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179.精读《小逻辑》笔记76——本质论第121节

(2011-07-01 23:59:42)
标签:

黑格尔

小逻辑

本质论

根据

充足理由律

诡辩派

莱布尼茨

制动因

目的因

杂谈

分类: 杂读笔记(钱先生指示)

179.精读《小逻辑》笔记76——本质论第121节

 

这一节的主题词是“充足理由律”,也就是说,任何事物都有其充足的根据。这里所说的充足的根据,是事物本身自在自为的根据。但是,我们日常所遇到的,往往是形式的理由,是“非充足”的,以至于,对于一个事物,有很多似是而非的理由,这些理由,都是片面的、形式的。莱布尼茨创造了制动因和目的因两个理由,为我们认识充足理由提供很好的教育。黑格尔通过分析诡辩论,指出形式理由律的存在原因。在进一步认识到根据的内涵的同时,也促进我们反省自己,是不是用一些牵强的理由,来为事物寻找根据。这一节,尽管有些地方英文是缺失的,但总体读起来比较顺。

 

[c]The Ground  (根据)

§121

The Ground is the unity of identity and difference, the truth of what difference and identity have turned out to be——the reflection-into-self, which is equally a reflection-into-other, and vice-versa. It is essence put explicitly as a totality.

根据是同一和差别的统一,是从同一和差别中得出来的真理,——自身反映也反映对方,反过来说,反映对方也同样反映自身。根据就是被设定为全体的本质。

The maxim of Ground runs thus: Everything has its Sufficient Ground: that is, the true essentiality of any thing is not the predication of it as identical with itself, or as different (various), or merely positive, or merely negative, but as having its Being in an other, which, being the self-same, is its essence. And to this extent the essence is not abstract reflection into self, but into an other. The Ground is the essence in its own inwardness; the essence is intrinsically a ground; and it is a ground only when it is a ground of somewhat, of an other.

根据的规律(充足理由律)是这样说的:某物的存在,必有其充分的根据,这就是说,某物真正的本质,不在于说某物是自身同一或异于对方,也不仅在于说某物是肯定或否定的,而在于表明一物的存在即在他物之内,这个他物即是与它自身同一的,即是它的本质。这本质也同样不是抽象的自身反映,而是反映他物。根据就是内在存在着的本质,而本质实质上即是根据。根据之所以为根据,即由于它是某物或一个他物的根据。

(根据就是存在的本质,反过来说,物之本质就是它存在的根据。而只要物有存在,就是因为其背后的本质发挥作用,也就是,赋予其根据。)

We must be careful, when we say that the ground is the unity of identity and difference, not to understand by this unity an abstract identity. Otherwise we only change the name, while we still think the identity (of understanding) already seen to be false. To avoid this misconception we may say that the ground, besides being the unity, is also the difference of identity and difference. In that case in the ground, which promised at first to supersede contradiction, a new contradiction seems to arise. It is however, a contradiction, which, so far from persisting quietly in itself, is rather the expulsion of it from itself. The ground is a ground only to the extent that it affords ground: but the result which thus issued from the ground is only itself. In this lies its formalism. The ground and what is grounded are one and the same content: the difference between the two is the mere difference of form which separates simple self-relation, on the one hand, from mediation, or derivativeness on the other. Inquiry into the grounds of things goes with the point of view which, as already noted (§112n), is adopted by Reflection. We wish, as it were, to see the matter double, first in its immediacy and secondly in its ground, where it is no longer immediate. This is the plain meaning of the Law of Sufficient Ground is that things should essentially be viewed as mediated. The manner in which Formal Logic establishes this law sets a bad example to other sciences. Formal Logic asks these sciences not to accept their subject-matter as it is immediately given; and yet herself lays down a law of thought without deducing it——in other words, without exhibiting its mediation. With the same justice as the logician maintains our faculty of thought to be so constituted that we must ask for the ground of everything, might the physicist, when asked why a man who falls into water is drowned, reply that man happens to be so constituted that he cannot live under water; or the jurist, when asked why a criminal is punished, reply that civil society happens to be so constituted that crimes cannot be left unpunished.

