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113.精读《小逻辑》笔记11——初步规定第19节

(2011-04-15 21:06:30)
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黑格尔

小逻辑

初步规定

笔记

杂谈

分类: 杂读笔记(钱先生指示)

113.精读《小逻辑》笔记11——初步规定第19节

 

此节开始,进入“逻辑学的初步规定”部分,这一节可以看成这一大篇的引言。引入,逻辑学的研究对象:真理。而对于逻辑学的能力,却有不同的设想。本序言中,还探讨了对真理的不同态度。这些都是引入逻辑学的开端。

 

§19

Logic is the science of the pure Idea; pure, that is, because the Idea is in the abstract medium of Thought.

逻辑学是研究纯粹理念的科学,所谓纯粹,就是指,思维是由最抽象的要素所形成的理念。

This definition, and the others which occur in these introductory outlines, are derived from a survey of the whole system, to which accordingly they are subsequent. The same remark applies to all prefatory notions whatever about philosophy.

这一概念,同导言提纲中的其他概念一样,都来源于对整个系统的考察,对于系统来说,它们都是派生的东西。所有哲学的序言概念,都是由同样的方法得到的。

Logic might have been defined as the science of thought, and of its laws and characteristic forms. But thought, as thought, constitutes only the general medium, or qualifying circumstance, which renders the Idea distinctively logical. If we identify the Idea with thought, thought must not be taken in the sense of a method or form, but in the sense of the self-developing totality of its laws and peculiar terms. These laws are the work of thought itself, and not a fact which it finds and must submit to.

我们已经知道,逻辑学是研究思维及其规定、规律的科学。但是思维作为思维,构成理念成为逻辑理念的普遍规定性或要素。若要区分理念和思维,思维一定不会被认为是某种方式或形式,而应被看作是,其特有的规定和规律自身发展而成的全体。这些规定和规律,是思维自身给予的,而不是已经存在于思维之外的现成的事物。

From different points of view, Logic is either the hardest or the easiest of the sciences. Logic is hard, because it has to deal not with perceptions, nor, like geometry, with abstract representations of the senses, but with the pure abstractions; and because it demands a force and facility of withdrawing into pure thought, of keeping firm hold on it, and of moving in such an element. Logic is easy, because its facts are nothing but our own thought and its familiar forms or terms: and these are the acme of simplicity, the ABC of everything else. They are also what we are best acquainted with: such as 'is' and 'is not’; quality and magnitude; being potential and being actual; one, many, and so on. But such an acquaintance only adds to the difficulties of the study; for while, on the one hand, we naturally think it is not worth our trouble to occupy ourselves any longer with things so familiar, on the other hand, the problem is to become acquainted with them in a new way, quite opposite to that in which we know them already.

从不同的角度看,逻辑学要么是最难、要么是最简单的科学。说哲学是最难的科学,其原因在于:其所处理的对象不是直观,也不是具有抽象感觉图形的几何学,而是纯粹抽象的东西。它需要具备回归抽象的力量和能力,紧紧抓住纯粹思想,并在纯粹思想中运动。说逻辑学是最简单的科学,其原因在于:其内容不是别的,而是我们自己的思维,以及思维熟习的规定。这些规定是最简单最初步的,而且也是人人熟知的,例如:有与无、质与量、自在存在和自为存在,一与多等。但恰恰是这种熟知性加重了逻辑研究的困难,因为,一方面,我们不值得费力气去研究这些熟习的东西;另一方面,逻辑学研究这些熟习的东西时,所采取的方式,同人们已经熟习的方式不同,甚至相反。

The utility of Logic is a matter which concerns its bearings upon the student, and the training it may give for other purposes. This logical training consists in the exercise in thinking which the student has to go through (this science is the thinking of thinking): and in the fact that he stores his head with thoughts, in their native unalloyed character. It is true that Logic, being the absolute form of truth, and another name for the very truth itself, is something more than merely useful. Yet if what is noblest, most liberal, and most independent is also most useful, Logic has some claim to the latter character. Its utility must then be estimated at another rate than exercise in thought for the sake of the exercise.

