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144.精读《小逻辑》笔记42——初步规定第67-70节

(2011-05-18 22:32:31)
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黑格尔

小逻辑

初步规定

直接知识

中介

杂谈

分类: 杂读笔记(钱先生指示)

144.精读《小逻辑》笔记42——初步规定第67-70节

 

中介性是直接知识的关键问题。

 

§67

One thing may be observed with reference to the immediate knowledge of God, of legal and ethical principles (including under the head of immediate knowledge what is otherwise termed Instinct, Implanted or Innate Ideas, Common Sense, Natural Reason, or whatever form, in short, we give to the original spontaneity).It is a matter of general experience that education or development is required to bring out into consciousness what is therein contained. It was so even with the Platonic reminiscence; and the Christian rite of baptism, although a sacrament, involves the additional obligation of a Christian upbringing. In short, religion and morals, however much they may be faith or immediate knowledge, are still on every side conditioned by the mediating process which is termed development, education, training.

至于关于上帝、法律和伦理原则的直接知识,(这里包括从别的方面看叫做本能、天赋观念,或先天观念、常识和自然的理性等,总之,就这种自发的原始性来说,不管其表现的形式是什么。)乃是极普通的经验:这种直接的原始性所包含的内容,总需要经过教化,经过发展,才能达到知觉,也可以说才能达到柏拉图所谓的“回忆”。(又如基督教的洗礼,虽然只是一种仪式,但还包含着进一步接受基督教训诲的义务。)换言之,就宗教和伦理来说,尽管它们是一种信仰和直接知识,但仍然完全受中介性的制约,——所谓中介性,指发展、教育和教养的过程。

The adherents, no less than the assailants, of the doctrine of Innate Ideas have been guilty throughout of the like exclusiveness and narrowness as is here noted. They have drawn a hard and fast line between the essential and immediate union (as it may be described) of certain universal principles with the soul, and another union which has to be brought about in an external fashion, and through the channel of given objects and conceptions. There is one objection, borrowed from experience, which was raised against the doctrine of Innate Ideas. All men, it was said, must have these ideas; they must have, for example, the maxim of contradiction present in the mind-they must be aware of it; for this maxim and others like it were included in the class of Innate Ideas. The objection may be set down to misconception; for the principles in question, though innate, need not on that account have the form of ideas or conceptions of something we are aware of. Still, the objection completely meets and overthrows the crude theory of immediate knowledge, which expressly maintains its formulae in so far as they are in consciousness. Another point calls for notice. We may suppose it admitted by the intuitive school, that the special case of religious faith involves supplementing by a Christian or religious education and development. In that case it is acting capriciously when it seeks to ignore this admission when speaking about faith, or it betrays a want of reflection not to know, that, if the necessity of education be once admitted, mediation is pronounced indispensable.

主张天赋观念的人,和反对天赋观念的人一样,都有被狭隘和小气的缺点,(都被互相排斥的对立所支配)。他们被划分为明显区别的对立双方:一方认为普遍规定和心灵在本质上直接联合(如何可以这么说的话),一方认为观念由来自外在方式产生的、通过现存对象和表象作为中介而联合所得。有人借经验论来反驳天赋观念,认为既然人人都具有天赋观念,而且譬如人人意识中都有矛盾原则,那么人人必然知道这一原则,——这些矛盾原则以及别的类似原则,均算作天赋观念。我觉得这种反驳是一个误解。因为这里所说的原则,虽是天赋的,却并不因此便具有我们所意识着的观念或表象的形式。但对于直接知识,这种反驳却是中肯的,因为持直接知识说的人明白宣称只有在意识之内的内容才可以说是具有直接知识的内容。另外一点值得注意。我们假定,那些直接知识者多少也承认,特别对宗教信仰而言,必然是包含有基督教或宗教之教养和开发的。那么当他一说到信仰时,又想抹煞中介性,这就未免有点随性,或者,既然承认了教养的必要性,而又不知道中介性的重要,这也未免有点缺乏思考。

The reminiscence of ideas spoken of by Plato is equivalent to saying that ideas implicitly exist in man, instead of being, as the Sophists assert, a foreign importation into his mind. But to conceive knowledge as reminiscence does not interfere with, or set aside as useless, the development of what is implicitly in man; which development is another word for mediation. The same holds good of the innate ideas that we find in Descartes and the Scotch philosophers. These ideas are only potential in the first instance, and should be looked at as being a sort of mere capacity in man.

当柏拉图说理念的回忆时,意思是说理念是潜伏在人心中,而不是如智者派所主张的那样,认为理念是从外面灌输到人心中的。但说认识是一种回忆,却并不排斥把人心中潜在的东西加以发展,而发展不是别的,就是一种中介过程。笛卡尔和那些苏格拉底哲学家所提出的天赋观念也是同样的道理。这些观念原来也只是潜伏的观念,必须看成是人天赋的禀赋。

 

§68

In the case of these experiences the appeal turns upon something that shows itself bound up with immediate consciousness. Even if this combination be in the first instance taken as an external and empirical connection, still, even for empirical observation, the fact of its being constant shows it to be essential and inseparable. But, again, if this immediate consciousness, as exhibited in experience, be taken separately, so far as it is a consciousness of God and the divine nature, the state of mind which it implies is generally described as an exaltation above the finite, above the senses, and above the instinctive desires and affections of the natural heart: which exaltation passes over into, and terminates in, faith in God and a divine order. It is apparent, therefore, that, though faith may be an immediate knowledge and certainty, it equally implies the interposition of this process as its antecedent and condition.

