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## 191.精读《小逻辑》笔记88——本质论第136节

(2011-07-14 23:33:43)

### 杂谈

191.精读《小逻辑》笔记88——本质论第136节

Force and the expression of force  （力和力的表现）

§136

[b]The one-and-same of this correlation (the self-relation found in it) is thus immediately a negative self-relation. The correlation is in short the mediating process whereby one and the same is first unaffected towards difference, and secondly is the negative self-relation, which repels itself as reflection-into-self to difference, and invests itself(as reflection-into-something-else)with existence, whilst it conversely leads back this reflection-into-other to self-relation and indifference. This gives the correlation of Force and its Expression.

（b）因此上述那种全体和部分的关系中唯一和同一的东西，即出现在那种关系中的自身联系，乃是一种直接的否定的自身联系，而且也可说是一种自身中介的过程，在这个过程里，那唯一和同一的东西（即自身联系）本是与差别不相干的。可是这自身联系即是否定的自身联系，它就对自己本身作为自身反映而形成的差别持排斥态度。并且把自己设定为反映他物而实存着的东西，而且反过来，又把这种反映他物引回到自身关系和无差别。这就发展到力和力的表现。

（能够引导物自身产生区分，把物质所反映东西不断发挥出来，这就是力的作用。）

The relationship of whole and part is the immediate and therefore unintelligent (mechanical) relation——a revulsion of self-identity into mere variety. Thus we pass from the whole to the parts, and from the parts to the whole: in the one we forget its opposition to the other, while each on its own account, at one time the whole, at another the parts, is taken to be an independent existence. In other words, when the parts are declared to subsist in the whole, and the whole to consist of the parts, we have either member of the relation at different times taken to be permanently subsistent, while the other is non-essential. In its superficial form the mechanical nexus consists in the parts being independent of each other and of the whole.

（部分和全体互相过渡，这只是一种机械的关系，并没有进展。也不能带来什么新的东西。）

This relation may be adopted for the progression ad infinitum, in the case of the divisibility of matter: and then it becomes an unintelligent alternation with the two sides. A thing at one time is taken as a whole: then we go on to specify the parts: this specifying is forgotten, and what was a part is regarded as a whole: then the specifying of the part comes up again, and so on for ever. But if this infinity be taken as the negative which it is, it is the negative self-relating element in the correlation——Force, the self-identical whole, or immanency——which yet supersedes this immanency and gives itself expression; and conversely the expression which vanishes and returns into Force.

（但是“力”的出现，将两方面的机械联系递推到无穷，物的无限可分性因而得到充分的体现，物在无限可分中体现其本质。）

Force, notwithstanding this infinity, is also finite: for the content, or the one and the same of the Force and its out-putting, is this identity at first only for the observer: the two sides of the relation are not yet, each on its own account, the concrete identity of that one and same, not yet the totality. For one another they are therefore different, and the relationship is a finite one. Force consequently requires solicitation from without: it works blindly: and on account of this defectiveness of form, the content is also limited and accidental. It is not yet genuinely identical with the form: not yet is it as a notion and an end; that is to say, it is not intrinsically and actually determinate. This difference is most vital, but not easy to apprehend: it will assume a clearer formulation when we reach Design. If it be overlooked, it leads to the confusion of conceiving God as Force, a confusion from which Herder's God especially suffers.

（但力的作用并不是无限的，而是与具体的物相联系的。在这里黑格尔还没有明确提出，物和力之间的统一关系。只是含蓄地说一下，不要把力的理解过于宽泛。）

It is often said that the nature of Force itself is unknown and only its manifestation apprehended. But, in the first place, it may be replied, every article in the import of Force is the same as what is specified in the Exertion: and the explanation of a phenomenon by a Force is a mere tautology. What is supposed to remain unknown, therefore, is really nothing but the empty form of reflection-into-self, by which alone the Force is distinguished from the Exertion——and that form too is something familiar. It is a form that does not make the slightest addition to the content and to the law, which have to be discovered from the phenomenon alone. Another assurance always given is that to speak of forces implies no theory as to their nature: and that being so, it is impossible to see why the form of Force has been introduced into the sciences at all. In the second place the nature of Force is undoubtedly unknown: we are still without any necessity binding and connecting its content together in itself, as we are without necessity in the content, in so far as it is expressly limited and hence has its character by means of another thing outside it.

