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西塞罗《论友谊》

想象如果你飞升天际。

孤单一人,你将无法享受揭开宇宙的奥秘,无法欣赏群星的美丽。只有当与他人分享,你才能享受自己的体验。

 

Si quis in caelum ascendissetnaturamque mundi et pulchritudinem siderumperspexisset,insuavemillam admirationem ei fore;

quae iucundissima fuisset, sialiquem, cui narraret,habuisset.

                                                                                        Cicero, De Amicitia, XXIII (88)

博文
(2016-09-23 15:36)

World Migration Crisis

​

How We Got to Now, and What's Up Next

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How sad the world is at evening!

You will know it if <…> you have walked through the world carrying an unbearable burden.

M. Bulgakov, “Master and Margarita”, Chapter 32 “Eternal Refuge”

 

All the lonely people

Where do they all come from?

All the lonely people

Where do they all belong?

The Beatles 

&#8203;The issue of international migration has attracted unprecedented degree of public attention. Amidst the extreme migration crisis in Europe, the phenomenon of the “desperate loner” terrorism, recently on the rise in many places of the world and often perpetrated by immigrants, might bean unfortunate testimony to the fact that there are indeed migration-related situations that can amount to moral, psychological, and psychiatric dilemmas. 

 

It is true that the ubiquitous question of public debate at stake in many countries, including the US presidential election and the UK Brexit referendum, is whether, if at all, a country needs any foreigners or whether they should all be kicked out. Whereas many scholars argued, validly, that immigrants can bring economic benefits to a country and that cultural exchanges are beneficial for knowledge acquisition, on the other hand,people may as well legitimately feel insecure when hearing news of terrorism or simply annoyed by the presence of those who look or behave differently.

 

Psychologists believe that humans have a naturalneed for “belonging” to a group. Therefore, from a migrant’s perspective, facing difficulties to integrate a society, exacerbated by endless legalhurdles of visas, residence, and work permits, can become extremelyfrustrating. Yet the migrants’ opinions tend to be stigmatized to the extentthat only those who have the experience of direct exposure to their conditionscan fully comprehend their frustration while most people who have never lived in a foreign country do not usually even think about it.

 

There are some simple steps that can save government money while greatly relieving the frustration of migrants that I have learnt throughoutmy almost twenty years of dealing with migration in different capacities of a migrant in several foreign countries, a scholar, and an UNHCR refugee aid worker. My stance on the issue can be summarized in one principle: in order tocreate a virtuous migration circle, policies should prioritize self-reliant migrants with strive and ability to succeed.

 

Towardsa fairer “migration mentality”

The “darwinist” principle of helping the fitterin various situations, including migration, has been criticized, by many, as too capitalist or even too cynical. In my opinion, it doesn’t mean, though, thatwe should not extend a helping hand to those in need. Rather, it means that atany given point where resources are limited, regardless of how we got to thatpoint, we should in the first place extend help to those people who are willingto accept it “actively”. That is to say, the assisted migrants shoulddemonstrate their ability to leverage resources in order to become self-reliantand, ideally, reach a level when they can in their own turn help others,creating a virtuous circle and reducing the burden of their original benefactors. 

 

Unfortunately, however, the migration and asylumpolicies in many countries and places launched the exact opposite vicious circle. They restricted opportunities for the fit, poured the assistanceresources towards, assumingly, provision of help to those in despair, but endedup creating a lot of waste throughout the process that includes maintainingcostly bureaucratic migration control apparatus. These policies succeeded inmaking literally everyone upset, migrants and nationals alike: the workers becauseof their lost opportunities, the employers because of inability to hire workersof their choice, those in personal relations with foreign nationals because of inadvertentlysharing the frustrating circumstances of their beloved ones.

 

Overall, the general course of events demonstratesthat, wherever culturally different foreigners become numerous enough, tensionsin the society tend to rise, and whoever finds themselves in a minoritysituation is vulnerable by definition. Theoretically, there is nothing toprevent any country from growing nationalistic to the extent of making acollective decision to simply expel all foreigners, like it famously happenedwith the Jews throughout history. In such a case, no better guarantee can beprovided to foreigners than granting them, at some point, with citizenshiprights. However, if more and more foreigners become citizens, sooner or later“citizens of foreign origin” will become the majority and the original nativesa minority, as it famously happened in the Roman Empire as well as in mostcountries of the so-called “New World”. Within the next several dozens ofyears, this kind of transformation is likely going to take place in large partsof Europe, including my native Russia.

 

The search for resolution of the migration dilemma is essentially comparable to the Shakespearean “to be or not to be”. Yet we are talking about people with their unique lives, their emotions, happiness andpains, so, it seems, some fairness should be pursued and can be found through answering the following two questions: First, how these foreigners ended up ina particular country? Second, at what time and under what conditions, if any, shouldthey be granted citizenship and no longer be considered, at least legally, asforeigners?

 

Burden,profit, and humanism   

Migrants are usually divided into two broadcategories: voluntary, often referred to as economic migrants, and forced,often referred to as refugees, a term that has its legal nuances but that Iwill retain here for the sake of simplicity. UNHCR, the UN refugee agency,currently estimates that 65.3 million people are in situation of forcibledisplacement around the world, a more than threefold increase from ten yearsago, and that their number continues to grow by 34 thousand on a daily basis[i].

 

Rather unfortunately, in dealing with refugees,national and institutional interests tend to prevail over personal dramas. Onemajor issue at stake for countries is the so-called “burden-sharing”: in otherwords, if a war causes massive flight of refugees from a country, whichcountries should be responsible of accommodating them, provided that theirpresence will almost inevitably impose financial and other costs on therecipient country?

 

A common sense fair answer to this questionsuggests that those responsible for the breakout of war should bear the coststhereof. Yet, in reality, refugees might either feel insecure in the country inconflict with their own, or feel emotionally reluctant to reach that country, or face inability to do so because of geographical distance, legal hurdles, andother reasons. The immediate refugee “burden” will therefore be incurred byeither those countries surrounding the conflict zone (such as Turkey in case ofthe conflict in Syria) or countries neutral to the conflict (paradoxically,that includes, according to our observations, China in case of the conflict inthe Ukraine).

 

The refugee “burden” may seem extremely unfair tothe recipient countries unless they manage to effectively involve refugees intheir economy and gain profit out of the otherwise unfortunate situation. TheUnited States science and technology, famously, benefitted greatly from theinflux of Second World War refugees from Europe, Albert Einstein being oneillustrious figure in the cohort.  

 

However, the US Second World War luck is ratheruntypical. Under the auspices of the United Nations Refugee Convention, the oneguarded by the UNHCR, many countries set up extremely cumbersome and costly “bureaucraticallylegalistic” procedures of determining who is and who is not a refugee. Goingthrough the determination process can last for years, if not dozens of years,result in legal battles that may literally lead up to the Supreme Courts, andcost fortunes in terms of government and personal funds, wasted time and lostopportunities.

 

Less attention has been paid to migrants whosesituation may be inasmuch dramatic as that of refugees: those who have stayedin a foreign country for a long enough period of time so they largely lost all tieswith their country of origin. Most European countries responded to the ageingof the massive generation of migrants who gained Europe during the post-SecondWorld War economic boom, by opening up their citizenship procedures.

 

In China, the issue of legal status of foreignimmigrants has not attracted much attention thus far because they represent buta tiny minority vis-à-vis the local population, and because, due to their smallnumber, it used to be largely possible to handle them on an ad hoc and case-by-case basis. Thissituation will likely change in the near future, as those foreigners who cameto China after the “reform and opening up” policy was launched will reach theirretirement age, and as more numerous generations of migrants will come and stayin China.

 

Quick,effective, and simple

Back in 2006, I assisted a French governmentimmigration department in streamlining their immigration and citizenshipapplication processing. I believe that some simple measures that we took werehelpful to relieve much of the migrants’ stress while saving the governmentfunding and could be considered by policy-makers elsewhere.

 

First of all, we decided that it was fair toprioritize those migrants who could speak good French and were able tocorrectly prepare their application file. Common sense as it may seem, it wasnot necessarily obvious to everyone, because one of the policies in place suggestedthat the government officials should assist “integration” of migrants by encouragingthem to learn French and helping them with filing their immigration applications.The difference of our approach was that we decided to start from the positiveend by first rewarding those who already made the necessary efforts to learnthe language and integrate the society, in the hope that others wouldspontaneously follow their example.

 

Second, we felt that spending resources on anyempowerment-oriented project with potential knowledge or economic output was amore productive budget expenditure than policing or enforcing restrictions. Inother words, assuming the choice is between either spending government money onsetting up language classes for those willing to improve their linguisticskills, or buying deportation tickets to migrants who are not otherwise criminalsand whose only fault consists in their failure to comply with various, oftenself-contradicting, migration regulations, which policy should be preferred? Wefound, not without systemic resistance, the former to be a more rational option.

 

Obviously, one important variable in the designof migration policies is a country’s willingness to submit the nationals to alabor market competition with foreigners. Based on my, likely subjective, observations,I believe that those countries, most of them common law, who have been lessprotective of their nationals, tend to be more successful in smoothly tacklingimmigration issues than those, frequently continental law countries, who haveshown more fear of competition.

 

For example, when the EU expanded in 2004 toinclude 10 new members, the UK, Ireland, and Sweden were the only three countrieswhich opened their borders straight away to workers from the new member stateswhile most other countries introduced transitional restrictions. Also, when Iwas working for the World Bank, an international organization withpredominantly American management culture, we were encouraged to introduce ourspouses and partners for vacancies within the Bank, provided they satisfiedqualification requirements. As one advisory note stated prettystraightforwardly, hiring spouses would be beneficial to both improve thepsychological stability of the Bank’s employees and to save the new stafftraining fees, as “you have already trained your spouses by sharing your workexperiences with them at home”.

 

Hence, the following few ideas might offer some insights to China. One of them is to allow foreign students to legally hold part-time jobs, as it is already the practice in many countries, a simple policy that has the advantage to increase the self-reliance of students and to reduce the need for scholarship funding. Another one is to open labor market to the spouses of nationals. Assuming family unity is a value and families should be allowed to stay together, if foreign spouses of a country’s citizens are not allowed to work or only allowed to work under a number of restrictive conditions (that is the case of China), the obvious question is: who is supposed to financially provide for the foreign husband or wife and for the children? The one who ends up penalized the most in this case is, likely, not even the foreigner but his orher citizen spouse!

 

 

* * *

 

Let me end this story with an anecdote. One French police intelligence department once found an ingenious “Gallic humor” solution to the issue of complying with the central government’s targets of the number of foreigners that had to be deported. On January 1, 2007, Romania was to join the European Union. After that date, the Romanians would no longer need visas to reenter France. In December 2006, the police agents secretly agreed with the illegal Romanians that their deportation would consist in “sending them back home for Christmas” on government expenses, but they would be able to safely come back after the holidays. An arrangement that, apparently, worked out just fine, but that would have, if publicized, certainly made many French, and not only French, citizens extremely jealous! 

[i]

UNHCR Figures at a Glance, URL: http://www.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html; compared with: 2005 Global Refugee Trends, June 9, 2006, URL: http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/unhcrstats/4486ceb12/2005-global-refugee-trends-statistical-overview-populations-refugees-asylum.html.

 


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欧亚留学生在中国:思考中国公共外交的新角度

[俄]苏梦夏[1]   张艳凝译

&#65279;摘要:今日的中国正将目光转向“欧亚”,因为这块囊括俄罗斯和中亚的区域是其“一带一路”国际倡议的重要组成部分。考虑到该区域缺乏华人作为桥梁作用,且该区域决策者对中国的认知也有所不足,吸引该区域民众的支持将可能成为一个极具挑战性的任务。本文认为来华的欧亚留学生能够成为中国在欧亚地区开展公共外交的重要媒介,因此对其活动展开研究。基于公共外交和教育学领域著名学者的理论研究,以及对中国大学的实地考察,本人得出以下结论:首先,中国应更加开放地看待外国公民在中国公共外交中所扮演的积极角色;其次,中国应将关注的重点由中国大学中外国留学生的数量转移到质量上去;最后,中国应更加关注外国留学生的长期职业选择,而不仅仅是简单的汉语学习和中国文化的展示。 

关键词:中国、“一带一路”倡议、欧亚、教育交流、交流学生、公共外交

注:这篇文章中文版本被《首席战略智库》发表:http://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzA4MTU5MzMwOQ==&mid=404582344&idx=1&sn=394c1d6dd88d8d0baa494a9a14d113ad&scene=1&srcid=0408ea8NFw3VT5GhBtzpcX7d&from=singlemessage&isappinstalled=0#wechat_redirect

英文原文,发表在 《公共外交与经济发展之间的联系:相关领域的案例研究》(美国南加大公共外交研究中心系列):http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/story/new-cpd-perspectives-pd-international-development

引言

2015年3月28日,中国正式公布“一带一路”战略蓝图,这是一个旨在将亚洲、欧洲、非洲大陆联系得更为紧密的宏大计划,重点发展几条大陆线和海洋线沿线基础设施建设 (Xinhua News Agency, March 28, 2015)。上述三条大洲线中的两条构成了“丝绸之路经济带”,其中明确提到了“欧亚”的概念——一个包含俄罗斯和中亚的地区。 (中国政府, 2015). 

