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223.精读《小逻辑》笔记121——概念论第204-206节

(2011-08-22 23:47:00)
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黑格尔

小逻辑

概念论

目的性

客体

理念

杂谈

分类: 杂读笔记(钱先生指示)

223.精读《小逻辑》笔记121——概念论第204-206节

 

理解目的性这一部分时,要把握一点:目的性不是主观的东西,而是客体之实现自为存在的必然过程。目的性连接着两端:现实性和理想性。而理想性也是物之一部分。目的性要消除现实性和理想性之间的区别。这是一个自身扬弃的过程。

 

(c)Teleology  目的性

§204

In the End the notion has entered on free existence and has a being of its own, by means of the negation of immediate objectivity. It is characterized as subjective, seeing that this negation is, in the first place, abstract, and hence at first the relation between it and objectivity still one of contrast. This character of subjectivity, however, compared with the totality of the notion, is one-sided, and that, be it added, for the End itself, in which all specific characters have been put as subordinated and merged. For it therefore even the object, which it presupposes, has only hypothetical(ideal)reality-essentially no-reality. The End, in short, is a contradiction of its self-identity against the negation stated in it, i.e. its antithesis to objectivity, and being so, contains the eliminative or destructive activity which negates the antithesis and renders it identical with itself. This is the realization of the End: in which, while it turns itself into the other of its subjectivity and objectifies itself, thus canceling the distinction between the two, it has only closed with itself, and retained itself.

目的是由于否定了直接的客观性而达到自由实存的自为存在着的概念。目的是被规定为主观的。因为它对于客观性的否定最初也只是抽象的,因此它与客观性最初仍只是出于对立的地位。但它的这种主观的性质与概念的全体性比较起来,却只是片面的,并且是为它自身的,因为就目的本身而言,一切片面的特性,均设定为被扬弃在它自身里面。所以那假定在先的客体对于目的也只是一种观念性的自在的不实的东西。目的虽说有它的自身同一性与它所包含的否定性和与客体相对立之间的矛盾,但它自身即是一种扬弃或主动的力量,它能够否定这种对立而赢得它与它自己的统一,这就是目的的实现。在这个过程里,目的转入它的主观性的对方,而客观化它自己,进而扬弃主客观的差别,只是自己保持自己,自己与自己相结合。

(认为目的性只是客观的否定的一方面,只是最初的印象,而实际上,目的性是物之自为存在得以实现的基础。因此,目的性,是物客观化的过程。)

The notion of Design or End, while on one hand called redundant, is on another justly described as the rational notion, and contrasted with the abstract universal of understanding. The latter only subsumes the particular, and so connects it with itself: but has it not in its own nature. The distinction between the End or final cause, and the mere efficient cause(which is the cause ordinarily so called),is of supreme importance. Causes, properly so called, belong to the sphere of necessity, blind, and not yet laid bare. The cause therefore appears as passing into its correlative, and losing its primordiality thereby sinking into dependency. It is only by implication, or for us, that the cause is in the effect made for the first time a cause, and that it there returns into itself. The End, on the other hand, is expressly stated as containing the specific character in its own self——the effect, namely, which in the purely causal relation is never free from otherness. The End therefore in its efficiency does not pass over, but retains itself, i.e. it carries into effect itself only, and is at the end what it was in the beginning or primordial state. Until it thus retains itself, it is not genuinely primordial. The End then requires to be speculatively apprehended as the notion, which itself in the proper unity and ideality of its characteristics contains the judgement or negation——the antithesis of subjective and objective——and which toan equal extent suspends that antithesis.