（力和力的表现，是不可分离的，我们只有从力的表现中才能认识到力。如果排除力的表现而寻找力的性质，无异于缘木求鱼。）

(1)Compared with the immediate relation of whole and parts, the relation between force and its putting-forth may be considered infinite. In it that identity of the two sides is realized, which in the former relation only existed for the observer. The whole, though we can see that it consists of parts, ceases to be a whole when it is divided: whereas force is only shown to be force when it exerts itself, and in its exercise only comes back to itself. The exercise is only force once more. Yet, on further examination even this relation will appear finite, and finite in virtue of this mediation: just as, conversely, the relation of whole and parts is obviously finite in virtue of its immediacy. The first and simplest evidence for the finitude of the mediated relation of force and its exercise is, that each and every force is conditioned and requires something else than itself for its subsistence. For instance, a special vehicle of magnetic force, as is well known, is iron, the other properties of which, such as its color, specific weight, or relation to acids, are independent of this connection with magnetism. The same thing is seen in all other forces, which from one end to the other are found to be conditioned and mediated by something else than themselves. Another proof of the finite nature of force is that it requires solicitation before it can put itself forth. That through which the force is solicited, is itself another exertion of force, which cannot put itself forth without similar solicitation. This brings us either to a repetition of the infinite progression, or to a reciprocity of soliciting and being solicited. In either case we have no absolute beginning of motion. Force is not as yet, like the final cause, inherently self-determining: the content is given to it as determined, and force, when it exerts itself, is, according to the phrase, blind in its working. That phrase implies the distinction between abstract force-manifestation and teleological action.

（1）和全体与部分之直接关系的比较，可把力和力的发挥之关系，看作是无限的关系。因为在力与力的发挥的关系中，两方面的统一是明白建立起来的，而在全体与部分的关系中，双方的同一则只是潜在的。全体虽为部分所构成，但全体一经分割成部分，就失去为全体。但力之为力，则全靠其发挥作用，只有经过发挥，力才返回其自身，而力的发挥就是力的本身。但细究之，这种关系仍然是有限的，其所以有限，即在于它的中介存在。正如全体与部分之关系的有限，即在于它的直接性。力与力的发挥的中介关系的有限性，最明显的证明就是，每一种力都是受制约的，都需要自身以外的别的东西来维持其存在。例如，我们所熟知的磁力，需要有铁才能发挥出来，至于铁的别种特质，如颜色、比重或与酸的关系，却和铁与磁力的关系不相干。同样，别的力也始终必须自身以外的别的事物的制约和中介。另外，力的有限性也表明力需要外在的诱导才能发挥出来。而这诱导力的东西自身也仍是力的发挥，而这一力的发挥又同样需要诱导。这样我们所得到的，或者是复演那无穷的递推，或者是诱导的力与被诱导的力之相互作用。在任何一种情形下，我们都得不到运动的绝对开始，即因力不像目的因，还没有内容规定自己本身的力量，正如一般人所常说的那样，它的效力是盲目的。从这里就可以理解到抽象的力的发挥和有目的行动之间的区别。

（力和力的发挥是不可分离的。但力的发挥，是需要在联系中来寻找的，因为力的发挥之所以发生，就在于它是物之间的关系的一种表达过程。此时所谓的力，还是盲目的，没有既定的指向，它同目的因的推动力还有比较大的区别，——目的因有着明确的指向性。）

(2)The often-repeated statement, that the exercise of the force and not the force itself admits of being known, must be rejected as groundless. It is the very essence of force to manifest itself, and thus in the totality of manifestation, conceived as a law, we at the same time discover the force itself. And yet this assertion that force in its own self is unknowable betrays a well-grounded presentiment that this relation is finite. The several manifestations of a force at first meet us in indefinite multiplicity, and in their isolation seem accidental: but, reducing this multiplicity to its inner unity, which we term force, we see that the apparently contingent is necessary, by recognizing the law that rules it. But the different forces themselves are a multiplicity again, and in their mere juxtaposition seem to be contingent. Hence in empirical physics, we speak of the forces of gravity, magnetism, electricity, etc., and in psychology of the forces of memory, imagination, will, and all the other faculties. All this multiplicity again excites a craving to know these different forces as a single whole, nor would this craving be appeased even if the several forces were traced back to one common primary force. Such a primary force would be really no more than an empty abstraction, with as little content as the abstract thing-in-itself. And besides this, the correlation of force and manifestation is essentially a mediated correlation(of reciprocal dependence),and it must therefore contradict the notion of force to view it as primary or resting on itself.

