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191.精读《小逻辑》笔记88——本质论第136节

(2011-07-14 23:33:43)
标签:

黑格尔

小逻辑

本质论

力的表现

全体

部分

杂谈

分类: 杂读笔记(钱先生指示)

191.精读《小逻辑》笔记88——本质论第136节

 

黑格尔在这里并没有把力讲透彻,或者这因为,“力”并不是他所要讲的主要对象,而只是为了印证他关于“内”“外”关系、整体与部分关系的一种例子而已。——这一节内容中,这种感觉比较强烈。因为,单单是“力”本身,并不是那么简单能够说清楚的。而黑格尔在这里主要是通过说力和力的表现说明事物之关系这一问题。力实际上就是力的表现,没有表现,也就无所谓力。而力是推动者,是从整体无穷推进到部分,或者从部分无穷推进到整体的动力。

 

Force and the expression of force  (力和力的表现)

§136

[b]The one-and-same of this correlation (the self-relation found in it) is thus immediately a negative self-relation. The correlation is in short the mediating process whereby one and the same is first unaffected towards difference, and secondly is the negative self-relation, which repels itself as reflection-into-self to difference, and invests itself(as reflection-into-something-else)with existence, whilst it conversely leads back this reflection-into-other to self-relation and indifference. This gives the correlation of Force and its Expression.

(b)因此上述那种全体和部分的关系中唯一和同一的东西,即出现在那种关系中的自身联系,乃是一种直接的否定的自身联系,而且也可说是一种自身中介的过程,在这个过程里,那唯一和同一的东西(即自身联系)本是与差别不相干的。可是这自身联系即是否定的自身联系,它就对自己本身作为自身反映而形成的差别持排斥态度。并且把自己设定为反映他物而实存着的东西,而且反过来,又把这种反映他物引回到自身关系和无差别。这就发展到力和力的表现。

(能够引导物自身产生区分,把物质所反映东西不断发挥出来,这就是力的作用。)

The relationship of whole and part is the immediate and therefore unintelligent (mechanical) relation——a revulsion of self-identity into mere variety. Thus we pass from the whole to the parts, and from the parts to the whole: in the one we forget its opposition to the other, while each on its own account, at one time the whole, at another the parts, is taken to be an independent existence. In other words, when the parts are declared to subsist in the whole, and the whole to consist of the parts, we have either member of the relation at different times taken to be permanently subsistent, while the other is non-essential. In its superficial form the mechanical nexus consists in the parts being independent of each other and of the whole.

全体和部分的关系是直接的,因而是无意义的(机械的)关系,并且是一种将自身同一性转化为差异性的过程。在这转化过程里,全体过渡为部分,部分过渡为全体,而且在这一方面,便忘记了它与那一个方面的对立,因为每一方面,无论全体一面,或个别一面都各自被认为是独立存在。换言之,如认为部分持存与全体内,并以全体为部分所构成,则我们一时便会认为全体是持存的,另一时又会认部分是持存的,同时每一方都认为对方是不重要的。机械关系的肤浅性一般即在于各部分即彼此独立,而部分又离全体而独立。

(部分和全体互相过渡,这只是一种机械的关系,并没有进展。也不能带来什么新的东西。)

This relation may be adopted for the progression ad infinitum, in the case of the divisibility of matter: and then it becomes an unintelligent alternation with the two sides. A thing at one time is taken as a whole: then we go on to specify the parts: this specifying is forgotten, and what was a part is regarded as a whole: then the specifying of the part comes up again, and so on for ever. But if this infinity be taken as the negative which it is, it is the negative self-relating element in the correlation——Force, the self-identical whole, or immanency——which yet supersedes this immanency and gives itself expression; and conversely the expression which vanishes and returns into Force.

