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187.精读《小逻辑》笔记84——本质论第131节

(2011-07-10 22:32:47)
标签:

黑格尔

小逻辑

本质论

现象

质料

形式

现实

杂谈

分类: 杂读笔记(钱先生指示)

187.精读《小逻辑》笔记84——本质论第131节

 

在现象这一部分,我感觉还需要进行更多的思考,从本节到134节,主要讲的是现象。个人理解,黑格尔把现象的地位抬得比较高,认为是质料和形式的外在表现,而这种“外在”是很重要的,因为我们只有通过这种外在才能认识物之本身。至于,存在、现象、持存之间的关系,还是需要进一步的探索才能更清楚。

 

Second Subdivision: Essence  World of Appearance——Content Form Relation

§131

The Essence must appear or shine forth. Its shining or reflection in it is the suspension and translation of it to immediacy, which, while as reflection-into-self it is matter or subsistence, is also form, reflection-on-something-else, a subsistence which sets itself aside. To show or shine is the characteristic by which essence is distinguished from Being——by which it is essence; and it is this show which, when it is developed, shows itself, and is Appearance. Essence accordingly is not something beyond or behind appearance, but——just because it is the essence which exists——the existence is Appearance (Forth-shining).

本质必定要表现出来。本质的映现于自身内是扬弃其自身而成为一种直接性的过程。此种直接性,就其为自身反映而言,为持存、为质料,就其为反映他物,自己扬弃其持存而言,为形式。显现或映现是本质之所以是本质而不是存在的特性。发展了的映现就是现象。因此本质不在现象之后,或现象之外,而即由于本质是实际存在的东西,实际存在就是现象。

(质料和存在是本质在自身和他物中的映现形象,但本质并不是与二者分离的,而是就在质料和存在之内。现象是质料或形式的具体体现,实际上也是本质。)

Existence stated explicitly in its contradiction is Appearance. But appearance (forth-showing) is not to be confused with a mere show (shining). Show is the proximate truth of Being or immediacy. The immediate, instead of being, as we suppose, something independent, resting on its own self, is a mere show, and as such it is packed or summed up under the simplicity of the immanent essence. The essence is, in the first place, the sum total of the showing itself, shining in itself (inwardly); but, far from abiding in this inwardness, it comes as a ground forward into existence; and this existence being grounded not in itself, but on something else, is just appearance. In our imagination we ordinarily combine with the term appearance or phenomenon the conception of an indefinite congeries of things existing, the being of which is purely relative, and which consequently do not rest on a foundation of their own, but are esteemed only as passing stages. But in this conception it is no less implied that essence dose not linger behind or beyond appearance. Rather it is, we may say, the infinite kindness which lets its own show freely issue into immediacy, and graciously allows it the joy of existence. The appearance which is thus created does not stand on its own feet, and has its being not in itself but in something else.(以下英文部分缺失)

在矛盾里的实存就是现象。现象却不可与单纯的假象(show)相混。假象(show)是存在或直接性最切近的真理。直接性并不是指独立自倚之物,反之,直接性只是一种假象,被看成是内在本质之单纯性的总拼凑。本质最初是映现在自身内的全体,但它并不停留在这种内在性里,而是作为根据进展到实存,而这个实存的根据又不在其自身内而在他物内,也只是现象。当我们说现象时,总联想到一堆不确定的具有杂多性的实际存在着的事物,它们的存在纯粹是相对的,因而没有自身的基础。由此,即可同时可触,本质并不徘徊于现象之外或现象之后,毋宁可以说,本质似乎以其无限的仁惠,让它的假象透露在直接性里,并予以享受定在的欣幸。于是,这样建立起来的现象便不站在自己的脚跟上,它的存在便不在自身而在他物。作为本质的上帝,当他让其自身显现在不同阶段的实存中,也可以说具有创造世界的大仁,但同时他又是超出于这世界的大力量,并且又是正义,可以使得这个实存世界的孤立自存的内容,表现为只是单纯的现象。

(现象是本质的表现,本质并不是固守在自身内,而是要通过现象透露出来。现象和本质之间,并不是二分的,而是一体的。)

Appearance is in every way a very important grade of the logical idea. It may be said to be the distinction of philosophy from ordinary consciousness that it sees the merely phenomenal character of what the latter supposes to have a self-subsistent being. The significance of appearance however must be properly grasped, or mistakes will arise. To say that anything is mere appearance may be misinterpreted to mean that, as compared to what is merely phenomenal, there is greater truth in the immediate, in that which is. Now, in strict fact, the case is precisely the reverse. Appearance is higher than mere Being——a richer category because it holds in combination the two elements of reflection-into-self and reflection-into-other: whereas Being(or immediacy)is still mere relationlessness, and apparently rests upon itself alone. Still, to say that anything is only an appearance suggests a real flaw, which consists in this, that Appearance is still divided against itself and without intrinsic stability. Beyond and above mere appearance comes in the first place Actuality, the third grade of Essence, of which we shall afterwards speak.

