2008年的市场告诉我们一个什么样的2009年?
(2009-01-22 14:19:25)
标签:
经济美国金融危机财经 |
对于金融市场而言,2008年是糟糕的一年,非常糟糕的一年。而2009年又如何呢?2008年市场的凄惨表现将带来什么的结果?今天,我们对2009年的经济前景又可以持怎样的期望呢?
2008年,标准普尔500指数大幅下挫,为1825年以来表现最差的三年之一。1825年迄今,只有1931年的表现更差。对于全球股市股指而言,情况亦如此。
如此凄惨的表现给我们带来了什么样的教训呢?首先,在非同寻常的高涨之后,不要期待有很好的回报率。1958年美国股市回报率超过40%,1997年的回报率超过30%,但这都不能与2008年下跌38.8%相提并论。(记住:从100到60的跌幅是40%,从60到100的涨幅却为67%。)
确实,股市表现最佳的“最近”年份是1997年和2003年,回报率分别超过30%和20%。因此,如果说此次股市修正是存在正当理由的,那么修正针对的就是互联网泡沫时代的价值高估。
可以看出,以往的强牛市或者出现在严重低迷期之前(1997年互联网泡沫)或者出现在重大修正之后(2003年)。
美国股市表现最佳的年份之一是1933年,回报率超过50%。但请注意,1931年和1930年的股市表现极差,而1929年更是历史有名的股灾年。再之前,1924年至1928年又是一轮好年份。当前危机背景下,美国已经有并且只有2008年一年股市暴跌,并且之前没有特别好的表现。
因此,我们从中可以得出什么结论呢?我们是否会重温上世纪30年代初经历的剧烈波动的疯狂年代?迄今尚未出现任何迹象。2008年股市的波动可能是开始,类似情况可能会持续几年的时间。不管怎样,2009年股市将快速反弹是让人怀疑的。公司将公布的财报很有可能是利空消息。因此,可以预期,2009年仍会是糟糕的一年,尽管可能不会和2008年一样糟糕。除非以下两种解释2008年糟糕表现的假设听起来更可信:
1. 市场行为反常。人们表现疯狂,愚蠢,受到过度自信、羊群效应等行为因素的驱使,但我们毕竟是有理智的,一年的疯狂并不会引发真正的危机。市场将会回归更合理的水平。
2. 市场是完全冷静理性的,考虑到全球范围内公司的盈利预期,2008年股市的修正是有充分理由的,将使市场回归应有的水平。因此,从现在开始,市场将表现理性,每个投资者将根据各自承担的风险获得“正常的”回报率。
不幸的是,我所听到的公司言论似乎并不支持这种说法。每家公司都令人鼓舞,除了那些信誉度较低或者被认为相当幼稚的公司外。
另外,人类心理和市场心理似乎也并不是完全协调一致的。很难说预期中的下滑仅仅由非理性因素拉动,同样很难让人相信市场能够一次性调整到位。2007年股市表现并不差,因此,说2008年一年就修正到位难以令人信服。
因此,留给我们的就是这样一种令人不安的感觉:2009年仍将是糟糕的一年,不仅对市场而言,更重要的是对经济——实体经济以及生产者而言。(翻译:兴亚)
原文:
2008 was a bad year, a very bad year for financial markets. What
does this tell us for 2009?
In 2008, the S&P500, the well-known US stock index, had the privilege to register one of its three worst performances since 1825! Only one year since 1825 (183 years of data!) was worse than that, and yes, it was 1931! Probably not a year we want to emulate! And this is true of indices around the world.
What are the lessons of this dismal performance? First, the US
returns did not come after extraordinary over-performance. You have
to go back to 1958 to have returns of above 40% and to 1997 to have
returns of above 30%. This does not compare favourably to the drop
of 38.8% we just got in 2008.
Indeed the best of “recent” years was 1997 with returns beyond 30% and 2003 with returns of above 20% -no match to what we have just lived through. The correction could thus, if justified, target overvaluations dating back from the dot-com bubble (thank you Mr. Greenspan!).
We have seen in the past strong bull markets either preceding big downturns (the dot-com bubble of 1997) or following major corrections (2003).
One of the best years ever was 1933, with returns of above 50%... but notice that 1930 AND 1931 were terrible years. 1929 was of course the famous crash year. And these followed the good years of 1928 (great year above 40%), 1927 (very good), 1926, 1925 and 1924. And thus, we have had only one terrible year in this crisis yet, 2008, and no great year before in the US.
What can we conclude from this?
1.
2. Markets were perfectly cool and rational and 2008 was the
perfectly justified correction to put us back at the exact
situation we needed to be in considering earnings expectations of
corporations worldwide. Thus, for now on, markets can perform
rationally and give us the “normal” returns every decent investor
expects for the risk taken.
Unfortunately, what I hear from the corporations I work with at IMD does not seem to corroborate. Everybody is bracing. Few stand tall, except some players that have low credibility or could be considered rather naïve (or derivatives traders standing to make money on volatility).
Unfortunately again, human as well as market psychology does not seem to line up either. While it is hard to see such an expected downturn be driven only by irrational forces, it is just as difficult to believe that markets got it fully right in one go. 2007 was not a bad year. It is hard to believe we cleaned up the act in one year. And while momentum has played up in good times, it is hard to see why it would not play down in bad times.
Hence, we are left with this uncomfortable feeling: 2009 could
still be bad indeed, both for the markets, but more importantly,
the economy - the real economy - and the producers. And thus we are
left with this question: what did the 2008 performance mean in
terms of real economy expectation for 2009?
I will explore this essential question next week.
Didier Cossin is the UBS Professor of Banking and Finance at IMD, the leading global business school based in Lausanne, Switzerland (www.imd.ch).