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228.精读《小逻辑》笔记126——概念论第216-222节

(2011-08-31 21:13:56)
标签:

黑格尔

小逻辑

概念论

生命

杂谈

分类: 杂读笔记(钱先生指示)

228.精读《小逻辑》笔记126——概念论第216-222节

 

家中网络暂时断开,因此,将这两天的笔记总的发过来,算是对钱先生承诺的遵守。这七节的内容不不难懂。把握这一点很重要:生命个体是短暂的,而其价值和意义在于种类的延续

 

(a)Life生命

§216

The immediate idea is Life. As soul, the notion is realized in a body of whose externality the soul is the immediate self-relating universality. But the soul is also its particularization, so that the body expresses no other distinctions than follow from the characterizations of its notion. And finally it is the Individuality of the body as infinite negativity——the dialectic of that bodily objectivity, with its parts lying out of one another, conveying them away from the semblance of independent subsistence back into subjectivity, so that all the members are reciprocally momentary means as well as momentary ends. Thus as life is the initial particularization, so it results in the negative self-asserting unity: in the dialectic of its corporeity it only coalesces with itself. In this way life is essentially something alive, and in point of its immediacy this individual living thing. It is characteristic of finitude in this sphere that, by reason of the immediacy of the idea, body and soul are separable. This constitutes the mortality of the living being. It is only, however, when the living being is dead, that these two sides of the idea are different ingredients.

直接的理念就是生命。概念作为灵魂,而实现在肉体里,灵魂是借肉体的外在性,以直接地自己和自己联系着的普遍性。肉体同样也是灵魂的特殊化,所有肉体除了表示它那里的概念规定外,不表示任何别的差别。最后,肉体的个体性作为无限的否定性,乃是它的彼此外在存在着的客观性的辩证法,这客观性从独立持存的假象返回到主观性。所以肉体内一切器官肢体,均彼此在不同时间内互为目的,互为手段。所以生命既是开始的特殊化作用,又是达到否定的自为存在着的统一的结果,因而生命在它的肉体里只是作为辩证的过程和它自身相结合。所以生命本质上是活生生的东西,而且就它的直接性看来,即是这一活生生的个体。在生命范围内,有限性的特点即由于理念的直接性的缘故,灵魂与肉体才是可分离的,这就构成了有生命者之有死亡性。但只有当有生命者死亡时,理念这两方面,灵魂和肉体,才是不同的组成部分。

(灵魂和肉体之间,并不是二元对立的东西,它们之间的存在不可分割。灵魂是概念的内在性,它通过外在性(肉体)实现概念的同一性。生命就是一个完整的概念。)

The single members of the body are what they are only by and in relation to their unity. A hand e.g. when hewn off from the body is, as Aristotle has observed, a hand in name only, not in fact. From the point of view of understanding, life is usually spoken of as a mystery, and in general as incomprehensible. By giving it such a name, however, the Understanding only confesses its own finitude and nullity. So far is life from being incomprehensible, that in it the very notion is presented to us, or rather the immediate idea existing as a notion. And having said this, we have indicated the defect of life. Its notion and reality do not thoroughly correspond to each other. The notion of life is the soul, and this notion has the body for its reality. The soul is, as it were, infused into its corporeity; and in that way it is at first sentient only, and not yet freely self-conscious. The process of life consists in getting the better of the immediacy with which it is still beset: and this process, which is itself threefold, results in the idea under the form of judgment, i.e. the idea as Cognition.

肉体上各个器官肢体之所以是它们那样,只是由于它们的统一性,并由于它们和统一性有联系。例如一只手,如果从身体上割下来,按照名称虽仍然可叫做手,但按照实质来说,已经不是手了。这点亚里士多德早已说过。从理智的观点出发,人们当把生命认作是个神秘的甚或不可思议的东西。这足以表示理智或知性自己供认它的有限性和空虚性。事实上生命不仅不是不可思议的,甚至可说,在生命里,我们即可看到概念本身,或确切点说,可看到作为概念存在着的直接的理念。这样也就同时说出了生命的缺陷之所在。生命的缺陷即在于概念和实在尚未达到真正的彼此符合。生命的概念是灵魂,而灵魂则以肉体作为它的实在或实现。灵魂好像是贯注于它的肉体里,在这种情形下,灵魂才是有感觉的,但尚未达到自由自觉的存在。生命进展的过程于是就在于客服那还在束缚其自身的直接性,而这个过程本身又是三重性的,其发展的结果就出现在判断形式中的理念,亦即作为认识的理念。

(这和概念作为一个完整的统一体是相符合的,其所有的部分,都是作为整体中的部分才有意义。)

 

§217

A living being is a syllogism, of which the very elements are in themselves systems and syllogisms(§198,§201,§207).They are however active syllogisms or processes; and in the subjective unity of the vital agent make only one process. 'Thus the living being is the process of its coalescence with itself, which runs on through three processes.