目的这一概念一方面固然是多余的,但另一方面,也很正当地被称为理性的概念,以与知性的抽象普遍相对立。抽象的普遍仅形式上概括了特殊,但并不以特殊为其内在性质。(而作为目的的概念却包含特殊性,亦即主观性,因而包含进一步的差别在其自身之内,作为它自己固有的性质。)——再则,关于作为目的因的目的与单纯的制动因,亦即通常所谓原因的区别,却极为重要。原因属于那尚未揭示出来的盲目必然性。因此,原因便会过渡到它的对方,从而失掉其原来的原始性而成为设定的存在,且须依赖它的对方。只有就其潜在性来说或就我们看来,才可说,原因唯有在效果里才成为原因,才回复它的自己。反之,目的便被设定为包含它的规定性或还表现那里作为它的异在,即效果在它本身之内。目的既包含效果在自身内,因此在效果里目的并没有过渡到外面,而是仍然保持其自身,这就是说,目的仅通过效果而实现其自身,而且它在终点里和它的起点或原始性里是一样的。由于目的有了这种自我保持性,所以它才是真正的原始的东西。——我们须从思辨的观点来理解目的,须将目的理解为概念,这概念在它自己的各种规定的统一性里包含有判断或否定,包含有主观与客观的对立,并且也同样是对这种否定和对立的扬弃。

(目的的自我保持性,是通过原因和结果的对比显现出来的。目的性就是将客观性和主观性之间的区别,进行扬弃的过程。)

By End however we must not at once, nor must we ever merely, think of the form which it has in consciousness as a mode of mere mental representation. By means of the notion of Inner Design Kant has resuscitated the Idea in general and particularly the idea of life. Aristotle's definition of life virtually implies inner design, and is thus far in advance of the notion of design in modern Teleology, which had in view finite and outward design only.

一提到目的,我们必不可立即想到或仅仅想到那单纯存在于意识之内的,以(主观)观念的形式出现的一种规定。康德提出了内在的目的性之说,他曾经唤醒了人们对于一般的理念,特别是生命的理念的新认识。亚里士多德对于生命的界说也已包含有内在目的的观念,他因此远远超出了近代人所持的只是有限的外在的目的性那种的目的论了。

(内在目的,这一名词,就体现着目的性的客观意义。)

Animal wants and appetites are some of the readiest instances of the End. They are the felt contradiction, which exists within the living subject, and pass into the activity of negating this negation which mere subjectivity still is. The satisfaction of the want or appetite restores the peace between subject and object. The objective thing which, so long as the contradiction exists, i.e. so long as the want is felt, stands on the other side, loses this quasi-independence, by its union with the subject. Those who talk of the permanence and immutability of the finite, as well subjective as objective, may see the reverse illustrated in the operations of every appetite. Appetite is, so to speak, the conviction that the subjective is only a half-truth, no more adequate than the objective. But appetite in the second place carries out its conviction. It brings about the supersession of these finites: it cancels the antithesis between the objective which would be and stay an objective only, and the subjective which in like manner would be and stay a subjective only.

人们的需要和意欲可说是目的的最切近例子。它们是人的机体内:感觉到的矛盾,这矛盾发生于有生命的主体本身的内部,并引起一种否定性的活动,去对这种还是单纯的主观性的否定性(或矛盾)加以否定。需要和意欲的满足恢复了主观与客观之间的和平。因为那客观的事物,只要这矛盾尚存在,或只要这意欲尚未满足,虽仍站在对方或外面,但通过与主观性相结合,便同样会扬弃它的片面性。对那些大谈有限事物以及主观事物和客观事物的固定性和不可克服性的人来说,每一个意欲的活动都可以提供相反的例证。意欲可以说是一种确信,即确信主观性同客观事物一样,也并不仅仅是片面的,没有真理的。意欲复进一步充分实现了这种确信;因为意欲的活动使得对这种片面的有限性的扬弃,并使得对主观的就仅仅是并永远是主观的,客观的就仅仅是并永远是客观的这种对立的扬弃,能成为事实。

(用主观欲望的例子让我们理解,主观欲望的平复是依靠欲望的实现。同样,客体之目的性的消灭,就是这一目的性的实现。)

As regards the action of the End, attention may be called to the fact, that in the syllogism, which represents that action, and shows the end closing with itself by the means of realisation, the radical feature is the negation of the termini That negation is the one just mentioned both of the immediate subjectivity appearing in the End as such, and of the immediate objectivity as seen in the means and the objects presupposed. This is the same negation as is in operation when the mind leaves the contingent things of the world as well as its own subjectivity and rises to God. It is the 'moment' or factor which(as noticed in the Introduction and§192) was overlooked and neglected in the analytic form of syllogisms, under which the so-called proofs of the Being of a God presented this elevation.

