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124.精读《小逻辑》笔记22——初步规定第33-35节

(2011-04-26 21:13:41)
标签:

黑格尔

小逻辑

初步规定

笔记

旧形而上学

本体论

宇宙论

杂谈

分类: 杂读笔记(钱先生指示)

124.精读《小逻辑》笔记22——初步规定第33-35节

 

黑格尔认为,形而上学的本体论、灵魂学和宇宙论都是不深刻的,因为,用来表示那些无限东西的谓词,原本应该是无限的,但形而上学所用以表达的,都是有限的。即使知道事物背后的无限内容,形而上学也只能肤浅地表达出来,因为,在形而上学里,思维和认识对象之间是隔离的。

 

§33

The first part of this metaphysic in its systematic form is Ontology, or the doctrine of the abstract Characteristics of Being. The multitude of these characteristics, and the limits set to their applicability, are not founded upon any principle. They have in consequence to be enumerated as experience and circumstances direct, and the import ascribed to them is founded only upon common sensualised conceptions, upon assertions that particular words are used in a particular sense, and even perhaps upon etymology. If experience pronounces the list to be complete, and if the usage of language, by its agreement, shows the analysis to be correct, the metaphysician is satisfied; and the intrinsic and independent truth and necessity of such characteristics is never made a matter of: investigation at all.

形而上学的第一部分是本体论,即关于本质的抽象规定的学说。对于这些规定的多样性及有限的效用,也缺乏一个根本原则。所以这些规定必须经验地和偶然地漫无次序地列举出来,而它们详细内容,只能以表象或以字义字根为根据(词源学)去说明,——宣称某些字有某种含义,固可用来表示某内容。因此,这部分形而上学只能寻求经验的完备性,和复合语言习惯的字面分析的正确性,而没有考虑到哲学规定自在自为的真理性和必然性。

To ask if being, existence, finitude, simplicity, complexity, etc. are notions intrinsically and independently true, must surprise those who believe that a question about truth can only concern propositions (as to whether a notion is or is not with truth to be attributed, as the phrase is, to a subject), and that falsehood lies in the contradiction existing between the subject in our ideas, and the notion to be predicated of it. Now as the notion is concrete, it and every character of it in general is essentially a self-contained unity of distinct characteristics. If truth then were nothing more than the absence of contradiction, it would be first of all necessary in the case of every notion to examine whether it, taken individually, did not contain this sort of intrinsic contradiction.

对一个相信只有一个命题才能真假,只能问一个概念加在一个主词上才有对错的人来说,问存在、定在、有限性、单纯性、复合型等等本身是否为真的概念这一问题,一定会使他觉得奇怪,因为他们认为真与不真只取决于表象的主词与用来称谓主词的概念之间有了矛盾。但概念是具体的,概念自身,甚至每一个规定性,本质上一般都是许多不同规定的统一体。因此,如果真理除了没有矛盾外别无其他性质,则对每一个概念首先必须考察就它本身说来是不包含这样一种内在矛盾。

 

§34

The second branch of the metaphysical system was Rational Psychology or Pneumatology. It dealt with the metaphysical nature of the soul——that is, of the Mind regarded as a thing. It expected to find immortality in a sphere dominated by the laws of composition, time, qualitative change, and quantitative increase or decrease.

形而上学的第二部分是理性心理学或灵魂学,它研究灵魂的形而上学本性,也就是把精神当作一个实物去研究。这种研究想再复合性、时间性、质的变化、量的增减的定律支配范围内寻求灵魂不死。

The name 'rational', given to this species of psychology, served to contrast it with empirical modes of observing the phenomena of the soul Rational psychology viewed the soul in its metaphysical nature, and through the categories supplied by abstract thought. The rationalists endeavored to ascertain the inner nature of the soul as it is in itself and as it is for thought. In philosophy at present we hear little of the soul: the favorite term is now mind(spirit).The two are distinct, soul being as it were the middle term between body and spirit, or the bond between the two. The mind, as soul, is immersed in corporeity, and the soul is the animating principle of the body.

