加载中…
个人资料
晨达Freiheit1770
晨达Freiheit1770
  • 博客等级:
  • 博客积分:0
  • 博客访问:175,808
  • 关注人气:263
  • 获赠金笔:0支
  • 赠出金笔:0支
  • 荣誉徽章:
相关博文
推荐博文
谁看过这篇博文
加载中…
正文 字体大小:

118.精读《小逻辑》笔记16——初步规定第24节(中)

(2011-04-20 22:03:33)
标签:

黑格尔

小逻辑

初步规定

笔记

杂谈

分类: 杂读笔记(钱先生指示)

118.精读《小逻辑》笔记16——初步规定第24节(中)

 

由于思维的作用,使得事物的本质摆脱了外在形式的束缚,得到自我实现。这种思维方法,看起来好像离我们很远,实际上却与我们很近,它就在我们的面前。

 

(2)Logic is the study of thought pure and simple, or of the pure thought-forms. In the ordinary sense of the term, by thought we generally represent to ourselves something more than simple and unmixed thought; we mean some thought, the material of which is from experience. Whereas in logic a thought is understood to include nothing else but what depends on thinking and what thinking has brought into existence. It is in these circumstances that thoughts are pure thoughts. The mind is then in its own home-element and therefore free; for freedom means that the other thing with which you deal is a second self——so that you never leave your own ground but give the law to yourself. In the impulses or appetites the beginning is from something else, from something which we feel to be external. In this case then we speak of dependence. For freedom it is necessary that we should feel no presence of something else which is not ourselves. The natural man, whose motions follow the rule only of his appetites, is not his own master. Be he as self-willed as he may, the constituents of his will and opinion are not his own, and his freedom is merely formal. But when we think, we renounce our selfish and particular being, sink ourselves in the thing, allow thought to follow its own course, and if we add anything of our own, we think ill.

逻辑学以纯粹思想或纯粹思维形式为研究对象。就思想的通常意义来说,我们所表象的东西,总不仅仅是纯粹的思想,因为我们总以为一种思想的内容必定是经验的东西。而逻辑学中所理解的思想则不然,除了属于思维本身,和通过思维所产生的东西之外,它没有别的内容。逻辑学中的思想就是纯思想。逻辑学中所说的精神也是纯粹自在的精神,也就是自由的精神,因为自由正是在他物中即是在自己本身中、自己依赖自己、自己是自己的决定者。思想和冲动不同,在一切冲动中,我是从一个他物、从一个外在于我的事物开始,在这里,我们说的是依赖,不是自由。只有在没有外在于我的他物和不是我自己本身的对方时,我才是自由的。那只是被其冲动所决定的自然人,并不是在自己本身内:即使他被冲动驱使表现一些癖性,但他的意志和意见的内容却不是他自己的,他的自由也只是一种形式上的自由。当我思维时,我放弃我主管的特殊性,我深入于事情中,让思维自为地做主,倘若掺杂了主观意思于其中,那思维就变了样。

If in pursuance of the foregoing remarks we consider Logic to be the system of the pure types of thought, we find that the other philosophical sciences, the Philosophy of Nature and the Philosophy of Mind, take the place, as it were, of an Applied Logic, and that Logic is the soul which animates them both. Their problem in that case is only to recognize the logical forms under the shapes they assume in Nature and Mind——shapes which are only a particular mode of expression for the forms of pure thought. If for instance we take the syllogism (not as it was understood in the old formal logic, but as its real value), we shall find it gives expression to the law that the particular is the middle term which fuses together the extremes of the universal and the singular.

如果依前此所说,认为逻辑学是纯粹思维规定的体系,那么别的部门的哲学科学,像自然哲学和精神哲学,是应用的逻辑学,逻辑学是自然哲学和精神哲学中富有生气的灵魂。自然哲学和精神哲学的兴趣,都只是在于认识在自然和精神形态中的逻辑形式,而自然和精神的形态只是纯粹思维形式的特殊表现。譬如,我们试取推论来说(不是旧形式逻辑的三段论,而是真正的推论),可以看出,推论是这样的规定:特殊是把普遍和个别这两个极端结合起来的中项。

The syllogistic form is a universal form of all things. Everything that exists is a particular, which couples together the universal and the singular. But Nature is weak and fails to exhibit the logical forms in their purity. Such a feeble exemplification of the syllogism may be seen in the magnet. In the middle or point of indifference of a magnet, its two poles, however they may be distinguished, are brought into one. Physics also teaches us to see the universal or essence in Nature: and the only difference between it and the Philosophy of Nature is that the latter brings before our mind the adequate forms of the notion in the physical world.