在上面所说的这些经验里,总是向于直接知识相连结的对象中去寻求真理。这种连结最初虽仅不过是外在经验的联系,所以只要对经验的考察本身来说,这联系足以表明它自身是本质的和不可分的,那么,这种联系就是长久的。再则,如果按照在经验中的这种直接知识自己本身,就其为对上帝和神圣知识而言,则这种意识一般地将被认为是高于感性,高于有限事物,高于自然感情中本能欲求和嗜好。这种(由一般感觉到更高知识的)提高就是过渡到并且归宿到对上帝和神圣事物的信仰过程。所以这种信仰就是直接知识和确定性。但它并不因此便没有中介过程作为它的前提和条件。

It has been already observed, that the so-called proofs of the being of God, which start from finite being, give an expression to this exaltation. In that light they are no inventions of an oversubtle reflection, but the necessary and native channel in which the movement of mind runs: though it may be that, in their ordinary form, these proofs have not their correct and adequate expression.

我们已经指明过,那从有限存在出发的所谓对上帝存在的证明,也表明了这种提高。从这一点看,这些证明并不是矫揉造作的反思作用所臆造,而是精神本身的、必然的曲折进展的中介过程,虽说在通常的形式里,这些证明没有得到充分而正确的表现。

 

§69

It is the passage (§64) from the subjective Idea to being which forms the main concern of the doctrine of immediate knowledge. A primary and self-evident interconnection is declared to exist between our Idea and being. Yet precisely this central point of transition, utterly irrespective of any connections which show in experience, clearly involves a mediation. And the mediation is of no imperfect or unreal kind, where the mediation takes place with and through something external, but one comprehending both antecedent and conclusion.

直接知识论主要关注的是主观理念到(客观)存在的过渡(就像64节中说的那样),并断言理念与存在之间有一个原始的无中介的联系。即使完全不考虑由经验中映现出来的联系,单就理念过渡到存在这一中心点来说,在它本身内也是包含有中介过程的。而且在它的这种(中介性)规定里,它既然是真实的,并不是一种外在东西并通过外在东西而形成的中介过程,而是自己包含着前提与结论在其自身内的中介过程。

 

§70

For, what this theory asserts is that truth lies neither in the Idea as a merely subjective thought, nor in mere being on its own account——that mere being per se, a being that is not of the Idea, is the sensible finite being of the world. Now all this only affirms, without demonstration, that the Idea has truth only by means of being, and being has truth only by means of the Idea. The maxim of immediate knowledge rejects an indefinite empty immediacy (and such is abstract being, or pure unity taken by itself), and affirms in its stead the unity of the Idea with being. And it acts rightly in so doing. But it is stupid not to see that the unity of distinct terms or modes is not merely a purely immediate unity, i.e. unity empty and indeterminate, but that ——with equal emphasis——the one term is shown to have truth only as mediated through the other——or, if the phrase be preferred, that either term is only mediated with truth through the other. That the quality of mediation is involved in the very immediacy of intuition is thus exhibited as a fact, against which understanding, conformably to the fundamental maxim of immediate knowledge that the evidence of consciousness is infallible, can have nothing to object. It is only ordinary abstract understanding which takes the terms of mediation and immediacy, each by itself absolutely, to represent an inflexible line of distinction, and thus draws upon its own head the hopeless task of reconciling them. The difficulty, as we have shown, has no existence in the fact, and it vanishes in the speculative notion.

这种观点所主张的是这样:无论作为单纯的主观思想的理念,或者作为单纯的自为存在,都不是真理,——一个仅仅是自为的存在,一个与理念无涉的存在,只是世界中有限的感性存在。因此,这种说法不依任何证明地说,理念只以存在为中介才是真理,同样,存在只有以理念为中介才是真理。直接知识的原则应该排斥无规定性的空洞直接性(抽象存在或纯粹的、自为的统一),而力持理念与存在的统一。这样做是对的。而两个相异的规定或范畴的统一,并不仅是纯粹直接或漫无规定的空洞的统一,如果没有看出这一点,就是失智。——其中一个规定只有通过另一个规定为中介才会有真理,或者说,每一个对顶只有以另一个规定为中介才会有真理。“中介的特点已被包括在直接性之内”在这里就被确认是一种事实,对于这一事实,知性,同直接知识最基本立场“直觉永远有效”相一致,也不会出来反对。只有通常抽象的理智作用(知性),才会把直接性与中介性双方都各自认作绝对,认为两者之间有一坚固的鸿沟。也因此,在设法连接双方时,自己给自己造成一个不可克服的困难。这一困难,正如我们已经指出的,事实上并不存在,而且也消失在玄思的概念中。

 

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