当说根据应是同一与差别之统一时,我们必须了解这里所谓统一并不是抽象的同一,因为否则,我们只是换了个名字,而仍然是指那已认作不真的理智抽象同一。为了避免这种误解,我们还可以说,根据不仅是同一与差别的统一,而且有别于同一与差别。这样,本来想要超越矛盾的根据,好像又产生了一种新的矛盾。但根据作为一个矛盾,并不是停留在自身矛盾中,而是力求排除其矛盾。根据之所以为根据,是因为它有根据来证明:但根据所证明的结果就是根据本身。这就是根据的形式主义。——根据和根据所要证明的,乃是同一个东西,两者的区别只是单纯的自我关系和中介性或被派生之存在的形式的区别。当我们追问事物的根据时,我们总是采取上面(112节)所提到过的反思的观点。我们总是向看见事物的双方面,一方面看见它的直接性,一方面又要看见它的根据,这里的根据已不是直接的了。这也就是所谓充足理由律的简单意义,这一思维规律宣称,事物本质上必须被认作是中介性的。形式逻辑在阐明这条思维规律时,却对别的科学起了一个坏的榜样。因为形式逻辑要求别的科学(须说出根据)——不要直接以自己的内容为标的,但它自己却提出一个未经推演、未经说明其中介过程或根据的思维规律。如果逻辑家有权利说,我们的思维能力碰巧有这样的性质,即我们对一切事物必须追问其根据,那么,一个医学家答复为什么人落水后会死这一问题时,也同样有权利说,人的身体碰巧是这样构成的:他不能在水中生活;或一位法学家回答为什么人犯法就须受罚时,同样有权利说,市民社会碰巧是这样组成的,犯罪的人不可不受罚。

(这一段主要是说,充足理由律认为,我们对任何事都需要问一个所以然来,需要追究出其本质元素来,但是,它存在一个缺点,就是,没有说出来自己(充足理由律)的所以然,没有追究出该定律的本质元素。根据和根据所要证明的,是同一个东西。)

Yet even if logic be excused the duty of giving a ground for the law of sufficient ground, it might at least explain what is to be understood by a ground. The common explanation, which describes the ground as what has a consequence, seems at first glance more lucid and intelligible than the preceding definition in logical terms. If you ask however what the consequence is, you are told that it is what has a ground; and it becomes obvious that the explanation is intelligible only because it assumes what in our case has been reached as the termination of an antecedent movement of thought. And this is the true business of logic: to show that those thoughts, which as usually employed merely float before consciousness neither understood nor demonstrated are really grades in the self-determination of thought. It is by no means that they are understood and demonstrated.

但即使逻辑可以免除为充足理由律说出理由或根据的义务,它也至少需要回答“应该怎么理解根据”这一问题。照通常的解释,“根据就是一个后果的东西”,初看起来,这个解释比上面所说的逻辑定义似乎更为通俗易懂。但如果进一步问什么叫做后果,那么得到的答复是,后果就是有一个根据的东西,——这足以表明,这种解释之所以通俗易懂,只是因为它已经预先假定了我们前面思想过程所产生有结果。但逻辑的任务是要表明单纯被表象的思想,(即那些未经理解未经证明的思想),仅仅是构成自己规定自己思想的一个阶段,因此,即在思想的自己规定自己的发展过程中,那些未经理解或证明的思想便可同时得到理解和证明。

(单纯说根据就是有后果,这样并不能给回答“什么是根据”或“如何找寻根据”这些问题,因为,后果就是根据的意思,这样回答,只是同语反复而已。逻辑的任务,同样依照充足理由律,是在找寻充足的根据。)

In common life, and it is the same in the finite sciences, this reflective form is often employed as a key to the secret of the real condition of the objects of investigation. So long as we deal with what may be termed the household needs of knowledge, nothing can be urged against this method of study. But it can never afford definitive satisfaction, either in theory or practice. And the reason why it fails is that the ground is yet without a definite content of its own; so that to regard anything as resting upon a ground merely gives the formal difference of mediation in place of immediacy. We see an electrical phenomenon, for example, and we ask for its ground (or reason): we are told that electricity is the ground of this phenomenon. What is this but the same content as we had immediately before us, only translated into the form of inwardness.