这种推论的形式,是一切事物的普遍形式。因为一切事物都是将普遍与个别结合起来的特殊。但自然软弱无力使得它自身不能纯粹表述出逻辑的形式。自然在推论上的软弱无力,可以用磁力的例子来证明。磁针的中间或无差异点,把它的两极结合起来,这两极虽说彼此有差别,但直接地就被磁针结合为一。物理学也可教我们从自然中认识共性或本质,物理学与自然哲学的区别,只在于自然哲学能够使我们认识到自然事物的概念的真正形式。

It will now be understood that Logic is the all-animating spirit of all the sciences, and its categories the spiritual hierarchy. They are the heart and centre of things: and yet at the same time they are always on our lips, and, apparently at least, perfectly familiar objects. But things thus familiar are usually the greatest strangers. Being, for example, is a category of pure thought: but to make 'is' an object of investigation never occurs to us. Common fancy puts the Absolute far away in a world beyond. The Absolute is rather directly before us, so present that so long as we think, we must, though without express consciousness of it, always carry it with us and always use it. Language is the main depository of these types of thought; and one use of the grammatical instruction which children receive is unconsciously to turn their attention to distinctions of thought.

由此可见,逻辑学是使一切科学生气蓬勃的精神,逻辑学的思维规定是一些纯粹的精神力量。这些思维规定就是事物内在的核心,但是它们同时又是我们常常挂在嘴边的名词,因此又显得是异常熟知的东西。但是这类熟知的东西往往又是我们最无所知的东西。例如,存在就是一纯粹思维规定,但我们平时绝没有想到把存在和“是”作为考察的对象。平时总以为,绝对必远在彼岸,殊不知绝对却正在目前,是我们凡有思想的人所日用而不自知的。所有这类思维的规定大都包含在语言里,所以儿童学习文法的用处,就在于儿童不自觉地注意到人们平日思维中的种种区别。

Logic is usually said to be concerned with forms only and to derive the material for them from elsewhere. But this 'only', which assumes that the logical thoughts are nothing in comparison with the rest of the contents, is not the word to use about forms which are the absolutely real ground of everything. Everything else rather is an 'only' compared with these thoughts. To make such abstract forms a problem presupposes in the inquirer a higher level of culture than ordinary; and to study them in themselves and for their own sake signifies in addition that these thought-types must be deduced out of thought itself, and their truth or reality examined by the light of their own laws. We do not assume them as data from without, and then define them or exhibit their value and authority by comparing them with the shape they take in our minds. If we thus acted, we should proceed from observation and experience, and should, for instance, say we habitually employ the term 'force' in such a case, and such a meaning. A definition like that would be called correct, if it agreed with the conception of its object present in our ordinary state of mind. The defect of this empirical method is that a notion is not defined as it is in and for itself, but in terms of something assumed, which is then used as a criterion and standard of correctness. No such test need be applied: we have merely to let the thought-forms follow the impulse of their own organic life.

人们常说,逻辑只研究形式,而其内容却来自别处。其实,我们可以说,逻辑思想比起一切别的内容来,倒并不只是形式,反之一切别的内容比起逻辑思想来,却只是(缺乏实质的)形式。逻辑思想是一切事物的自在自为地存在着的根据。要有相当高教养的人,才能把他的兴趣指向逻辑的纯粹规定。对这些逻辑的规定加以自在自为的考察,还有一层较深远的意义:我们从思维的本身去推演出这些思维的规定,并且从这些思维规定的本身来判断他们是否是真的。我们并不是从外面把它们袭取而来,并勉强给予定义,也不是把它们拿来与它们出现在我们意识中的形态漫加比较而指出其价值和有效性。因为如果这样做,我们就会从观察和经验出发,如说“力”之所以有效,是由于我们习惯于在某种情形和意义下使用力这个词。如果定义同对象在通常意义下呈现在我们面前的表象相符合,这样的定义也就是正确的。这种经验方法的一个不足之处是,概念的规定,不是按照它自在自为的本质,而是按照一个(外在的)前提,这一前提将会成为判断这一概念正确与否的标准和尺度。但是在逻辑学范围内,我们用不着这类外在的标准,而只须让那本身活泼自如的思维规定循着他们自己的进程逐步发展。