说到目的的活动,有一层还须注意,即在表示目的活动的推论里,目的通过实现的手段作为中介和自身相结合,而主要的特点则是对两极端的否定。这种否定性即使刚才所提的否定性,它一方面否定了表现在目的里的直接的主观性,另一方面否定了表现在手段里或作为前提的客体里的直接的客观性。这种否定性与下述的精神所运用的否定性是一样的:即当精神提高到神性时,它一方面超出(否定)了世间的偶然事物,一方面超出(否定)了它自身的主观性。用知性推论的形式去证明上帝的存在,便忽视并丢掉了这种精神提高的阐述(如在导言和192节所提到的),亦即忽视并丢掉了这种精神提高性质的推论和否定。

 

§205

In its primary and immediate aspect the Teleological relation is external design, and the notion confronts a presupposed object. The End is consequently finite, and that partly in its content, partly in the circumstance that it has an external condition in the object, which has to be found existing, and which is taken as material for its realization. Its self-determining is to that extent in form only. The unmediatedness of the End has the further result that its particularity or content——which as form——characteristic is the subjectivity of the End——is reflected into self, and so different from the totality of the form, subjectivity in general, the notion. This variety constitutes the finitude of Design within its own nature. The content of the End, in this way, is quite as limited, contingent, and given, as the object is particular and found ready to hand.

直接的目的关系最初只是一种外在的合目的性,在这个阶段里,概念与那假定在先的客体是对立的。因此目的是有限的,一方面由于它的内容(是主观的),一方面由于有一个现成的当前的客体作为它(目的)实现的材料或外在条件。在这种情形下,它的自身决定性只是形式的。直接性的目的还有一个特点,即它的特殊性或内容(即目的的主观性是作为形式规定而出现的)是反思自己的,因而它的内容表现出异于它的形式的全体,异于它的潜在的主观性,或概念。这种差异构成目的的自身内的有限性。这样,目的的内容便是受限制的、偶然的、给予的、正如目的的客体是特殊的、现成的。

(直接的目的关系一说,就是将目的性同客体分离了。此种状态下,不仅目的性是偶然的,受限的,而且客体也是受限制的。)

Generally speaking, the final cause is taken to mean nothing more than external design. In accordance with this view of it, things are supposed not to carry their vocation in themselves, but merely to be means employed and spent in realizing a purpose which lies outside of them. That may be said to be the point of view taken by Utility, which once played a great part even in the sciences, but of late has fallen into merited disrepute, now that people have begun to see that it failed to give a genuine insight into the nature of things. It is true that finite things as finite ought in justice to be viewed as non-ultimate, and as pointing beyond themselves. This negativity of finite things however is their own dialectic, and in order to ascertain it we must pay attention to their positive content.

一说到目的,一般人心中总以为只是指外在的合目地性而言。依这种看法,事物不具有自身的使命,只是被使用或利用来作为工具,或实现一个在自身以外的目的。这就是一般的使用的观点。这种观点前些时候即在科学范围内,也曾占有重要的地位,但后来却得到应得的轻视,因为大家看出了实用的观点不足以达到对事物本性的真切识见。无疑,有限事物正当地应被看成非究竟的,指向于超出自身以外的。但同时须知,有限事物的否定性就是它们自己的辩证法,为了认识事物的内在辩证法,人们首先必须注意它们的积极的内容。

(客体不应该仅仅作为目的性的出发点,而应该看做是目的性的发起者。)

Teleological observations on things often proceed from a well-meant wish to display the wisdom of God as it is especially revealed in nature. Now in thus trying to discover final causes for which the things serve as means, we must remember that we are stopping short at the finite, and are liable to fall into trifling reflections: as, for instance, if we not merely studied the vine in respect of its well-known use for man, but proceeded to consider the cork-tree in connection with the corks which are cut from its bark to put into the wine-bottles. Whole books used to be written in this spirit. It is easy to see that they promoted the genuine interest neither of religion nor of science. External design stands immediately in front of the idea: but what thus stands on the threshold often for that reason is least adequate.