之所以说这部分心理学是“理性的”,是因为它和对灵魂外化现象的经验研究相对立。理性心理学通过抽象思维的规定去研究灵魂的形而上学本性。这门学问的目的在于认识灵魂的内在本性、灵魂自身、灵魂被思想所把握的真面目。现在,哲学里很好谈到灵魂了,而主要是谈“精神”。精神和灵魂是有区别的,灵魂好像是肉体与精神之间的中介,或者两者之间的联系。精神沉浸在全身内为灵魂,而灵魂则是使身体有生命的原则。

The pre-Kantian metaphysic, we say, viewed the soul as a thing. 'Thing' is a very ambiguous word. By a thing, we mean, firstly, an immediate existence, something we represent in sensuous form: and in this meaning the term has been applied to the soul. Hence the question regarding the seat of the soul. Of course, if the soul have a seat, it is in space and sensuously envisaged. So, too, if the soul be viewed as a thing we can ask whether the soul is simple or composite. The question is important as bearing on the immortality of the soul, which is supposed to depend on the absence of composition. But the fact is, that in abstract simplicity we have a category, which as little corresponds to the nature of the soul, as that of compositeness.

旧形而上学把灵魂看成是一个“物”,但“物”是一个很含糊的词。所谓物,首先是指一个当前实存的物,是我们感官所能表象的东西,也正是在这个意义下,说灵魂是感官所能表象之物。所以人们会问到灵魂的居所问题。如果灵魂有居所,当然应该在空间中,可以被感官所表象。同样,如果认为灵魂是物,也就能问灵魂是单纯的还是复合的了。这一问题对于灵魂不灭至关重要,因为一般认为,灵魂不灭的前提是灵魂的单纯性。但事实上,抽象的单纯性这一规定,和复合性一样,都不符合灵魂的本质。

One word on the relation of rational to empirical psychology. The former, because it sets itself to apply thought to cognize mind and even to demonstrate the result of such thinking, is the higher; whereas empirical psychology starts from perception, and only recounts and describes what perception supplies. But if we propose to think the mind, we must not be quite so shy of its special phenomena. Mind is essentially active in the same sense as the Schoolmen[Scholastics]said that God is 'absolute actuality'. But if the mind is active it must as it were utter itself. It is wrong therefore to take the mind for a processless ens, as did the old metaphysic which divided the processless inward life of the mind from its outward life. The mind, of all things, must be looked at in its concrete actuality, in its energy; and in such a way that its manifestations are seen to be determined by its inward force.

说到理性心理学与经验心理学的关系,前者显然比后者更高深,因为前者的任务在于通过思维以认识精神,并进而证明这种思想内容的真实性,而经验心理学则以知觉为出发点,只限于列举并描述知觉所提供的当前事实。但我们既然以精神为思考的对象,就不可太回避精神的特殊现象。精神是主动的,这里所谓的主动,其意义与经院哲学家曾经说上帝是绝对的主动性意义相同。由于精神既然是主动的,则精神必会表现其自身于外。因此,我们不能把精神看成一个没有过程的存在,像旧形而上学那样,把精神无过程的内在性和它的外在性截然分开。我们主要地必须从精神的具体现实性和能动性去考察精神,通过这种方法,就能认识到,精神的外在表现是由其内在力量所决定的。

 

§35

The third branch of metaphysics was Cosmology. The topics it embraced were the world, its contingency, necessity, eternity, limitation in time and space: the laws (only formal) of its changes: the freedom of man and the origin of evil.

形而上学的第三部分是宇宙论,探讨世界、世界的偶然性、必然性、永恒性、在时空中的限制,世界在变化中的形式的规律,以及人类的自由和恶的起源。

To these topics it applied what were believed to be thoroughgoing contrasts: such as contingency and necessity; eternal and internal necessity; efficient and final cause, or causality in general and design; essence or substance and phenomenon; form and matter; freedom and necessity; happiness and pain; good and evil.

宇宙论中所认为绝对对立的,主要有下列各范畴:偶然性与必然性;外在必然性与内在必然性;制动因与目的因,或因果律一般与目的;本质或实体与现象;形式与质料;自由与必然;幸福与痛苦,善与恶。

The object of Cosmology comprised not merely Nature, but Mind too, in its external complicating in its phenomenon——in fact, existence in general, or the sum of finite things. This object however it viewed not as a concrete whole, but only under certain abstract points of view. Thus the questions Cosmology attempted to solve were such as these: Is accident or necessity dominant in the world? Is the world eternal or created? It was therefore a chief concern of this study to lay down what were called general cosmological laws: for instance, that Nature does not act by fits an starts. And by fits and starts (saltus) they meant a qualitative difference or qualitative alteration showing itself without any antecedent determining mean: whereas, on the contrary, a gradual change (of quantity) is obviously not without intermediation.