有生命之物是一推论,(即包含有三个成分的矛盾统一体),这统一体里面,各环节本身又各自成一体系和推论(或统一体)(参见198、201、207节)。它们是主动的推论(或推移)过程,而在生命之物的主观统一性内只是一个过程。所以有生命之物乃是自己与自己结合的过程,这个结合过程本身又经历了三个过程。

 

 

§218

(1)The first is the process of the living being inside itself. In that process it makes a split on its own self, and reduces its corporeity to its object or its inorganic nature. This corporeity, as an aggregate of correlations, enters in its very nature into difference and opposition of its elements, which mutually become each other's prey, and assimilate one another, and are retained by producing themselves. Yet this action of the several members(organs)is only the living subject's one act to which their productions revert; so that in these productions nothing is produced except the subject: in other words, the subject only reproduces itself.

(1)第一过程就是有生命之物在它自身内部的运动过程。在这过程里它自身发生分裂,它以它的肉体为它的客体,为它的无机本性。这种无机性,作为相对的外在性,分化为它的各环节的差别与对立,这些不同的对立的环节彼此互相争夺,互相同化,在不断地自身产生这的过程中保持自身。但有生命之物的各肢体官能的这种活动,只是那有生命的主体的一个活动,这个活动的各种产物,必须回复到主体的活动,以致在这种内部过程中,只产生了有生命的主体,换句话说,只是那主体自身在再生。

(这是有生命之物的第一个阶段,在自身内保有自身,发展自身。)

The process of the vital subject within its own limits has in Nature the threefold form of Sensibility, Irritability, and Reproduction. As Sensibility, the living being is immediately simple self-relation——it is the soul omnipresent in its body, the outsideness of each member of which to others has for it no truth. As Irritability, the living being appears split up in itself; and as Reproduction, it is perpetually restoring itself from the inner distinction of its members and organs. A vital agent only exists as this continually self-renewing process within its own limits.

有生命之物自身的内部过程在自然界又可分为三种形式,即敏感、反感和繁殖。作为敏感,有生命之物是直接简单的自我关系,即灵魂,灵魂到处弥漫于它的肉体内,肉体各部分的彼此外在,对灵魂来说,已根本没有真理性了。在反感过程中,有生命之物表现自身有了分裂,到了再生或繁殖阶段则它便从它的肢体各官能的内在差别里继续不断地恢复其自身。有生命之物仅恃自身内容这种不断地更新的过程而持续其存在。

(敏感,是生命之物对外界限制的认知,这同时也肯定过程。反感,是有生命之物对外界刺激的反应。敏感和反感是生命之物与外界的交换,实际上也是其发展自身的过程。)

 

Objective Nature The matter which it assimilates

 

§219

(2)But the judgment of the notion proceeds, as free, to discharge the objective or bodily nature as an independent totality from itself; and the negative relation of the living thing to itself makes, as immediate individuality, the presupposition of an inorganic nature confronting it. As this negative of the animate is no less a function in the notion of the animate itself, it exists consequently in the latter(which is at the same time a concrete universal)in the shape of a defect or want. The dialectic by which the object, being implicitly null, is merged is the action of the self-assured living thing, which in this process against an inorganic nature thus retains, develops, and objectifies itself.

(2)但是概念的判断为了自由地前进,便放任客观的无机体,使其成为一个离它而独立的全体,并且使有生命之物对自身的否定联系,成为直接的个体性,成为它自己对立的无机自然的前提。有生命之物的自身否定,正是它的概念本身的一个环节,这就表示它与它的概念(同时是一具体的普遍)相比较便有了缺陷。扬弃那自在地带有虚幻性的客体的辩证法乃是一自身确信的有生命之物的能动性,这又生命之物于反抗它这种无机自然的过程里因而保持、发展并客观化其自身。

(有生命之物的否定阶段,促使自己成为独立的个体性。“扬弃那自在地带有虚幻性的客体的辩证法”而确信自身的能动性。)

The living being stands face to face with an inorganic nature, to which it comports itself as a master and which it assimilates to itself. The result of the assimilation is not, as in the chemical process, a neutral product in which the independence of the two confronting sides is merged; but the living being shows itself as large enough to embrace its other which cannot withstand its power. The inorganic nature which is subdued by the vital agent suffers this fate, because it is virtually the same as what life is actually. Thus in the other the living being only coalesces with itself. But when the soul has fled from the body, the elementary powers of objectivity begin their play. These powers are, as it were, continually on the spring, ready to begin their process in the organic body; and life is the constant battle against them.

