of the Jewish Agency for
Palestine have also been invited to came to London to discuss the
Palestine question.3
注释：
3. The London Conference on Palestine in fact opened on 9
September. The Zionist representatives declined the invitation to
take part in the discussions, the former demanding the release of
their leaders, who had been detained by the British in June 1946.
There were, however, unofficial meetings with the Zionists. The
Arabs were represented by members of the Arab League, but there
were no representatives of the Palestinian Arabs. The Arab plan
submitted to the conference called for the establishment of an
independent state in palestine after a two-year transition period,
during which elections would be held. The conference was adjourned
on 2 October, after having failed to reach agreement between the
parties (See Political Documents of the Jewish Agency, Vol.1,
Editorial Notes, pp.587-8, 662).
Page 146
If the proposed plan for
the partition of Palestine is accepted by the conference, or if the
British reach an agreement with the Jews and the Arabs on a
different basis, which is similar to the plan for the partition,
this will mean that the whole of Palestine will continue under
British control fao an indefinite period. We must respond to these
prospective plans for the dismemberment of Palestine before the
London Conference ends. It would be timely for us to publish one or
two more articles in our press explaining the essence of the
British plan.
When the question is dealt
with in the press, we should start from the following basic
premises:
1. The military regime set
up by the British in Palestine and the presence of British troops
there increase the threat to security in the Middle East. British
troops must be withdrawn from Palestine.
2. Any attempts to reach a
radical solution to the Palestine problem based on the existing
mandate is doomed to failure since the very basis is rotten. The
mandate must be abolished.
3. A radical solution to
the Palestine problem and the establishment of an independent
Palestine on a democratic basis must be achieved through a
trusteeship arrangement under the United Nations.
I should be glad to have
your comments. 4
M.Maksimov
注释：
4. On the last page of the document, above the
text, is a handwritten note:' for V.D[ekanozov], 6.4'.
Page 146
68 A.A.Smir nov, M.A.Maksimov, L.F.Teplov to
V.G.Dekanozov (Moscow)
COPY:AVP RF, F.0118, OP.2, P.2, D.7, LL.18-19
Moscow, 17 September 1946
Secret
To Comrade V.G.Dekanozov,
The deputy Plenipotentiary
of the Council of Ministers on repatriation, Lieutenant-General
Golubev, 1 has reported that there is a mass exodus taking place of
Jews who are trying to go to Palestine from Poland through
注释：
1. See doc.66
Page 147
Czechoslovakia and the Soviet zone of Austria. The number of
Jews trying to get out is 150-180,000. Trains carrying the Jews are
heading for Munich in the American zone of occupation, where there
is said to be a mustering point for dispathing them on to
Palestine. Comrade Osokin, 2 referring to his conversation with the
leader of the Zionist organization in Hungary, reported on 10
September from Budapest that the Zionist Jews of Hungary also
intended to leave for Palestine.
We consider it expedient to
ask our ambassadors in Poland, 3 Romania 4 and Czechoslovakia, 5
and our ministers in Bulgaria 6 and Hungary, 7 for more detailed
information on the activity of the Zionist organizations in these
countries in connection with the measures which are being taken to
organize the mass exodus of Jews to Palestine. At the same time we
must warn our ambassadors and ministers in these countries that
none of our personnel should become involved in any matters to do
with the departure of Jews for Palestine.
A.Smirnov,
M.Maksimov, L.F.Teplov
注释：
2. Osokin was apparently the director of Soviet
counter-intelligence in Hungary. On 5 January 1945, Osokin and
Major General Kuznetsov (Commander of NKVD troops at the Second
Ukrainian Front) met the Hungarian prime minister, the minister of
interior and the minister of education (Kuznetsov and Osokin to
L.P. Beria, 6 January 1945; Konasov and Tereshchuk, 'Budut
nemedlenno predany sudu voennogo', pp.325-6).
3. Viktor Lebedev, from 1945 USSR ambassador
to Poland, see Doc.64.
4. Sergei Kavtaradze, ambassador to Romania
from 1945.
5. Valerian Zorin, ambassador to
Czechoslovakia from 1945.
6. Stepan Kirsanov, from August 1945, USSR
minister in Bulgaria.
7. Georgii Pushkin, from 1945 political
advisor of the Allied Control Commission in Hungary, and from
October 1945. USSR minister in Hungary.
Page 148
69 Memorandum by L.Gelber
COPY:CZA Z4/15279
[New York] 15 November 1946
MR. NOVIKOV AND MR. SUMNER WELLES
Second Thoughts on Palestine and the United Nations
The remarks of Mr.K.V.Novikov, delegate of the USSR in Committee
Four, the United Nations General Assembly (November
11th),1 constitute a general statement and bind nobody
to concrete steps. Running through his observations, however- as of
those of the Ukrainian and Belorussian delegates later in the
week--is the premise that mandatory powers are obliged to say what
they will do with all their mandates; with respect to Palestine
some [...] least of British intentions was, he felt, required.