中国宣称丝绸之路经济带将会促进沿线所有国家和地区的经济发展。为了推进这一影响深远的计划,中国将需要争取到欧亚地区决策者的支持。此外,中国形象在这一地区的改善也必须是长期的,因为中国希望通过丝绸之路来帮助其实现重要的国内经济目标,例如,中国经济向创新驱动转型 (习近平, 2014),以及平衡东部沿海和西部内陆地区之间的经济发展 (冯玉军, 2015)。 

然而,想要吸引欧亚地区民众的支持有可能比预期的更具挑战性。目前,缺乏海外华人在俄罗斯和中亚国家扮演与中国政府交流的中间人角色,就像上世纪70年代末、80年代初海外华人在中国实施“对外开放”政策初期在西方国家所扮演的重要角色(Vogel, 2011)。因此,许多因素都有可能影响中国的计划,例如欧亚地区决策者对中国相对较低的文化认知度 (Gabuev, 2015),中国与俄罗斯潜在的竞争关系(Smirnova, 2014),中亚的自身的地区敏感性,以及存在将中国作为“长期威胁” (Nixey, 2012)的不信任态度(虽然该观念正在逐渐消退中)。 

中国大学的外国毕业生们对向他们祖国可靠传递中国的讯息具有战略性意义。2013年的中国政府统计数据显示,有33,947名外国留学生来自上海合作组织(SCO)成员国(该地区多边合作组织成员国除中国外还包括俄罗斯、哈萨克斯坦、吉尔吉斯斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦和塔吉克斯坦)。 按中国教育部2004年-2013年间的《来华留学生简明统计》报告,中国统计数据显示总计有174,494名来自欧亚地区的外国留学生  (中国教育部)。中国政府还在努力增加与欧亚地区之间在未来的交流学生人数 (Xinhua News Agency , October 13, 2014)。

中国的公共外交因其显著的“中国形象”,或通常而言的“政府主导”而闻名 (Nye, 2013),与之相对的是外国人在其中的消极作用,他们大部分都是作为中国文化的仰慕者出现的。正如王坚所言,中国公共外交的几个广为人知的推动者有中国中央电视台的英语新闻频道(CCTV News)、政府新闻发布会和发言人以及孔子学院 (Wang, 2011)。中国传媒针对外国受众播出的外国人画面通常与针对本国受众的大同小异。这些画面描绘了不同国家文化之间的和谐交流,向外国人展示了书法艺术、功夫表演、或是中国传统服饰穿着。可能除了亨利·基辛格,大部分来到中国的外国游客都绕不开中国媒体这种形式的描绘。例如,在米歇尔·奥巴马最近一次来访中国时就看到了这种形式的新闻报道。 (China Daily USA, March 21, 2014),中国对其仰慕者是友善大方的,但它作为一个封闭社会的时间太长了,需要改变一些态度接纳外国人以自己的形式积极推广中国形象。 

但与西方某些时候的推测相反的是,中国并不坚持认为其公共外交一定要由政府指导。由于中国学者广泛引用西方公共外交学术观点的影响,不管是整体上,还是教育交流方面来说,公共外交的潜能正更受重视和面临着概念重建 (张薇薇, 2013)。随着中国思维方式的转变,对中国在欧亚地区开展“民间外交”的机遇和挑战进行实证研究尤其具有意义。  

理论和方法论 

公共外交与国际经济发展之间的联系构成了一个还未完全建立的新兴研究领域 (Pamment, 2015)。本文认为学生交流项目如果结合对参与者的长期职业发展和个人机会将会更加有效。例如,S·H·云普批评传统的学生交流过分关注于构建对留学国家的理解和学习,认为“通过直接的经历获取知识是不言而喻的,但这些知识在何种程度上能够转化为积极或消极的效用则是鲜为人知的”(Yun, 2015)。G·斯科特-史密斯指出,“……这样的交换将产生最大的影响……如果它能够为参与者提供机会,并对他未来的个人和/或职业发展有所帮助” (Scott-Smith, 2008)。 

有教育经济学的研究机构也号召政策制定者们增加对毕业生就业前景的关注。D·索罗斯比认为,“很清楚地可以看到下一步研究的空白领域……是评估国外学习对所有利害关系人产生的广阔效益,尤其要评估高等教育国际化对学生长期职业发展产生的效益” (Throsby, 1999)。D·奥布斯特和J·福斯特同样发现“增加就业机会和为未来就业获得经验(不管是在国内,还是国外)是一个学生决定前往海外学习的主要因素” (Obst & Forster)。与认为留学生应该返回本国的传统观念形成对比的是,J·伯杰霍夫及其他学者近来根据经验指出,“如果一个国家能够吸引许多外国学生留在这个国家,那么它将由此受益。向外国学生开放大学的政策之后,应该同时制定使劳动力市场吸引这些外国留学生的政策” (Bergerhoff, Borghans, Seegers, & van Venn, 2013)。 

不充分的统计数据对那些想要实证研究在华留学生状况的学者提出了挑战,甚至通过这些学生的祖国获得一份学生列表也是困难的。其中,最权威的数据来源是中国教育部国际合作与交流司自1999年来每年发布的“来华留学生简明统计” (中国教育部)。该数据公布仅供中国,并且只有中文版本。 

另一个困难在于查明获得奖学金的学生比重,而这对于评估中国吸引外国留学生的投入具有重要意义。目前,中国有以下三种类型的奖学金:(1)中国政府奖学金,由中国国家留学基金管理委员会(CSC)管理;(2)孔子学院奖学金,由国家汉办(孔子学院或CI)管理;(3)由各个省、市以及大学管理的众多资助。中国国家留学基金管理委员会(简称留基委)是中国最大的奖学金管理机构。例如,2013年,留基委为总计33,322名外国留学生提供了奖学金 (中国教育部),而同一年国家汉办仅资助了6,929名外国留学生 (国家汉办, 2013)。留基委提供的奖学金数据及其国别分布包括在“来华留学生简明数据”中,但国家汉办奖学金的国家分配却并未公布,而其他奖学金的数据因其来源广泛而难以获取。幸运的是,中国一所重要大学(应其要求不透露具体名称)的国际交流部善意地回应了笔者请求,并提供了这所学校来自上海合作组织(简称上合组织)成员国的留学生数据。这些数据使得评估获得奖学金的学生比重成为可能。 

为了评价留学生的个人经历,笔者与中国的一些欧亚留学生进行了深度交流。为了保护受访者的隐私权,使他们能够自由地表达自己的想法,在本文中隐去了他们的名字。受访者的国别分布大致与上合组织各个成员国的留学生比重是一致的。23名受访者中,12名来自俄罗斯,余下11名来自中亚地区,他们平均在中国学习和生活了4.15年。其中,17名仍旧生活在中国大陆,6名已经离开。18名参加的是学位课程的学习(9名在读博士生,2名硕士毕业生,4名在读硕士生,1名本科毕业生,2名在读本科生),5名参加的是长期(至少1年)但没有学位的中文学习。交流主要围绕以下三个主题展开:来到中国的动机、中国教育体系的优缺点对比以及职业规划和选择。

主要发现

1.中国高等教育在欧亚地区的吸引力正在逐渐增加,尤以哈萨克斯坦为甚。    

数据显示,大部分欧亚地区留学生来自俄罗斯和哈萨克斯坦。2013年,33,947名上合组织成员国来华留学生中,将近一半(47%)来自俄罗斯。排名第二位的是哈萨克斯坦(33%)。其余三个上合组织成员国(吉尔吉斯斯坦、塔吉克斯坦、乌兹别克斯坦)的来华留学生比重总计为20%(参见表 1 / 图 1)。 

过去的十年间,留学生来华接受教育的兴趣持续快速增长,平均来看欧亚地区学生的兴趣增长超过了其他地区的学生,其中尤以哈萨克斯坦的兴趣增长表现最为明显。2004-2013年间,欧亚地区来华留学生数量至少增长了7.9倍。 (哈萨克斯坦来华留学生数量至少增长了14倍)。同一时期,总的来华留学生数量只增长了3.2倍。哈萨克斯坦来华留学生数量年增长率为46%,俄罗斯为25%,而总的留学生数量增长率仅为14%。然而,该数据在2005年前后达到巅峰,并于2010年后逐渐趋于稳定,现在已接近于总的留学生平均增长率。如果用人口比重计算,哈萨克斯坦同样名列首位,每100,000名哈萨克斯坦人中就有66名现在在中国学习。事实上,这一比重在俄罗斯是较低的,每100,000名俄罗斯人中只有11名在中国学习,这一比重最低的国家是乌兹别克斯坦(6/100,000)(图 2)。  

2. 欧亚地区的学生,尤其是来自相对富裕国家的学生,通常更乐意承担他们在中国的学习费用,因为他们认为这一投资在他们未来的职业生涯中将会增值。 

大部分欧亚地区来华留学生或是自己支付教育费用,或是从各自本国获得奖学金。过去三年间,欧亚地区来华留学生获得中国国家留基委(CSC)奖学金的比重相对稳定,平均为10%左右(图 3)。来自相对不发达的国家,尤其是乌兹别克斯坦和塔吉克斯坦的学生获得奖学金的比重相对较高。 

欧亚地区留学生获得中国方面各种奖学金资助的总比重大约为20%-30%。为了核对这一数据,我从中国一所不愿意透露姓名的顶级大学国际交流部取得了相关数据。2000年以来,有483名欧亚地区留学生在该校学习。其中,361名(75%)学生是自费学习,包括俄罗斯留学生数量的80%,哈萨克斯坦和吉尔吉斯斯坦学生数量的75%。大部分乌兹别克斯坦留学生(74%)和全部塔吉克斯坦留学生(100%)获得了中国方面的奖学金。

&#8203;虽然中国的学费一般远高于本国的学费,但欧亚地区的留学生普遍还是负担得起的。来华学习的金钱动机(例如获得奖学金)虽然很高,但并不总排在首位。虽然我的大部分受访者都曾在受教育的某些阶段受惠于中国方面的奖学金,但大部分都曾自费学习过。某些受访者解释道,获得奖学金“在更大程度上是一种荣誉,而不是来华学习的决定性因素”。所有受访者都同意“在中国获得奖学金是可行的,只不过需要一些复杂行政程序”。一些情况下,当学习费用负担得起时,他们“倾向于自费,而不去(为获得奖学金)麻烦”。 

学生们认为来华学习是一种在未来会有所增值的投资。这种观点基于中国的经济发展引人瞩目的普遍看法,他们认为成为一名“中国通”将会帮助他们找到一份好工作。“目前,外国留学生想要进入中国的大学学习并不困难,哪怕是顶级的大学也是一样。但十年后,想要进入北京大学或清华大学学习就会变得十分困难。那时,如果我告诉人们我毕业于清华大学,他们将会印象深刻的。”与来华接受教育的乐观态度相对应的是对本国教育的悲观态度。“我相信中国的教育在未来将成为比俄罗斯教育更好的一项投资,因为中国的教育正在增值,而俄罗斯的却在贬值”,一个受访者这样告诉我。 

3. 欧亚地区留学生的主要来华动机是在原有的学位基础上提升“汉语”或是增进“中国特色知识”。 

这些欧亚地区的留学生多半不止拥有中国大学的学习经历,欧亚地区的学生通常已经在本国获得了大学学位,并把中国的教育看做是附加优势。上述某中国大学的483名欧亚地区来华留学生中,仅仅只有58人(12%)参加本科学位课程,59人(也是12%)参加研究生学位课程,366人(76%)参加无学位的课程或是交换。23名受访者中有21名都已在本国至少获得了本科学位。 

其中,汉语专业无疑占了绝大多数。根据中国教育部的官方统计无法得知特定国家或地区留学生的专业选择。上述某中国大学483名学生的数据显示,大部分欧亚地区留学生(398名,或82%)选择了不同水平的汉语学习课程(图 4)。

&#8203;留学生对用中文或英文教授的、与中国有关的社会科学学科的兴趣正在增加。上述大学提供的数据显示,许多经济相关专业十分受欢迎,例如商务、金融和管理。留学生选择的其他专业按受欢迎程度递减,依次为政治学、国际关系、通讯、传媒、中国哲学、教育学和艺术。 

这些留学生认为中国是“与众不同的”,了解中国不仅对他们各自的国家有益,也/或对他们自身的职业发展有好处。一名国际关系专业的硕士毕业生在受访时提到,她“对所学课程有点失望,因为它们过分关注西方在国际关系方面的理论,而对中国自身的特点不够重视”。另一名来自俄罗斯的经济学专业学生正在撰写一篇关于中国政府在2008年全球经济危机时推行经济刺激政策的论文。她认为中国的政策是“十分先进的”,“有可能借鉴到俄罗斯的国情中”。 

在中国学习自然科学的兴趣事实上是极其罕见的。在这一点上,欧亚地区的学生与他们的西方同龄人是相似的 (Belyavina, 2013) ,但区别于经常前往中国学习技术技能的非洲学生 (Gillespie, 2001; 2013)。在我进行调查的那所中国大学,483名欧亚地区留学生中只有11名(2.2%)的专业是自然科学。它们中最流行的是软件和信息技术,其次是建筑学、化学、生物学和传统中医。由此可见,来自欧亚地区的学生还未将中国视为技术强国,他们更可能前往俄罗斯 (Arefiev & Sheregi, 2014) 学习科学技术,而不是中国。 

