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231.精读《小逻辑》笔记128——概念论第229-232节

(2011-09-04 23:25:41)
标签:

黑格尔

小逻辑

概念论

认识

必然性

客体

主观

杂谈

分类: 杂读笔记(钱先生指示)

231.精读《小逻辑》笔记128——概念论第229-232节

 

这四节主要是深入到“认识”里,阐释客体之概念和必然性是不能通过主观的范式表格来构建的,这些必然性是自为的,是自己在主观中映现出来的。

 

Definition, Division and Theorem

§229

[a]When the object has been in the first instance brought by cognition into the form of the specific notion in general, so that in this way its genus and its universal character or specialty are explicitly stated, we have the Definition. The materials and the proof of Definition are procured by means of the Analytical method(§ 227).The specific character however is expected to be a 'mark' only: that is to say it is to be in behoof only of the purely subjective cognition which is external to the object.

(一)当对象在认识过程中首先被带到特定的一般概念形式内,从而这对象的类和它的普遍的规定性得到明白的表述时,于是我们便有了界说。这界说的材料和证明都是由于运用分析方法得来的(227节)但这界说里所表述的普遍规定性仍然只是一个标志,这就是说,对于对象只说出其外在标志,而所得到的只是主观的认识。

(对一事物有“界说”,只是说出客观对象的外在标志,所得到的只是主观认识。这些规定性都是分析得来的。)

Definition involves the three organic elements of the notion: the universal or proximate genus(genus proximum),the particular or specific character of the genus(qualitas specifica),and the individual, or object defined. The first question that definition suggests, is where it comes from. The general answer to this question is to say, that definitions originate by way of analysis. This will explain how it happens that people quarrel about the correctness of proposed definitions; for here everything depends on what perceptions we started from, and what points of view we had before our eyes in so doing. The richer the object to be defined is, that is, the more numerous are the aspects which it offers to our notice, the more various are the definitions we may frame of it. Thus there are quite a host of definitions of life, of the state, etc. Geometry, on the contrary, dealing with a theme so abstract as space, has an easy task in giving definitions. Again, in respect of the matter or contents of the objects defined, there is no constraining necessity present. We are expected to admit that space exists, that there are plants, animals, etc., nor is it the business of geometry, botany, etc., to demonstrate that the objects in question necessarily are. This very circumstance makes the synthetic method of cognition as little suitable for philosophy as the analytical: for philosophy has above all things to leave no doubt of the necessity of its objects. And yet several attempts have been made to introduce the synthetic method into philosophy. Thus Spinoza, in particular, begins with definitions. He says, for instance, that substance is the causa sui. His definitions are unquestionably a storehouse of the most speculative truth, but it takes the shape of dogmatic assertions. The same thing is also true of Schelling.

界说本身包含有概念的三个环节:普遍性或最近的类,特殊性或类的诸特性,和个体性或被界说的对象本身。界说所引起的第一个问题就是:界说从何处来?对这一问题的一般回答是,界说是由分析的方式得来的。但这又会引起关于所提出的界说的正确性的争论。要解答这种争论又要看我们的界说是以什么知觉为出发点,以及我们心目中采取的什么观点。要下界说的对象内容越是丰富,提供给我们观察的方面越多,则我们对这对象所可提出的界说也就越有差异。例如说,关于生命、关于国家等较复杂的现象,便可有许多不同的界说。反之,几何学可以下许多好的界说,因为,它所研究的对象——空间,是一个异常抽象的对象。再则,就须下界说的对象的内容来说,也没有什么必然性。我们只需承认,有空间、有植物、有动物等等即行,几何学、植物学、动物学等,并没有义务去证明这些对象所以存在的必然性。就这种情形看来,无论综合方法或分析方法,皆同样不适用于哲学。因为哲学首先要做的工作,就是要证明它的对象的必然性。但哲学上曾有过不少的运用综合方法的尝试。斯宾诺莎就是从界说开始的,例如他说,实体即是自因之物。他的许多界说留下了不少富有思辨的真理,但是用论断的形式表述出来的。这些话也适用于谢林。

(得到界说的方法,多是分析的方法。要下界说的对象内容越是丰富,提供给我们观察的方面越多,这对象可能的界说也就越有差异。)

 

§230

[b]The statement of the second element of the notion, i.e. of the specific character of the universal as particularizing, is given by Division in accordance with some external consideration.

