A POPULAR game this summer among watchers of the Chinese economy is to guess the size of speculative capital or “hot money” flowing into the country. One clue is that although China’s trade surplus has started to shrink this year, its foreign-exchange reserves are growing at an ever faster pace. The bulk of its net foreign-currency receipts now comes from capital inflows, not the current-account surplus.

今夏，中国经济观察家们一个津津乐道的游戏是猜测进入到中国的游资或称“热钱”的规模有多大。有一个线索是，尽管今年中国的贸易盈余已经开始缩小，但其外汇储备的增长却更快了。其中大量的净外汇收入来源于资本流入，而非经常性帐户的盈余。

According to leaked official figures, China’s foreign-exchange reserves jumped by $115 billion during April and May, to $1.8 trillion. In the five months to May, reported reserves swelled by $269 billion, 20% more than in the same period of last year. But even this understates the true rate at which the People’s Bank of China (PBOC) has been piling up foreign exchange.

据泄露的官方数据显示，中国的外汇储备在四月和五月份跳升了1,150亿美元，达到18兆亿（即18,000亿）。今年头五个月中，所报告的储备膨胀了2,690亿美元，比去年同期增加20%。但即使这样，还是低估了中国人民银行（人行）外汇增长的真实速度。

Logan Wright, a Beijing-based analyst at Stone & McCarthy, an economic-research firm, has done some statistical detective work to make sense of the figures. The first problem is that reported reserves exclude the transfer of foreign exchange from the PBOC to the China Investment Corporation, the country’s sovereign-wealth fund. The reserve figures have also been reduced in book-keeping terms this year by the PBOC “asking” banks to use dollars to pay for the extra reserves that they are now required to hold at the central bank. Adding these two items to reported reserves, Mr Wright reckons that total foreign-exchange assets rose by an astonishing $393 billion in the first five months of 2008 (see chart), more than double the increase in the same period last year.

楼根·赖特（Logan Wright）是经济研究公司Stone & McCarthy驻北京的分析员，他对这些数据进行了一些统计学的分析估算。第一个问题是，所报告的外汇储备不包括从人行转拨到中国投资公司——中国最大的主权基金——的那部分。同时，从账目中，今年的储备数据还减去了人行要求银行用美元支付存在中央银行的额外的准备金的部分。如果把这两项加回到报告的储备数额上，赖特先生认为外汇资产总额在2008年头五个月的增加额达到惊人的3,930亿美元（见图），与去年同期相比翻倍还不止。

China’s trade surplus and foreign direct investment (FDI) explain only 30% of this. Deducting investment income and the increase in the value of non-dollar reserves as the dollar has fallen still leaves an unexplained residual of $214 billion, equivalent to over $500 billion at an annual rate. Some economists use this as a proxy for hot-money inflows. But some of it may reflect non-speculative transactions, such as foreign borrowing by Chinese firms. Mr Wright therefore estimates that China received up to $170 billion in hot money in the first five months of 2008. This far exceeds anything previously experienced by any emerging economy.

中国的贸易盈余和外国直接投资（FDI）数额仅占此金额的30%，减去投资收收益和非美元外汇储备的升值部分（因为美元贬值），仍剩余2,140亿美元(相当于每年5,000亿)不能解明出处。有些经济学家把这作为流入热钱的估算值，但问题是该数值有可能包涵了非投机性的游资，如中国公司的外债。赖特先生的看法是，在今年的头五个月，中国吸收的热钱可达1,700亿，远远超过以前任何的新兴经济体的数量。

Michael Pettis, an economist at Peking University’s Guanghua School of Management, reckons that speculative inflows during that period were perhaps well over $200 billion, because hot money also comes into China through companies overstating FDI and over-invoicing exports. Foreign firms are bringing in more capital than they need for investment: the net inflow of FDI is 60% higher than a year ago, yet the actual use of this money for fixed investment has fallen by 6%. Some of it has been diverted elsewhere.

北京大学光华管理学院的经济学家迈克尔·裴倜司（Michael Pettis）认为在此期间的流入热钱远高于2,000亿美元，因为热钱流入中国还有通过公司夸大进入中国的直接投资（ＦＤＩ）的金额以及打高出口发票的形式。外国公司输入比实际业务所需投资更多的资金：ＦＤＩ比一年前要高６０％，但实际用于固定资产投资的资金却下降了６％。显然，一部分的资金走到别处去了。

It is one thing to deduce how much money is coming in. It is another to work out where it is going and how it gets past China’s strict capital controls. The stockmarket, which continues to plunge (see article), is no home for hot money. Some has gone into property. The lion’s share is in bog-standard bank deposits. An interest rate of just over 4% on yuan deposits compared with 2% on dollars, combined with an expected appreciation in the yuan, offers a seemingly risk-free profit for those who can get money into China.

推算出进来的钱有多少是一回事，但要搞清楚它去了哪儿，又是如何绕过中国严格的资本管制的，那就是另外一回事了。股市不断地在跌，热钱不会去。一部分资金投往房地产。大部分的钱是待在账户上无所作为。比起美元2%的利率，稍高于4%的人民币利率，再加上预期的升值，给那些能把钱弄到中国来的人带来似乎是无风险的利润。

It comes in via various circuitous routes. Big Western investment funds which care about liquidity would find it hard to move money into China, although rumours abound of hedge funds that are investing money through Chinese partners. Trade and investment offers a big loophole for Chinese and foreign firms. Resident individuals can use the $50,000 annual limit for bringing money into China from abroad—many also use their friends’ and relatives’ quotas. Another big loophole lets Hong Kong residents transfer 80,000 yuan ($11,600) a day into mainland bank deposits.

进来的钱途径多种多样。西方大的投资基金关注流动性，会觉得把钱弄进中国有难度，虽然谣传很多的对冲基金通过中国的合作伙伴在国内投资。贸易和投资是中外公司可以利用的一大漏洞。而居民个人则可以通过每年5万美元的限额从海外向国内打款 —— 许多人用亲属的额度汇入外币。还有一个空子就是允许香港居民每天可转帐80,000元（11,600美元）到大陆银行的户头上。

The government is trying to crack down, but that risks shifting the activity towards underground money exchangers. And if the government were to increase its monitoring of FDI and trade flows, the extra bureaucracy could harm the real economy. China needs to reduce the incentive for destabilising capital inflows, rather than block the channels.

政府试图清理整顿，但又带来将汇款逼入地下钱庄的风险。而且如果政府要提高监控FDI和外贸流动的话，额外增加的官僚机构和办事程序还会有损于经济的发展。中国需要的是减少引起资金流动不稳定的动因，而不是堵住流动的渠道。

Massive hot-money inflows present two dangers to China’s economy. One is that capital could suddenly flow out, as it did from other East Asian countries during the financial crisis a decade ago and Vietnam this year. China’s economy is protected by its current-account surplus and vast reserves, but its banking system would be hurt by an abrupt withdrawal.