这种无聊的两方面循环往复的抽象关系也可以采取递推无穷的方式。物质之可分性的无穷进展的关系就是如此:一个东西在一旦被认作是全体,于是便进入对其部分的分析,而这个规定旋即被忘记,反而认这部分是全体,于是又重新开始寻找其部分,如此递推以至无穷。但如果将这种无穷递推的过程认为是否定的东西——它本身就是否定的东西——那么它就是这两方关系中的否定的自身联系,它就是力,一个作为自在存在的自身同一的全体。同时它又是自己扬弃其内在存在并且表现其自身于外,这就是力的表现。反过来,这力的表现又消逝了而回复到力。

(但是“力”的出现,将两方面的机械联系递推到无穷,物的无限可分性因而得到充分的体现,物在无限可分中体现其本质。)

Force, notwithstanding this infinity, is also finite: for the content, or the one and the same of the Force and its out-putting, is this identity at first only for the observer: the two sides of the relation are not yet, each on its own account, the concrete identity of that one and same, not yet the totality. For one another they are therefore different, and the relationship is a finite one. Force consequently requires solicitation from without: it works blindly: and on account of this defectiveness of form, the content is also limited and accidental. It is not yet genuinely identical with the form: not yet is it as a notion and an end; that is to say, it is not intrinsically and actually determinate. This difference is most vital, but not easy to apprehend: it will assume a clearer formulation when we reach Design. If it be overlooked, it leads to the confusion of conceiving God as Force, a confusion from which Herder's God especially suffers.

力虽说具有这种递推的无限性,但也是有限的。因为(力的)内容,或力及其表现和唯一和同一的东西,首先只是潜在地是这种同一性,因为关系的两个方面的每一方面本身都还不是关系的具体同一性,都还不是全体。所以,它们是彼此相异的,而它们的关系也是一种有限的关系。因此,力需要外在的诱导,它是盲目地起作用,而且由于这样的缺乏形式,所以内容也是受限制的、偶然的。它的内容与形式还没有真正的同一性,还不是自在自为地规定了的概念和目的。——这种区别有高度的重要性,却不易了解。要到以后讨论目的的概念本身时,才作较细密的规定。如果忽视了这个区别,就会引起混乱,误认为上帝是力,赫尔德的上帝观就特别犯了这个毛病。

(但力的作用并不是无限的,而是与具体的物相联系的。在这里黑格尔还没有明确提出,物和力之间的统一关系。只是含蓄地说一下,不要把力的理解过于宽泛。)

It is often said that the nature of Force itself is unknown and only its manifestation apprehended. But, in the first place, it may be replied, every article in the import of Force is the same as what is specified in the Exertion: and the explanation of a phenomenon by a Force is a mere tautology. What is supposed to remain unknown, therefore, is really nothing but the empty form of reflection-into-self, by which alone the Force is distinguished from the Exertion——and that form too is something familiar. It is a form that does not make the slightest addition to the content and to the law, which have to be discovered from the phenomenon alone. Another assurance always given is that to speak of forces implies no theory as to their nature: and that being so, it is impossible to see why the form of Force has been introduced into the sciences at all. In the second place the nature of Force is undoubtedly unknown: we are still without any necessity binding and connecting its content together in itself, as we are without necessity in the content, in so far as it is expressly limited and hence has its character by means of another thing outside it.

常有人说,力本身的性质是不可知的,人们所知的只是其表现。须知,一方面,力的整个内容规定与力的表现的内容规定正是同一个东西,因此,用一种力以解释一个现象,只是一空洞的同语反复。所以一般人以为无法知道的东西,实际上仅不过是自身反映的空洞形式,唯有通过这种空洞的形式,力和它的表现才有区别,而这种空洞的形式同样是某种熟知之物。这种形式对那些只能从现象中得到认识之内容和规律,却毫无增益。到处也都有人肯定地说,使用这种形式并不会对力的性质提出什么说明,因而我们真无法看出当初为什么会把力的形式引进到科学里面来。但另一方面,力的性质当然是一个还没有被知道的东西,因为,无论就力的内容在其本身内如何必然地连结在一起,无论里的内容自身如何受到限制,因而它的规定性必须以外在于它的他物为中介,才会连结在一起,——对这些,我们都仍然缺乏理解。