(二)对于概念的第二环节的陈述,亦即对普遍事物的规定性作为特殊化加以陈述,就是根据某一外在的观点去进行分类。

(对在普遍性/类之下的特性进行陈述,其依据是普遍事物在知觉中不同的表现。)

Division we are told ought to be complete. That requires a principle or ground of division so constituted that the division based upon it embraces the whole extent of the region designated by the definition in general. But, in division, there is the further requirement that the principle of it must be borrowed from the nature of the object in question. If this condition be satisfied, the division is natural and not merely artificial, that is to say, arbitrary. Thus, in zoology, the ground of division adopted in the classification of the mammalia is mainly afforded by their teeth and claws. That is so far sensible, as the mammals themselves distinguish themselves from one another by these parts of their bodies back to which therefore the general type of their various classes is to be traced. In every case the genuine division must be controlled by the notion. To that extent a division, in the first instance, has three members: but as particularity exhibits itself as double, the division may go to the extent even of four members. In the sphere of mind trichotomy is predominant, a circumstance which Kant has the credit for bringing into notice

关于分类据说必须求其完备。这样又须寻求分类所依据的原则或根据。这个原则必须相当概括,这样根据它来分类才可以涵盖界说所包含的全部范围。但进一步的要求是分类的原则必须从被分类的对象本身演绎出来。这样一来,分类才是很自然的,而不单纯是矫揉造作的,换言之,不是武断的。例如,在动物学里,关于哺乳动物的分类所采取的原则,是以动物的牙齿和趾爪为准的。这个办法可以理解,因为哺乳动物彼此之间的区别是基于它们身体上的牙齿和趾爪这些部分的。以这些作为关键去追溯,便不难察出不同类哺乳动物的普遍类型。一般讲来,真正的分类必须以概念为准则。而概念又包含三个环节,因此分类一般首先分为三个部分。但就特殊性表现为两个方面而言,所以采取分为四类的方式也未尝不可。在精神的范围内。应以分为三部分为主,这一点我们不能不说是康德的功绩,他曾经首先促使人注意到精神应分为三部分这一事实。

(普遍性的进一步分类,则分类的依据乃是来自于客观,来自对象。由此,这种分类才是符合其概念的。——由此可以证明,分类并不是主观任性活动。)

 

Theorem

§231

[c]In the concrete individuality, where the mere unanalyzed quality of the definition is regarded as a correlation of elements, the object is a synthetic nexus of distinct characteristics. It is a Theorem. Being different, these characteristics possess but a mediated identity. To supply the materials, which form the middle terms, is the office of Construction: and the process of mediation itself, from which cognition derives the necessity of that nexus, is the Demonstration.

(三)在具体的个体性里,当界说中简单的规定性被认为是一种关系时,这对象便是许多有差别的规定的综合联系。——这就是一个定理。这些规定因为是不相同的,故它们之间的同一性是一种经过中介的同一性。要提供材料来构成中介环节,那就是“构造”的任务。而认识所赖以达到那种联系的必然性的中介过程本身就是证明。

(具体个体性,是综合了众多规定性,这些规定性通过个体而聚集在一起。它们的同一性还是中介的产物。)

As the difference between the analytical and synthetic methods is commonly stated, it seems entirely optional which of the two we employ. If we assume, to start with, the concrete thing which the synthetic method presents as a result, we can analyze from it as consequences the abstract propositions which formed the pre-suppositions and the material for the proof. Thus, algebraical definitions of curved lines are theorems in the method of geometry. Similarly even the Pythagorean theorem, if made the definition of a right-angled triangle, might yield to analysis those propositions which geometry had already demonstrated on is behoof. The optionalness of either method is due to both alike starting from an external presupposition. So far as the nature of the notion is concerned, analysis is prior, since it has to raise the given material with its empirical concreteness into the form of general abstractions, which may then be set in the front of the synthetic method as definitions.