4.欧亚地区的学生认为中国的高等教育体系相对于本国而言更为开放,并开始将其作为一个前往欧洲教育机构接受更为先进教育的平台。  

这一结论或许有别于普遍认知,但我的大多数受访者,不管他们来自于哪个国家,都认为中国的高等教育体系相较于他们本国而言“更加开放”。中国教育体系的开放性体现在以下几个方面: 

&#61692;中国大学图书馆里的西方书籍、期刊和研究数据库数量比他们本国来得多。 

&#61692;来自西方的客座教授数量也相对较多。 

&#61692;相较于本国大学,他们在中国的大学更容易接触专门针对外国学生的英语授课课程,因为语言水平是外国学生的一个主要担忧。 

不管他们在中国参加的是英文课程还是中文课程,大部分受访者指出,他们的英语水平在中国有所提高,因为他们会遇到来自不同文化背景的同学,并且相互交流。“大部分受过良好教育的中国学生英语都很好,因此在中国学习英语比汉语来得更快、更容易。”那些参加中文课程或是英文课程的受访者尤其强调,“我的团体十分国际化”,“我的同班同学来自40多个国家”,或是“中国是我在国外生活的第一站,在这里我学会与来自不同国家的人交流”。他们普遍对这种交流的多样化充满赞赏。 

欧亚地区的留学生趋向于认为中国的教育体系相较于他们本国而言与西方标准更为兼容。首先,中国的高等教育体系是根据国际通行的三段模式“学士(4年)+硕士(3年)+博士(3-4年)”标准组织的,而许多欧亚地区的大学仍旧维持苏联模式“专家(5年)+副博士(3年)+博士(不定)”。其次,中国的大学正逐渐获得更高的国际排名。中国大陆至少有两所大学在国际上具有竞争力(清华大学和北京大学) (QS, 2015) (Times Higher Education, 2015) (Webometrics, 2015),而且中国政府设立了巨大的基金来推动大学的国际化(“985工程”),旨在将39所中国大学提升至国际水平。第三,由于数量众多的中国学生希望前往西方接受先进教育 (UNESCO, 2013),中国大学为他们提供了便捷的途径帮助他们通过西方的入学考试。 

因此,越来越多的欧亚地区留学生将中国视为连接他们前往西方学习的桥梁。尤其是俄罗斯的受访者中,许多人表示想前往西方继续深造。“我在中国的学习结束后”,一名俄罗斯受访者告诉我,“我想前往西方国家(继续学习)。但是我的丈夫不会说外语,而且我还有一个小女儿。这使我目前无法前行,但我仍旧会考虑这个机会”。“我有一个德国男朋友”,另一名受访者告诉我,“所以我想在毕业后和他一起移居德国。但是,我同样想前往哥伦比亚大学学习”。另一名学生告诉我,她从中国大学毕业后,前往法国获得了MBA学位,现在居住在普罗旺斯。 

然而,中亚地区的学生相较于俄罗斯学生而言,前往西方的意愿似乎较小。相较于西方的大学,中国的大学在吸引中亚地区学生方面与俄罗斯的大学更存在竞争关系(图 5)。中亚人通常更传统,与本国的家庭联系更紧密,因此也更容易融入中国社会。正如一名来自哈萨克斯坦学生这样解释道:“西方对我而言没有吸引力,我更喜欢亚洲。这是一个如此“富饶”的地方。我的长相和想法与中国人并无不同,他们通常将我认作新疆的哈萨克人,当我说我实际上来自于哈萨克斯坦时,他们都十分惊讶”。对中亚地区的受访者而言,回到祖国是最为常见的选择。但一名中亚地区的受访者表示,他正在“考虑在几年后移居俄罗斯”。


5.中国的学习经历通常是积极的,但职业选择并不如最初预想得那样丰富。

欧亚地区的留学生倾向于喜欢中国,并会在中国长时间居住。没有统计数据显示留学生在中国的平均居住时限,因为一旦他们毕业或是转向另一个学习项目,他们就会被重新统计。我的受访者们平均在中国居住4.15年。其中,在中国居住时间最长的已达9年,2名学生居住了8年,1名学生居住了7年。 

除了少数例外,受访者通常表示,他们发现中国与他们的祖国比想象中来得更为相似。“我能够区别中国、俄罗斯和法国教育体系的不同”,一名受访者这样告诉我。“中国的教育体系更加接近俄罗斯的。它对理论的重视超过实践”。另一名受访者表示:“我在中国并不会太思念家乡,因为我的大部分朋友和同事都在中国”。一名来自哈萨克斯坦的学生告诉我:“我和妹妹在7年前来到中国,一开始是很偶然的,因为新疆离我们居住的地方很近。但我很喜欢中国,然后我的妈妈也过来了,她现在在北京攻读博士学位。我们都很习惯中国的生活方式”。 

欧亚地区的学生不认为中国的政治或宗教自由,以及社会规范是严重的制约因素。根据中国大学目前和之前的留学生在众多本地博客和社交网络上的评论可知,他们对中国的总体态度是积极的(Magazeta.com, realchina.ru)。他们通常喜欢中国胜过自己的祖国。“不像我的祖国,中国的教育体系中没有腐败”,一名中亚地区的学生这样说道。中亚地区的学生觉得有些中国习惯十分可笑或是讨厌,例如不让电梯内的人先出来就冲进电梯,但总的说来,他们认为与中国人交流并不困难。 

那些良好掌握汉语的学生倾向于对前景更加积极。一个励志的成功故事是,一名叫作亚历山大·卡布耶夫的29岁俄罗斯青年,以前曾经是浙江大学的交换生,现在是莫斯科卡耐基中心的知名中国问题评论员。另一个值得一提的俄罗斯人尤莉亚·德雷吉斯,以前是华中师范大学的交换生,现在是俄罗斯国立莫斯科大学的副教授,因翻译余华的小说而知名。然而,他们两人除了在汉语专业,还在其他的专业拥有学位(亚历山大·卡布耶夫——历史和金融,尤莉亚·德雷吉斯——文学)。尽管如此,对那些职业不那么有声望的受访者而言,一个典型的回答是,“我并不担心我的职业前景。我会说俄语、英语、中文(以及一门中亚语言),我总能找到一份工作”。 

然而,当这些学生想要在中国找到工作时,他们却经常遭遇挫折,原因有以下几点。首先,他们面对会说英语和俄语的中国学生的强有力竞争,这些中国学生留学国外,而且“中文说得更溜,也更好地理解中国”。其次,欧亚地区的学生相对与英语母语者而言处在劣势。“中国人有可能对美国的态度是“又爱又恨”的”,一个刚刚毕业的学生告诉我,“但即便是那些不喜欢某些美国政策的中国人,他们也仍旧喜欢美国的商品和美国的生活、行为方式”。因此,这名学生得出结论,“中国的公司通常更偏向于美国的求职者,或是英语母语者,各种岗位都是这样”。第三,许多受访者认为中国外国人工作许可过于严格,以致于难以获得合法的工作。一个学生解释道:“如果你被一家跨国公司录用,他们会给你一个工作许可证。然而,大部分中国公司甚至完全不被允许雇佣外国职员”。 

与他们的职业预期相悖的是,大部分受访者都对“学生不被允许合法地从事兼职工作”这一事实感到苦闷,因为“这使他们很难获得工作经验,并且认识潜在的雇主”。一个现居法国的毕业生说道:“在法国,学生每周允许工作20个小时。这是很有帮助的,而且对国家也是有益的,因为外国留学生可以变得更加独立,更少依赖于政府的奖学金”。 

结论和政策建议

根据调查发现,至少有好几万欧亚地区的留学生已经毕业或仍在中国大学学习。这代表了已有新一代接受中国教育的专业人员,他们的数量比以前大大增加,而在以前只有很小范围的、苏联某些学校的毕业生才有机会学习中文。这些在中国居住过的欧亚地区留学生倾向于对中国友好,有着关于中国的第一手信息,并且大多至少拥有一些对中国的知识。 

这些专业人员主要有三个选择:回到祖国、留在中国工作或是前往西方,但他们在进入西方的劳动力市场前有可能需要接受进一步的教育。这三种情况的任意一种中,他们都能够为中国的公共外交中发挥作用,扩大中国的国际影响力。如果他们返回祖国,他们将逐渐在本国与中国相关的决策制定中扮演越来越重要的角色。在这一地区缺少华人作为桥梁作用的情况下,这些专业人员对中国的积极印象将会对“一带一路”倡议等项目的成功实施产生关键影响。如果他们有机会留在中国,他们将帮助加强中国与祖国的联系,像华人在西方国家对中国的公共外交中发挥作用一样。前往西方的最后一个选择最初看起来可能对中国不会那么有利,但是,西方大学中,除了中国学生人数的增加,中国大学外国毕业生人数的增加,也会提升中国大学的影响力,最终帮助吸引更多优秀的外国留学生前往中国。

考虑到中亚地区在中国外交中的优先性,中国应采取一些行动来维系与这一地区毕业留学生的联系,并且建立与未来学生的联系,来改善外国留学生的职业前景,使他们成为“民间外交”的推动者。 

1.可以通过校友会来与中国大学毕业的外国留学生保持联系,这种校友会已经开始出现了 (俄罗斯科学院远东研究所, 2014))。中国的教育机构可以与这些协会建立联系。  

2.为中国大学毕业的外国留学生提供便利的签证程序。中国可以考虑推行快速签证申请,如果不可行的话,也可以考虑给予长期多次往返签证来推动这些留学生返回中国参加各种项目。中国可以学习美国的B1/B2签证,该签证在3、5或10年期间允许不限次数的往返和一定时间的居住,并且研究这些期限是否试用于中国。 

3.可以考虑简化对居住在中国的外国人授予签证的要求。允许外国留学生合法地进行兼职工作,增加可以雇佣外国人工作的中国公司数量,并且降低近期引进的、针对外国高水平专家的R签证的要求。  

4.课程设计不仅仅局限于汉语教学,还可以吸引更多专业的学生参加多种多样的中文和英文课程。 

5.考虑到许多留学生抱怨说他们的职业前景没有预期中那么有希望的问题,中国在不久的将来不应该还仅仅关注欧亚地区学生数量的增加,而应该将关注点转移到提升欧亚地区来华受教育的学生质量上来。 

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【1】本文作者苏梦夏(Larisa Smirnova)(su.mengxia@qq.com)是俄罗斯科学院中央经济数学研究所高级研究员,厦门大学外籍讲师/外国专家。作者谨向本文中文翻译张艳凝(上海外国语大学俄语系)表示谢意。本文英文原文“Eurasian Students in China: a New Angle in Understanding China’s Public Diplomacy”发表在“Intersections between Public Diplomacy and International Development”,University of Southern California Center on Public Diplomacy, CPD Perspectives Series, 2016.ISBN-13: 978-0-18-220287-4 (下载链接:http://uscpublicdiplomacy.org/story/new-cpd-perspectives-pd-international-development)。作者获得中国教育部人文社科青年基金项目(14YJCZH190)和中国国家社科基金项目(14ZDA053)资助。本项目在实施过程中得到了Marine Cai、胡亮宇、James Pamment、李玮和于丹红的宝贵建议。最后,本文的写作离不开问卷受访者的贡献,他们为研究提供了富有价值的看法。 

 (1)但实际的学生人数有可能小于该数据。由于该数据每年更新,因此有可能一些在中国居住多年的学生每一年都被记录在内。 

 (2) 那些没有包含进数据年表的国家中,学生数量最大值可能为499(数据年表明确表示,它只包含学生数量大于等于500的国家)。因此,中亚地区来华留学生数量总计最多为499*4=1996。上合组织成员国来华留学生数量总计最多为1996 (中亚地区) +2288 (俄罗斯) = 4284.因此,33947/4284≈7.9。 

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参考文献

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“一带一路”背景下的中俄关系展望



如果这个问题无法通过外交解决,那么更不可能被权力和鲜血解决。

——列夫·托尔斯泰《塞瓦斯托波尔故事》

(注:本文为《FT中文网》约稿,2015年12月17日发表:http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001065318  中文翻译:刘波  

原文是英文, 2015年12月27日发表在Russia Direct的网站:http://www.russia-direct.org/archive/russia-direct-brief-russia-and-world-foreign-policy-outlook-2016 (please scroll down to read the full version of this article in Engilsh) 

 图片来源:Russia Direct)


在2015年,我们已经看到,俄罗斯将外交政策向亚洲倾斜,这主要带来了两个结果。首先,俄罗斯与中国的关系变得更紧密。中国是亚洲大国,也是崛起中的全球大国。其次,俄罗斯的外交政策日益重视中亚国家。中亚已成为俄罗斯倡议的“欧亚经济联盟”与中国倡议的“丝绸之路经济带”的主要合作地域。

很明显的是,俄罗斯越来越默许中国对后苏联空间的不断介入,尤其是中亚。这是史无前例的。俄罗斯一直拒斥西方国家对那里的介入。俄罗斯态度变化的至少部分原因是中国外交的灵活技巧:西方国家试图通过单边行动来与后苏联国家交往,既不征求也不索取俄罗斯的支持,也几乎不顾及俄罗斯的战略敏感,而中国则采取了合作态度,试图把俄罗斯的利益纳入考虑之中。