宇宙论研究的对象,不仅限于自然,而且也包括精神、它的外在的错综复杂的关系。精神的现象一般说来,宇宙论以一切定在、一切有限事物的总体为其研究对象。但是宇宙论并不把它的对象看成是一个具体的全体,而是只按照抽象的规定去看对象。因此它只研究这类的问题,例如,究竟是偶然性抑或必然性支配这世界?这世界是永恒的抑或是被创造的?这种宇宙论的主要兴趣只在于揭示出所谓普遍的宇宙规律,例如说,自然界中没有飞跃。飞跃在这里是指没有经过中介性而出现的质的差别及质的变化而言,与此相反,量的逐渐变化显然是有中介性的。

In regard to Mind as it makes itself felt in the world, the questions which Cosmology chiefly discussed turned upon the freedom of man and the origin of evil. Nobody can deny that these are questions of the highest importance. But to give them a satisfactory answer, it is above all things necessary not to claim finality for the abstract formulae of understanding, or to suppose that each of the two terms in an antithesis has an independent subsistence or can be treated in its isolation as a complete and self-centered truth. This however is the general position taken by the metaphysicians before Kant, and appears in their cosmological discussions, which for that reason were incapable of compassing their purpose, to understand the phenomena of the world. Observe how they proceed with the distinction between freedom and necessity, in their application of these categories to Nature and Mind. Nature they regard as subject in its workings to necessity; Mind they hold to be free. No doubt there is a real foundation for this distinction in the very core of the Mind itself: but freedom and necessity, when thus abstractly opposed, are terms applicable only in the finite world to which, as such, they belong. A freedom involving no necessity, and mere necessity without freedom, are abstract and in this way untrue formulae of thought. Freedom is no blank indeterminateness: essentially concrete, and unvaryingly self-determinate, it is so far at the same time necessary. Necessity, again, in the ordinary acceptation of the term in popular philosophy, means determination from without only——as in finite mechanics, where a body moves only when it is struck by another body, and moves in the direction communicated to it by the impact. This however is a merely external necessity, not the real inward necessity which is identical with freedom.

关于精神如何在世界中表现其自身的问题,宇宙论主要讨论的是人的自由和恶的起源问题。无疑这是最重要的问题。但要想给这些问题一个满意的答复,最紧要的使我们切不可把抽象的执行规定坚执为最后的规定,这意思是说,不可认为对立的两个规定的任何一方好像有其本身的持存性似的,或者认为任何一方在其孤立的状态下就有其实体性和真理性似的。但康德之前的形而上学家,却大都采取这种固执孤立的观点,所以他们在宇宙论的讨论里,便不能达到他们想要把握世界现象的目的。例如,试看他们如何把自由与必然区别开,以及如何应用这些规定来讨论自然和精神。他们总是认为自然现象受必然规律的支配,而精神则是自由的。这种区别无疑是很重要的,而且是以精神本身最深处的要求为根据的。但把自由和必然认作是彼此抽象对立这种看法,只属于有限世界,而且也只有在有限世界内才有效。这种不包含必然性的自由,或者一种没有自由的单纯必然性,只是一些抽象而不真实的观点。自由本质上是具体的,它永远自己决定自己,因此同时又是必然的。一说到必然性,一般人总以为只是从外面去决定的意思,例如在有限的力学里,一个物体只有在受到另一物体的撞击时,才有运动,而且运动所循的方向也是被另一物体的撞击所决定的。但这只是一种外在的必然性,而非真正内在的必然性,因为内在的必然性就是自由。

The case is similar with the contrast of Good and Evil——the favorite contrast of the introspective modern world. If we regard Evil as possessing a fixity of its own, apart and distinct from Good, we are to a certain extent right: there is an opposition between them; nor do those who maintain the apparent and relative character of the opposition mean that Evil and Good in the Absolute are one, or, in accordance with the modern phrase, that a thing first becomes evil from our way of looking at it. The error arises when we take Evil as a permanent positive, instead of——what it really is——a negative which, though it would fain assert itself, has no real persistence, and is, in fact, only the absolute sham-existence of negativity in itself.

同样,善恶的对立也是这样。这种对立,在近代世界中是更加深化了。假如,我们认为恶是本身固定,认为恶不是善,这诚然完全是对的,它们两者之间实有相反之处。即使那些认为善恶对立只是表面或相对的人,也并不承认善恶在绝对中是统一的,有如近来许多人所常说的,一物之所以成为恶,只是由于我们的(主观)看法使然,但如果我们认恶为固定的肯定的东西,那就错了。因为,恶只是一种否定物,其本身没有持久的存在,但只是想要坚持其独立自为存在,其实,恶只是否定性自身的绝对假象。

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