逻辑学有用与否,取决于学习和寻求它的人付出了多少辛劳。学习逻辑学在于训练思维,在于得到真正纯粹的思想,因为逻辑学乃是关于思维的思维。就其作为真理的绝对形式来说,尤其是作为纯粹真理本身来说,逻辑学绝不仅仅是某种有用的东西。然而如果说最高尚、最自由和最独立的东西就是最有用的东西,那么逻辑学就是有用的。但是逻辑学的用处,却不仅仅在于其对思维的训练上,而必须在另一层面上加以估价。

(1)The first question is: What is the object of our science? The simplest and most intelligible answer to this question is that Truth is the object of Logic. Truth is a noble word, and the thing is nobler still. So long as man is sound at heart and in spirit, the search for truth must awake all the enthusiasm of his nature. But immediately there steps in the objection——are we able to know truth? There seems to be a disproportion between finite beings like ourselves and the truth which is absolute, and doubts suggest themselves whether there is any bridge between the finite and the infinite. God is truth: how shall we know Him? Such an undertaking appears to stand in contradiction with the graces of lowliness and humility. Others who ask whether we can know the truth have a different purpose. They want to justify themselves in living on contented with their petty, finite aims. And humility of this stamp is a poor thing.

(1)第一个问题是,逻辑学的对象是什么?对这一问题最简单最明了的答复是:逻辑学的对象是真理。真理是一个高尚的名词,而其实质更为高尚。只要一个人的智力和心理是健康的,那么对真理的追求一定能够唤起他心中高度的热忱。但这里马上会出现一个疑问:我们是否有能力认识真理?有限的人和绝对的真理之间,似乎存在着某种不协调,这自然会引起一个问题:有限和无限时间是否存在着桥梁?上帝是真理,那么我们如何才能认识他?这种求索,似乎同谦虚和谦虚的美德正相违反。另一些人在自问是否能认识真理的时候,有另一个目的:为他们留恋于平庸的有限目的的生活做辩解。这种的谦卑没什么可取之处。

But the time is past when people asked: How shall I, a poor worm of the dust, be able to know the truth? And in its stead we find vanity and conceit: people claim, without any trouble on their part, to breathe the very atmosphere of truth. The young have been flattered into the belief that they possess a natural birthright of moral and religious truth. And in the same strain, those of riper years are declared to be sunk, petrified ossified in falsehood. Youth, say these teachers, sees the bright light of dawn: but the older generation lies in the slough and mire of the common day. They admit that the special sciences are something that certainly ought to be cultivated, but merely as the means to satisfy the needs of outer life. In all this it is not humility which holds back from the knowledge and study of the truth, but a conviction that we are already in full possession of it. And no doubt the young carry with them the hopes of their elder compeers; on them rests the advance of the world and science. But these hopes are set upon the young, only on the condition that, instead of remaining as they are, they undertake the stern labor of mind.

但说“像我这种尘世的可怜虫,怎么能认识真理呢?”这种话的时代已经过去了。代之而起的,是另一种诞妄和虚骄:有人宣称,他们直接呼吸于真理之中。青年人也被这种虚骄所鼓动,相信他们一生下来就现成地具有宗教和伦理的真理。基于同样的观点,认为,所有的成年人都堕落、麻木、僵化于虚妄谬误中。这些教师爷称,青年人所见的有似朝霞辉映,而老辈人则陷入白日的沼泽与泥泞中。他们承认,特殊部门的科学无疑需要探讨的,但它们却只是达到生活外在目的的工具。现在,对真理的认识与研究形成妨碍的,已经不是前面所说的卑谦,而是认为已经得到真理的自诩。毫无疑问,青年人承担了老辈人的期待,他们承负着促进世界和科学进展的希望。但这些期待和希望建立在以下基础上:青年人不能停滞和自满,而应该担负起精神上严肃而艰苦的工作。

This modesty in truth-seeking has still another phase: and that is the genteel indifference to truth, as we see it in Pilate's conversation with Christ. Pilate asked ‘What is truth?’ with the air of a man who had settled accounts with everything long ago, and concluded that nothing particularly matters——he meant much the same as Solomon when he says: ‘All is vanity’. When it comes to this, nothing is left but self-conceit.

真理的谦逊还有一种反对观点:正如我们在Pilate对基督教的态度中所看到的,这是一种对真理的贵族式的漠视。Pilate问“真理是个什么东西?”意思是说,一切还不是那么回事,没有什么东西是有意义的——他的意思和Solomon所谓 “一切都是虚幻”的意思相近。这样一来,就只剩下主观虚幻了。

The knowledge of the truth meets an additional obstacle in timidity. A slothful mind finds it natural to say: 'Don't let it be supposed that we mean to be in earnest with our philosophy. We shall be glad inter alia to study Logic: but Logic must be sure to leave us as we were before.’ People have a feeling that, if thinking passes the ordinary range of our ideas and impressions, it cannot but be on the evil road. They seem to be trusting themselves to a sea on which they will be tossed to and fro by the waves of thought, till at length they again reach the sandbank of this temporal scene, as utterly poor as when they left it. What comes of such a view, we see in the world. It is possible within these limits to gain varied information and many accomplishments, to become a master of official routine, and to be trained for special purposes. But it is quite another thing to educate the spirit for the higher life and to devote our energies to its service. In our own day it may be hoped a longing for something better has sprung up among the young, so that they will not be contented with the mere straw of outer knowledge.