本文的主要论点是,中俄走近实际上符合各方的最大利益,包括西方国家,因为两国有助于维持脆弱的世界和平。即使我们假设,西方决策者的主要目标是遏制俄罗斯的单边好战倾向(无论这是客观存在还是仅为一种主观感受),使其返回妥协政治的轨道,中国作为一个奉行谨慎外交政策的国家,以及一个潜在的调停中介国,其影响力也极有利于这个目标的达成。

为了证明这一论点,我们设想中俄关系发展的三种可能场景。中亚地区安全形势的变化情况,以及西方国家对中俄两国的态度,是我们考虑的两个变量。

场景一:欧亚经济联盟和丝绸之路经济带实现互补

2015年,中俄双边关系的主要政治事件是中国国家主席习近平在5月对俄罗斯的访问。两国签订了欧亚经济联盟与丝绸之路经济带合作宣言,确定了未来的合作计划。仔细考察宣言文本,我们会发现,“经济”一词单在标题里就出现了两次。很明显,两国试图加强的合作主要是经济领域的合作。

丝绸之路经济带可以让中亚的交通变得更通畅。该战略是基于中国国内一项非常成功的经济发展战略:中国多山省份的发展经历证明,通过修路,打破一些地区的隔绝状态,能有效促进经济发展。

但丝绸之路经济带战略目前尚不能解决的是,基础设施网络在建成之后的管辖权问题。外国与中国省份不同,中国将资金投入最终将由外国政府经营的公路等设施时,中国投资者的收益将如何保障,的确是一个问题。

但事实上,主要以欧盟(EU)为灵感的欧亚经济同盟,完全有能力解决这个管辖权问题。事实上,欧盟已经通过一系列所谓的“铁路指令”,即超国家的欧盟法律,为跨界铁路运营设立了立法先例。从1991年开始,欧盟逐渐放开了铁路经营的市场准入,允许铁道基础设施之外的企业参与,结果是跨国界的铁路数目大增,由欧洲之星(Eurostar)、Thalys、TGV等企业运营。欧盟各方现正举行谈判,以通过“最后一步”,为“欧洲单一交通区”构建法律框架。如果这一努力成功,最终将形成由欧洲铁路局(European Railway Agency)主导的超国家的铁路管理机制。

欧亚经济联盟还提议建立一个铁路客运与货运的管理框架。根据欧亚经济联盟缔结条约中仿欧盟的规定,该联盟意在实现“货物、服务、劳动力和资本的自由流动”。即使中国不正式加入欧亚经济联盟,该联盟也可以成为签证、海关等多边事务谈判的辅助性平台。如果该平台能得到有效利用,还可能促成某种混合机制,如类似于欧洲的申根区——瑞士、挪威等非欧盟国家也可加入申根区。

场景二:中亚的安全威胁可能推动中俄结成战术性联盟

2015年9月曾传出一项几乎未被西方媒体注意到的消息:中亚国家塔吉克斯坦发生了一场伊斯兰主义的政变图谋。塔吉克斯坦与阿富汗相邻,其居民与阿富汗北部居民在种族上相近。该国有漫长而痛苦的族群争斗史。这段历史常被带着意识形态色彩,描绘为世俗政府与伊斯兰主义反对派之间的冲突。

俄罗斯知名军事专家瓦西里·卡申(Vasily Kashin)在今年6月的清华世界和平论坛上发言时指出:“(中亚)地区在中期有可能爆发一场全面的安全危机”。卡申认为,假如这样的危机爆发,鉴于该地区毗邻中俄两国,所以两国的介入几乎是必然的,介入的程度将取决于威胁的严重程度。

中俄两国早已开始为这样的不测做准备。从2005年开始,上海合作组织(SCO)就允许在其框架下举行军事演习,中俄两国也联合参加了演习。从这个角度出发,一些俄罗斯军事专家长期以来都呼吁,提升上海合作组织的防务潜力,尤其是加强中俄两国的军事协调,其最引人瞩目的代表是俄罗斯科学院的Anatoly Klimenko将军。

2015年7月乌法峰会通过的《上海合作组织至2015年发展战略》重申,上海合作组织不准备成为一个政治或军事联盟。在和平年代将是如此。但通常发生的情况是,如果发生战争或冲突,为了展开军事行动,国家之间就会结成战术性联盟。所以,任何担心中俄结盟的人,都应首先祈祷中亚保持和平与稳定。

场景三:中俄两国政治稳定受威胁可能加快新的多极化世界秩序趋势

“一带一路”战略和亚洲基础设施投资银行(AIIB)是迄今为止非西方国家提出的最具雄心的发展倡议。尽管这两项倡议是否能成功,现在判断为时尚早,但它们明显在软实力方面是成功的。AIIB有50多个创始成员国,包括俄罗斯。中国已与俄罗斯就围绕“丝绸之路经济带”的合作签署了一项重要宣言。而最关键的是,在这项计划所涉及的各国里,政治经济决策者都预估该计划能成功。这表明了国际上对中国的信心,这是来之不易的,中国也完全有理由为此自豪。

可以说,中国外交战略的主要优势在于,中国在承诺提供发展支持的同时,不挑战当地精英的政治权力。西方以经济政治改革为条件的做法备受指责,被认为在世界很多地方导致了冲突,在这种情况下,中国的方式更具吸引力。作为一个非西方国家,中国一方面能学习西方的发展方法,另一方面保留了根据自身需要来选择适用国际“最优经验”的权利。

发展中国家的政治悲剧在于,一方面,学习西方科学、政府治理与社会管理制度,对自身发展至关重要,但另一方面,动荡的政权更迭,或者说所谓的“颜色革命”,又会让任何负责任的政府望而却步。正像记录乌克兰“独立广场运动”的纪录片《凛冬烈火》所表明的,反政府示威往往不仅不能鼓励政治多元化,反而造成混乱和失序,而且像穆斯林世界的例子所说明的,可能使恐怖主义威胁加剧。

在俄罗斯,脆弱的政治平衡已被2011-2013年的反对派运动打破,该运动质疑弗拉基米尔·普京竞选连任成功的合法性。大部分反对派领导人都是自由派阵营的代表。在1990年代非常不得人心的改革中,他们的影响力已受损,至今缺乏真正的社会支持基础。因此,俄罗斯反对派运动未能实现其让普京下台的目标,他们唯一做到的是,推动普京及其他中间派与更保守的力量结成联盟。同时,尤其是在克里米亚危机和西方对俄制裁之后,很多原本亲西方或属于自由派阵营的俄罗斯人,也已转向更加民族主义的立场。

回到国际关系方面,很多人认为新的多极化不可能出现,理由是在现代世界不存在两种意识形态选择,例如资本主义和共产主义。《历史的终结》、《世界是平的》等很多书阐述了这一假定。然而,中国“一带一路”战略、AIIB等倡议的吸引力表明,一种新的意识形态可能正在出现。发展中国家有权走稳定和平的发展道路,不受来自西方国家的外部政治压力,或许确实在成为一种新的意识形态。很多新兴市场国家,如“金砖国家”,都会认同这种观点。而且,来自西方的政治压力越强,中俄结成实质性战略联盟的可能性就越大,两国也会越有动力去尽可能拉拢那些对西方施压不满的国家,作为自己的盟友。

在本文描述的三个场景中,第一个以经济合作为目的的场景,是中俄两国官方目前所愿意实现的。任何国家,包括西方国家,都没有理由担心该场景的实现,或者为其可能的失败而鼓掌。如果我们认为当前的主要任务是维持世界和平,那么向俄罗斯施压以希图实现政权更迭,显然不能实现这个目标。由于西方政治家曾试图通过单边行动增强西方在前苏联国家的存在,他们在俄罗斯人眼中已失去公信力,所以他们的外交努力也无法实现这个目标。但是,中国作为一个奉行审慎外交政策的国家,作为一个潜在的协调中介,却有可能间接地促成世界和平目标的实现。当前国际政治已发展到危险阶段,全球力量平衡正在转移,这让一些人联想到两次世界大战之前的岁月。在这种情况下,合作尤其是经济合作的立场,而不是对抗的立场,在本质上是一种远为明智的立场。

(注:本文作者Larisa Smirnova(苏梦夏)是居住在中国的俄罗斯人,是厦门大学外籍教师,莫斯科大学政治学博士,法国国家行政学院ENA、莫斯科国际关系学院双硕士。文章仅代表作者个人观点。责编邮箱bo.liu@ftchinese.com


Three Scenarios for Russia-China Relations in 2016 

Do not take lightly the perils of war

  Thucydides

Russian international relations scholar Timofei Bordachev has referred to 2015 as the year of “greatest breakthrough in Russia’s Asia pivot policy” as well as the year of “its incompletely used potential.” It means the upcoming year is an important one for determining the future of Russia’s pivot to Asia.Russian President Vladimir Putin mentioned that the nation’s Asia pivot was associated with objective reasons, such as “the processes in the global economy”and “the new opportunities” related to the faster growth in the Asia-Pacific region than in the rest of the world. In some ways, Russia’s pivot to Asia also mirrored the U.S.’s pivot to Asia under President Barack Obama. 

The term “pivot to Asia” itself became widespread following the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis. The shift of Russia’s foreign policy towards Asia mainly translates into two results. First, closer relations with China; second, increased priority of the Central Asian states in Russia’s foreign policy which is explained, besides the traditional ties, by the weakening of Russia’s positions in the European part of the former Soviet Union, starting from Ukraine.

One certain trend for 2016 and beyond is the continued development of Russia-China relations with a primary focus on Eurasia. Russia’s growing acquiescence to China’s progressive involvement in the post-Soviet space, an involvement that Russia always resisted from Western nations, is without precedent. Russia’s changing attitude should be, at least partially, credited to the accommodating skills of Chinese diplomacy: While the Western nations attempted to engage post-Soviet countries through unilateral attempts, neither soliciting nor obtaining Russia’s support and with little regard to Russia’s strategic sensitivities, China is taking a partnership stance that intends to take Russia’s interests into account.

As it turns out, it is actually in the best interests of the West to encourage, rather than fear, Russia’s cooperation with the Asian nations, notably China. There are no reasons for the West to either be apprehensive of the successes or applaud the potential failures of Russia’s Asia pivot. At a point when international politics has reached a dangerous phase of a shifting balance of power, the stance of cooperation rather than confrontation is obviously a much wiser one to take. Even assuming that the main goal of Western policy makers is to contain Russia’s unilateral belligerence (real or perceived), and engage it back into the politics of compromise, the influence of China as an intermediary can be extremely instrumental in reaching this goal.

Three scenarios for Russia-China relations in 2016
To prove this point, it’s possible to construct three scenarios for the development of Russia-China relations. We take as variables the development of the security situation in the Central Asian region and the attitudes of Western nations towards Russia and China.

The first scenario, most desired by Russia and China, is when the Central Asian region is stable and the relations with the West are friendly and balanced. In this case, Russia and China will focus on the complementary economic components of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) and the Silk Road Economic Belt.

The second scenario, undesired by either Russia or China, but estimated likely by the two countries’military experts, is a security crisis in Central Asia. Should such a crisis occur, Russia and China, if they feel their border regions are threatened, would have to engage in joint security operations of a scale that will vary depending on the seriousness of the threats and the involvement of the Western nations in the crisis, real or perceived. In this case, Russia and China will more deeply consider a military alliance for the reasons of better tactical coordination.

The third scenario, the most feared by both Russia and China, is when the regional situation in the Central Asia is volatile, and relations with the Western nations are tense to the extent the global security situation becomes a threat to the internal political stability of the two countries. The best way through which Russia and China can resist such a development is by pushing for a full-scale reshaping of the world order. In this case, they will move towards a strategic alliance and engaging the greatest number of other allies possible. A strategic alliance necessitates an ideology, and such an ideology might be currently emerging: It is the right of developing nations to peaceful development without political interference from the West. This idea is implicit to the Chinese “One Belt, One Road” strategy and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The soft power success of these initiatives among the transitional, emerging and developing countries has proven to be quite attractive.

2016 will likely become a key year when the trends in favor of each of these scenarios will be weighed, and the trends thus set will eventually persist over the next decades.

Scenario #1: The EEU and the Silk Road Economic Belt achieve complementary economic goals
In May 2015, the main political event in Russia-China bilateral relations was President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia. It was marked, besides the more eye-catching part of the Red Square Victory Day parade, by signing of the agenda-setting declaration on the cooperation between the EEU and the China-initiated Silk Road Economic Belt. What that translates into is that, first, Russia and China openly claimed that the impact of their relationship exceeds their bilateral ties and extends at least to the whole of Eurasia, and second, that the kind of cooperation the two countries seek to boost lies mainly in the economic area. 

What the Silk Road Economic Belt can do is to improve the geographic accessibility of the Central Asian region. Indeed, the Chinese plan suggests developing basic infrastructure with a goal of better connecting the neighboring countries to China. The effort is supposed to simultaneously boost the economic development of these neighboring countries and of China’s own border regions.

The suggested strategy was once a very successful domestic economic development strategy for Beijing. China’s infrastructure development levels are by far superior to those of Russia and the Central Asian countries. Taking into account that approximately 70 percent of Chinese surface are mountainous and was previously difficult to access, China’s example is a proof that road-building gives an impetus to the economic development merely by bringing places out of isolation.

What the Silk Road Economic Belt strategy does not resolve is the issue of the jurisdiction over the infrastructure networks once they are in place. Foreign countries are different from the Chinese provinces: A plan to invest Chinese money into the roads that will eventually be run by foreign governments, raises legitimate concerns regarding the returns of Chinese investors.