在日常生活中以及在有限科学里,我们常应用这些反思式的思想方法,意在对所要考察的对象与日常生活的真切关系有所了解。对于这种认识方式,只要其目的可以说是在于追求日常浅近的知识,当然无可非议,但同时必须注意,这种认识方式,无论从理论还是实践看,都不能给人以足够的满足。其所以这样,乃是因为,这些所谓“根据”还缺乏自在自为规定了的内容,因此,当我们认为一物有了根据时,不过是仅得到一个直接性和中介性的单纯形式差别而已。例如,当我们看见电流现象,而且追问其根据,所得到的答复是:电就是其根据。所以这种根据只不过是把当前所之间见到的同一内容,翻译成内在性的形式而已。

(用同语反复的方法来敷衍根据,只能满足日常浅近的只是需求,而对理论和实践来说,那种同于反复的、反思式的思想方法都是不充足的,都是“事后诸葛亮”,对我们认识事物没有帮助。)

The ground however is not merely simple self-identity, but also different: hence various grounds may be alleged for the same sum of fact.(以下英文缺失)

再则,根据并不仅似乎简单的自身同一,而且也是有差别的。对于同一的内容,我们可以提出不同的根据。而这些不同的根据,又可以按照差别,进展为相对立的两种形式的根据,一种根据赞成那同一内容,一种根据反对那同一内容。如,就偷窃而论,这一事实可以分为很多方面。这一偷窃行为曾侵犯他人的财产权,但这个穷苦的偷窃者也借此获得其物资的满足,而且也可能是比被窃者更好运用该财产。诚然不错,在这里侵犯财产权比其他理由,是绝对性的,但只是靠充足理由律却不能决定这一问题。按照一般对充足理由律的看法,这条规律不是空泛的理由律,而是充足的理由律,因此我们就可以说,像刚才所举的偷窃的例子,除了举出侵犯财产权外,还可以举出别的一些观点作为根据,只不过这些根据不是充分的而已。但须注意,既说充分根据,则“充分”一词不是毫无意义的废话,就是足以使我们超出根据这一范畴本身的词。“充分”二字,如果只是空泛地表示提出根据的能力,那便是多余或同语反复,因为根据之所以是根据,就是因为它有提出理由的能力。如果一个士兵临阵脱逃以保全性命,其行为无疑是违反军法的,但我们不能说,决定他这种行为的根据不够充分,否则,他就会留守在岗位上。此外,还有一层须说明,即,一方面,任何根据都是充足的,另一方面,没有根据可以说是充足的。因为如上面所说,这种形式的根据缺少自在自为地规定了的内容,因此并不是自我能动的和自我产生的。

(“充足”的理由,就是根据。任何事物之存在,都有根据,也就是有充足的理由。但在同一内容下提出不同理由,乃是对根据的不充分表达,——根据还没有进展到自在自为规定的内容。所谓的根据,都是充足的,说某一根据不“充足”,指示说,此时根据并不是思维意义上的根据。)

A content thus objectively and intrinsically determined, and hence self-acting, will hereafter come before us as the notion: and it is the notion which Leibnitz had in his eye when he spoke of sufficient ground, and urged the study of things under its point of view. His remarks were originally directed against that merely mechanical method of conceiving things so much in vogue even now; a method which he justly pronounces insufficient. We may see an instance of this mechanical theory of investigation when the organic process of the circulation of the blood is traced back merely to the contraction of the heart.(以下英文缺失)

像这种自在自为地规定了的,因而自我能动的内容,就是后面所说的概念:当莱布尼茨说到充足理由律,并劝人采取这种观点考察事物,其所说的,是这一概念。莱布尼茨心中所要反对的,正是现在流行的、许多人都很爱好的、单纯机械式的认识方法,他正确地宣传这种方法是不充足的。例如,把血液循环的有机过程仅归结为心脏的收缩,或如某些刑法理论,将刑罚的目的解释为在于使人不犯法,使犯法者不伤害人,或用其他外在的根据去解释,这些可以说是机械的解释。

(我们在此,应该反省自身,是不是,经常用一些不充足的理由,不是自在自为之规定概念的理由来解释事物。)

It is unfair to Leibnitz to suppose that he was content with anything so poor as this formal law of the ground. The method of investigation which he inaugurated is the very reverse of a formalism which acquiesces in mere grounds, where a full and concrete knowledge is sought. Considerations to this effect led Leibnitz to contrast causae efficientes and causae finales, and to insist on the place of final causes as the conception to which the efficient were to lead up. If we adopt this distinction, light, heat, and moisture would be the causae efficientes, not causa finalis of the growth of plants; the cause finalis is the notion of the plant itself.

