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## 179.精读《小逻辑》笔记76——本质论第121节

(2011-07-01 23:59:42)

### 杂谈

179.精读《小逻辑》笔记76——本质论第121节

[c]The Ground  （根据）

§121

The Ground is the unity of identity and difference, the truth of what difference and identity have turned out to be——the reflection-into-self, which is equally a reflection-into-other, and vice-versa. It is essence put explicitly as a totality.

The maxim of Ground runs thus: Everything has its Sufficient Ground: that is, the true essentiality of any thing is not the predication of it as identical with itself, or as different (various), or merely positive, or merely negative, but as having its Being in an other, which, being the self-same, is its essence. And to this extent the essence is not abstract reflection into self, but into an other. The Ground is the essence in its own inwardness; the essence is intrinsically a ground; and it is a ground only when it is a ground of somewhat, of an other.

（根据就是存在的本质，反过来说，物之本质就是它存在的根据。而只要物有存在，就是因为其背后的本质发挥作用，也就是，赋予其根据。）

（这一段主要是说，充足理由律认为，我们对任何事都需要问一个所以然来，需要追究出其本质元素来，但是，它存在一个缺点，就是，没有说出来自己（充足理由律）的所以然，没有追究出该定律的本质元素。根据和根据所要证明的，是同一个东西。）

Yet even if logic be excused the duty of giving a ground for the law of sufficient ground, it might at least explain what is to be understood by a ground. The common explanation, which describes the ground as what has a consequence, seems at first glance more lucid and intelligible than the preceding definition in logical terms. If you ask however what the consequence is, you are told that it is what has a ground; and it becomes obvious that the explanation is intelligible only because it assumes what in our case has been reached as the termination of an antecedent movement of thought. And this is the true business of logic: to show that those thoughts, which as usually employed merely float before consciousness neither understood nor demonstrated are really grades in the self-determination of thought. It is by no means that they are understood and demonstrated.

（单纯说根据就是有后果，这样并不能给回答“什么是根据”或“如何找寻根据”这些问题，因为，后果就是根据的意思，这样回答，只是同语反复而已。逻辑的任务，同样依照充足理由律，是在找寻充足的根据。）

In common life, and it is the same in the finite sciences, this reflective form is often employed as a key to the secret of the real condition of the objects of investigation. So long as we deal with what may be termed the household needs of knowledge, nothing can be urged against this method of study. But it can never afford definitive satisfaction, either in theory or practice. And the reason why it fails is that the ground is yet without a definite content of its own; so that to regard anything as resting upon a ground merely gives the formal difference of mediation in place of immediacy. We see an electrical phenomenon, for example, and we ask for its ground (or reason): we are told that electricity is the ground of this phenomenon. What is this but the same content as we had immediately before us, only translated into the form of inwardness.

（用同语反复的方法来敷衍根据，只能满足日常浅近的只是需求，而对理论和实践来说，那种同于反复的、反思式的思想方法都是不充足的，都是“事后诸葛亮”，对我们认识事物没有帮助。）

The ground however is not merely simple self-identity, but also different: hence various grounds may be alleged for the same sum of fact.（以下英文缺失）

（“充足”的理由，就是根据。任何事物之存在，都有根据，也就是有充足的理由。但在同一内容下提出不同理由，乃是对根据的不充分表达，——根据还没有进展到自在自为规定的内容。所谓的根据，都是充足的，说某一根据不“充足”，指示说，此时根据并不是思维意义上的根据。）

A content thus objectively and intrinsically determined, and hence self-acting, will hereafter come before us as the notion: and it is the notion which Leibnitz had in his eye when he spoke of sufficient ground, and urged the study of things under its point of view. His remarks were originally directed against that merely mechanical method of conceiving things so much in vogue even now; a method which he justly pronounces insufficient. We may see an instance of this mechanical theory of investigation when the organic process of the circulation of the blood is traced back merely to the contraction of the heart.（以下英文缺失）

（我们在此，应该反省自身，是不是，经常用一些不充足的理由，不是自在自为之规定概念的理由来解释事物。）

It is unfair to Leibnitz to suppose that he was content with anything so poor as this formal law of the ground. The method of investigation which he inaugurated is the very reverse of a formalism which acquiesces in mere grounds, where a full and concrete knowledge is sought. Considerations to this effect led Leibnitz to contrast causae efficientes and causae finales, and to insist on the place of final causes as the conception to which the efficient were to lead up. If we adopt this distinction, light, heat, and moisture would be the causae efficientes, not causa finalis of the growth of plants; the cause finalis is the notion of the plant itself.

（莱布尼茨的这一创造，对我们有很大的启发意义。制动因，类似于我们常理解的外因，而目的因，则相对于内因。所谓充足的理由，就是指内因、目的因，而制动因和外因都是外在于事物的，不是概念意义上的根据。）

（以下英文部分缺失）

（实在是折服。我们日常生活中，会经常遇到，为一件事，有些人会说出一大堆似是而非的理由来，但实际上，这些理由，只是形式的根据，而不是事物本身自为的根据。在这里，也给我另一个角度，来认识哲学史上的诡辩派。）

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