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2012-11-16 工作记录 Fanny

(2012-11-16 16:50:14)
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fanny

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分类: 工作记录

今天上午都在翻译了。下午就是raphael和晓艳姐帮我们讲了一下公司模板。好多内容,从头开始,肯定会遇到很多很多问题,做的时候也会很生疏。告诉自己:莫急,慢慢来。

还看了《旁观者》的怀恩师的一部分。艾尔莎小姐所倡导的的教学方式,个性化的学习和指导其实一直都是我国教育所缺乏的。她分析每个学生的优势劣势,指导每个人制定不同的计划,并监督其实行。而且鼓励每个人发展自己的优势,比方说德鲁克的写作能力(或许这已经为他未来这么多优秀的著作打了些基础)。一位令学生崇拜的女士。而苏菲则非常亲切友好,对学生是慈母般的关怀,而她独特的教育理念——教育学生掌握基本的生存技能(包括让男生锻炼补袜子,让女生学习当时社会普遍认为较为低下的工作“烹饪”)要超前许多。很明显,这种教育方式跟目前美国的教育方式极为相似。而德鲁克之所以最这两位老师记忆犹新,最为感激也就比较好理解了。


附:巴菲特致股东的信1985年D部分

Today, corporate instability is an inevitable consequence of widely-diffused ownership of voting stock.  At any time a major holder can surface, usually mouthing reassuring rhetoric but frequently harboring uncivil intentions.  By circumscribing our blocks of stock as we often do, we intend to promote stability where it otherwise might be lacking.  That kind of certainty, combined with a good manager and a good business, provides excellent soil for a rich financial harvest.  Thats the economic case for our arrangements.

 如今,企业的不稳定性是股权分散的必然结果。经常会有大股东浮出水面,满口仁义道德但却心怀鬼胎。通过像往常一样限制我们的股权,我们倾向于促进公司的稳定。公司的稳定性、杰出的管理层以及优秀的企业相结合,才能够让企业收获厚利。这就是我们这项安排的经济动机。

  The human side is just as important.  We dont want managers we like and admire - and who have welcomed a major financial commitment by us - to ever lose any sleep wondering whether surprises might occur because of our large ownership.  I have told them there will be no surprises, and these agreements put Berkshires signature where my mouth is.  That signature also means the managers have a corporate commitment and therefore need not worry if my personal participation in Berkshires affairs ends prematurely (a term I define as any age short of three digits).

 人这一方面也很重要。我不想让我们欣赏的管理人,在欢迎我们加入之后,因为担心我们是否会因股权太大而带来一些“惊喜”。我已经告诉他们这不会发生,并且也已经签了字。签字也意味着管理人有了承诺,因而也就不再需要担心我发生什么意外(我意思是我活不到一百就挂了)。

   Our Cap Cities purchase was made at a full price, reflecting the very considerable enthusiasm for both media stocks and media properties that has developed in recent years (and that, in the case of some property purchases, has approached a mania). Its no field for bargains.  However, our Cap Cities investment allies us with an exceptional combination of properties and people - and we like the opportunity to participate in size.

 我们购买大都会公司并没有占到什么便宜,这反映了近年来媒体事业的蓬勃发展(当然,媒体事业的收购已经到了狂热的地步)。这已经很难讨价还价了。然而我们这项投资使我们有机会和最优秀的企业和管理人共事,我们珍惜这个参与大规模企业的机会。

  Of course, some of you probably wonder why we are now buying Cap Cities at $172.50 per share given that your Chairman, in a characteristic burst of brilliance, sold Berkshires holdings in the same company at $43 per share in 1978-80.  Anticipating your question, I spent much of 1985 working on a snappy answer that would reconcile these acts. A little more time, please.

当然,你们中的某些人可能奇怪为什么你们才华横溢的董事长1978-80年以43美元的价格卖掉大都会公司的股票,而现今却以172.5美元的价格买回来。料想到你们的这一问题,1985年我花了不少时间来想怎么给你们解释这二者之间的一致性。请再给我一点儿时间。

    

Acquisition of Scott &Fetzer

 

收购斯科特费则公司

 

 Right after yearend we acquired The Scott &Fetzer Company (ScottFetzer) of Cleveland for about $320 million. (In addition, about $90 million of pre-existing Scott Fetzer debt remains in place.) In the next section of this report I describe the sort of businesses that we wish to buy for Berkshire.  Scott Fetzer is a prototype - understandable, large, well-managed, a good earner.

就在年后我们以3.2亿美元收购了克里兰夫的斯科特费则公司。(另外,斯科特费则公司大约0.9亿美元的债务依然存在)。在下一部分我们讲述公司的收购标准。斯科特费则就是一个典型——易懂,规模大,管理好,盈利高。

    The company has sales of about $700 million derived from 17 businesses, many leaders in their fields.  Return on invested capital is good to excellent for most of these businesses.  Some well-known products are Kirby home-care systems Campbell Hausfeld air compressors, and Wayne burners and water pumps.