按照通常所作出的关于分析方法和综合方法的区别,究竟用哪一种方法,好像可以完全任意选择似的。如果我们试假定从综合方法所表明为结果的具体东西开始,则它们可以从它分析出许多抽象的命题作为结论,而这些命题便构成证明的前提和材料。这样,代数关于曲线的定义,在几何学方法里就成了定理。同样,即如毕达哥拉斯的定理,如果用来作为直角三角形的界说,也可得出几何学中早已通过分析予以证明的一些定理。两个方法其做一可任意选择之故,即基于两者都是从一个外在的前提开始的。就概念的本性看来,分析方法是在先。大概因首先须将给予的具体经验的材料提高成一般的抽象概念的形式,而这些抽象概念又须首先在综合方法里先行提出来作为界说。

(分析的方法在先,通过对众多经验的分析,而总结出一定抽象的概念,而这些概念,还是要在综合方法中得到广泛的分解界说。)

That these methods, however indispensable and brilliantly successful in their own province, are unserviceable for philosophical cognition, is self-evident. They have presuppositions; and their style of cognition is that of understanding, proceeding under the canon of formal identity. In Spinoza, who was especially addicted to the use of the geometrical method, we are at once struck by its characteristic formalism. Yet his ideas were speculative in spirit; whereas the system of Wolf, who carried the method out to the height of pedantry, was even in subject-matter a metaphysic of the understanding.

这些方法在它们自己范围内无论如何重要,如何有辉煌的成效,但对于哲学认识却没有用处,这是自明的,因为它们是有前提的,它们的认识方式是抽象理智的方式,是按照形式的同一性而进行的。斯宾诺莎主要应用几何方法,虽说是用来表达思辨的概念,但这个方法的形式主义却很显明。乌尔夫的哲学,发挥几何方法到了学究气的极峰,即就其内容来说,也只是理智形而上学。

(如果只是按照抽象理智的方式,形成一些大前提,然后来时推论,却无法对大前提的合理性进行证明,则,并不能说它就是好的。)

The abuses which these methods with their formalism once led to in philosophy and science have in modern times been followed by the abuses of what is called 'Construction'. Kant brought into vogue the phrase that mathematics 'construes' its notions. All that was meant by the phrase was that mathematics has not to do with notions, but with abstract qualities of sense-perceptions. The name 'Construction(construing)of notions' has since been given to a sketch or statement of sensible attributes which were picked up from perception, quite guiltless of any influence of the notion, and to the additional formalism of classifying scientific and philosophical objects in a tabular form on some presupposed rubric, but in other respects at the fancy and discretion of the observer. In the background of all this, certainly, there is a dim consciousness of the Idea, of the unity of the notion and objectivity——a consciousness too that the idea is concrete. But that play of what is styled 'construing' is far from presenting this unity adequately, a unity which is none other than the notion properly so called: a perception is as little the concreteness of reason and the idea.

继几何方法及其形式主义被滥用于哲学和科学之后,在近代又有所谓的构造方法的滥用代之而起。康德曾经使得下面这句话异常流行:数学构造它的概念。这句话的意思不外是说,数学要研究的不是概念,而是感性直观的抽象规定。此后,“概念的构造”一词曾经用来指谓从知觉里抽象出来的感性特质的陈述,未经过任何概念的规定;并用来指谓将哲学和科学的对象依照某种预先设定的方式(但其余方面便以个人的任意和高兴为准)加以分类,列成一表格。这都表明了康德式的一种形式主义。在这些作法的后面,无疑地隐约提示了关于理念、概念与客观性的统一,以及理念是具体的等想法。但所谓构造这种把戏,实未能表达出这种统一性,而只有概念才是那样的统一性。而且那种直观的感性具体性也不能表述出理性和理念的具体性。

(康德的十二规定表格,并没有真正表达概念的统一性,同样也没有对主观何以有如此表格做出陈述。)

Another point calls for notice. Geometry works with the sensuous but abstract perception of space; and in space it experiences no difficulty in isolating and defining certain simple analytical modes.