现象当然是逻辑理念的一个很重要的阶段。我们可以说哲学与普通意识的区别,就在于哲学能把普通意识认为是独立自存之物,认出其为现象。问题在于,我们必须正确理解现象的意义,以免陷于错误。如当我们说某物是现象时,一般会误解为,同单纯的现象相比,那直接的或存在着的东西,好像要更高一级。事实恰恰相反,现象要比当前单纯存在反而要更高一级。现象是存在的真理,是比存在更为丰富的范畴,因为现象包括自身反映和反映他物两方面内容,反之,存在或直接性只是片面的没有联系的,并且似乎只是单纯地依靠自身。再则,说某物只是现象,总暗示那物有某种缺点,其缺点即在于现象自身有了分裂或矛盾,使得他没有内在稳定性。比单纯现象较高一级的范畴就是现实,现实就是本质内第三阶段的范畴,这个将在稍后讨论。

(由于,现象背后就是本质,处在内外的和前后的联系之中,所以,其被认为是比存在要更高级的。但是,现象是表面的,其还是要发展,进入到现实。)

In the history of Modern Philosophy, Kant has the merit of first rehabilitating this distinction between the common and the philosophic modes of thought. He stopped half-way, however, when he attached to Appearance a subjective meaning only, and put the abstract essence immovable outside it as the thing-in-itself beyond the reach of our cognition. For it is the very nature of the world of immediate objects to be appearance only. Knowing it to be so, we know at the same time, the essence, which, far from staying behind or beyond the appearance, rather manifests its own essentiality by deposing the world to a mere appearance. One can hardly quarrel with the plain man who, in his desire for totality, cannot acquiesce in the doctrine of subjective idealism, that we are solely concerned with phenomena.

康德在近代哲学史里第一个有如此功绩:将前面所提到的常识与哲学思想的区别恢复原貌。但是康德只是走了一半就停住了,因为他只理解到现象的主观意义,像感知所达不到物自身一样,将抽象的本质认为是固定外在的。殊不知,直接的对象世界之所以只能是现象,是由于它自己的本性使然,当我们认识了现象,同时也就认识了本质,因为本质并不是留在现象之后或现象之外,而正是由于将世界降低到仅仅现象的地位,从而表现为本质。一般人试图认识全体时,对于这种主观唯心论的(我们只知道现象)说法,会满腹狐疑,那就是无可责难的。

(康德的不足之处在于,他认为认识了现象,并不代表就认识了本质。而实际上,只要认识了现象,就已经是认识了本质。)

The plain man, however, in his desire to save the objectivity of knowledge, may very naturally return to abstract immediacy and maintain that immediacy to be true and actual. In a little work published under the title A Report, Clear as Day, to the Larger Public touching the Proper Nature of the Latest Philosophy: an Attempt to force the Reader to understand, Fichte examined the opposition between subjective idealism and immediate consciousness in a popular form, under the shape of a dialogue between the author and the reader, and tried hard to prove that the subjective idealist's view was right. In this dialogue the reader complains to the author that he has completely failed to place himself in the idealist's position, and is inconsolable in the thought that things around him are not real things but mere appearances. The affliction of the reader can scarcely be blamed when he is expected to consider himself hemmed in by an impervious circle of purely subjective conceptions. Apart from this subjective view of Appearance, however, we have all reason to rejoice that the things which environ us are appearances and not steadfast and independent existences; since in that case we should soon perish of hunger, both bodily and mental.

不过,朴素意识意欲拯救知识的客观性时,很易于退回到抽象的直接性,不加深究,坚持以为,当前所给予的这些抽象直接的东西就是真理和现实。费希特的一本小书《昭如白日的解说——对公众谈谈关于最新哲学的真正性质,一个逼着读者去理解的尝试》,用著者和读者的对话的通俗方式去讨论主观唯心论与朴素意识的对立,以证明主观唯心论之立场的正确性。在这个对话里,读者向著者诉苦说,他实在不能接受唯心主义的立场,因为,一想到围绕着他的事物都不是真实的事物,而只是现象,就使他感到怅惘而失落。读者的这种苦恼,实在无可厚非,因为我们想要他把自己看成是被禁锢在一个无法穿透的单纯主观观念的包围中。可是另外,撇开这种纯主观的现象观不论,我们不能不说,我们有一切理由足以感到欣慰,因为,我们所须应付的围绕着我们的事物,并不是坚固不催、独立不倚的实际存在,而只是一些现象,假如真是那样独立而坚实,那么我们的身体以及精神,都会立刻死于饥饿。

(我想,大多数人,都会对肤浅的唯心主义表示怀疑,因为这种唯心主义认为,身边的一切都是虚幻的、变动的,都是出于意识的。如此,会让人感到无助,因为,在大多人的意识中,我们的思想是经常变动的,而周围的存在则保持不变。但深入理解唯心主义的人就会知道,我们身边的看似坚实的东西,实际上只是我们的意识感觉而已,实际上,在我们感知身边一切的东西之时,是我们的思想将这些感知到的东西进行整理,或者说,是我们的思想,给予我们认识的能力,使得外在世界能够被我们所认识。说存在着现象,并不是唯物,也不是唯心。)

 

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