In fact, the EEU, largely inspired by the European Union, if implemented smartly, totally possesses the potential to resolve the road jurisdiction issues. Indeed, the EU already sets a legislative precedent for cross-border railway operations through a series of the so-called “railway directives,” i.e., supranational EU laws. Starting from 1991, the EU opened access to operations on railway lines by companies other than those that own the rail infrastructure, which resulted in a surge of cross-European trains by operators such as Eurostar, Thales and TGV. Negotiations are currently ongoing for the “final step” towards the legal framework for a “single European transport area”that would result in a supranational regime of railroad management by the European Railway Agency.

The EEU also suggests a framework to fill the railroads with people and the freight that will travel through them. According to the EU-copied yet praise-worthy formula in the EEU founding treaty, the Union intends at achieving “free movement of goods, services, labor and capital.” Even if China does not formally join the EEU, which it will probably not do in the foreseeable future, the Union could become an instrumental platform for multilateral negotiations on visa and customs issues and, if used efficiently, result in a hybrid regime, such as the European Schengen zone, to which non-EU countries, such as Switzerland and Norway, acceded.

However, what the realization of these optimistic cooperation scenarios needs most is mutual trust. And trust-building needs a much better familiarity with each other than Russia, China, and the Central Asian countries, that have long prioritized other directions in their foreign policy, can currently boast of. Russia-China bilateral trade relations are a notorious proof: Despite the original enthusiasm about their potential, following the massive gas deal of May 2014, Russia-China trade volume decreased by an impressive rate of 29.3 percent only in the first nine months of 2015. Furthermore, practice shows that negotiations between Russia and China on many specific issues ranging from gas pipes and bridge building to university cooperation often had to deal with mutual cultural unawareness, insufficiency of human ties and deep misunderstandings.

The EEU, again, contains a potential framework to nurture human ties through what could become a “Eurasian higher education area.” Unlike railways, customs, and visas, where Russia only observed the European experience, it actually possesses a firsthand experience of participation in the “European higher education area” since joining the Bologna Process of education integration in 2003. The Chinese are traditionally very keen on education cooperation too. China’s reform and opening-up policy famously started from massive dispatching of Chinese students to Western countries, mainly the U.S. Xi Jinping, in his landmark foreign policy speech of Oct. 24, 2013, that some scholars believe actually shifted the Chinese foreign paradigm from the traditional “keeping a low profile” to a much more assertive “striving for achievement” and paved the way for the “One Belt, One Road” initiative, stressed that “diplomatic relations rely on the bonds between people” and called on promoting people-to-people exchanges, including in areas of science and education.

Hu Angang, one of China’s main economic strategists, also advocates an increase in the availability of projects that support the mobility of students and scholars within the “One Belt, One Road” strategy. By all means, it will take less time and effort to launch, let’s say, a “Bishkek Process” of higher education integration than to agree on the railroad map of the future Central Asia. Most importantly, human ties, improved through education, might become very helpful in pursuing various economic goals, including shaping the future railroad maps.

Scenario #2: Security threats
Russia and China to form a tactical alliance In September 2015, a news alert that went almost unnoticed by the Western media mentioned an Islamic coup attempt in the Central Asian state of Tajikistan. According to reports, “the government accused a deputy defense minister of siding with Islamists in clashes with the police that killed 17 people.”Tajikistan, a state bordering Afghanistan with a population ethnically relative to that of Northern Afghanistan, possesses a long and painful story of clan fighting painted in ideological colors of secular government and Islamist opposition. In the 1990s, a disastrous Tajik civil war that followed the disintegration of the Soviet Union killed over 60 thousand people. After the 1997 peace accords, clashes continued sporadically, the most serious in a series being the Tajik insurgency of 2010-2012.

A Russian military expert Vasily Kashin pointed out that, “A full scale security crisis in the region is likely in the mid-term perspective.” The most likely conflict zone, according to him, is “the Ferghana Valley where clashes between the Uzbeks and the Tajiks, the Uzbeks and the Kyrgyz, and the Uzbeks and the Kazakhs might occur.”According to Kashin, should such a crisis in the Central Asian region occur, taking into account the region’s immediate proximity to Russia’s and China’s borders, the two countries’ involvement into it will be almost certain. 

Russia and China has been preparing for such an unfortunate course of events: Since 2005, the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) allowed participants to conduct military drills, in which the Russian and the Chinese jointly took part. From this perspective, some Russian military experts, including Anatoly Klimenko of the Russian Academy of Sciences, have advocated for the increase of the defense potential of the SCO and of military coordination between Russia and China. 

The “Shanghai Cooperation Organization Development Strategy through 2025” reiterates that the SCO is not planning to become a political or a military alliance. And that shall be true in times of peace. In times of war or conflict, however, alliances usually emerge out of tactical necessity to conduct military operations. Hence, whoever fears that Russia and China might end up forming an alliance, should in the first place keep their fingers crossed for the peaceful and stable development in Central Asia.

Scenario #3: Threats to political stability in Russia and China result in a new bipolar world order
In March 2015, President Xi Jinping launched the “One Belt, One Road” strategy and the AIIB. These initiatives are the most ambitious development initiatives not initiated by the West. Too early to be called actual successes, the initiatives are clearly soft power successes. The AIIB has over 50 prospective founding members, including Russia. Moreover, China signed a key declaration with Russia on cooperation over the Silk Road Economic Belt project, securing Russia’s acquiescence to its involvement in the Central Asian region, a position the Western nations neither solicited from Russia nor obtained.

Indeed, at a point when the Western methods of economic and political reforms are under attack as having led to conflicts in many parts of the world, China’s own example is appealing. A non-Western country, it managed to both learn Western development methods and to maintain the right to select and adapt the best international practices to its needs. Arguably, the strength of China’s strategy is its pledge to provide development recipes without challenging the political leverage of local elites, something that Western countries and development institutions always endangered through the promotion of linkages between development and democracy.

Understanding the internal political spectrum of countries, such as Russia and China, is crucial for understanding their foreign policy concerns. Both Russia’s and China’s governments are in the process of undertaking reforms. Although the stage of reforms is different, there is one common point: Russia and China are determined, especially after Russia’s experience of 1990s, to pursue the domestic reforms without allowing external pressure for regime change.

The prospects of a violent regime change, or so called “Color Revolution,” is a daunting perspective for any government, especially in big and complex countries like Russia and China. In these states, the internal political spectrum is split between the camps of liberals and conservatives. In view of the considerable radicalization of the camps and the history of public unrest, a dilemma that the governments face is how to position themselves as centrists in a way to reconcile the camps, ensure stability and push through reforms. For example, Putin has always projected himself as a centrist. The political party he initiated, called the “United Russia” party, has equally tried to position itself as a center party aiming at reconciling the opposing camps.

In Russia, this fragile balance of political spectrum was broken by the opposition movement of 2011-2013 that questioned the legitimacy of Putin’s reelection. Most opposition leaders were representatives of the liberal camp that had compromised themselves in the process of highly unpopular reforms in the 1990s and lacked real social support basis. Therefore, the opposition movement did not achieve its purpose, but one thing it did succeed in was pushing Putin and other centrists to an alliance with more conservative forces. Furthermore, many Russians who were originally rather pro-Western or belonged to the liberal camp, also shifted to more nationalist positions.

This dilemma is not unique to Russia and China. The tragedy of politics in the developing world is that learning the Western methodology of science, government, and management is crucial for development. However, when people in the liberal camp push too hard for a regime change, the government will have to affiliate closer with the conservative camp, that eventually results in a further delay of the reforms desired by the liberals and the West. 

Going back to the international relations, the usual argument on the improbability of the new bipolarity lies in the presumed absence, in the modern world, of two alternative ideologies, such as capitalism and communism. However, the appeal of the Chinese initiatives, such as the “One Belt, One Road” strategy and the AIIB, shows that a new ideology might be emerging. The right of the nations to stable development without external pressure on behalf of the Western nations might in fact become a new ideology, with which many emerging economies would be likely to align themselves. And the stronger the pressure from the West, the likelier are Russia and China to form a real strategic alliance, and the likelier a new bipolar world order is to form.

In the end, even if the trend for Russia-China strategic alliance prevails, to what extent it will be anti-Western and confrontational, will also depend on the stakes that the West puts on the regime change in Russia and China. So far China has maintained a very careful stance on most political matters. It has called for respect of international law, territorial integrity and peaceful resolution of the Ukrainian, the Syrian and other international crises. China has more economic ties with the West than Russia does. Finally, through over 30 years of sending students and scholars to Western academic institutions, China has arguably acquired a deeper understanding of Western methodology than Russia did. In much of Chinese public opinion, the U.S. remains the only example worth following. All in all, China has a lot to lose from a potential confrontation with the West and will be likely to keep avoiding it for as long as possible.

If the West maintains a positive relationship with China, it could in fact become an intermediary to restore the dialogue between Russia and the West. Indeed, Russia’s assertive foreign policy and the personality of Putin, whom many Chinese admire for his chevalier-like bravery, certainly attracted some fans in China. Still, the dominant perception of Russia’s assertiveness by the Chinese audiences is that, even if it might be thrilling from the point of view of military tactics, it in fact lacks strategic vision for Russia’s future development. 

Assuming that the main goal of Western policymakers is to engage Russia back into politics of compromises and maintain the world’s peace, this goal can not be achieved through exerting pressure for a regime change in Russia. It is also unlikely to be achieved through the efforts of the Western politicians who lost credibility in Russia’s eyes following their unilateral attempts to increase the Western presence in the post-Soviet countries. Yet it could perhaps be pursued indirectly through the influence of China as a diplomatically cautious and potentially reconciling intermediary.

Developments to watch in 2016
The year of 2015 determined Russia’s growing acquiescence to China’s progressive involvement in Central Asia. The importance of the Russia-China relationship will persist through 2016 and beyond, but the exact turn of events could take three scenarios, for which the security situation and the attitudes of the West towards Russia and China will be crucial.

#1. Should stability prevail in the Central Asia, Russia and China could realize the plan of peaceful economic development of the Eurasian region, with the Silk Road providing the mechanism of economic development and the EEU providing the legislative framework for its management.

#2. Should the security situation in the Central Asia deteriorate, with real or perceived involvement of the West in this destabilization, Russia and China will feel a threat to their border regions, and will be inclined to form a tactical alliance in view of joint military operations in the region.

#3. Should the security situation deteriorate beyond the region and the relations with the West become tense to the extent Russia and China feel a threat to their own political stability, they will be inclined to form a strategic alliance. They will attract the maximum number of allies on the ideological grounds of the right of nations to peaceful development without pressure from the West.

The Chinese philosophy of “yin” and “yang” might suggest that bipolarity is likelier, and more productive, than “the end of history.” This said, it remains to be seen, whether this bipolarity can still stand a chance to become a healthy competitive one rather than a Cold-War style confrontational one.
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厦门大学俄语系精彩书籍推荐名单
Наш "международный" список рекомендованной литературы


俄罗斯有个传统:假期前,老师会给学生们书籍推荐名单。不过,我们这个名单是大二的童鞋们自己做得~ 

1. Антуан де Сент-Экзюпери. "Маленький принц". 
Это детская сказка французского писателя, который по профессии был л&#1105;тчиком. Он рассказывает эту сказку глазами пилота, а на мир смотрит глазами реб&#1105;нка, отмечая пустоту, глупость и посредственность взрослых. В этой книге много красивых и свежих предложений, например: 
- Вот именно, - сказал Лис. - Ты для меня пока всего лишь маленький
мальчик,  точно  такой же,  как сто тысяч других мальчиков.  И ты мне не
нужен.  И я тебе тоже не нужен.  Я для тебя всего только  лисица,  точно
такая  же,  как  сто тысяч других лисиц.  Но если ты меня приручишь,  мы
станем нужны друг другу.  Ты будешь для меня единственным в целом свете.
И я буду для тебя один в целом свете...
“一点不错,”狐狸说。“对我来说,你还只是一个小男孩,就像其他千万 个小男孩一样。我不需要你。你也同样用不着我。对你来说,我也不过是一只狐 狸,和其他千万只狐狸一样。但是,如果你驯服了我,我们就互相不可缺少了。 对我来说,你就是世界上唯一的了;我对你来说,也是世界上唯一的了。”

2. William Manchester. "The Glory and the Dream". 
Эпопея Уильяма Манчестера "Слава и мечта" повествует о социальной истории США в 1932-1972 годах. "Слава и мечта" в 1975 году была отмечена как бестселлер газетой Нью Йорк Таймс. В книге описываются политические махинации в период Нового курса Ф.Д. Рузвельта, Второй мировой войны и Холодной войны. Особое внимание уделяется тому, как Вторая мировая война и Холодная война повлияли на американскую культуру. У. Манчестер упрощает сложные политические ман&#1105;вры и непрозрачную терминологию, делая их доступными даже неподготовленному читателю. Название книги взято из стихотворения Уильяма Вордсворта:

Whither is fled the visionary gleam?
Where is it now, the glory and the dream?