如果有人以为莱布尼茨对如此贫乏的形式的充足理由律会表示满意,这对他未免太不公平。他认为可靠的思想方式正是这种形式主义的反面。因为这种形式主义在寻求充分具体的概念式的知识时,仅仅满足于抽象的根据。这就是从这方面讲,莱布尼茨才区分开制动因(causae efficientes)和目的因(causae finales)彼此不同的性质,认为,不要停留在制动因,而应该达到目的因。如果按照这种区别,则光、热、湿气等应视为植物生长的制动因,但不应视为植物生长的目的因,因为植物生长的目的因是植物本身的概念。

(莱布尼茨的这一创造,对我们有很大的启发意义。制动因,类似于我们常理解的外因,而目的因,则相对于内因。所谓充足的理由,就是指内因、目的因,而制动因和外因都是外在于事物的,不是概念意义上的根据。)

(以下英文部分缺失)

还有一点这里必须提及的,即在法律和道德范围内,只寻求形式的根据,一般是诡辩派的观点和原则。一说到诡辩,我们总是以为这只是一种歪曲正义和真理,从一种谬妄的观点去表述事物的思想方式。但这并不是诡辩的直接倾向。诡辩派的观点,在一开始只是一种“合理化论辩”。诡辩派出现在希腊人不复满意于宗教和道德上的权威和传统时代,当时希腊人感觉到一种需要,即凡他们所认为可靠的事物必须经过思想证明过的。为了适应这一要求,诡辩派教人寻求足以解释事物的各种不同的观点,这些不同的观点不是别的东西,却正是根据。但前面已经说过,这种形式的根据缺乏本身规定了的内容,为不道德的违法行为寻求根据,并不难于为道德的合法行为寻求根据。要决定哪个规定较优胜,就必须每一个人主观进行选择。要作这种选择,又必须视各个人的意向和观点。于是人人所公认的本身有效的标准的客观基础因而摧毁了。正是诡辩派这种否定的方面,理应引起上面所提及的坏名声。如世所周知,苏格拉底曾到处与诡辩派做斗争,但他并不只是简单地把权威和传统与诡辩派的合理化论辩或强辩对立起来,而毋宁是辩证地指出形式的根据之站不住脚,因而将正义与善、普遍的东西或意志的概念之客观标准重新确立起来。即在现时,不仅在世间事物的论辩里,即在宗教的演讲里,采用合理化的方式以自圆其说,也是常有之事。例如,为了引起听众的宗教信仰,牧师们不惜找出一切可能的根据,以教导世人对上帝的恩典抱有感谢之忱。对这类论辩,苏格拉底和柏拉图都斥之为诡辩。因为诡辩者并不深究所要辩护的东西的内容,(这种内容可能是真的)他只求说出根据的形式,通过这些理由或根据,他可以替一切东西辩护,但同时也可以反对一切东西。在我们富于抽象反思和合理化的论辩时代,假如一个人不能对任何事物,即使最坏或最无理的事物说出一些好的理由,那么真可说他的教养不够高明。世上一切腐败的事物都可以找到说其腐败是好的理由。当一个人自诩能说出理由和根据时,最初你或不免虚怀领受,肃然起敬。但到了你体验所谓说出的理由究竟是怎么一回事之后,就会对它不加理睬,不为强词夺理的理由所欺骗。

(实在是折服。我们日常生活中,会经常遇到,为一件事,有些人会说出一大堆似是而非的理由来,但实际上,这些理由,只是形式的根据,而不是事物本身自为的根据。在这里,也给我另一个角度,来认识哲学史上的诡辩派。)

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