 这家公司有17项业务,营业额达7亿美元。很多都是该行业的领导者。该公司的资本报酬率很高。一些知名的产品有卡比家庭护理系统,坎贝尔空气压缩机,韦恩燃烧器以及水泵等。

   World Book, Inc. - accounting for about 40% of Scott Fetters sales and a bit more of its income - is by far the companys largest operation.  It also is by far the leader in its industry, selling more than twice as many encyclopedia sets annually as its nearest competitor.  In fact, it sells more sets in the U.S. than its four biggest competitors combined.

世界百科全书,占了斯科特费则公司40%的销售额和更大份额的收入,是目前为止该公司最大的一项业务。它也是该行业而对龙头老大。每年百科全书销量为其最强竞争者的两倍。事实上,在美国它销售量要比它最大的四个竞争对手总量还多。

  Charlie and I have a particular interest in the World Book operation because we regard its encyclopedia as something special.  Ive been a fan (and user) for 25 years, and now have grandchildren consulting the sets just as my children did.  World Book is regularly rated the most useful encyclopedia by teachers, librarians and consumer buying guides.  Yet it sells for less than any of its major competitors. Child craft, another World Book, Inc. product, offers similar value.  This combination of exceptional products and modest prices at World Book, Inc. helped make us willing to pay the price demanded for Scott Fetzer, despite declining results for many companies in the direct-selling industry.

Charlie和我对世界百科全书这项事业都非常感兴趣,我们认为它很特别。事实上我读他们的书已经有25年了,并且也让我孩子以及孙子们都读它。世界百科全书经常被老师、图书管理员以及导购员评为最有用的百科全书。然而它售价要比它的最大的竞争对手的书便宜很多。这种物美价廉的产品优势让我们愿意支付斯科特费则所提出的价格,尽管直销行业许多企业销售量都在下滑。

   An equal attraction at Scott Fetzer is Ralph Schey, its CEO for nine years.  When Ralph took charge, the company had 31 businesses, the result of an acquisition spree in the 1960s.  He disposed of many that did not fit or had limited profit potential, but his focus on rationalizing the original potpourri was not so intense that he passed by World Book when it became available for purchase in 1978.  Ralphs operating and capital-allocation record is superb, and we are delighted to be associated with him.

同样的吸引力还来自于斯科特费则的任职九年的CEO,拉夫尔·苏依。当拉夫尔接管公司时,由于20世纪六十年代的并购风潮,公司有31项事业。他处理了许多不合适的或者不盈利的事业,而并没有格外的关注原始业务并由此在1978年百科全书正需要时推出了世界百科全书。拉夫尔的资本分配和运用能力非常杰出,我们很高兴可以与他合作。

 The history of the Scott Fetzer acquisition is interesting, marked by some zigs and zags before we became involved.  The company had been an announced candidate for purchase since early 1984.  A major investment banking firm spent many months canvassing scores of prospects, evoking interest from several.  Finally, in mid-1985 a plan of sale, featuring heavy participation by an ESOP (Employee Stock Ownership Plan), was approved by shareholders.  However, as difficulty in closing followed, the plan was scuttled.

 并购斯科特费则公司的过程极为有趣,在我们参与之前就有一些小插曲。公司早在1984年就提出要出售公司。一家大银行花了很了几个月编织了公司美好的前景,吸引了几家公司的兴趣。而在1985年中期,一项具有员工持股计划特征的收购案获得通过,但因接下来的一些小麻烦,计划开了天窗。

   I had followed this corporate odyssey through the newspapers.  On October 10, well after the ESOP deal had fallen through, I wrote a short letter to Ralph, whom I did not know.  I said we admired the companys record and asked if he might like to talk.  Charlie and I met Ralph for dinner in Chicago on October 22 and signed an acquisition contract the following week.

 我从报纸上看到了这件事。1010日,在股东持股销售方案失败之后,给拉夫尔写了一封信,虽然我并不认识他。我说我们很欣赏公司的经营历史并问他是否有兴趣和我谈谈。Charlie和我在1022日与拉夫尔在芝加哥共进午餐,并在之后一周签署了收购合同。

  The Scott Fetzer acquisition, plus major growth in our insurance business, should push revenues above $2 billion in 1986, more than double those of 1985.

 收购斯科特费则公司,加上我们保险公司的增长,将使得1986年的收入达到20亿美元,比1985年的两倍还多。

 Miscellaneous

 其他项目:

  The Scott Fetzer purchase illustrates our somewhat haphazard approach to acquisitions.  We have no master strategy, no corporate planners delivering us insights about socioeconomic trends, and no staff to investigate a multitude of ideas presented by promoters and intermediaries.  Instead, we simply hope that something sensible comes along - and, when it does, we act.

