What India wants

Begin with two countries that are allied with each other's nuclear adversaries. They spent the Cold War in opposite camps, one emerging as the free world and the other rallying a "nonaligned" movement against superpower politics. The two have bickered over nonproliferation issues for 30 years, one trying to preserve the status quo, the other challenging what it derided as "nuclear apartheid."

Is this the basis for a beautiful strategic partnership or what?

The Bush administration has come to believe that it is. Indeed, during the last five years, the administration has gradually lifted sanctions on dual-use and military sales and permitted security cooperation with Delhi, reversing a host of policies imposed in the wake of India's 1998 nuclear tests. This under-the-radar courtship culminated in July 2005 with the so-called "nuclear deal," under which the U.S. will support India's civilian nuclear program. With this step, the White House exponentially increased its strategic bet.

The nuclear deal also touched a nerve of opposition to this radical departure from longstanding policy. As the administration went to Congress for the approvals needed for the nuclear deal, a variety of voices, including senior statesmen like former President Carter and former Sen. Sam Nunn, weighed in against the passing of U.S. nuclear technology to India.

On the presumption that one should never share fissile material with strangers, I visited India earlier this year to see how this strategic partnership is shaping up on the ground.

The timing of my trip was lucky: I arrived as India was publicly debating whether to support a U.S.-led effort to refer Iran's nuclear program to the U.N. Security Council. India has longstanding ties to the Islamic Republic and many Indians questioned whether it was a good idea to abandon a fellow nonaligned government. Conversely, for American skeptics, India's alliance with Iran was clear evidence that Delhi cannot be trusted. When U.S. Ambassador David Mulford warned — accurately, albeit undiplomatically — that India's failure to cooperate on Iran would be "devastating" for the nuclear deal, Indian pundits exploded into criticism of American interference.

In principle, my first stop in Delhi was the perfect venue to discuss the question of how to square India's longstanding ties to Iran with its new strategic partnership with the U.S. The Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses, an elite foreign-ministry-funded think tank, was holding its annual Asian Security Conference on India's relations with the Middle East, or in deference to the local nomenclature, "Southwest Asia." I would see Indians talking to Indians, not performing for an American audience.

Alas, my hopes for a nuanced discussion of India's emerging security strategy, or indeed any other issue, were immediately dashed. Early speakers set the tone for the conference when they declared that U.S. efforts to "dominate" the region had done "no good and much harm" and presented India with "a choice between harmony and hegemony" in international relations. Later speakers would alternate between lambasting America's Middle East policy as oil-grubbing and defending India's relationships with such countries as Sudan and Iran as necessary in the face of Washington's efforts to "squeeze India out" of the global energy market. Not the sort of stuff the Bush administration has been touting.

But as the conference wrapped up — and as my despair peaked — one of the organizers took me aside and said: "Ignore everything you've just heard." He explained that although Indians criticize the U.S. and the Singh government, they privately support closer relations with Washington. Indian intellectuals would require more time before they could break free of vestigial mistrust of America and embrace an emerging strategic partnership.

While it initially sounded as though he was apologizing to a dinner guest who had been insulted, the more time passed, the more I saw his point.

PERCEPTION GAP

In both capitals, the public debate on U.S.-Indian relations is too often obsessed with the bogeymen of the past. Whether it is the fear that India can only be developing ballistic capabilities in order to target the U.S., or apprehension that the current nuclear deal is just another Yankee ploy to undermine India's strategic ambitions, public, political dialogue — what bureaucrats call "track two" — this is has not caught up to the "track one" diplomatic agreements between the two capitals.

This perception gap is dangerous because it creates political pressures to limit the scope of a strategic partnership that's barely begun, and which may unravel the progress of the last five years. As one Indian diplomat warned when I asked about the cost of failure to carry out the nuclear deal: "Anybody who expects that, if this deal doesn't go through, then the morning after will be the same as the day before, will be wrong. ... The next time there is a tsunami disaster, we might not take your call."

In sum, it is more than possible to destroy the potential of the partnership, and destroy it fairly quickly. This is because the partnership is starting from a weak position: Although officials in Washington and Delhi recognize the necessity for greater cooperation, there have been no major "deliverables" that skeptics would demand in exchange for closer ties.

Indeed, a near-term focus is the major source of confusion in Washington and Delhi; witness the proliferation of litmus tests and ultimatums. This U.S.-Indian relationship should not be judged in terms of immediate deliverables, but the gradual convergence of national interests. This is the essence of former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's characterization of the U.S. and India as "natural allies." Although there are strong reasons for the relationship to come to fruition, it can only occur with concerted, sustained effort.

Trends indicate that over the next 20 to 50 years, India will emerge as one of the world's great powers. And the Bush administration believes that as Indian power grows, Delhi will assume greater responsibility for regional and international security. India shares Washington's support of democracy at home and abroad, opposition to international terrorism and concerns about the security of the sea lines of communication upon which the world economy depends. Philip Zelikow, the State Department official who has been one of the key architects of the Bush administration policy, said the goal is "to help India become a major world power in the 21st century."

Bharat Verma, publisher of Indian Defense Review, explained the Indian view of partnership to me: "We won't hand over strategic autonomy to anyone, but our strategic autonomy does not conflict with American interests."

But just because India's rise will not conflict with American interests does not mean there won't be differing priorities or diverging perceptions. Thus, the challenge for American strategists is to shape India's understanding of its own power, of its own growing strategic interests, of its role in the world. An essential means will be to tie U.S.-Indian cooperation into those fields where India's abilities are growing most rapidly.

DEFENSE INDUSTRY DILEMMA

Some of these possibilities for cooperation — as well as the challenges —were on display when I visited the 2006 Indian Defense Expo, jointly organized by the Ministry of Defense and the Confederation of Indian Industry. India is the largest arms importer in the developing world, purchasing some $15 billion in weapons every year, a figure expected to rise to $50 billion by 2015. India inked deals on $5.7 billion in arms imports last year, almost twice as much as the next largest importer, Saudi Arabia ($2.7 billion) and significantly more than China ($2.2 billion).

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