有生命之物与一个无机的自然相对立,它是后者的主宰力量,并同化后者以充实自身。这种过程所获得的结果,并不像在化学过程里那样只是一种中和的产物,在这个产物里,那相互对立、彼此独立的两方面都同样被抛弃了。反之,那有生命之物却表明自己是统摄着它的对方的,而它的对方却不能抵抗它的力量。被有生命之物所征服的无机自然之所以忍受这种征服,就是因为无机自然是自在的生命,而生命则是自为的无机自然。所以有生命之物在对方里只是和它自身相结合。当灵魂离开了肉体时,客观性的那些基本力量就开始发挥它们的作用了。这些力量可说是不断地准备着飞跃,以求在有机的肉体里开始其过程,而生命便不断地在那里与无机力量做斗争。

(在这一阶段,生命之物和自然是对立的,生命之物通过对后者的否定而充实自己。无机自然是自在的生命,而生命则是自为的无机自然。生命的过程,就是无机自然从自在到自为的实现。)

 

The living individual

 

§220

(3)The living individual, which in its first process comports itself as intrinsically subject and notion, through its second assimilates its external objectivity and thus puts the character of reality into itself. It is now therefore implicitly a Kind, with essential universality of nature. The particularizing of this Kind is the relation of the living subject to another subject of its Kind: and the judgment is the tie of Kind over these individuals thus appointed for each other. This is the Affinity of the Sexes.

(3)有生命的个体,在第一过程里居于主体和概念的地位,在第二过程里,它同化它的外在的客观性,因而它自身便取得一种真实的规定性,于是它现在就成为潜在的族类、实体性的普遍性。“族类”的特殊化就是一个有生命的主体与另一同类的主体的联系,判断就是“族类”与这些彼此对立的特定“个体”的相互关系。这就是性的差别。

(有生命的个体,在第三阶段,进入类的规定。)

 

Birth, Death and Genus

 

§221

The process of Kind brings it to a being of its own. Life being no more than the idea immediate, the product of this process breaks up into two sides. On the one hand, the living individual, which was at first presupposed as immediate, is now seen to be mediated and generated. On the other, however, the living individuality, which, on account of its first immediacy, stands in a negative attitude towards universality, sinks in the superior power of the latter.

“族类”的发展过程使它成为自为存在。因为生命还只是直接的理念,它就分裂成两方面:一方面那最初被假定为直接性的东西,现在就作为一中介性的、被产生的东西出现了。但另一方面,有生命的个体性由于它最初的直接性的缘故,与普遍性处于否定的关系中,便沉没在这个有较高力量的普遍性里。

(个体之被否定,作为中介,承认了其普遍性。个体消逝,而种类得以保存。)

The living being dies, because it is a contradiction. Implicitly it is the universal or Kind, and yet immediately it exists as an individual only. Death shows the Kind to be the power that rules the immediate individual. For the animal the process of Kind is the highest point of its vitality. But the animal never gets so far in its Kind as to have a being of its own; it succumbs to the power of Kind. In the process of Kind the immediate living being mediates itself with itself, and thus rises above its immediacy, only however to sink back into it again. Life thus runs away, in the first instance, only into the false infinity of the progress ad infinitum. The real result, however, of the process of life, in the point of its notion, is to merge and overcome that immediacy with which the idea, in the shape of life, is still beset.

有生命之物要死亡,因为生命就是矛盾:它自在地市族类,是普遍性,但直接地却仅作为个体而存在。在死亡里,族类表明其自身为支配那直接的个体的力量。就动物来说,族类的过程乃是它的生命力的顶点。但生物在它们的族类里并不能达到自为的存在,而是屈服于族类的力量。在族类的过程里,直接的有生命之物有了自身的中介,并提高自身以超出其直接性,但只是为了不断重新又沉陷在直接性里。因此生命最初只是没完没了地走向坏的无限进展的过程。但从概念看来,生命的过程所获得的结果,即在于扬弃并克服尚束缚在生命形态中的理念的直接性。

(族类的存在是个体生命之目的和意义。这是生命之物之概念的实现。族类是生命之物的顶点。)

 

 

§222

In this manner however the idea of life has thrown off not some one particular and immediate 'This', but this first immediacy as a whole. It thus comes to itself, to its truth: it enters upon existence as a free Kind self-subsistent. The death of merely immediate and individual vitality is the 'procession' of spirit.

但是生命的理念因而不仅必须从任何一个特殊的直接的个体性里解放出来,而且必须从这个最初的一般的直接性里解放出来,这样,它才能够达到它自己本身,它的真理性。从而,它就进到作为自由的族类为自己本身而实存。那仅仅直接的个体的生命的死亡就是精神的前进。

(个体之死亡,是为族类之发展的必然过程。个体生命的死亡是生命精神的前进。)

 

 

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