还有一种畏缩也足以阻碍对真理的探索。心灵懒散的人易于这样说:“不要觉得我们对哲学的研究是认真的,我们自然乐意去学一下逻辑学,但学了逻辑学,我们还不是那样。”这些人认为,一旦思维超出了日常表象的范围,就会走上一条邪恶的路。好像任他们的思想漂浮在海洋上,被思维的海浪抛来抛去,末了还是回到现世的沙岸,同最初离开沙岸的时候一样毫无所得。这种看法的后果如何,我们在世界中可以看得出来。我们可以学习到许多知识和技能,可以成为循例办公的人员,也可以被训练成为达致一定目的的专门技术人员。但是,培养自己的精神,努力从事于高尚神圣的事业,却是另一回事。我们可以希望,这个时代的青年,内心中激起对更高尚神圣事物的渴求,而不会仅仅满足于外在知识的草芥。

(2)It is universally agreed that thought is the object of Logic. But of thought our estimate may be very mean, or it may be very high. On one hand, people say: ‘It is only a thought.’ In their view thought is subjective, arbitrary and accidental——distinguished from the thing itself, from the true and the real. On the other hand, a very high estimate may be formed of thought; when thought alone is held adequate to attain the highest of all things, the nature of God, of which the senses can tell us nothing. God is a spirit, it is said, and must be worshipped in spirit and in truth. But the merely felt and sensible, we admit, is not the spiritual; its heart of hearts is in thought; and only spirit can know spirit. And though it is true that spirit can demean itself as feeling and sense——as is the case in religion, the mere feeling, as a mode of consciousness, is one thing, and its contents another. Feeling, as feeling, is the general form of the sensuous nature which we have in common with the brutes. This form, viz. feeling, may possibly seize and appropriate the full organic truth: but the form has no real congruity with its contents. The form of feeling is the lowest in which spiritual truth can be expressed. The world of spiritual existences, God himself, exists in proper truth, only in thought and as thought. If this be so, therefore, thought, far from being a mere thought, is the highest and, in strict accuracy, the sole mode of apprehending the eternal and absolute.

(2)人人都赞同说逻辑的对象是思维。但人们对思维的估价,可以很低,也可以很高。一方面,我们说“这不过是个思想而已”。意思是说,思想是主观的、任意的、偶然的,而不是实质,不是真实的和现实的。另一方面,对思想可能会估价很高,认为,只有思想才能达到对至高无上的存在、上帝之性质的认识,而感觉却是达不到的。我们承认,上帝是一种精神,也务必在精神和真理中去崇拜他。我们也承认,可感觉到的或感性的东西并不是精神的,而精神的内在核心是思想,并且只有精神才能认识精神。精神诚然也可表现其自身为感觉(例如在宗教中),但感觉,其形式是一回事,而其内容又是一回事。感觉作为感觉,是一切感性事物的形式,这是人类和禽兽所共有的。感觉的形式也许可以把握具体的内容,但是形式却有区别于内容。感觉的形式是达到精神内容的最低形式。精神的内容、上帝本身,只有在思维中,或作为思维时,才有其真理性。在此种意义下,思想不仅仅是思想,而且是把握永恒和绝对存在的最高方式,严格地说来,是唯一方式。

As of thought, so also of the science of thought, a very high or a very low opinion may be formed. Any man, it is supposed, can think without Logic, as he can digest without studying physiology. If he have studied Logic, he thinks afterwards as he did before, perhaps more methodically, but with little alteration. If this were all, and if Logic did no more than make men acquainted with the action of thought as the faculty of comparison and classification, it would produce nothing which had not been done quite as well before. And in point of fact Logic hitherto had no other idea of its duty than this. Yet to be well informed about thought, even as a mere activity of the subject-mind, is honorable and interesting for man. It is in knowing what he is and what he does that man is distinguished from the brutes. But we may take the higher estimate of thought——as what alone can get really in touch with the supreme and true. In that case, Logic as the science of thought occupies a high ground. If the science of Logic then considers thought in its action and its productions (and thought being no resultless energy produces thoughts and the particular thought required), the theme of Logic is in general the supersensible world, and to deal with that theme is to dwell for a while in that world. Mathematics is concerned with the abstractions of time and space. But these are still the object of sense, although the sensible is abstract and idealized. Thought bids adieu even to this last and abstract sensible: it asserts its own native independence, renounces the field of the external and internal sense, and puts away the interests and inclinations of the individual. When Logic takes this ground, it is a higher science than we are in the habit of supposing.