To ask if a category is true or not, must sound strange to the ordinary mind: for a category apparently becomes true only when it is applied to a given object, and apart from this application it would seem meaningless to inquire into the truth. But this is the very question on which every thing turns. We must however in the first place understand clearly what we mean by Truth. In common life truth means the agreement of an object with our conception of it. We thus presuppose an object to which our conception must conform. In the philosophical sense of the word, on the other hand, truth may be described, in general abstract terms, as the agreement of a thought-content with itself. This meaning is quite different from the one given above. At the same time the deeper and philosophical meaning of truth can be partially traced even in the ordinary usage of language. Thus we speak of a true friend; by which we mean a friend whose manner of conduct accords with the notion of friendship. In the same way we speak of a true work of Art. Untrue in this sense means the same as bad, or self-discordant. In this sense a bad state is an untrue state; and evil and untruth may be said to consist in the contradiction subsisting between the function or notion and the existence of the object. Of such a bad object we may form a correct representation, but the import of such representation is inherently false. Of these correctnesses, which are at the same time untruths, we may have many in our heads. God alone is the thorough harmony of notion and reality. All finite things involve an untruth: they have a notion and an existence, but their existence does not meet the requirements of the notion. For this reason they must perish, and then the incompatibility between their notion and their existence becomes manifest. It is in the kind that the individual animal has its notion; and the kind liberates itself from this individuality by death.

在一般意识中,很少出现关于思想规定是真或不真的问题。因为,思想规定只有应用在一些对象的过程中,才能获得其真理性,因此,离开其应用过程来问思想规定的真或不真这一问题,似乎没有什么意义。但关于思想规定真或不真的疑问,是解答其他问题的关键。我们首先知道,要如何来理解真理。通常我们总是认为,真理就是我们的表象和其对象相符合。这种说法预先假定了一个对象,要求我们的表象去和它符合。但反之,从哲学的意义上来看,概括地抽象地来讲,真理就是思想的内容与其自身的符合。这种看法和刚才所说的那种看法完全不同。但同时,即使是在平常习用的言语中,也部分地有一些较深的(哲学)意义的真理。比如,我们常说一个真朋友,是指一个朋友的言行态度能够符合友谊的概念。同样,我们也常说一件真的艺术品,在这个意义下,不真的就是相当的不好,或自己不符合自己本身。一个不好的政府就是不真的政府。一般说来,不好与不真都是由于一个对象的规定或概念与其实际存在之间发生了矛盾。对于这种不好的对象,我们当然能够得到一个正确的观念或表象,但这种观念的内容却不是真的。像这样正确的同时又是不真的观念,在我们脑子里可以有很多。唯有上帝才是概念与实在的真正符合,但一切有限事物,自在地都具有一种不真实性,因为凡物都有概念,有存在,而其存在总不能与概念相符合。因此,所有有限事物皆不免于毁灭,而其概念与存在之间的不符合,都由此表现出来。个别动物的概念就是它的类,个别动物的死亡,类也就从其个别性中解脱出来。

The study of truth, or, as it is here explained to mean, consistency, constitutes the proper problem of logic. In our everyday mind we are never troubled with questions about the truth of the forms of thought. We may also express the problem of logic by saying that it examines the forms of thought touching their capability to hold truth. And the question comes to this: What are the forms of the infinite, and what are the forms of the finite? Usually no suspicion attaches to the finite forms of thought; they are allowed to pass unquestioned. But it is from conforming to finite categories in thought and action that all deception originates.

在刚才所解释的意义下,把真理认作是自身的符合,构成逻辑学的真正兴趣。因为在通常意识里,关于思维规定的真理问题就完全不会发生。逻辑学的职责在于考察思维规定把握真理的能力和限度。问题归结在这里:什么是无限事物的形式?什么是有限事物的形式?在通常意识中,我们对于有限的思维形式从来没有怀疑过,而是任其无条件地通行有效。但按照有限的规定去思维和行动,就是导致一切幻觉和错误后果的根源。

0

阅读 评论 收藏 禁止转载 喜欢 打印举报/Report
  • 评论加载中,请稍候...
发评论

    发评论

    以上网友发言只代表其个人观点,不代表新浪网的观点或立场。

      

    新浪BLOG意见反馈留言板 电话:4000520066 提示音后按1键(按当地市话标准计费) 欢迎批评指正

    新浪简介 | About Sina | 广告服务 | 联系我们 | 招聘信息 | 网站律师 | SINA English | 会员注册 | 产品答疑

    新浪公司 版权所有