(力和力的表现,是不可分离的,我们只有从力的表现中才能认识到力。如果排除力的表现而寻找力的性质,无异于缘木求鱼。)

(1)Compared with the immediate relation of whole and parts, the relation between force and its putting-forth may be considered infinite. In it that identity of the two sides is realized, which in the former relation only existed for the observer. The whole, though we can see that it consists of parts, ceases to be a whole when it is divided: whereas force is only shown to be force when it exerts itself, and in its exercise only comes back to itself. The exercise is only force once more. Yet, on further examination even this relation will appear finite, and finite in virtue of this mediation: just as, conversely, the relation of whole and parts is obviously finite in virtue of its immediacy. The first and simplest evidence for the finitude of the mediated relation of force and its exercise is, that each and every force is conditioned and requires something else than itself for its subsistence. For instance, a special vehicle of magnetic force, as is well known, is iron, the other properties of which, such as its color, specific weight, or relation to acids, are independent of this connection with magnetism. The same thing is seen in all other forces, which from one end to the other are found to be conditioned and mediated by something else than themselves. Another proof of the finite nature of force is that it requires solicitation before it can put itself forth. That through which the force is solicited, is itself another exertion of force, which cannot put itself forth without similar solicitation. This brings us either to a repetition of the infinite progression, or to a reciprocity of soliciting and being solicited. In either case we have no absolute beginning of motion. Force is not as yet, like the final cause, inherently self-determining: the content is given to it as determined, and force, when it exerts itself, is, according to the phrase, blind in its working. That phrase implies the distinction between abstract force-manifestation and teleological action.

(1)和全体与部分之直接关系的比较,可把力和力的发挥之关系,看作是无限的关系。因为在力与力的发挥的关系中,两方面的统一是明白建立起来的,而在全体与部分的关系中,双方的同一则只是潜在的。全体虽为部分所构成,但全体一经分割成部分,就失去为全体。但力之为力,则全靠其发挥作用,只有经过发挥,力才返回其自身,而力的发挥就是力的本身。但细究之,这种关系仍然是有限的,其所以有限,即在于它的中介存在。正如全体与部分之关系的有限,即在于它的直接性。力与力的发挥的中介关系的有限性,最明显的证明就是,每一种力都是受制约的,都需要自身以外的别的东西来维持其存在。例如,我们所熟知的磁力,需要有铁才能发挥出来,至于铁的别种特质,如颜色、比重或与酸的关系,却和铁与磁力的关系不相干。同样,别的力也始终必须自身以外的别的事物的制约和中介。另外,力的有限性也表明力需要外在的诱导才能发挥出来。而这诱导力的东西自身也仍是力的发挥,而这一力的发挥又同样需要诱导。这样我们所得到的,或者是复演那无穷的递推,或者是诱导的力与被诱导的力之相互作用。在任何一种情形下,我们都得不到运动的绝对开始,即因力不像目的因,还没有内容规定自己本身的力量,正如一般人所常说的那样,它的效力是盲目的。从这里就可以理解到抽象的力的发挥和有目的行动之间的区别。

(力和力的发挥是不可分离的。但力的发挥,是需要在联系中来寻找的,因为力的发挥之所以发生,就在于它是物之间的关系的一种表达过程。此时所谓的力,还是盲目的,没有既定的指向,它同目的因的推动力还有比较大的区别,——目的因有着明确的指向性。)