（2）常被人提及的说法称，力的本身不可知，只有力的发挥才可知的说法，必须斥为没有根据。因为力之所以为力，只在于其向外发挥，而我们从力的全部发挥里所得到的规律，同时就是对力本身的认识。但从认力的全部发挥里所得到的规律，同时就是对力的本身的认识。那种认为力之本身不可知的说法，已经正确地预示了力和力的发挥之关系仅是有限的关系。就力之各种各样的发挥看来，最初好像只是一些杂多的没有规定性的东西，而且单就力的每一个别的发挥看来，也好像只是偶然的发动。直至把这种杂多归结为它内在的统一，而赋予其“力”的名称，并好像是在那里偶然的发挥中认识其支配着的规律时，我们才意识到它的必然性了。但各种不同的力自身仍然是杂多的东西，而且表现为彼此单纯地纷然杂陈，也好像是偶然的。因此在经验物理学中，我们说引力、磁力、电力等，同样在经验的心理学里，我们说记忆力、想象力、意志力以及其他的心理力量。于是又重新引起这些不同的力量归结为统一的全体的需要，而这种需要，即使我们能将这多种不同的力归结为一个共同的原始的力，仍不能得到满足。因为这种原始的力其实只是一个空洞的抽象东西，正如抽象的物自体一样，没有内容。并且，力与力的发挥的相互关系，本质上仍然是一种中介性的（相互依赖）的关系。如果认为力是原始的，独立不倚的，这未免与力的概念或定义相矛盾了。

（这里就出现一个矛盾：因为力和力的作用是统一的，只要认识了力的作用就能够认识力。但是，就力的发挥来说，似乎是杂乱的、没有既定的目标和方向，因此，就有一种需要：这些力是不是应该归结为一种本质的（终极的）力；而这种需要，同认为；力具有独立不倚、原始的（不依靠其他东西而存在的）性质，相矛盾。）

Such being the case with the nature of force, though we may consent to let the world be called a manifestation of divine forces, we should object to have God himself viewed as a mere force. For force is after all a subordinate and finite category. At the so-called renaissance of the sciences, when steps were taken to trace the single phenomena of nature back to underlying forces, the Church branded the enterprise as impious. The argument of the Church was as follows. If it be the forces of gravitation, of vegetation, etc., which occasion the movements of the heavenly bodies, the growth of plants, etc., there is nothing left for divine providence, and God sinks to the level of a leisurely onlooker, surveying this play of forces. The students of nature, it is true, and Newton more than others, when they employed the reflective category of force to explain natural phenomena, have expressly pleaded that the honor of God, as the Creator and Governor of the world, would not thereby be impaired. Still the logical issue of this explanation by means of forces is that the inferential understanding proceeds to fix each of these forces, and to maintain them in their finitude as ultimate. And contrasted with this de-infinitised world of independent forces and matters, the only terms in which it is possible still to describe God will present him in the abstract infinity of an unknowable supreme Being in some other world far away. This Is precisely the position of materialism, and of modern 'freethinking', whose theology ignores what God is and restricts itself to the mere fact that he is. In this dispute therefore the Church and the religious mind have to a certain extent the right on their side. The finite forms of understanding certainly fail to fulfill the conditions for a knowledge either of Nature or of the formations in the world of Mind as they truly are. Yet on the other side it is impossible to overlook the forma right which, in the first place, entitles the empirical sciences to vindicate the right of thought to know the existent world in all the specialty of its content, and to seek something further than the bare statement of mere abstract faith that God created and governs the world. When our religious consciousness, resting on the authority of the Church, teaches us that God created the world by his almighty will, that he guides the stars in their courses, and vouchsafes to all his creatures their existence and their well-being, the question Why? is still left to answer. Now it is the answer to this, question which forms the common task of empirical science and of philosophy. When religion refuses to recognize this problem, or the right to put it, and appeals to the unsearchableness of the decrees of God, it is taking up the same agnostic-ground as is taken by the mere Enlightenment of understanding. Such an appeal is no better than an arbitrary dogmatism, which contravenes the express command of Christianity, to know God in spirit and in truth, and is prompted by a humility which is not Christian, but born of ostentatious bigotry.

（自然科学寻找力的尝试被宗教认为是对上帝的冒犯，如果找到了力，就会把上帝放到尴尬的地位。这一点，宗教学家是对的。但如果自然哲学只是进展到认为，力是推动物质运动的原因，则不算什么成就，因为，对于为什么会有力发生作用这一问题，更为关涉重大。宗教不允许来讨论这件一问题，也就是直观地认识到，这一问题是关键所在。）

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