3. Юй Хуа. "Жить". 
Книга рассказывает о жизни наследника уважаемой в городе семьи и заядлого игрока по имени Фу Гуй. Он жил во время Гражданской войны, Большого скачка и Культурной революции. Он претерпел много бед одну за другой. Его родные умерли один за другим. В конце концов, остался только пожилой Фу Гуй со старым быком. Я не могу себе представить, как он смог пережить столько горя. Эта книга рассказывает нам, что люди живут не только, чтобы выжить, но и ради других вещей. Это книга о дружбе человека с его судьбой. 
PS. Романы Юй Хуа активно переводятся на русский язык. Роман "Жить" вышел на русском языке в 2014 году. В 2015 году вышел роман "Братья" в переводе Юлии Дрейзис, а буквально на днях - роман "Как Сюй Сангуань кровь продавал" в переводе Романа Шапиро. 

4. А.М. Волков. "Волшебник изумрудного города". 
«Волшебник Изумрудного города» — сказочная повесть Александра Мелентьевича Волкова, написанная в 1939 году на основе сказки Фрэнка Баума «Удивительный волшебник из страны Оз» (англ. The Wonderful Wizard of Oz) с некоторыми изменениями. Сказка показывает, что советские и американские ценности были на удивление похожи: смелость, дружба, верность и вера в себя. Однако, как пишет литературовед Ева Карий, "несмотря на родство двух сказок, книга А. Волкова не повторяет страну Оз, а является самостоятельны творческим произведением. Сказочный цикл А. Волкова оказался ближе к реальности, в нем меньше чудес, а появление их – более мотивированно. Здесь четче расстановка сил Добра и зла, Добро здесь сплоченнее. У Ф. Баума девочка Дороти постоянно ссорится и спорит со своими спутниками, Элли более привязана к своим друзьям, их дружба крепче и нежнее. У Ф. Баума Дороти совершает поступки более практичные, чем Элли. Например, она срывает волшебные башмачки с ног погибшей колдуньи, Элли же получает эти башмачки в подарок от доброй феи. А. Волков переносит акцент с жесткой практичности героев в сторону этических поступков" (Источник: Е. Карий. Как американский «Мудрец из страны Оз» стал русским «Волшебником Изумрудного города»? URL: http://shkolazhizni.ru/article/72903/)

5. Харуки Мураками. "Норвежский лес". 
Тору, тихий и необычайно серь&#1105;зный токийский студент, очарован Наоко, юной и прекрасной, но их взаимное чувство омрачено трагической гибелью лучшего друга Тору и возлюбленного Наоко. В то время как Тору потихоньку адаптируется, возвращаясь к повседневностям студенческой жизни, Наоко вс&#1105; больше погружается в себя, находя бремя жизни вс&#1105; более невыносимым. Вскоре судьба сводит Тору с яркой, независимой и сексуально раскрепощ&#1105;нной Мидори... 

6. Элис Манро. "Беглянка". 
Элис Манро - канадская писательница, лауреат Нобелевской премии по литературе (2013). "Беглянка" - это сборник историй о любви и предательстве, о неожиданных поворотах судьбы и сложном спектре личных отношений. Из под пера Элис Манро выходят, как живые, женщины всех возрастов и общественных положений. Эта книга об их друзьях, любовниках, родителях и детях. Они настолько реальны, что вполне могли оказаться бы нашими соседями... 

7. Вислава Шимборска. "Молчание растений". 
Польская поэтесса Wislawa Szymborska, лауреат Нобелевской премии по литературе 1996 года, родилась в 1923 и умерла в 2012 году. Она была очень популярной и известной в мире поэтессой - и в то же время красивой женщиной. Хорошо владея французским языком, она также была переводчиком и много переводила с французского на польский. Она стала третьей женщиной-лауреатом Нобелевской премии в истории. 
Если Вы любите поэзию, мы уверены, что эти строки Вас не разочаруют: 

Одностороннее знакомство между мной и вами
развивается не худшим образом.
Знаю что листок, что лепесток, колос, шишка, стебель,
и что с вами происходит в апреле, а что в декабре.
Хотя мой интерес не взаимен,
над некоторыми специально склоняюсь,
а к некоторым из вас задираю голову.

8. Халед Хоссейни. "Бегущий за ветром". 
В сво&#1105;м дебютном романе "Бегущий за ветром" афгано-американскому писателю Халеду Хоссейни удалось то, на что способен мало кто из современных писателей. С одной стороны, повествование охватывает огромный исторический пласт. Роман рассказывает историю Амира, мальчика из состоятельной кабульской семьи, и его лучшего друга, Хасана, сына хазарейского слуги в их доме, на фоне бурных событий от падения монархии в Афганистане, через советское военное вмешательство, бегство в Америку через Пакистан и приход к власти талибов. При этом Хоссейни созда&#1105;т настолько эмоционально мощные и убедительные характеры персонажей, что они вызывают резонанс с чувствами читателя и продолжают вибрировать в их душах ещ&#1105; длительное время после прочтения романа. 

9. Василий Гроссман. "Жизнь и судьба". 
Роман-эпопея Василия Гроссмана о событиях Великой Отечественной войны, написанный в 1950—1959 годах. Завершает дилогию, начатую романом «За правое дело» (1952, издан в 1954). В отличие от первой части, соответствующей канонам соцреализма, вторая часть написана после смерти Сталина и содержит резкую критику сталинизма. В СССР первая публикация состоялась во время перестройки, в 1988 году. Наиболее полная редакция увидела свет в 1990 году.
Роман 《生活与命运》доступен в переводе на китайский язык. 
В России по нему также сняли телесериал, который можно найти в Интернете с китайскими субтитрами 

10. Джон Райт. "Золотой век" "Golden Oecumene" 
Оглядываясь назад в историю от Древнего Рима до современной Великобритании, почти все мировые гегемонии опирались на силу или политические средства, чтобы достичь статуса великой державы. Соедин&#1105;нные Штаты, по мнению автора, являются исключением. Хотя они располагают только 6% населения мира и небольшой частью территории, а их истори составляет всего немногим больше 200 лет, однако, именно в США производится почти треть мирового богатства. Причина: в США производится большинство идей. Ведь недаром американцы безусловно лидируют по числу Нобелевских лауреатов... 

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(2015-11-09 21:53)
标签:

杂谈

我们今天的活动很exciting,很positive 

 

大家讨论的结果: 1. 我们要知道过去但乐观地往前看 2. 中俄双国需要提高互相的信任 3. 提高信任的最有效的方式是推动中俄民间交流,包括中俄和大欧亚地区的教育合作(欧亚高等教育一体化)

 

我的朋友中医安娜特别受欢迎,她表示:俄罗斯人很欣赏中国传统文化,不少的俄罗斯人来中国找中医看病,但很多俄罗斯人因为语言文化不同各个因素无法和中国的医生直接沟通,像她这样的交流使者的角色很关键

 

 感谢主办方辽宁大学国际关系学院和徐坡岭教授个人给我们提供平台和交流机会,也感谢所有的参加活动和对我们表示各种支持的朋友们 (从无法来现场的好意者我们也通过微信,微博收到了很多鼓励来信

 

#I have a dream #I believe in 'magic'

 

 

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战争记忆不应成为当代政治的工具

不管怎样,
先辈的形象会在我们的记忆中出现,
在我们被提到过去的时代和社会时。
——莫里斯•哈布瓦赫《历史记忆和集体记忆》(1950年)




(注:本文为《FT中文网》约稿,2015年5月8日发表:http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001061849  中文翻译:张雄飞  

原文是英文, 2015年5月7日发表在俄罗斯国际事务委员会的网站:http://russiancouncil.ru/en/inner/?id_4=5858#top-content 

 图片来源:俄罗斯国际事务委员会)


2015年5月9日,俄罗斯将举行盛大的纪念活动庆祝第二次世界大战欧战胜利日70周年。现仍健在的二战老兵最年轻的也差不多90岁了。我们曾乐观地期待时代的变更能抚平战争给先辈们带来的伤痛,新一代人将更加珍惜和维护和平。但乌克兰危机和多国领导人拒绝参加莫斯科红场阅兵,却使胜利日庆祝面临有史以来最大的争议。

二战老兵仍健在,胜利日就属于这个时代,为他们的胜利而庆祝,为他们的荣耀而庆祝。但二战的记忆已逐渐远去,对于未参加过二战的新一代人来说,我们是该思考自己为何庆祝胜利日。当我们说“我们”赢得了战争,“我们”已经不一样了:事实上不是我们,而是我们的先辈赢得了战争。我们只是从先辈的奋战和牺牲中继承了和平。因此,守护和平——这一宝贵的遗产才是新一代人义不容辞的责任。

苏俄的战后创伤是整个民族的集体记忆

战争给俄罗斯人集体心理中带来了巨大伤痛。二战中,苏联人民的伤亡是极为惨重的。根据官方保守估计,1941年-1945年,苏联军民的死亡人数为2660万。至少占总人口14%(1941年苏联人口为1.92亿)。换句话说,大约七分之一的苏联人在战争中丧生。这意味着在苏联每个家族都有人参加战争,每个家族都有人在战争中丧生,且牺牲的通常不止一个家庭成员。

除了直接在战场上牺牲的人,还有为战争做出各种贡献的幸存者。以自己的家族为例,我亲戚中有人在战斗中牺牲、有人被关进德国集中营、有人在列宁格勒围困中丧生、有人在敌占区恶劣的卫生条件下染病亡故。我还知道有人参加攻占柏林的战斗并幸存下来。同时也有人在医疗队救治伤员,捐献她自己的血液挽救了伤员的生命……这样的家族在俄罗斯非常普遍。于是,无数个类似遭遇的家庭构成了整个民族的集体记忆。

无论生存,还是死亡,对于二战老兵和他们的家人来说,命运都是残酷的。在战争中牺牲意味着丧失亲人的悲痛和破碎家庭中成长的小孩;在战争中幸存往往也意味着他们的健全人生被彻底毁坏了。比如,在80年代俄语中“残疾人”经常被用来泛指日常随处可见的,在战争中失去身体一部分的幸存者。

我们的先辈,也就是二战老兵这一代人,在风雨飘摇的十月革命时期出生,在集体农场和工业化的激进时代成长,年轻时参加卫国战争,青年时致力于战后重建。而当这些前苏联地区的战争幸存者历经大风大浪已经逐渐老去,到了退休的时候,却又遭遇了90年代的社会经济动荡和生活水平的大幅度下降。他们是英雄的一代,也是悲怆的一代。

纪念战争的意义在于维护和平

 

随着岁月流逝,幸存者已经越来越少。人们常后悔没能在他们在世时多问问其亲身经历,以便于对战争加深了解。但事实上,和其他很多在生活中屡经苦难的人们一样,二战老兵们对于自己的经历总是以沉默者居多。是不愿回首伤痛的记忆?还是难以和我们分享他们的情感?或者我们不能理解他们的沉默?

现在,我们一谈起战争的话题,就不可避免充满着国家之间的分歧和矛盾,二战中最明显的矛盾就是轴心国和同盟国。一方面是强调国际主义、人民自由和无国籍歧视,另一方面是强调一些民族凌驾于其他民族的法西斯主义。当然,胜利的同盟国之间也存在着分歧,但当时的同盟国之间保持了对分歧的默契。今天,强调俄罗斯与西方国家存在巨大分歧的人们可以回顾一下当年的同盟国,也就是斯大林的苏联和罗斯福、丘吉尔的西方盟国之间的关系,当时还存在着意识形态间的根本矛盾,这些矛盾恐怕远比现在分裂俄罗斯和西方国家的乌克兰问题大得多。

而战争的一代人选择了越过分歧,尊重盟友对胜利做出的贡献,这是他们用自己的方式维护着战后的和平。1945年5月8日,温斯顿•丘吉尔在欧洲停战演讲中对盟友的贡献予以高度评价:“……从(大不列颠)岛到我们整个大英帝国,我们坚持独立奋战了整整一年直到苏联军事力量的加入,随后是美国压倒性的力量和资源……今天和明天作为欧洲胜利日庆祝。今天,或许,我们主要是自己。明天,我们应该特别向苏联同志们致敬,他们在战场上用自己的力量对整个胜利做出了巨大贡献。”

现在,俄罗斯人和德国人之间已经没有了仇恨,俄罗斯和德国保持着良好的政治和经济关系。但很少有人记得,事实上正是常被视为恶魔的约瑟夫•斯大林在苏联开始要求停止反德宣传,早在1942年他就写道:“解放苏联土地的战争很有可能将导致希特勒集团被驱逐或毁灭。我们迎接这样的结果。但将希特勒集团与德国人民、德国政府混为一谈是荒谬的。历史经验告诉我们,希特勒们只是昙花一现,而德国人民和德意志国家将始终存在。”

战争的一代人对其中的分歧和矛盾的理解比新一代人认知的要清楚得多,但他们明白什么将导致分裂和战争,从而故意选择对盟友保持尊敬,以维护长远的和平——正是他们通过残酷的战争取得的和平。战争的一代人取得了显而易见的伟大成就:他们在极其紧张的国际政治形势下,已经成功避免了爆发另一次世界大战超过七十年。

营造战争的历史幻象是危险的

战争的记忆在维护当代和平时是非常重要的,但利用战争的回忆来扩大历史分歧,创造历史幻象来渗透现代政治则是危险的。

首先的一个幻象就是“代际幻象”。很多时候,我们将先辈们做的事情当做我们自己的经历,将自己代入历史。我们开始倾向于认为,是我们这一代人赢得了战争。而事实上不管我们是来自哪里,是战胜国还是战败国,我们新一代人都并未参加战争,战争时我们甚至还没有出生。是我们的前辈赢得了战争。我们只是从先辈的奋战和牺牲中继承了和平,而我们的责任是应该守护和平。当我们继续庆祝胜利日是为了反思战争和追求和平。在现代政治中,滥用年代幻象或者利用战争形象隐喻作为打击现在政治对手的手段,正是对先辈们的极不尊重。