(2)The often-repeated statement, that the exercise of the force and not the force itself admits of being known, must be rejected as groundless. It is the very essence of force to manifest itself, and thus in the totality of manifestation, conceived as a law, we at the same time discover the force itself. And yet this assertion that force in its own self is unknowable betrays a well-grounded presentiment that this relation is finite. The several manifestations of a force at first meet us in indefinite multiplicity, and in their isolation seem accidental: but, reducing this multiplicity to its inner unity, which we term force, we see that the apparently contingent is necessary, by recognizing the law that rules it. But the different forces themselves are a multiplicity again, and in their mere juxtaposition seem to be contingent. Hence in empirical physics, we speak of the forces of gravity, magnetism, electricity, etc., and in psychology of the forces of memory, imagination, will, and all the other faculties. All this multiplicity again excites a craving to know these different forces as a single whole, nor would this craving be appeased even if the several forces were traced back to one common primary force. Such a primary force would be really no more than an empty abstraction, with as little content as the abstract thing-in-itself. And besides this, the correlation of force and manifestation is essentially a mediated correlation(of reciprocal dependence),and it must therefore contradict the notion of force to view it as primary or resting on itself.

(2)常被人提及的说法称,力的本身不可知,只有力的发挥才可知的说法,必须斥为没有根据。因为力之所以为力,只在于其向外发挥,而我们从力的全部发挥里所得到的规律,同时就是对力本身的认识。但从认力的全部发挥里所得到的规律,同时就是对力的本身的认识。那种认为力之本身不可知的说法,已经正确地预示了力和力的发挥之关系仅是有限的关系。就力之各种各样的发挥看来,最初好像只是一些杂多的没有规定性的东西,而且单就力的每一个别的发挥看来,也好像只是偶然的发动。直至把这种杂多归结为它内在的统一,而赋予其“力”的名称,并好像是在那里偶然的发挥中认识其支配着的规律时,我们才意识到它的必然性了。但各种不同的力自身仍然是杂多的东西,而且表现为彼此单纯地纷然杂陈,也好像是偶然的。因此在经验物理学中,我们说引力、磁力、电力等,同样在经验的心理学里,我们说记忆力、想象力、意志力以及其他的心理力量。于是又重新引起这些不同的力量归结为统一的全体的需要,而这种需要,即使我们能将这多种不同的力归结为一个共同的原始的力,仍不能得到满足。因为这种原始的力其实只是一个空洞的抽象东西,正如抽象的物自体一样,没有内容。并且,力与力的发挥的相互关系,本质上仍然是一种中介性的(相互依赖)的关系。如果认为力是原始的,独立不倚的,这未免与力的概念或定义相矛盾了。

(这里就出现一个矛盾:因为力和力的作用是统一的,只要认识了力的作用就能够认识力。但是,就力的发挥来说,似乎是杂乱的、没有既定的目标和方向,因此,就有一种需要:这些力是不是应该归结为一种本质的(终极的)力;而这种需要,同认为;力具有独立不倚、原始的(不依靠其他东西而存在的)性质,相矛盾。)

Such being the case with the nature of force, though we may consent to let the world be called a manifestation of divine forces, we should object to have God himself viewed as a mere force. For force is after all a subordinate and finite category. At the so-called renaissance of the sciences, when steps were taken to trace the single phenomena of nature back to underlying forces, the Church branded the enterprise as impious. The argument of the Church was as follows. If it be the forces of gravitation, of vegetation, etc., which occasion the movements of the heavenly bodies, the growth of plants, etc., there is nothing left for divine providence, and God sinks to the level of a leisurely onlooker, surveying this play of forces. The students of nature, it is true, and Newton more than others, when they employed the reflective category of force to explain natural phenomena, have expressly pleaded that the honor of God, as the Creator and Governor of the world, would not thereby be impaired. Still the logical issue of this explanation by means of forces is that the inferential understanding proceeds to fix each of these forces, and to maintain them in their finitude as ultimate. And contrasted with this de-infinitised world of independent forces and matters, the only terms in which it is possible still to describe God will present him in the abstract infinity of an unknowable supreme Being in some other world far away. This Is precisely the position of materialism, and of modern 'freethinking', whose theology ignores what God is and restricts itself to the mere fact that he is. In this dispute therefore the Church and the religious mind have to a certain extent the right on their side. The finite forms of understanding certainly fail to fulfill the conditions for a knowledge either of Nature or of the formations in the world of Mind as they truly are. Yet on the other side it is impossible to overlook the forma right which, in the first place, entitles the empirical sciences to vindicate the right of thought to know the existent world in all the specialty of its content, and to seek something further than the bare statement of mere abstract faith that God created and governs the world. When our religious consciousness, resting on the authority of the Church, teaches us that God created the world by his almighty will, that he guides the stars in their courses, and vouchsafes to all his creatures their existence and their well-being, the question Why? is still left to answer. Now it is the answer to this, question which forms the common task of empirical science and of philosophy. When religion refuses to recognize this problem, or the right to put it, and appeals to the unsearchableness of the decrees of God, it is taking up the same agnostic-ground as is taken by the mere Enlightenment of understanding. Such an appeal is no better than an arbitrary dogmatism, which contravenes the express command of Christianity, to know God in spirit and in truth, and is prompted by a humility which is not Christian, but born of ostentatious bigotry.

