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120.精读《小逻辑》笔记18——初步规定第25节

(2011-04-22 21:54:35)
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小逻辑

初步规定

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分类: 杂读笔记(钱先生指示)

120.精读《小逻辑》笔记18——初步规定第25节

 

第25节之后,开始分析思维的几种形式。这一节应该算作是以下三部分的引言。

 

§25

The term 'Objective Thoughts' indicates the truth——the truth which is to be the absolute object of philosophy, and not merely the goal at which it aims. But the very expression cannot fail to suggest an opposition, to characterize and appreciate which is the main motive of the philosophical attitude of the present time, and which forms the real problem of the question about truth and our means of ascertaining it. If the thought-forms are vitiated by a fixed antithesis, i.e. if they are only of a finite character, they are unsuitable for the self-centered universe of truth, and truth can find no adequate receptacle in thought. Such thought, which can produce only limited and partial categories and proceed by their means, is what in the stricter sense of the word is termed Understanding. The finitude, further, of these categories lies in two points. Firstly, they are only subjective, and the antithesis of an objective permanently clings to them. Secondly, they are always of restricted content, and so persist in antithesis to one another and still more to the Absolute. In order more fully to explain the position and import here attributed to logic, the attitudes in which thought is supposed to stand to objectivity will next be examined by way of further introduction.

上节所讲,客观思想一词最能表明真理,——真理不仅影视哲学所追求的目标,而且应是哲学研究的绝对对象。但客观一词立即提出一种对立,甚至可以说,现时哲学观点的主要兴趣,均在于说明思想与客观对立的性质和效用,而且关于真理的问题,以及关于认识真理是否可能的问题,也都围绕思想与客观的对立问题而转。如果所有的思维规定都受一种规定的对立的限制,这就是说,如果这些思维规定的本性都只是有限的,那么思维便不适合于把握真理,认识绝对,而真理也不能显现于思维中。那只能产生有限规定,并且只能在有限规定中活动的思维,便叫做知性。而且,思维规定的有限性可以有两层看法。第一,认为思维规定只是主观的,永远有一客观的和它们对立。第二,认为各思维规定的内容是有限的,因此,各规定间彼此对立,而且更尤其和绝对对立。为了说明并发挥这里所提示的逻辑学的意义和观点起见,对于思维对客观性的各种态度将加以思考,作为逻辑学进一步的导言。

In my Phenomenology of the Spirit, which on that account was at its publication described as the first part of the System of Philosophy, the method adopted was to begin with the first and simplest phase of mind, immediate consciousness, and to show how that stage gradually of necessity worked onward to the philosophical point of view, the necessity of that view being proved by the process. But in these circumstances it was impossible to restrict the quest to the mere form of consciousness. For the stage of philosophical knowledge is the richest in material and organization, and therefore, as it came before us in the shape of a result, it presupposed the existence of the concrete formations of consciousness, such as individual and social morality, art and religion. In the development of consciousness, which at first sight appears limited to the point of form merely, there is thus at the same time included the development of the matter or of the objects discussed in the special branches of philosophy. But the latter process must, so to speak, go on behind consciousness, since those facts are the essential nucleus which is raised into consciousness. The exposition accordingly is rendered more intricate, because so much that properly belongs to the concrete branches is prematurely dragged into the introduction. The survey which follows in the present work has even more the inconvenience of being only historical and inferential in its method. But it tries especially to show how the questions men have proposed, outside the school, on the nature of Knowledge, Faith, and the like——questions which they imagine to have no connection with abstract thoughts——are really reducible to the simple categories, which first get cleared up in Logic.

在《精神现象学》一书中,我是采取这样的进程,从最初、最简单的精神现象,直接意识开始,进而从直接意识的辩证进展逐步发展以达到哲学的观点。完全按从意识辩证进展的过程去指出达到哲学观点的必然性(也因为这个缘故,在那本书出版的时候,我把它当作科学体系的第一部分。)因此哲学的探讨,不能仅停留在单纯意识的形式里。因为哲学知识的观点本身同时就是内容最丰富和最具体的观点,是许多过程所达到的结果。所以哲学知识须以意识的许多具体的形态,如道德、伦理、艺术、宗教为前提。意识发展的过程,最初似乎仅限于形式,但同时即包含有内容发展的过程,这些内容构成哲学各特殊部门的对象。但内容发展的过程(在逻辑上)必须跟随在意识发展的过程之后,因为内容与意识的关系,乃是潜在(与形式)的关系。因此对于思维形式的阐述,较为烦难,因为有需要属于哲学各特殊部门的具体材料,都部分地已经在那作为哲学体系的导言里,加以讨论了。本书的讨论,如果只限于用历史的和形式推理的方式,那就会有更过的不方便之处。但本书主要的是在发挥一种根本见解,即指出,一般人对于认识、信仰等等的本性的观念,总以为完全是具体的东西,其实均可回溯到简单的思想范畴,这些思想范畴只有在逻辑学里猜得到真正透彻的处理。

 

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