同时,残酷的战争场景渐渐幻化成英雄史诗。这也是人类潜在的好战心理和战争相关的流行文化的不幸结果。我们倾向于相信,如果我们的先辈们是英雄,我们自己也成为了英雄。我们越来越多地接触关于战争的动作电影、虚拟游戏,越来越远离真正参与过战争的二战老兵和见证者。我们开始越来越容易地忘记战争带来的伤痛,陷入浪漫的幻想中。大家都想成为英雄,如果通过战争就能成就一番伟业,为何不放手一搏?一旦迷恋于英雄神话,我们就可能轻率地扩大现实的分歧而不是谨慎地谋求未来的和平。

然而,历史不是游戏。无论喜欢也好,不喜欢也罢。我们无法用现在的意图来重演历史。不能改变的是苏联参加了二战,而不是现在的俄罗斯、乌克兰、白俄罗斯等,对二战起到了决定性作用并最终获得胜利的是当时不可分割的苏联人民。也无法推测,哪些国家不需要其他盟友的支持也能取得胜利。因此,我们应该尊重当时的历史选择,并记住二战结束是同盟国里所有国家和人民都以自己的方式做出过贡献的伟大胜利。

2003年5月,莫斯科正值北国的春天,只有在这段很短的时间,日落迟,白天长,充满温暖的阳光。莫斯科开始庆祝欧战胜利日58周年的纪念活动。红场阅兵前几天,红场和克里姆林宫重建了一些战时的军营和医疗营地,八十多岁的二战老兵们男男女女齐聚在这里,伴随着音乐跳起了圆舞曲,他们看上去很健康,很享受着欢乐的氛围。

那一年,争论很少,尊重很多。一般认为,弗拉基米尔•普京给二战老兵带回了90年代后已被忽视的尊严。从全国各地挑选的二战老兵应邀到莫斯科参加了在大克里姆林宫的音乐会。从亚历山德罗夫红旗歌舞团雄壮的歌声响起,普京在第一排静静地坐着,没有喋喋不休的套话,只让国防部长对二战老兵发表了简短的致辞。当时,我在现场环顾四周,发现二战老兵已经不到全场的一半——再过几年,他们将越来越少。想到此,我感到一阵悲伤。

2005年,欧战胜利日60周年,很多国家领导人应邀参加了莫斯科红场阅兵等盛大纪念活动,包括当时的美国总统乔治•布什、中国国家主席胡锦涛、德国总理格哈德•施罗德、日本首相小泉纯一郎等。纪念战争的传统是默哀一分钟。

将保持沉默作为纪念的方式或许是有道理的。


World War II and Change of Generations: 
Trauma, Myth, and Memory

Be that as it may, the personage of an aged relative 
seems to grow in our memory 
as we are told of a past time and society.

Maurice Halbwachs 
“Historical Memory and Collective Memory” 
1950

On May 9, 2015, Russia will hold celebrations in memory of the 70th anniversary of the Victory in the Second World War (in Europe). Even the youngest veterans are approximately ninety years old now. It seemed reasonable to expect, optimistically, that the change of generations would bring appeasement to the traumas of war, and that the new generation will cherish the peace with renewed efforts. However, the celebration that takes place amid the Ukrainian crisis and the reluctance of many of the world leaders to take part in the traditional Red Square parade in Moscow turns out to be the most controversial one ever.

As long as the veterans are still alive, the Victory Day belongs to the present, is for them, for their victory, and in their honor. As they become scarcer, it is a good time to reflect upon why we, a new generation, keep celebrating the Victory Day. Even if we say that ‘we’ won the war, the ‘we’ now sounds differently: the truth is that our ancestors won the war, not us. We simply inherited the peace that they fought for and sacrificed their lives for. Hence, our absolute responsibility as the new generation is to preserve the peace.

Handling Post-War Trauma

The war trauma is first of all measured in terms of human casualties. The human cost that the Soviet people paid in the war was tremendous. The losses of the Soviet population in 1941-1945, in military personnel and civilians, are officially and conservatively estimated at 26.6 million. This means that at least 14% of the total USSR population (estimated at 192 million people in 1941), or 1 in every 7-8 people, perished in the war [1]. In other words, every family had people who took part in the war and every family likely had people who did not survive the war, and usually more than one.

Besides those who sacrificed their lives, there were obviously various contributions of those who survived. In my own family, I can mention someone who was killed in action, and someone who went to a German concentration camp, and someone who perished in the Leningrad blockade, and someone who died of disease because of bad sanitary conditions in occupied areas. But I can also mention someone who marched up to Berlin and survived the whole war. As well as someone who, serving in a medical unit, saved lives by donating her own blood to the wounded soldiers. All these stories are very common in Russia, and these traumatic experiences of a great number of men, women, and their families constitute our collective memory about the war.

Destiny was never gentle to the war veterans and their families, alive or dead. War casualties translated into personal losses and a generation of children being raised in incomplete families. War returnees often had their health destroyed. In the 1980s the word ‘invalid’ was commonly used in Russian language with reference to the war veterans with missing body parts whom we could still frequently encounter back then.

The war generation. The dawn of their lives coincided with the tumultuous October revolution, their adolescence with the radical times of collectivization and industrialization, in their youth they took part in the war, in their adulthood they strived for post-war reconstruction. At the end of their lives, when the survivors of all these upheavals finally entered their retirement age, many saw their living standards deteriorate tremendously due to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the economic situation of the 1990s. They were indeed the heroic and the tragic generation.

True Meaning of Memory

The relentless passage of the years has left fewer and fewer survivors of the war generation. As they leave us, we regret that we never asked them enough questions, that we missed forever so many details. Yet, like most of those who suffered a big deal in their lives, the veterans actually seemed reserved about sharing their experiences, to the extent, I remember, that asking them questions about the war felt almost embarrassing. The questions stuck in the throat: out of fear to raise hurtful memories? Because of our inability to understand? Because of their reluctance to share the inconceivable?

It turns out nowadays that, whenever the war theme is raised, it is hard to avoid the divisions and boundaries among countries and nations. The most obvious division is among the Allies and the Axis powers. The Second World War was not a conventional war, but a war between two ideologies. On the one hand, the ideology of internationalism and freedom of the peoples, regardless of their ethnicity and race; on the other, fascist ideology, which promoted the superiority of certain nations over others.

A less intuitive fact is that the war also left lots of controversies within the winning camp. Whoever thinks that today’s rivalries between Russia and the Western countries are too deep to overcome, should definitely reflect on the ideological contradictions among the Allies, mainly between the USSR and the Western Allies, between Stalin, on the one side, and Churchill and Roosevelt on the other. It is highly unlikely that those days’ huge rivalries were smaller than those that now separate Russia and the West over Ukraine.

In fact, the war generation’s reserve over these numerous sensitive points and their respect to the mutuality of contribution towards the Victory was their way to preserve post-war peace. When Winston Churchill delivered his “End of the War in Europe” speech on May 8, 1945, he chose the formula giving credit to all Allies: “After gallant France had been struck down we, from this Island and from our united Empire, maintained the struggle single-handed for a whole year until we were joined by the military might of Soviet Russia, and later by the overwhelming power and resources of the United States of America. <…We are> celebrating to-day and to-morrow <…> as Victory in Europe days. Today, perhaps, we shall think mostly of ourselves. To-morrow we shall pay a particular tribute to our Russian comrades, whose prowess in the field has been one of the grand contributions to the general victory” [2].

There is no hatred of the Germans among the Russian people, and nowadays Germany and Russia enjoy one of the best political and economic relations. But few people remember that it was Joseph Stalin himself, sometimes demonized afterwards, who actually stopped anti-German propaganda in the Soviet Union, writing as early as in 1942: “It is very likely that the war for the liberation of Soviet soil will lead to the expulsion or destruction of Hitler's clique. We would welcome such an outcome. But it would be ridiculous to identify Hitler's clique with the German people, with the German government. The experience of history shows that Hitlers come and go, but the German people and the German state remain” [3].

The people of the war generation were likely to be much more aware of the controversies of war than the new generations might assume, but they realized these issues would be divisive, and chose, deliberately, to remain respectful in order to maintain long-lasting peace, that uneasy peace that they struggled for during the war. The biggest achievement of the war generation is obvious: it is their success to avoid, in an extremely tense political situation, for seventy years already, another major world conflict.

When Memory Becomes a Myth

The war memory is important today when it serves to maintain the peace, but it becomes dangerous when it serves to revive historical divisions, create historical mythology and gets involved into modern politics. From this, two myths easily emerge.

The first myth is what we could call the ‘generation myth’. At some point, the boundaries between the war generation and the new generations become blurred, and we start to associate our historic role with theirs. We start to think that we won the war if our ancestors did it. The reality is, no matter where we come from, we didn’t actually win the war (neither lost it), as we were not even born when the war was fought. Our ancestors did. Those of our ancestors who won the war did so in order to secure peace for us, and left us with the responsibility to preserve that peace. Therefore, while we continue to celebrate the Victory Day and to reflect upon the war, it is ultimately disrespectful to their memory to tie the war history to our modern-day politics or to use the war metaphors against our contemporary political opponents.

The second myth is the ‘hero myth’. Brutal war scenes gradually evolve into a beautiful chapter of epic fantasy. It is also the unfortunate result of the war-related popular culture. We then start to believe that we are automatically heroes if our ancestors were heroes. The more we play games and watch movies about the war, and the remoter we actually are from the war veterans and witnesses, the easier it is for us to forget the war traumas and the likelier we are to fall into the trap of war romance. This is an especially dangerous myth, because many humans naturally want to become heroes. And if waging wars can pave the way for us to become heroes – why not start a war once again?

However, life is not a game, and we cannot replay history in a way we want today. We cannot change it that there was the Soviet Union back in time, not modern days Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, or other former USSR countries. Neither alternate the fact that the decisive contribution of the peoples of the Soviet Union to the victory is indivisible. We cannot test, either, whether some of the Allies would have been able to achieve the Victory without the assistance from others. We should therefore respect the historic choices made back then and remember that the end of the World War II is the multinational achievement of all the countries and peoples of the coalition who each in their way contributed to the grand victory and grand peace.

* * *

The 58th anniversary of the Victory, May 2003, Moscow. A few days before the parade, decorations of war time bivouacs and medical units were arranged around the Red Square and the Kremlin. The music is flowing, and couples of octogenarian veterans, many still in sufficiently good health to enjoy the atmosphere, are dancing the waltz. It is one of those long May evenings that only occur in the North, where spring sunsets are late, and only last for a short season.

That year, there was less talking and more respect. Vladimir Putin was generally believed to bring decency back to the veterans after the neglect of the 1990s. Selected veterans from all over the country were invited to attend the concert at the Grand Kremlin Palace, as the rumor said, on government expenses. And while the magnificent sounds of the renowned Alexandrov military orchestra were opening the show, Vladimir Putin quietly entered the hall and placed himself in the first row. He wouldn’t utter a word during the whole evening, letting his Minister of Defense greet the veterans in a brief speech. I looked around the hall and noticed, with sadness, that the veterans’ were no more than a half of those present. “In a few more years, they would become a minority”, I thought, my heart squeezing.

In 2005, the 60th anniversary Red Square parade was attended by many world leaders, including George Bush, Hu Jintao, Junichiro Koizumi, Gerhard Schröder, and Silvio Berlusconi. After all, there are probably good reasons for the tradition that tribute to the war is best paid by a minute of Silence.

1. The constant discussion about the amount of the USSR human losses in the Second World War continues. The number of approximately 27 million victims was first announced by Mikhail Gorbachev in: Gorbachev, M.S. Lessons of War and Victory. Report at the celebratory meeting in memory of the 45th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet People in the Great Patriotic War. May 8, 1990. Published in “Pravda” on May 9, 1990.

2. Churchill, Winston. End of the War in Europe. Speech delivered on May 8, 1945. URL:http://www.winstonchurchill.org/resources/speeches/1941-1945-war-leader/end-of-the-war-in-europe

3. Order of the People’s Commissar of Defense No. 55 of February 23, 1942.

The article was published in Financial Times Chinese.

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俄罗斯人会否因经济危机怀疑普京?
 