根据这番对力的性质的讨论,我们虽勉强可以承认说,这实存的世界是神圣的力的表现,但我们反对认为上帝是一单纯的力,因为力仅仅是一个从属于有限的范畴。在文艺复兴时期,许多自然哲学家曾把自然界的各种现象追溯一种根植于各现象背后的力。这种说法被当时的教会斥为无神论,实其宜也。大概教会认为,如果认为天体运行是由于引力,植物生长是由于生力等等,那就没有什么化育需要天意主宰,而上帝就会被贬抑成各种自然力运行之外的一个悠闲静观者。诚然,许多自然科学家,特别是牛顿,当他们用抽象的力之范畴来解释自然现象时,都明白地保证,他们的学说绝不会损害作为世界创造者和主宰者的上帝的尊荣。但这种用力的观念来解释自然的办法,其逻辑结果就是:抽象的理智根据推论,会执着于每一个别的力本身,并且将这有限性的力坚持当作究竟至极者,和这种有限化了的独立的力和质素构成的世界相反,便只好用抽象的无限性去规定上帝,说他是不可知的、最高的、远彼岸的存在。这种唯物论和近代启蒙思想的立场,它们对上帝的看法,只限于表面上承认上帝的存在,而忽视了上帝之所以存在。所以在这场辩论中,教会和宗教思想在某种意义上是站在较正确的一方。因为那有限的理智的思想方式,对认识自然界以及精神世界的诸形态的真理,都不能让人满意。另一方面,我们却不能忽视,经验有理由,争取对现存时间及其各方面内容的规定性予以思维的理解,并进一步寻求比只是抽象地相信上帝是世界之创造者和主宰者更深彻的智慧。当受到教会权威支持的宗教意识告诉我们说,上帝以其全能的意志创造世界,上帝指导星球在轨道上运行,并赋予万物以存在和幸福时,还剩下一个“为什么?”这个问题没有解答。回答“为什么”的问题,就是科学、经验科学以及哲学科学的共同任务了。当宗教意识拒绝承认科学哲学有权回答这个问题,并拒绝科学哲学提出这一问题,而用神圣之谜不可思索的借口来搪塞,它的立场依然与上面所提到的单纯抽象的启蒙思想的立场是一致的。而且这种借口与基督教企求在精神和真理去认识上帝的明白命令相违背,而只是一种任意的独断,这种独断并不是基于基督徒的谦卑,而是出于高傲的狂热和顽固。

(自然科学寻找力的尝试被宗教认为是对上帝的冒犯,如果找到了力,就会把上帝放到尴尬的地位。这一点,宗教学家是对的。但如果自然哲学只是进展到认为,力是推动物质运动的原因,则不算什么成就,因为,对于为什么会有力发生作用这一问题,更为关涉重大。宗教不允许来讨论这件一问题,也就是直观地认识到,这一问题是关键所在。)

 

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