Certainly it might be hard under the charter or the Assembly
resolution of February 9th , 1946, to regard their
obligations actually to convert mandates into trusteeships as a
strictly legal one; a moral one seems clear. It may be added that
Mr. Bevin has at no time committed His Majesty's government to any
specific disposition of the Palestine mandate, through he has
proposed trusteeship agreement for other territories such as the
Cameroons, Togoland and Tanganyika.
Because of the ambiguities
of the charter and the non-binding froce of the Assembly resolution
of February 9th , 1946, 2 one imagines that there will
be no great alarm in London or Washington over one of Mr. Novikov's
assertions:
...the attempts of the
British government to solve the question on Palestine by
negotiations with the United States government, as well as with
Arab and Jewish representatives apart from the United Nations, does
not correspond to the principles of the United Nations Charter
which establishes a trusteeship system over non-self-governing
territories, including former mandates.
注释：
1. In a general discussion about the implementation of the UN
Charter's provisions. Soviet representative K. Novikov criticized
Great Britain, Austrlia and South Africa for not complying with the
UN decision and ending their mandates. He also complained about the
delay in the establishment of the UN Trusteeship Council (see GA
OR, Second Part of the First Session, Fourth Committee
(trusteeship), 8th Meeting, 11 November 1946,
pp.87-92).
2. This resolution expressed regret that the
projected Trusteeship Council had not materialized. It stated that
any delay in implementing the system of trusteeship deprived the
populations of the ex-mandatory territories of the benefits of
self-rule and called for a rapid conclusion of the trusteeship
agreements (see GA OR, Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly
at the First Part of the First Session, p.13).
Page 149
But another passage on Palestine from his speech may make a more
serious impression:
The fate of this as well as
other former territories under mandate cannot be left suspended
after the liquidation of the League of Nations. There are but two
possible legal ways of determining their fate; either by granting
the true independence to this or that territory, or by transforming
it into a trust territory. From the point of view of the principles
of the charter, there is no third way.
In the sense that Mr.Novikov's statement is a protest against
needless delay, it is quite in accord with the assembly resolution
of February 9th , 1946. To that extent, too, it may
operate to the Zionist advantage. But Mr. Novikov may also have
been serving notice that the USSR will subject to searching inquiry
not only proposals for a possible Palestinian trusteeship, but also
any definition which could satisfy his government on what is ' true
independence'.
The phrase ' true
independence ', with the word 'true' underscored, should be
pondered in the event of a Jewish Palestine applying for membership
in the United Nations. There is the strategic aspect of things. On
November 11,Premier Ismail Sidqi Pasha of Egypt, fresh from the
Anglo-Egyption negotiations, revealed that while the centre of
gravity for Britain in the Middle East is shifting from the
Mediterranean to East Africa, construction of new barracks across
the border from Egypt indicates that Britain still means to treat
Palestine as a feature of her world-wide strategic system. So far
as the United Nations is concerned, the new Jewish Palestine may
yet find itself in the same bout as Transjordan. If Transjordan
were not a military dependency of Britain, the adverse note against
her by Russia, a slight echo of which resounded in Mr.Novikov's
speech, might have not occurred. So, too, in the event of
partition, there would be little enthusiasm in Moscow if British
ascendancy prevailed over what may otherwise be an
internationalized Jerusalem area. A fortiori how much less happy
will they be about an Anglo-Jewish agreement for British naval
bases, air facilities, or military cooperation on land: The age of
secret treaties is supposed to have passed. Yet some understanding
about future eventualities rather than hard and fast stipulations,
signed, sealed and delivered, may therefore be necessary during the
initial state of Jewish independence, if the Russian stumbling
block is to be surmounted.
It should, however, be
remembered that Transjordan, while part of a mandated area,
achieved what is at any rate the semblabce of sovereignty and no
international obstacle barred her way. Nor does reluctance to admit
her to the United Nations or the fact of non-recognition by a power
such as Russia present her with an unprecedented state of affairs.
Other powers have been withdrawn from the League of Nations as well
as the United Nations, or have gone without recognition for
considerable periods by other powers. On the Transjordan model
there may, therefore, be a better chance of getting a workable
answer to the problem of Jewish political independence, even though
it be outside the United Nations sphere rather than within it. At
any
Page 150
rate, the effective disapprobation of Russia and even the direct
voting interference of an Arab bloc might thus be circumvented. It
is true that the future Jewish state's admission to the United
Nations would be rendered more difficult to obtain. If the Russians
prove adamant, it might have to be postponed indefinitely. This,
while regrettable, would not be fatal. First things come first.
[...]3
Lionel Gelber
注释:
3. The last part of the document, dealing with the views of
Sumner Welles on the Palestine question, has been omitted.
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