目的论的看法常基于一种善意的兴趣,想要揭示出上帝的智慧特别启示于自然中。但必须指出,即这种寻求目的的方式,将事物作为达到目的的工具的看法,不是使我们超出有限界,而且容易陷于贫乏琐碎的反思。例如,我们仅从葡萄树对人们熟知的用处的观点来研究葡萄树,而且又去考察一种其皮可以制软木塞的橡树,并研究这树皮如何可以剥下来作为木塞以封酒瓶。过去曾有不少的书是根据这样的作风写成的。很容易看出,这种看法既不能增进宗教的真正兴趣,也不能增进科学的真正兴趣。外在的目的性直接站在理念的门前,但仅站在门前或门外总是很不够的。

(还是归结到一句话,外在的目的性不是客体所必然性需要的东西,而是外在的,偶然的。)

 

§206

The teleological relation is a syllogism in which the subjective end coalesces with the objectivity external to it, through a middle term which is the unity of both. This unity is on one hand the purposive action, on the other the Means, i.e. objectivity made directly subservient to purpose.

目的的关系是一推论(或三段式的统一体)。在这推论或统一体内,主观的目的通过一个中项与一外在于它的客观性相结合。这中项就是两者的统一:一方面是合目的性的活动,一方面是被设定为直接从属于目的的客观性,即工具。

(目的性是一种关系,也是这种关系所实现的过程,它需要有客观的基础,也需要客观的必然性需要,而且,更需要实现目的的行动。)

The development from End to Idea ensues by three stages, first, Subjective End; second, End in process of accomplishment; and third, End accomplished. First of all we have the Subjective End; and that, as the notion in independent being, is itself the totality of the elementary functions of the notion. The first of these functions is that of self-identical universality, as it were the neutral first water, in which everything is involved, but nothing as yet discriminated. The second of these elements is the particularizing of this universal, by which it acquires a specific content. As this specific content again is realized by the agency of the universal, the latter returns by its means back to itself, and coalesces with itself. Hence too when we set some end before us, we say that we 'conclude' to do something: a phrase which implies that we were, so to speak, open and accessible to this or that determination. Similarly we also at a further step speak of a man 'resolving' to do something, meaning that the agent steps forward out of his self-regarding inwardness and enters into dealings with the environing objectivity. This supplies the step from the merely Subjective End to the purposive action which tends outwards.

有目的到理念的发展须经历三个阶段:第一,主观的目的;第二,正在完成过程中的目的;第三,已完成的目的。首先,我们得到主观的目的,主观目的作为自为存在着的概念,其本身就是概念的各环节的全体。其中第一环节就是一个自身同一的普遍性,就好像那中和性的最初的水一样,这里面包含着一切,但是还没有任何东西区分开来。第二环节为这种普遍体的特殊化,通过这种特殊化过程,它就有了特定的内容了。当这特定的内容由于普遍体的活动过程而得到确立时,这普遍体便通过这种过程而回归到它自己,并且自己和它自己相结合。因此当我们提出一个目的在前面时,我们又说,我们决定要做某件事,我们从而首先好像把我们看成是开阔的,我们可以接受这一规定或那一规定。同样,我们有时进一步说,我们决定要做某件事,这意思是说,主体从它单纯自为存在着的内在性向前走出来,要与那外的与他对立的客观性打交道。于是就形成了由单纯的主观目的到那转向外面的合目的的活动的进展。

(三类目的的分法,是抽象的,而在实际上,目的性只有一个,客体的现实性得以实现的过程。)

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