以思维为对象的科学,也和思维一样,人们可以有很高或很低的估价。有人认为,每个人不需要学习逻辑就能思考,正如无须学习生理学就能消化一样。即使研究了逻辑之后,人的思想仍不过与以前一样,虽然也许更有方法一些,但不会有多大的变化。如果除了使人仅仅熟习于形式思维的活动(对照和分类)外,没有别的任务,那么逻辑将不会带来什么新的东西。实际上,旧的逻辑也只有这个地位。然而,即使仅仅是单纯的主观活动,对人来说,也是很光荣而有兴趣的事。因为人之所以异于禽兽之处就在于人能知道他是什么及他在做什么。而且,逻辑是唯一能够体验真理和最高存在的活动,我们也应该对逻辑给予更高的估价。这种情况下,逻辑作为研究思维的科学,占有很高的地位。如果逻辑科学研究思维活动及其产物(思维并不是没有内容的活动,因为思维能够产生思想,而且能产生其所需的特定思想),那么逻辑的内容一般讲来,乃是超感官的世界,而探讨这超感官的世界的同时也是遨游在超感官的世界。数学关注抽象的时间和空间,尽管这些时间和空间是抽象的和理想化的,但它们还只是感觉的对象。思维甚至进一步脱离这种最后的感性的东西,自由自在、舍弃外在和内在的感觉,排斥一切特殊的兴趣和倾向。一旦逻辑学具有这样的基础,它就比通常我们所看法中科学的地位高。

(3)The necessity of understanding Logic in a deeper sense than as the science of the mere form of thought is enforced by the interests of religion and politics, of law and morality. In earlier days men meant no harm by thinking: they thought away freely and fearlessly. They thought about God, about Nature, and the State; and they felt sure that a knowledge of the truth was obtainable through thought only, and not through the senses or any random ideas or opinions. But while they so thought, the principal ordinances of life began to be seriously affected by their conclusions. Thought deprived existing institutions of their force. Constitutions fell a victim to thought: religion was assailed by thought: firm religious beliefs which had been always looked upon as revelations were undermined, and in many minds the old faith was upset. The Greek philosophers, for example, became antagonists of the old religion, and destroyed its beliefs. Philosophers were accordingly banished or put to death, as revolutionists who had subverted religion and the state, two things which were inseparable. Thought, in short, made itself a power in the real world, and exercised enormous influence. The matter ended by drawing attention to the influence of thought, and its claims were submitted to a more rigorous scrutiny, by which the world professed to find that thought arrogated too much and was unable to perform what it had undertaken It had not——people said——learned the real being of God, of Nature and Mind. It had not learned what the truth was. What it had done was to overthrow religion and the state It became urgent therefore to justify thought, with reference to the results it had produced: and it is this examination into the nature of thought and this justification which in recent times has constituted one of the main problems of philosophy.

逻辑学比单纯形式思维的科学有更高的思维能力,这种认识由于宗教、政治、法律、伦理各方面的兴趣而强化了。从前人们都以为思想是无足轻重的,不妨放任于新鲜大胆的思想。他们思考上帝、自然和国家,他们深信只是通过思想,人就能认识到真理是什么,而这些东西,是不能够通过感官,或者通过偶然的表象和意见所能达到。当他们这样思想时,思想的结果渐渐严重影响到现世生活的最高原则。传统的典章制度皆因思想的行动而失去了权威,国家的宪章成为思想的牺牲品,宗教受到了思想的打击:摧毁了许多向来被认作是天启的坚固的宗教观念,动摇了传统宗教在许多人心中的地位。例如在希腊,哲学家反对旧式宗教,因此摧毁了对旧式宗教的信仰。因此也就有一些哲学家因为摧毁宗教而动摇政治,而被驱逐或处死,而宗教和政治在本质上是联系在一起的。简单地说,思维成为现实世界中一种力量,禅城了极大的影响。于是人们开始注意到思维的威力,进而仔细考察思维的权能,想要发现,思维自诩甚高,未能完成其所担负的工作。思维不但不能认识上帝、自然和精神的本质,总而言之,不但未能认识真理,反而推翻了政府和宗教。因此亟须对思维的效果或效用加以辩护,所以考察思维的本性、维护思维的权能,构成了近代哲学的兴趣。

 

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