英文原文首发于英国国际战略研究所Survival: Global Politicsand Strategy杂志2013年6－7月刊。文章下半部分如下：

China’s military is larger, and being modernised morequickly, than that of any other Asian country. The Americans feared that itsgrowing anti-access and area-denial capabilities would enable it to coerce itsneighbours and gradually displace US influence in the region. In the mid-1990s,China’s economic development allowed it to significantly increase defencespending and modernisation programmes, and to initiate an RMA. Since then,Marshall has commissioned studies on the country’s military development,power-projection capabilities, changes to its operational doctrine, perceptionof the future security environment, approach to warfare and RMA. In the 1994China in the Near Term, net assessors contended that the 1991 US invasion ofIraq in Operation Desert Storm fundamentally altered Chinese perceptions offuture warfare and fuelled the PLA’s modernisation efforts. In 2005 the lateMary C. FitzGerald, research fellow at the Hudson Institute, warned that Chinahad moved towards an RMA by developing weaponry and improving its militarytheory, organisation, education and training. She argued that information,naval and, above all, aerospace [capabilities] still constitute the nucleus ofthe new revolution in military affairs. If we neglect the timely development ofweaponry in these arenas, then China could catch America like a deer in theproverbial headlights, precisely where we caught them after the 1991 victory inDesert Storm.

During the 1990s, the balance of military power in theAsia-Pacific gradually shifted to benefit China. The collapse of the USSR andthe establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation considerably easedSino-Russian territorial disputes and allowed China to focus on other contendedareas, such as the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea and the East China Sea.In response to the PLA’s demonstration of force in the 1995–96 Taiwan Straitcrisis, the United States assisted Taiwan by providing it with analyticaltraining through the ONA and helping it to develop its defence capabilities.

In 2000 Marshall argued that ‘the PRC is ambitious. Its goalis to be a great power.’ Such a view was also evident in China in the NearTerm, which concluded that China’s long-term strategic goal was to develop amilitary that rivalled the United States globally.The report argued that Chinawas dissatisfied with the US-dominated world order and its foreign policieswere ‘independent of and sometimes opposed to U.S. policies’, which created‘the potential for China directly to challenge U.S. security interests’. ThePentagon-sponsored The United States and a Rising China: Strategic and MilitaryImplications, published in 1999, used realist theory and an analysis of Chinesehistory to argue that China would seek to dominate the Asia-Pacific as itspower grew. As FitzGerald put it in 2005, ‘China’s ultimate objective is toachieve global military-economic dominance by 2050’.

Marshall laid out the blueprint for the pivot in a memo toRumsfeld in May 2002:

Australia: start negotiations to base selected US forces inAustralian Northern Territories and expand US and regional states’ use ofAustralian training ranges … India: increase port visits, and initiate programof mil-to-mil interactions; initiate joint planning for contingency of loss ofcontrol of nuclear weapons in Pakistan … Initiate planning for a majorexpansion of basing infrastructure in Guam, and possible improvement in PearlHarbor infrastructure … Direct the Services to plan for the types of militarychallenges a malevolent China may pose over the long-term, and incorporatethese into Service and Joint war games, training and exercise programs,including routine wide-area USN–USAF–special forces exercises … For next UCPchange (GWOT permitting), redraw CENTCOM/PACOM boundaries to reflect China asprinciple long-term strategic competitor.

The memo makes clear that despite China’s comparative lackof development in many areas, the ONA had identified it as the biggest threatto US primacy over the next few decades. As Aaron L. Friedberg, professor atPrinceton University, has argued, ‘China today appears to have both the “will”and the “wallet” to compete actively with the United States for power andinfluence, not only in Asia, but around the world’.

Preserving US primacythrough competition with China

Net assessors usually suggest that the United States hasthree ways to meet the challenges of a rising China. It could either forego itscurrent primacy by reducing its global presence and reverting to isolationism,create a multipolar world order in which other great powers take the lead indealing with problems in their regions or preserve its current position bylimiting China’s growing power and influence.

Several ONA studies in the early 2000s addressed thedifficulties of preserving or extending US primacy. Although net assessorsacknowledge that the United States’ relative power will decline in comingdecades, they often argue that it can preserve its current role. In the face ofchallenges from emerging powers, history suggests that a dominant state canpreserve or strengthen its primacy. Friedberg has argued that the United Statesmay be able to maintain its position for at least a few decades. The 2002 ONApaper Military Advantage in History uses case studies of dominant ancientpowers to argue that superior armed forces are vital to the preservation ofgreat power status:

The Roman model suggests that it is possible for the UnitedStates to maintain its military advantage for centuries if it remains capable oftransforming its forces before an opponent can develop countercapabilities.Transformation coupled with strong strategic institutions is a powerfulcombination for an adversary to overcome.

The paper therefore suggests that the United States neededto initiate an RMA to adapt to the changing security environment, especiallythe asymmetric challenges posed by China.

Having confirmed that maintaining US primacy was possible,Marshall devised a strategy for competing with China that focused ondissuasion, deterrence and defeat. This approach was officially introduced inthe 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report and reiterated in later documents.The strategy accords with Marshall’s view that ‘any adequate balance assessmentrequires evaluation from at least three perspectives: deterrence, likely waroutcomes, and long-term competition in peacetime’.