因为几何学所研究的对象是感性的然而又是抽象的空间的直观,所以它可以毫无阻碍地用抽象的理智在空间里建立某些简单的规定。

To geometry alone therefore belongs in its perfection the synthetic method of finite cognition. In its course, however(and this is the remarkable point),it finally stumbles upon what are termed irrational and incommensurable quantities; and in their case any attempt at further specification drives it beyond the principle of the understanding. This is only one of many instances in terminology, where the title 'rational' is perversely applied to the province of understanding, while we stigmatise as irrational that which shows a beginning and a trace of rationality. Other sciences, removed as they are from the simplicity of space or number, often and necessarily reach a point where understanding permits no further advance: but they get over the difficulty without trouble. They make a break in the strict sequence of their procedure, and assume whatever they require, though it be the reverse of what preceded, from some external quarter——opinion, perception, conception, or any other source. Its inobservancy as to the nature of its methods and their relativity to the subject-matter prevents this finite cognition from seeing that, when it proceeds by definitions and divisions, etc., it is really led on by the necessity of the laws of the notion. For the same reason it cannot see when it has reached its limit; nor, if it have transgressed that limit, does it perceive that it is in a sphere where the categories of understanding, which it still continues rudely to apply, have lost all authority.

因此有限认识的综合方法,唯有在几何学里才达到它的完满性。但最值得注意的是,在综合方法的进程里,一遇到那不可衡量的和不合理的量时,便碰了壁。因为在这里要进一步予以规定,便超出了理智原则的范围。这也足以表明“合理”和“不合理”二词常常被颠倒使用的一个例子:通常总是把“合于理智(常识)的东西,认为是合理的,反而把具有合理性的开端和迹象的东西认为是不合理的。别的许多科学所研究的对象即远不像空间或数那样简单,它们会常常地而且必然地达到抽象理智的进展的限度,但它们却很轻易地变渡过了这难关了。它们打断了推演进程的顺序,于方便时随其所需接受一些外在的条件,甚至也不惜违反它们所出发的前提,另外采取意见、表象、知觉或别的外在东西作为出发点。这种有限的认识自己意识不到它的方法的限度和它对于认识的内容或对象的关系,使得它既不能认识在界说分类等过程里它已是必然地接受了概念规定的指导,又不能看到什么地方是它的限度,更不知道,当它超越了它的限度时,它已经进入了一个新的范围,在这里知性的规定已不复有效用,但仍然在那里以粗疏的方式被使用着。

(那些思想范畴的表格,并不能给予对象以完备的解释。)

 

§232

The necessity which finite cognition produces in the Demonstration is, in the first place, an external necessity, intended for the subjective intelligence alone. But in necessity as such, cognition itself has left behind its presupposition and starting-point, which consisted in accepting its content as given or found. Necessity qua necessity is implicitly the self-relating notion. The subjective idea has thus implicitly reached an original and objective determinateness——a something not-given, and for that reason immanent in the subject. It has passed over into the idea of Will.

有限的认识在证明过程中所带来的必然性,最初也只是外在的、为了主观的识见而规定出来的必然性。但真正的或内在的必然性里,认识本身便摆脱了它的前提和出发点、它的现成的和给予的内容。换言之,真正的必然性自在地是自己和自己联系的概念。这样,那主观的理念便自在地达到了那自在自为地规定了的,非给予的,因之亦即内在于主体的东西。于是它便过渡到意志的理念。

(真正的必然性,是自为的。)

The necessity which cognition reaches by means of the demonstration is the reverse of what formed its starting-point. In its starting-point cognition had a given and a contingent content; but now, at the close of its movement, it knows its content to be necessary. This necessity is reached by means of subjective agency. Similarly, subjectivity at starting was quite abstract, a bare tabula rasa.It now shows itself as a modifying and determining principle. In this way we pass from the idea of cognition to that of will. The passage, as will be apparent on a closer examination, means that the universal, to be truly apprehended, must be apprehended as subjectivity, as a notion self-moving, active, and form-imposing.

认识作用通过证明而达到的必然性,正是构成认识的出发点的反面。认识在它的出发点内有一个给予的偶然的内容。但到了它的运动结束时,它却知道这内容是有必然性的,而且这种必然性是通过主观的活动的中介才达到的。同样,最初这主观性是异常抽象的,是一张单纯的白纸。但现在却证明其为一能决定的主导的原则了。这就是由认识的理念过渡到意志的理念的关键。细究起来,这个过渡的意义即在于表明,真正的普遍性必须理解为主观性、为自身运动的、能动的和自己建立规定的概念。

(认识,是人的主观构造出课题的必然性,这种方法必然南辕北辙:事物的必然性乃在于其自身,而不是人的主观。客体之必然性是在主观中透出其自己出来。)

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