斯科特费则的并购显示了我们公司收购具有一定的随意性。我们没有收购计划,也没有专门的规划师研究企业的经济趋势,也没有工作人员调查出售企业和中介人的意图。相反,我们就只是顺其自然,事情发生了,我们就做。

 To give fate a helping hand, we again repeat our regular business wanted ad.  The only change from last years copy is in (1): because we continue to want any acquisition we make to have a measurable impact on Berkshires financial results, we have raised our minimum profit requirement.

为了对命运有所帮助,我们再次重申我们的“收购企业”广告。跟去年相比唯一的变化是在第一项:由于我们希望我们的收购能够对伯克希尔的财务结构有显著的影响,我们提高了收购公司的最小收益标准。

     Heres what were looking for:

   (1) large purchases (at least $10 million of after-tax earnings),

          (2) demonstrated consistent earning power (future projections are of little interest to us, nor areturn-around situations),

          (3) businesses earning good returns on equity while employing little or no debt,

   (4) management in place (we cant supply it),

   (5) simple businesses (if theres  lots of technology, we wont understand it),

   (6) an offering price (we dont want to waste our time or that of the seller by talking, even preliminarily, about a transaction when price is unknown).

 这是我们要找的公司:

  (1)巨额交易(至少每年税后盈余1000万美元)

 (2)持续的盈利能力(前景预期或者我转型期我们都不感兴趣)

(3)高股东报酬率(并甚少举债)

 (4)具备管理阶层(我们无法提供)

 (5)简单的企业(若涉及到太多高科技,我们弄不懂)

  (6)主动报价(在确定交易价格之前,我们不希望浪费太多时间谈判)

 We will not engage in unfriendly takeovers.  We can promise complete confidentiality and a very fast answer - customarily within five minutes - as to whether were interested.  We prefer to buy for cash, but will consider issuance of stock when we receive as much in intrinsic business value as we give.  Indeed, following recent advances in the price of Berkshire stock, transactions involving stock issuance may be quite feasible.  We invite potential sellers to check us out by contacting people with whom we have done business in the past.  For the right business - and the right people - we can provide a good home.

我们不会恶意收购。我们能够保证对此保密并尽快回复我们是否感兴趣(通常不超过五分钟)。我们希望现金收购,除非我们换的的内含价值和我们付出的一样多,否则不考虑发行股票。我们欢迎那些有意向的公司向我们过去收购的公司打听。对于那些好的企业和好的管理者,我们能够提供一个好的归属。

 On the other hand, we frequently get approached about acquisitions that dont come close to meeting our tests: new ventures, turnarounds, auction-like sales, and the ever-popular (among brokers) Im-sure-something-will-work-out-if-you-people- -get-to-know-each-other None of these attracts us in the least.

相反,经常有人要求我们收购不符合我们要求的公司:新事业、转机股、拍卖案以及中介中很流行的“如果你了解了肯定会觉得这个收购很好”,这些我们都不感兴趣。

  Besides being interested in the purchases of entire businesses as described above, we are also interested in the negotiated purchase of large, but not controlling, blocks of stock, as in our Cap Cities purchase.  Such purchases appeal to us only when we are very comfortable with both the economics of the business and the ability and integrity of the people running the operation.  We prefer large transactions: in the unusual case we might do something as small as $50 million (or even smaller), but our preference is for commitments many times that size.

 除了对上面所述公司的整体并购感兴趣,我们也对一些像之前讲到的大都会收购案一样的对大公司无控制权的大额股票收购感兴趣。只有我们对这家公司及其管理层都较为满意的时候这项收购才对我们有吸引力。我们喜欢大额交易:在一般情况下可能最小5000亿美元(或者小点儿),当然越多越好。

  About 96.8% of all eligible shares participated in Berkshires 1985 shareholder-designated contributions program.  Total contributions made through the program were $4 million, and 1,724 charities were recipients.  We conducted a plebiscite last year in order to get your views about this program, as well as about our dividend policy.  (Recognizing that its possible to influence the answers to a question by the framing of it, we attempted to make the wording of ours as neutral as possible.) We present the ballot and the results in the Appendix on page 69. I think its fair to summarize your response as highly supportive of present policies and your group preference - allowing for the tendency of people to vote for the status quo - to be for increasing the annual charitable commitment as our asset values build.