有时候我也在想,小熊是不是可以不要去抓小猪,
平静地吃野果和蜂蜜,但是不要去骚扰小熊。
可是做不到,他们总是在企图用锁链拴住它。 
如果他们取得成功,那么小熊马上就会被拔掉牙齿和爪子,
把它变成动物标本,如果发生以上情况,
那么也就不再需要这只小熊了。
——普京年度发布会(2014年12月18日)


(注:本文为《FT中文网》约稿,2014年12月24日发表:http://www.ftchinese.com/story/001059803 原文是英文, 中文翻译:张雄飞。图片来源:厦门卫视《两岸直航》2014年12月24日)

2014年12月18日,普京面向俄罗斯和国外媒体举行了年度记者会,这是他作为总统的第10次大型年度记者招待会。俄罗斯年度记者会的传统是由普京创立的,现已成为俄罗斯政治的关注焦点。新闻发布会中普京提到的一个意象,让很多俄罗斯人深有感受,同时也容易在国外引起极大误解。那就是普京把俄罗斯描绘成树林里想要保护自己的可爱小熊,而树林外的恶棍企图用锁链困住它,拔掉牙齿和爪子,最后杀死小熊做成标本。

在一些国家文化中,熊似乎感觉是可怕的动物。而在俄罗斯文化中,熊是可爱,受欢迎的动物:,普京用的确切词是“Mishka”,对应的形象是“小熊”或“泰迪熊”,并非凶猛的熊。泰迪熊是俄罗斯小孩最喜欢的玩具之一。熊也一直是俄罗斯举办大型国际文化活动,如两届奥运会(1980年莫斯科奥运会和2014年索契冬奥会)的吉祥物。现在执政的统一俄罗斯党的党徽就有一只熊。戈尔巴乔夫(Mikhail Gorbachev)的昵称就是“小熊”,虽然在俄罗斯他不一定被认为是成功的政治家,但还是觉得他是比较善良的人。现任俄罗斯总理梅德韦杰夫(Dmitry Medvedev)这个姓,在俄语里就是“熊”的意思。

文化的差异可能产生两种结果。首先,不同国家的人想法各异。比如俄罗斯人确实喜欢并觉得熊很可爱,即便对其他人可能毫无意义。再比如喷火龙在俄罗斯是典型的负面形象,斯拉夫传说中有三头火龙Zmey Gorynych,被描绘成杀死很多英雄的怪物,但在英国威尔士,红色的喷火龙却是他们的象征。其次,人们习惯于从自己国家文化角度思考,如果仔细考量,就会发现人们往往自我中心主义,容易相信有利于自己的说辞,即便有时候与客观事实不符。

俄罗斯人对乌克兰危机的自我认知

从西方国家的媒体可以看出,一些人倾向于相信,对俄罗斯经济制裁和日益恶化的经济形势会增加普京的政治压力。这种想法背后的潜在假设是:俄罗斯民众认定是俄罗斯的错误导致乌克兰危机,西方国家认为俄罗斯违反了国际法和国际秩序,主要是由普京精心策划;同时还认定,俄罗斯民众在生活舒适时可能对此漠不关心,但生活受经济影响后会尽力推翻普京。

但在俄罗斯现实情况则正好相反。大多数俄罗斯民众相信,俄罗斯在乌克兰危机占据道德优势,俄罗斯是在保护自己的国家利益和克里米亚、东乌克兰人民的权利。即使那些反对收回克里米亚的一些具体措施的俄罗斯政客往往也认同一点,即克里米亚人会选择回归俄罗斯,他们认为早在1991年苏联解体时克里米亚人就会选择回归俄罗斯,只是当时他们没有被征求意见而直接分配给乌克兰。即使那些反对东乌克兰局势的俄罗斯政客也承认,乌克兰试图加入北约会增加俄罗斯西部的安全威胁。

民调结果也支持上述结论。通常被认为是俄罗斯最独立、甚至有时会被视为反普京立场的非政府民调机构列瓦达中心(Levada-center)在12月10日公布了11月的调查结果。结果显示,52%的俄罗斯受访者相信克里米亚公投是克里米亚自主行为,没有俄方介入;65%的俄罗斯受访者明确支持克里米亚加入俄罗斯且应当即实现(另16%的俄罗斯受访者支持克里米亚加入俄罗斯但认为应与乌克兰政府进行谈判)。同时,列瓦达中心近期关于俄罗斯在乌克兰的政治目的民调结果也显示,最多的选项是“保护俄罗斯的军事战略和地缘政治利益,维持塞瓦斯托波尔海军基地,防止北约扩张(46%)”。79%的俄罗斯受访者反对克里米亚归乌克兰(51%强烈反对、28%相当反对),只有14%的俄罗斯受访者支持克里米亚归乌克兰(7%完全支持、7%相当支持)。

因为相信自己是正确的,俄罗斯人准备直面经济制裁。英国《金融时报》最近发表了席佳琳(Kathrin Hille)关于卢布危机的报道,曾引用俄罗斯官员亚历山大•特卡乔夫(Alexander Tkachev)的说法:“我们现在收获了国家征服和政治胜利的果实,也明白迟早俄罗斯经济和俄罗斯民众会和总统一起支付代价。”在席佳琳看来,特卡乔夫的说法虽然不是对普京的批评,但至少意味着俄罗斯政治的争论发生了转变(a sign of how financial upheaval is starting to transform Russia’s political debate)。事实上,或许是文化差异造成的误解,从俄文语境和文化看来,特卡乔夫的说法强调的是俄罗斯获得的胜利并在号召俄罗斯民众支持普京,看不出其他特别的含义或任何转变。

俄罗斯如何看待西方国家,同时也是西方国家如何看待俄罗斯的镜子。西方国家笃信自我行为正确,所以期待俄罗斯会做出让步;俄罗斯也一样,期待西方国家会理解和做出让步。当西方国家道德谴责俄罗斯时,俄方也在道德谴责西方。俄领导人一再声明,俄并没有封闭经济,经济制裁来自西方国家,并呼吁西方国家解除制裁。西方国家的意图被理解为旨在控制俄罗斯,如同普京比喻的“链锁小熊”,俄方为走出困境就要寻求其他市场和国内政策解决。比如,俄罗斯在加强与中国和印度的合作。目前俄罗斯国内还盛行这样的观点,认为现在的经济制裁可能会帮助俄罗斯经济转型,从依赖石油出口到发展更多元化的经济结构。

期待俄罗斯政治短期内发生变化并不现实

虽然俄罗斯主流媒体越来越支持普京,但是对普京的批评在俄罗斯国内也很常见。网络和社交媒体均可见很多对普京的建设性批评甚至公开辱骂。但普京之外的俄罗斯反对派依然难以获得民众的真正支持。反对派难以获得支持的理由并不仅仅在于普京政府的排斥,也在于他们的政治主张很难获得俄罗斯民众的支持。

俄罗斯人政治态度消极,很多人认为只需要对自己家庭负责。民意调查显示,57%的俄罗斯人认为对国家“完全不需要负责”,认为需要对国家完全负责的只有2%。俄罗斯的政治光谱是倾向于支持保守主义,包括保守主义右派(强调俄罗斯传统文化)、保守主义左派(强调国家对经济的控制)。目前执政的是统一俄罗斯党,自认为是中间党派,但或许更适合被定位为保守主义偏右派。俄罗斯第二影响力的政党是根纳季•久加诺夫(Gennady Zyuganov)领导的俄罗斯共产党,是保守主义偏左派。俄罗斯共产党与统一俄罗斯党最大的不同在于:俄罗斯共产党反对上世纪90年代实行的私有化,统一俄罗斯党以国家稳定为由支持私有化、拒绝进行翻案。除此之外,在俄罗斯寻求强国地位、克里米亚和乌克兰问题等,俄罗斯共产党都支持普京的政策。

与此相反,西方国家喜欢的自由主义右派在俄罗斯没有市场。自由主义右派主张更强调个人自由和弱政府权力,鉴于俄罗斯上世纪90年代自由主义右派改革的教训,自由主义右派并不受欢迎:当时弱化的俄罗斯政府给通过不正当手段获取巨额财富的人提供了机会。事实上,当时在俄罗斯几乎没有利用个人能力创造财富的传奇,却四处充斥着通过内部关系将国家财产、国家资源私有化而一夜暴富的著名寡头们。现在,即使私有化的支持者们也承认如此快速私有化国家财产的结果实际上是非法的。

1995年,在普京成为后来的俄罗斯领导人和统一俄罗斯党建立以前,为了应对自由主义右派当时的窘境,当时叶利钦(Boris Yeltsin)支持的俄罗斯总理切尔诺梅尔金(Viktor Chernomyrdin)就组建了“俄罗斯我们的家园党(Our Home - Russia)”,该党声称是中间党派,运行的平台已经和现在的统一俄罗斯党相似,包括也是一样强调俄罗斯的传统,拒绝对叶利钦一手操作的私有化进程进行翻案。从那时起,为了应对俄罗斯共产党的挑战和汹涌的民意,俄罗斯政府不得不调整政策,脱离了自由主义右派的理想方向。

俄罗斯自由主义右派的再次复兴是在2012年普京第三次竞选总统期间。2011年底到2012年间,笔者曾作为观察者对这段“反对派黄金时期”的自由主义右派在“FT中文网”撰写过一些文章。在对这些反对派的政治诉求和当时参加者的采访进行研究后,不难看出他们带有的精英主义的优越感,难以获得俄罗斯大众的支持。相比之下,在集体公寓长大、注意亲民形象的普京当然比自由主义精英反对派们更受欢迎。

在这种情况下,受西方国家青睐的俄罗斯自由主义右派政治家在俄罗斯并不是现实选择。顺便说一句,为避免他们在俄罗斯的选民基础被彻底破坏,在反对派中相当受欢迎的政治家霍多尔科夫斯基(Mikhail Khodorkovsky)和纳瓦尔尼(Alexei Navalny)最近被记者提问乌克兰危机时也都宣称,不支持克里米亚应归乌克兰。

开放和知识才能带来俄罗斯政治光谱的改变

最近的经济危机已经是我在人生中第三次经历。说实话,俄罗斯人厌倦了这样的牺牲。我记得1992年1月1日俄罗斯价格自由化以后,有一天母亲带我去店里买体育课需要的滑雪板——尽管苏联时代商品不多,但物价并不贵。可是到了店里我们忽然发现滑雪板价格居然上涨到了难以承受的80卢布。后据报道得知,1992年俄罗斯的物价居然提高了整整26倍!我还记得1998年8月17日,当时我刚到法国巴黎,就在香榭丽舍大街俄罗斯航空公司办公室门口拍照留念——这是我第一次出国,充满着爱国主义热情。然后路过的一对法国年长夫妇告诉我,卢布暴跌4倍,从1美元6卢布跌到了1美元24卢布……
 
有人可能会认为,国家不断陷入经济危机或许代表着政府爱国,但仍然难说是很称职的。俄罗斯民众更易陷入这种境地的深层根源在于,俄罗斯的管理方式比西方落后。

这里的管理方式,指的是自然科学和社会科学各领域的理论和实践如何影响政府的政治和经济决策过程。比如,一些俄罗斯评论员认为俄罗斯经济可能从经济制裁受益,因为可以从依赖石油出口到发展更多元化的经济结构。但并没有案例表明封闭的经济体会发展得比开放的经济体好。如果俄罗斯在受到经济制裁之前不能顺利实现经济转型,那么没理由表明受经济制裁后可以发展得更好。

不管西方国家是否愿意,最有可能的是,2018年或2024年接替普京成为俄罗斯下一位总统的人选将仍可能是普京选出来的或受普京影响,局外人入围的可能性很小。

在此背景下确实需要认真思考,为什么俄罗斯仍然选择目前这些政治家,而不是选择外交更加务实,更懂经济和反腐的人。民众的偏好是真实的,不只在俄罗斯,这是转型国家中普遍存在的现象。西方国家有时遵循思维定式,认为这样的选择并未真正反应民意,而是政府的宣传、洗脑或缺乏民主的结果。但民众的偏好事实上还是反映了大多数人的想法,代表了一个特定的转型社会中的真实民意。西方国家不应根据自己的喜好回避,而应务实地考虑这种民意会如何影响俄罗斯的政治发展方向。

俄罗斯政治发展的正确方向应该是淡化民族主义元素,消除激进的国内政治光谱,增强经济竞争力和重视政治实用主义。为了实现这一目标,俄罗斯今天真正需要的是更多的开放性和更多的知识。俄罗斯需要向西方国家开放和学习更多的分析方法和理论。俄罗斯人需要加强批判性思维(critical thinking)训练。这将有助于更细致入微地政治分析,实现更好的经济发展,弥合政权精英和普通民众之间的距离,减少民族主义元素。

这需要双方的共同努力:西方国家也需要对俄罗斯人保持更加开放的态度。同时,比起完全无视俄罗斯人的感受,一再支持在俄罗斯大多数人并不认可的政治人物可能会加强“链锁小熊”映射而引发对立情绪,用开放和知识吸引俄罗斯未来有影响力的政治力量也许更明智些。

* * *

近日,美国与古巴的恢复外交关系的新闻报道后,《经济学人》称早在1960年就发表的制裁对古巴政府的影响的文章被证明是完全正确的。“制裁必然造成两个直接的和有害的结果。这会得罪很多拉美人,虽然他们未必支持卡斯特罗,但是他们更不喜欢因为政治目的而被施加经济压力……根本无助于刚发展的(卡斯特罗)反对者,美国的制裁可能起到相反的作用,卡斯特罗博士的支持者们已经战意高涨,(制裁)只能让这种氛围变得更强硬。”

这不会是历史上第一次被证明可能会适得其反的经济制裁。当前在乌克兰和俄罗斯的危机是可以解决的,但未必是通过制裁。普京一直强调不拒绝跟西方国家对话。普通俄罗斯人也支持与西方的对话。根据列瓦达中心11月的调查结果,“进一步扩大与西方国家的经济、政治和文化联系,与西方国家和解”仍然是俄罗斯大多数民众(57%)最喜欢的政策选项。但只有彼此尊重和务实的选择才能使各方进一步走出目前的危机。
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