Dissuasion, deterrence and defeat

Net assessors argue that dissuasion is crucial to long-termpeacetime competition. Marshall suggests the United States’ strategic goal‘should be to delay the emergence of hostile and competent competitors’. Thisobjective could be achieved by dissuading China from further developing itsmilitary or expanding globally. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Reportproposed that through its strategy and actions, the United States influencesthe nature of future military competitions, channels threats in certaindirections, and complicates military planning for potential adversaries in thefuture. Well targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade othercountries from initiating future military competitions.

Although the concept of dissuasion was only officiallyintroduced in 2001, the ONA has studied the idea for much longer. In 1992Krepinevich stated ‘there are ways in which the United States could shape thecompetition, or dissuade or deter competitors’.Today, dissuasion and deterrenceappear to be very similar. Dissuasion Strategy, a 2008 study by the Center forStrategic and Budgetary Assessments, defined dissuasion as ‘pre-deterrence’ or‘actions taken to increase the target’s perception of the anticipated costsand/or decrease its perception of the likely benefits from developing,expanding, or transferring a military capability that would be threatening orotherwise undesirable from the US perspective’. Stephen P. Rosen, professor atHarvard University, has explained the logic of long-term peaceful competition:

By understanding the fears and sensitivities of anadversary, programs could be initiated or reinforced in ways that reduced theconfidence of the adversary in his ability to win an engagement or a war. Thiscould enhance deterrence, and also lead the adversary to cease its efforts evento compete with the United States in certain areas.

The United States may dissuade potential competitors byoccasionally demonstrating its military capabilities and willingness to enterinto a conflict, but dissuasion is a very delicate matter. An excessivedemonstration of force and willingness to fight could prompt greater Chineseassertiveness。

This suggests that to determine the correct use of thestrategy, the Pentagon will closely monitor China’s perception of, andresponses to, dissuasive action. The success of such a strategy depends more onthe Chinese reaction to dissuasive demonstrations of power than the actualcapabilities of US forces. Where China’s view of US military superiority hasmade it less likely to develop capabilities to challenge the United States,dissuasion has succeeded. This recognition of the importance of perceptions hasled to many studies of human cognition, the biological mechanisms ofdecision-making and Chinese culture, strategic traditions and leadershipideology.

In the last 10–15 years, the ONA has focused on strategicdissuasion. The office views China’s development of capabilities as being inits early stages, but having great potential to challenge US primacy in thelong term. The ONA also concludes that, should both dissuasion and deterrencefail, the United States must be prepared to defeat China. The likely outcomesof such a conflict, and whether it would serve US interests in the long term,are unclear. The ONA’s usual method of gathering experts from relevant areas tocreate a range of plausible scenarios is insufficient for predicting how a warbetween the United States and China would play out, even in terms of assessingthe likelihood of achieving military objectives. Qualitative factors, such asdoctrine and operational concepts, are vital to determining the results of sucha war. The development of new weapons technologies and operational conceptscould serve the strategies of dissuasion, deterrence and defeat because it mayenable the United States to prevail in future conflicts and discouragepotential adversaries from attacking US interests.

Assessing China

Since 2000, the ONA appears to have made significantprogress in creating strategies for long-term competition with China. As theoffice increased its efforts to understand the long-term consequences ofChina’s rise, it undertook a series of analyses of the country’s economy;military capabilities and modernisation; potential economic and politicalinfluence in the region and perception of the security environment. The ONAoften conducted war games designed to assess how US and Chinese forces mightinteract, including through the office’s annual summer studies programme at theUS Naval War College.

During this period, many other US organisations, especiallyONArelated think tanks, worked to assess China. Analytical tools developed bythe office were often used to simulate Sino-American conflicts. In recentyears, the ONA has organised many seminars and workshops on net assessment,competitive strategies and case studies focusing on China, including a 2010conference that produced the book Competitive Strategies for the 21st Century:Theory, History, and Practice. Such developments suggest the office hasaccepted the United States will enter into long-term competition with China,and has made the application of Cold War analytical and strategic methodscentral to its work. It is likely that the ONA seeks to identify China’sstrengths and weaknesses, how to best use US power against Chinesevulnerabilities and the forms of competition that most favour the UnitedStates. For example, if the office judges that China fears containment, it mayformulate strategies to exploit this perception.

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A study of the ONA’s work suggests that the United States’pivot towards Asia has been a gradual process. Between the mid-1980s and thelate 1990s, the office’s progressive shift of focus from the Soviet Union tocompetition with China was based on long-term assessments of the securityenvironment and the development of potential emerging powers. It also suggeststhat the Pentagon began a detailed assessment of Chinese strengths andweaknesses in the early 2000s. In recent years, ONA studies have attempted tooutline a strategy to exploit Chinese vulnerabilities and compete in areas inwhich the United States is strong, with the goal of preserving US primacy. Ifthe office’s work anticipates US strategy in Asia, the United States maydemonstrate its power in highly selective ways that aim to dissuade China fromchallenging its dominance. It is likely that Cold War competitive strategies willbe a significant part of the Pentagon’s approach to China in coming decades.