大约有96.8%的合格股东参与了伯克希尔1985年的股东指定捐款项目。总共有400万美元捐给了1724家慈善机构。去年为了解你们对该项目的态度以及股利政策的想法我们发起了一项投票表决(由于意识到问题本身就可能对你们的答案有一定的引导性,我们在设计问题时尽量中立)。我们在附录69页展示投票结果。我认为可以合理的概括为你们高度支持公司目前的策略,并且你们也支持现在的每年捐款数量随公司资产状况决定的政策。

  We urge new shareholders to read the description of our shareholder-designated contributions program that appears on pages 66 and 67.  If you wish to participate in future programs, we strongly urge that you immediately make sure that your shares are registered in the name of the actual owner, not in street name or nominee name.  Shares not so registered on September 30, 1986 will be ineligible for the 1986 program.

 我们敦促新的股东阅读66页和67页的股东指定捐款计划的项目说明。并且你想参加这个项目的话,我们强烈建议你把股权从经纪人那儿改到登记于自己名下。1986930号之前未登记的无权参与这一项目。

   Five years ago we were required by the Bank Holding Company Act of 1969 to dispose of our holdings in The Illinois National Bank and Trust Company of Rockford, Illinois.  Our method of doing so was unusual: we announced an exchange ratio between stock of Rockford Bancorp Inc. (the Illinois Nationals holding company) and stock of Berkshire, and then let each of our shareholders - except me - make the decision as to whether to exchange all, part, or none of his Berkshire shares for Rockford shares.  I took the Rockford stock that was left over and thus my own holding in Rockford was determined by your decisions.  At the time I said, This technique embodies the worlds oldest and most elementary system of fairly dividing an object.  Just as when you were a child and one person cut the cake and the other got first choice, I have tried to cut the company fairly, but you get first choice as to which piece you want”.

5年之前1969年的银行控股公司法要求我们披露我们在伊利诺斯国民银行和证券公司的股份。我们处理这件事的方法与众不同:我们公布了洛克福银行和伯克希尔公司的换股比例,并且让每一位股东(除了我自己)决定是否把自己伯克希尔的部分或全部股票转化成独立的洛克福银行的股票。洛克福剩下的股票将由我来接手,所以我在洛克福的股份是由你们决定的。那时我曾说“这是一种最古老的最有效的划分事物的方法。这就好像是你们小时候一个人切蛋糕但是让另一个人首先选择。我尽量公平的分割公司,然后你们再自由选择。

   Last fall Illinois National was sold.  When Rockfords liquidation is completed, its shareholders will have received per-share proceeds about equal to Berkshires per-share intrinsic value at the time of the banks sale.  Im pleased that this five-year result indicates that the division of the cake was reasonably equitable.

 去年秋天伊利诺斯国民银行被正式出售,当洛克福清算结束时,它的股东获得的每股收益和伯克希尔的每股的内在价值相当。我很高兴这个五年之后的结果显示蛋糕划分的很公平。

  Last year I put in a plug for our annual meeting, and you took me up on the invitation.  Over 250 of our more than 3,000 registered shareholders showed up.  Those attending behaved just as those present in previous years, asking the sort of questions you would expect from intelligent and interested owners. You can attend a great many annual meetings without running into a crowd like ours. (Lester Maddox, when Governor of Georgia , was criticized regarding the states abysmal prison system. The solution, he said, is simple.  All we need is a better class of prisoners. Upgrading annual meetings works the same way.)

 去年我插入了一段年会的事情,并且你们也接受了我的邀请。3000名股东中有超过250名参与了会议。你们和之前的股东表现的一样好,提出的问题显示你们都是有智慧和对公司感兴趣的股东。你们很难再遇到我们这样的会议。(Lester Maddox在担任乔治亚州州长时,曾因该州混乱的狱政体系遭受批评,他说解决的方法很简单:我们需要的是更好的犯人团体。“提高年会水平也是类似道理)

  I hope you come to this years meeting, which will be held on May 20 in Omaha.  There will be only one change: after 48 years of allegiance to another soft drink, your Chairman, in an unprecedented display of behavioral flexibility, has converted to the new Cherry Coke.  Henceforth, it will be the Official Drink of the Berkshire Hathaway Annual Meeting.

我希望你们能够参加今年的年会,会议将于520日在奥马哈市举行。只有一个变化:经过48年的坚持之后,本人将做出一个前所未有的改变,将经常喝的饮料转变成一种新的樱桃味的可口可乐。因此,伯克希尔的年会上它将是指定饮料。

 And bring money: Mrs. B promises to have bargains galore if you will pay her a visit at The Nebraska Furniture Mart after the meeting.

最后记得带来钱,B太太承诺你们在会后去参观Nebraska家具城的话给你们大量的折扣。

                                                                                                                 Warren E. Buffett

                                                                                                              Chairman of the Board

 

March 4, 1986

                                                                                                                   董事长  华伦·巴菲特

                                             198634

 

 

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